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MESSAGE AS MEDIUM IN SIERRA LEONE
Diane Marie Amann"
We attacked everybody.
We feared nobody.
We were very bold.
Everybody is knowing our tempers.
This virtual haiku of war comes from a fellow named Josep Sonah, whom
a Boston Globe report described as a nineteen-year-old veteran of the Sierra
Leone civil war.' Sonah's four statements reflect the reasons that the nearly
decade-old war in Sierra Leone has become notorious among armed conflicts.
We attacked everybody: The campaign, particularly that of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the most significant of several rebel groups,
was a campaign of terror against civilians. It included arson, mutilation, and
summary executions. An estimated 20,000 persons were abducted, and many
have never been returned to their homes. Some were impressed into labor,
others used as human shields. There were systematic rapes, numbering in the
thousands, of girls as young as five, women as old as seventy-five. The
displacement of a million people, one-quarter of the country's population. And
the hallmark of this conflict, the chopping off of the hands of those said to have
cast votes for President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 1996.2
We were very bold: Sierra Leone is known for the use of child soldiers,
many of whom also were child victims. Estimates of the number of child
soldiers range between 5,000 and 10,000. One-tenth of the rebels who waged
a devastating assault on Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, in January 1999 are
believed to have been children. Children were recruited by both sides of the
conflict, by pro-government militias and by rebels. At nineteen, Josep Sonah
* Professor of Law, Universityof California, Davis; B.S., 1979, Universityof Illinois;M.A., 1981,
University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1986, Northwestern University. I wish to thank Gwen K. Young
for invaluable research assistance. These remarks were presented as part of a panel on United Nations
intervention at the October 2000 International Law Weekend in New York.
1. See Colin Nickerson, Albright to See Peace's High Price in Sierra Leone, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
18, 1999, at Al.
2. On these atrocities, see generally U.S. Dep't of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, Sierra Leone, Feb. 25, 2000, § 1, at http://www.state.gov/www/
global/hu...ghts/1999_hrp-reportsierrle.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Country
Report]; Douglas Farah, A War Against Women, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2000, at AO1; Norimitsu Onishi, In
Looted Home In Sierra Leone, A Rebel Riddle, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at A l [hereinafter Onishi, Looted
Home].
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was an old soldier. Children as young as seven served in combat. Some came
to fight out of desperation or disaffection, but remained because of terror and
drugging. Others were kidnapped and forced into service. Many had no choice
but to stay because they had RUF tattoos, and their families would not take
them back.3
Everybody is knowing our tempers: Sierra Leone is also unsettling in that
there appears to be little explanation for the longevity and brutality of the war.
The conflict appears to have no source in, for instance, ethnic or religious
division. The RUF and other rebel groups lack both ideology and popular
support. They simply exploit alienation among young people, and then enforce
continued service through intimidation. Their motivations appear to be to
continue to profit from illegal diamond trading, and to continue to experience
the joy of doing evil.'
We feared nobody: Sierra Leone is notorious for giving amnesty to the
people who did these things. Amnesty was granted not once, but twice: first in
1996, in talks at Abidjan, C6te d'Ivoire, and again in 1999, at Lom6, Togo.5
Recently I have been studying expressive theories of law, and I find them
very helpful in considering events in Sierra Leone. Expressive theories look not
so much at whether a law deters or whether a law punishes, but at the message
we get from a law. The message understood, rather than the message intended,
is critical. Expressivism tells us that a harmful message in itself causes harm;
therefore, when we evaluate whether an action done was good or bad, we should
look at the message that the action was understood to convey.6 I am going to
do that now, looking first at the Lomd Agreement and then at the post-Lom6
proposal for a Special Court for Sierra Leone.
3. On child soldiers, see generally Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, in AFRICAN GUERRILLAS 172, 173 (Christopher Clapham ed., 1998); Sierra Leone
Country Report, supra note 2, § 5; Amnesty International, Annual Report 2000: Sierra Leone, at
httpJ/www.web.anesty.orglweb/ar2...0d6fc802568f200 0552966!Open Document (last visited Oct. 19,
2000).
4. See generally, e.g., Abdullah & Muana, supra note 3, at 172-93; Sierra Leone Country Report,
supra note 2, § 5; Barbara Crossette, Sierra Leone Rebel Leader Reportedly Smuggled Gems, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2000, at 14 § 1. The United Nations Security Council banned trade in Sierra Leone diamonds in July
2000. See S.C. Res. 1306, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., pmbl. & para. 12, U.N. Doc. S/Resl1306 (2000).
5. See ECOWAS: Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) - Lomd, July 7, 1999, reprinted in I I AFR. J. INT'L
& COMP. L 557 (1999) [hereinafter LomE Agreement]; Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) - Abidjan, Nov. 20, 1996, reprinted
in 9 APR. J. INT'L & CoMP. L 414 (1997) (hereinafter Abidjan Accord].
6. On expressivism, see generally, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L REV. 1503 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L REV. 413 (1999).
Preceding the Lomd Agreement were eight years of civil war, peppered
with coups d'dtat. At one point, in March 1996, Sierra Leoneans chose Kabbah,
a lawyer and former United Nations Development Program official, to be the
first democratically elected President in thirty years. Kabbah immediately
negotiated a ceasefire with Foday Saybana Sankoh, the leader of the RUF. On
November 30, 1996, the two signed a peace agreement, known as the Abidjan
Accord.7
The Abidjan Accord promised an end to the fighting, followed by
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants into Sierra
Leonean society. Numerous agencies, among them a Demobilization and
Resettlement Committee, a Socio-Economic Forum, and a National
Commission on Human Rights, were to be established to coordinate
reconstruction. Political prisoners and prisoners of war were to be released.
The RUF was to begin functioning as a legitimate political movement, and all
its soldiers were to enjoy amnesty:
To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national
reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no
official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL
in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as
members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this
Agreement.8
The RUF failed to meet disarmament deadlines, and the Abidjan Accord soon
foundered. Low-ranking members of the military staged a coup in May 1997.
Nigerian-led troops, organized under the auspices of the Economic Community
of Western African States (ECOWAS), deposed that junta in February 1998.
President Kabbah, who had been in exile in neighboring Guinea, resumed
power.9
In January 1999, the RUF waged a destructive attack on Freetown that
resulted in 6,500 dead, thousands kidnapped or maimed, and tens or hundreds
of thousands left homeless. ECOWAS troops again drove the rebels back.
Eventually Sankoh, a prisoner condemned to death for treason against Sierra
7. On these events, see Sierra Leone Country Report, supra note 2, at intro.; Norimitsu Onishi &
Jane Perlez, How U.S. Left Sierra Leone Tangled in a Curious Web, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2000, at 6 § 1; James
Rupert, Civilian Rule Overturned in Sierra Leone, WASH. PosT, May 26, 1997, at A21 (hereinafter Rupert,
Civilian Rule]. For specific provisions discussed infra, see Abidjan Accord, supra note 5.
8. Abidjan Accord, supra note 5, at art. 14.
9. On these events, see Sierra Leone Country Report, supra note 2, at intro.; James Rupert, Sierra
Leone Junta Leader Refuses to Abdicate Power, WASH. PosT, Aug. 1, 1997, at A23; Rupert, Civilian Rule,
supra note 7. See generally Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore
Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. L
REV. 321 (1998) (questioning the legality of the Nigerian-led action).
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Leone, was brought to Lomd, where he and the government again signed a
ceasefire in May 1999. Peace talks continued there, culminating six weeks later
in the Lom6 Agreement. 0
In many respects the Lomd Agreement resembled the Abidjan Accord. It
too promised disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and included
speedy timetables for this process. It included even more sweeping plans for
reconstruction, among them victims' and refugees' programs, educational
institutions, a Human Rights Commission, a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, a National Election Commission, and a Constitutional Review
Committee. It also talked about transforming the RUF from a political
movement into a political party.
It spoke as well about amnesty. Again, unnamed combatants and
collaborators received pardons for their pre-Lomd actions. Then the Lom6
Agreement took a remarkable turn, granting the following, by name, to RUF
leader Sankoh: "In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the
Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal
Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.""
The Lomd Agreement did not just free Sankoh from liability. It rewarded
him, appointing Sankoh, by name, chairman of the new Commission for
Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development.
This reputed trafficker in diamonds, Sierra Leone's main source of wealth, was
to oversee the entire industry. Sankoh also was accorded the status of Vice
President of Sierra Leone, answerable only to the President.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan lauded it as "a great step
forward for Sierra Leone.' ' 12 He admitted that the Lom6 pardons were "difficult
to reconcile with the goal of ending the culture of impunity," but suggested that
he had alleviated that problem by addition of what United Nations officials have
variously termed a "proviso," "statement," or "reservation."' 3 I must mention
that although I am certain this addition exists, I have not been able to find it
attached to printed or on-line versions of the Lomd Agreement. The only
evidence I can find is in press reports or in United Nations documents, such as
the following passage, in which Annan reported to the United Nations Security
Council that he had instructed his "Special Representative to enter a reservation
when he signed explicitly stating that, for the United Nations, the amnesty
10. On these events, see Sierra Leone Country Report, supra note 2, at intro. For specific peace
accord provisions discussed, see Lom Agreement, supra note 5.
11. See Lomd Agreement, supra note 5, at art. IX().
12. Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., para. 52, U.N. Doc. S/1999/836 (1999) (hereinafter Seventh Report].
13. See id. para. 7 (calling this addition a "proviso"); id. para. 54 (calling it a "reservation"). See
also S.C. Res. 1315, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (2000) [hereinafter Resolution
1315] (stating that United Nations representative had "appended" a "statement" after "his signature").
cannot cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law."' 4 Thus,
Annan indicated that there was an international way out of the agreement even
as he expressed a preference first to let Sierra Leone try to effect the amnesty.
United States officials maintained that the pardons of Sankoh and others
were essential to the deal, though several of the United States State Department
officials most concerned with human rights and humanitarian issues reportedly
opposed giving Sankoh a government post. The amnesty outraged
nongovernmental organizations; others, however, faulted opponents for holding
Western, privileged viewpoints not suited to the needs of Sierra Leone. 5
Among many people within Sierra Leone, there was resignation."6 An
example is the following quote from sixty-eight-year-old Johnny Crowther. He
had spent half his life savings to build a cement-block house; rebels destroyed
it during the January 1999 attack on Freetown. Eight months later a New York
Times reporter found Crowther breaking what was left of his house into stones
that he could sell. Asked about the amnesty, Crowther said: "We just have to
forget, really, we just have to forget. Nothing else. I have no power. Our
leaders say we must forget. Am I going to refuse our leaders? We just have to
unite together and build the country back up together. Finished, finished, that
is all."' 7
What was the message of Lom6? There was an ostensible message of
reconciliation - admirable expressions, both in the preamble and in the
provisions of the Lom6 Agreement, of desires to move forward, to reconcile,
rebuild, reintegrate. That message, however, was supplanted by the message
that the amnesty provision conveyed. That provision contained a specific and,
14. Seventh Report, supra note 12. para. 7.
15. On these reactions, see, e.g., Onishi & Perlez, supra note 7 (describing various reactions and
listing as objectors Harold Hongju Koh, assistant Secretary of State for human rights; David J. Scheffer,
ambassador at large for war crimes; and Julia V. Taft, assistant Secretary of State for refugees); Remy Ourdan,
La guerre oublide de ia Sierra Leone (3): Le prix de la paix, LE MONDE (Dec. 2, 1999), available at
http:llwww.lemonde.fr/..J0,232,0,seq-2044-32996-QUO,00.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001) (quoting Sierra
Leonean government and United Nations officials as stating that calls for accountability reflected Western
viewpoint); Norimitsu Onishi, Survivors Sadly Say, Yes, Reward the Tormentors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1999,
at A4 (quoting opposing comments from Peter Takirambudde of Human Rights Watch) [hereinafter Onishi,
Survivors].
16. One vocal exception was Abdul Tejan-Cole, a Freetown lawyer, who told a reporter: "The
amnesty, it will not work. And the position of the international community is indefensible. If human rights
are universal values, why give amnesty to those people of whom United Nations leaders like Mary Robinson
say that they have committed 'atrocities worse than in Kosovo?"' Ourdan, supra note 15 (translation by
author). Recently, Tejan-Cole was one of five human rights defenders honored by Human Rights Watch. See
Africa News Service, Human Rights Watch Honors Sierra Leonean Advocate, Nov. 14, 2000, available at
2000 WL 29191915.
17. Onishi, Survivors, supra note 15.
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as far as I can tell, unique grant of pardon to a named individual, Foday Sankoh.
That individual was suspected of the most heinous crimes, of forcing others to
commit unspeakable acts. He had flouted an earlier promise to disarm in
exchange for amnesty. To pardon Sankoh, in that particular context, told the
world that, at least in Sierra-Leone, all talk of the new era of accountability was
just that, just talk. That atrocities will not be punished. That perhaps, if they are
effective enough, atrocities may even be rewarded. The subtextual message
was, the West does not really care, and does not have the political will to do
what really needs to be done in Sierra Leone.
Foday Sankoh, at least, got those messages. With regard to disarmament,
he stalled, he objected, he dissembled, much as after the signing of the Abidjan
Accord. When United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright came to
Freetown to see him, he showed up hours late for the meeting. 8 He made harsh
public statements regarding the post-Lomd process; in dealings with Annan,
however, Sankoh reaffirmed his support for the peace process. 9 Attacks on
civilians resumed in October 1999, just a few months after Lomd, and almost
as soon as Sankoh returned to Freetown. ' By May 2000, as we all know,
everything fell apart. Five hundred United Nations peacekeepers were seized
by the RUF. Sankoh was arrested; nonetheless, peacekeepers remained in RUF
custody for several months before they were released, sometimes by negotiated
agreements and sometimes by commando operations. 2' Disarmament "came to
a standstill," Annan reported in mid-2000, and "the situation in Sierra Leone
remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil war."22
The international community now has a chance to do better. There is a
proposal for a Special Court for Sierra Leone. In June 2000, Sierra Leone wrote
Secretary-General Annan a letter asking for such a court.23 Two months later,
a Security Council resolution instructed the Secretary-General to negotiate an
agreement establishing a Special Court. On October 4, 2000, Annan submitted
18. See Onishi & Perlez, supra note 7.
19. See Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., paras. 6-7, 43, 60, U.N. Doc. S/2000/186 (2000); Second Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/2000/13 (2000).
20. Id. para. 3, 20-21.
21. On events in spring and summer 2000, see Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., paras. 2,56-79, 95, U.N. Doc. S/2000/455 (2000);
Barbara Crossette, U.N. to Establish a War Crimes Panel to Hear Sierra Leone Atrocity Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2000, at A6; John Donnelly & Joe Lauria, UN Peace Efforts on Trial in Africa, BOSTON GLOBE, May
11, 2000, at Al.
22. Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/2000751 (2000).
23. See Resolution 1315, supra note 13, pmbl.
24. Id.
a proposed agreement and draft statute to the Security Council.'5 The proposal,
for a hybrid court that would comprise both international and Sierra Leonean
judges and would apply both international and Sierra Leonean law, is now under
consideration.
The contents of the draft statute address the four notorious features of the
Sierra Leone civil war that I mentioned at the outset. Respecting the campaign
of terror against civilians, the statute would set up a unit to address the needs of
victims and witnesses. It would require the court to balance a defendant's fair-
trial rights against the needs for protection of victims and witnesses. It calls for
judges, investigators, and other staff who are trained in issues related to juvenile
justice and sexual violence. It includes three articles that would permit
prosecution for international crimes; specifically, Article 2 relating to crimes
against humanity; Article 3 relating to violations of the law of internal armed
conflict; and Article 4 relating to other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. With regard to the violence that women suffered during the
conflict, two of the international articles specifically allow prosecution for rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and all other sexual
violence. Furthermore, Article 5, which covers Sierra Leonean law, permits
prosecution for certain abuses and kidnappings of girls.
With regard to the phenomenon of child soldiers and child victims, the
statute has two approaches. First of all, it permits prosecution not only for
abuse of girls, as mentioned above, but also for conscription of children under
fifteen for use in combat. Second, and most notably, the statute provides for a
Juvenile Chamber to prosecute child soldiers. This decision posed a "moral
dilemma," according to the Secretary-General's report, between the desire of the
people of Sierra Leone to call war criminals to account regardless of age and the
concern of human rights organizations that prosecution would undercut
rehabilitation.2 Annan said that the proposed statutory language aimed to
balance these concerns, should the Council, "weighing in the moral-education
message to the present and next generation of children in Sierra Leone, 27
decide to pursue prosecution. It is contemplated that the cases of defendants
who were between fifteen and eighteen when the alleged crimes occurred might
be referred to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when it
begins operation. Annan's draft leaves that decision, however, to the discretion
of the prosecutor. Those cases referred to the Special Court might be conducted
25. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Special Court Report].
The proposed Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, as well as the draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone [hereinafter Special Court Statute], are attached to this report.
26. Secretary-General's Special Court Report. supra note 25, para. 32, at 7.
27. Id. para. 38, 8.
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in camera, in anonymous proceedings. A finding of guilt would result in a
"disposition" entailing no prison time, but rather orders to participate in
community service, counseling, schooling and vocational training, or
disarmament and reintegration programs. 2s
Such rehabilitative options begin to address the third feature of the Sierra
Leone conflict; that is, the disaffection and despair that contributed, at least at
the beginning, to the war.
Finally, respecting the fourth feature, amnesty, the Special Court statute
minces no words. It states: "An amnesty granted to any person falling within
the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in
Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution." 29 It says,
simply, that the amnesty does not apply. It also incorporates a new message
about accountability. The clock for prosecution starts on November 30, 1996,
the date of the Abidjan Accord. The statute contains no finishing date for the
court, as is the case with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.' This indicates that the Special Court is to keep watch over those
who should commit crimes within its jurisdiction in the future.
The message of the draft statute for the Special Court, then, is far stronger
than that of the Lomd Agreement. It promises accountability. It allows
flexibility to accommodate some of the features characteristic of the Sierra
Leone conflict.
It remains to be seen if the Special Court will be established. The initial
Security Council resolution suggested funding by voluntary contributions. 3
The Secretary-General's report questions the adequacy of this method, and
estimates that the court will cost twenty-two million dollars to operate the first
28. Following the presentation of this paper, the United Nations Security Council omitted detailed
discussion of a Juvenile Chamber from the draft statute. See Letter dated December 22, 2000 from the
President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000). Annan
acceded in large part, but called for reinstatement of the specific provision regarding disposition. See Letter
dated January 12, 2001 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (2001). For a critique of the Juvenile Chamber proposal, see Diane Marie
Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, in PEPPERDINE L REv. (forthcoming 2001).
29. Special Court Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10.
30. Compare Special Court Statute, supra note 25, at art. I with Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, arts. 1, 8, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 1.L.M. 1159,1192, 1194 (1993). In contrast, the statute for the
Rwanda Tribunal contains both start and finish dates for temporaljurisdiction. See Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, arts. 1, 7, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/955 (1994). reprinted in 33 I.LM. 1598, 1602, 1605 (1994).
31. See Resolution 1315, supra note 13, para. 8.
year.32 That is an extremely conservative number, less than a quarter of this
year's budget for either of the ad hoc tribunals.33
Despite financial and other obstacles, the Special Court ought to be
attempted. I mentioned at the beginning that one of the notorious features of the
Sierra Leone conflict was amputation, at first of the hands those who had dared
to vote. The practice was not unique to this conflict. Belgian colonizers had
chopped off the hands of Congolese who resisted harsh conditions at the rubber
plantations. 34  The perpetrators of those atrocities never were punished. A
century later, Foday Sankoh's RUF borrowed that tactic of dominance, infused
it with new meaning, and used it for a new round of terror. Punishing those
responsible for atrocities in Sierra Leone, by conveying a concrete message of
accountability, may begin to break that cycle of violence.
32. See Secretary-General's Special Court Report, supra note 25, at paras. 57-63, 68-72.
33. A December 1999 report stated that the United Nations General Assembly had "decided to
appropriate some $106.15 million gross for the former Yugoslavia Tribunal and $86.15 million gross for the
Rwanda Tribunal" for this year. UN: General Assembly Adopts 2000-2001 Programme Budget of Some
$2.536 Billion as It Concludes Work, M2 PREsswiRE, Dec. 24, 1999, available at 1999 WL 24375551.
Subsequent references to the actual budgets were somewhat lower: about $96 million for ICTY and about
$80 million for ICTR. See ICTY President Wants Faster Processing of War Criminals, More Expeditious
Trials, WORLDS NEWS CONNETtON, June 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22916078; Sylvia de Bertodano,
Rwanda's Long Wait for Justice, TIMES (London), Aug. 22, 2000, at LAW4.
34. See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST 164-66 (1998) (describing practice, so widely
reported "that people overseas began to associate the Congo with severed hands"); BARBARA KINGSOLVER,
THE PoisoNwooD BIBLE 144, 432 (1998) (referring to this practice, and to "the whacked-off ghost hands of
all those rubber workers," in novel treating the end of colonialism in the Congo); Onishi, Looted Home, supra
note 2 (linking Belgian and RUF practices).
20011 Amann
LESSONS FROM THE NGO CAMPAIGN AGAINST
THE SECOND REVIEW OF THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL: A PARTICIPANT'S
PERSPECTIVE*
Daniel D. Bradlow'"
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 247
1I. THE CASE STUDY ....................................... 248
A. Background on the Inspection Panel .................... 248
B. The NGO Campaign Against the Working Group Report .... 252
I. LESSONS FROM THE SECOND REVIEW ........................ 254
IV . CONCLUSION ........................................... 257
I. INTRODUCTION
This case study of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) campaign
against the second review of the World Bank's Inspection Panel is intended as
an example of the impact international civil society can have on international
financial institutions (IFIs). It also serves to highlight three important lessons
about the relationship between civil society and the IFIs, particularly the World
Bank (Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund), and their
member states.
The first of the three lessons is that the IFIs are slowly developing
administrative procedures that create limited but important opportunities for
NGOs to influence policy and rule-making in the IFIs. The second lesson is that
power relations in the Bank and the IMF are developing in a troubling direction.
The G-7 countries, and particularly the United States, are exercising power
without responsibility in these institutions in the sense that they can influence
the Bank and the Fund to adopt policies that will have no impact on their
citizens or on anyone to whom they are directly accountable. The third lesson
is that the tension that exists in these organizations between the NGOs and their
member states is largely attributable to the fact that they have different visions
of development.
* This paper is based on a presentation made as part of a panel on "The Impact of International
Civil Society on the World Bank, the [MF and the WTO" International Law Association's International Law
Weekend, New York, October 27, 2000.
** Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, American University's
Washington College of Law, Washington D.C. The author participated in the campaign and in the NGO-Bank
meetings described in this paper.
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In order to make the case for these findings, the next section of this paper,
after a short explanation of the Inspection Panel (Panel), will describe the
campaign that the NGOs mounted around the second review of the Panel and
the outcome of the campaign. The third section of the paper will discuss the
lessons that can be learned from this case study.
II. THE CASE STUDY
A. Background on the Inspection Panel
In 1994, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors voted to establish
the Panel.' Its motivation for doing so was that it was under pressure from
NGOs, the United States Congress, and others to take steps to correct the
problems that had been exposed in some high-profile cases of problematic Bank
projects. The Bank's executive directors had also expressed some concern
about the Bank's performance and were looking for ways to improve it.2
Briefly, the Panel has been empowered to respond to Requests for
Inspection (Requests) from any affected people, except a single person, who
claim that they have been or are threatened with material injury or harm because
of the failure of the Bank staff and management to act in compliance with the
Bank's operating policies and procedures.' The Resolution establishing the
Panel provides for a two step process for handling such requests for inspection.
In the first step, the Panel reviews the Request and the management response to
the request to see if it meets all the eligibility requirements 4 and to decide
whether or not the Panel should recommend that it conduct an investigation to
the Bank's Board of Executive Directors (Board). The Board makes the final
decision about whether or not to authorize an investigation. The Request, the
Management response, the Panel recommendation and the Board decision are
all made publicly available. In the second stage the Panel conducts the
investigation and submits its findings to the Board. The Management is entitled
to submit a response to the Panel report. The Board then decides how to
respond. The Panel report, the management response thereto and any Board
decision on the report are all made publicly available.
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Res. 93-10, The World Bank
Inspection Panel, Res. 93-6, International Development Association (September 22, 1993). See also
Operating Procedures of the Inspection Panel (August 1994), available at http://www.
worldbank.org/html/ins-panel (last visited March 24, 2001) [hereinafter Resolution].
2. See LF., I. Shihata, THE WoRLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL IN PRAcTIcE (2000), for history of
Inspection Panel. Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the
World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L 553 (1994).
3. Resolution, supra note I.
4. The eligibility criteria are in Paragraphs 12-14 of the Resolution, supra note 1.
When the Panel was established, it was the first formal mechanism through
which non-state actors could attempt to hold an international organization
directly accountable for its actions. NGOs hailed its establishment as an
important milestone in their campaign to make the Bank more accountable and
responsive to those who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of its operations.
During the first three years of its existence, the Panel received ten Requests
for Inspection. Most of these cases were controversial and they resulted in
growing opposition to the Panel process in the Board.5 There were several
causes for this controversy. First, even though the goal of the initial stage of the
process is only to determine eligibility and not the more difficult issues of harm
and causation, it had become, in practice, very complex. In fact, the Panel's
report included almost all the findings and issues one would expect to see
included in a final investigation report. It should be noted that, from the
perspective of the Requester, this was not bad because it meant that there was
a strong likelihood that the filing of a Request would lead to a field visit by the
Panel. This tended to generate publicity and an "on the record" report about the
project and the Requester's concerns with it. However, from the Board's
perspective the Panel's detailed initial report called into question the need for
a full investigation.
The second reason that the Panel was becoming so controversial was that
the Bank Management used its response to the Request as an opportunity to
deny its responsibility for any of the harm alleged in the Request. In addition,
it used the time from the filing of the Request, until the Panel submitted its
recommendation to the Board, to work with the borrower to develop an action
plan that was designed to correct the problems that the Requester had identified
with the project. The plan was developed without consultation with the
Requester. It also often involved unauthorized communications between the
Management and the Board about the Request that the Panel was considering.
These communications were not provided for under the Resolution or the
Operating Procedures of the Panel. They also undermined the perceived
fairness and independence of the Panel process, at least in the eyes of outside
observers.
The result was that the Board, when it considered the Panel's
recommendation, was confronted with the following information: a detailed
Panel report that found harm and eligibility but did not fully analyze the issue
of causation; a Management response that denied it was responsible for the
problems in the project; and an action plan in which the borrower agreed to
undertake certain actions to correct the problems with the project. The
5. For an overview of the Panel's first years, see L UDALL, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:
A THREE YEAR REVIEw (Oct. 1997, Bank Information Center). See also THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:
THE FIRST FOUR YEARS (Alvaro Umana ed. 1998); Shihata, supra, note 2.
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combined effect of these documents was to create the impression that the only
remaining issue to investigate was what the borrower had done that had caused
the harm to the Requester.
Confronted with this information, the Board members from part II
countries (that is representing the countries that actually borrow from the Bank)
argued that this was not consistent with the purpose of the Panel, which was to
investigate problems attributable to the acts or omissions of the Bank's staff and
management. They usually opposed Panel recommendations to investigate.
Bitter fights ensued between those Executive Directors who supported the
recommendation (usually from Part I countries) and those who opposed it. The
result was that the Board failed to authorize full-scale investigations like those
envisaged in the Resolution establishing the Panel. Instead, it authorized very
limited follow up investigations to the Panel report, for example a desk review
or a Panel review of the implementation of the action plans.
These compromises satisfied no one. The affected people and their NGO
representatives felt that they were not getting what they were entitled to under
the Resolution. The borrower countries and their representatives on the
Executive Board felt that they, rather than the Bank staff and Management, were
becoming the real targets of the Panel. In many ways, they felt that the function
of the Panel was becoming to assign blame rather than to correct problems in
the implementation of the Bank's operational policies and to solve problems in
Bank projects. The Board felt frustrated that a mechanism that had been
designed to help reduce their problems in dealing with difficult projects was
instead generating more conflict in the Board. In fact, the only partially
satisfied party was the original target of the Panel-the staff and management-
who were successfully avoiding investigations that may have revealed problems
in their operations and conduct.
It is important to recognize that despite these criticisms, the Panel process
was producing real benefits for the requesters. Often it offered them the first
opportunity to raise their concerns with senior officials of the Bank who would
listen to their complaints. In some cases, they were able to gain compensation
for affected people. In others they managed to get either the borrower or the
Bank to implement promised project elements that were of particular interest to
affected people, or to increase spending on issues of importance to them. These
results were sometimes precipitated by the site visit by Panel and on other
occasions were the result of the action plan or the management response to the
filing of the Request.6
As a result of these problems, the Board decided to initiate a review of the
Panel process in late 1997. After receiving papers from and consulting with
6. See supra note 5, for a detailed discussion of the Panel's cases. See also Daniel D. Bradlow,
A Test Case for the World Bank, II AM. J. llN'L L POL'Y 247 (1996) (describing the Panel's first case).
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management and the Panel, the Board, in early 1998, appointed a Working
Group to recommend a solution to the Board. The Working Group, which
consisted of six Executive Directors-three from part I countries (that is the
capital contributing countries) and three from part Hl countries-after difficult
discussions prepared a report that recommended changes to the Panel process,
that it believed would both improve the Panel process and correct the current
problems. This report was distributed to the Board in December 1998 and was
scheduled for consideration by the full Board in late January 1999. Before this
could happen, the report, which was supposed to be confidential, was leaked
and obtained by some Washington-based NGOs. It was also obtained by some
journalists, who wrote about the report.
When the NGOs reviewed the leaked Working Group report they reacted
with alarm. They felt that the Working Group's proposals, instead of resolving
the problems with the Panel, were more likely to make the position of the Panel
untenable. They argued that it would effectively strip the Panel of any
meaningful function.
The NGOs identified three major problems with the Working Group
proposal. The first was that the Working Group proposed, to limit the Panel's
role in the first phase of the process to consideration of the issue of eligibility
and to preclude investigation of any other factual issues at this stage. However,
at the same time it proposed to allow the Bank's Management to submit a plan
showing what it would do to bring itself into compliance with the Bank's
operating policies and procedures with its response to the Request for an
Investigation. The net effect of this proposal would have been to allow the
Management to provide the Board with its view of the facts and the solution to
the problems it was alleged to have caused before the Board had received a
report from the Panel based on an independent investigation of the facts of the
case. In other words, the Working Group seemed to be endorsing the
management's "informal" practice of submitting an action plan to the Board
before it had reviewed the Panel's recommendation. From the NGO
perspective, this seemed to be formalizing precisely that management practice
which the NGOs saw as a major cause of the problems with the Panel process.
The second problem was that the Working Group proposed that the Board
should accept the Panel's recommendation regarding the Request without
discussion except with respect to "technical criteria" relating to eligibility.
However, the working group report did not define technical criteria, leaving this
up to the discretion of each board member. This was troubling because the
eligibility criteria contained in the Resolution establishing the Panel contains
some obviously "non-technical" criteria.7 For example, it requires requesters
to show that the "rights or interests" of the requesters "have been or are likely
7. Resolution, supra note 1.
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to be directly affected by the acts or the omissions of the Bank."8 This is clearly
a factual issue that goes to the heart of the merits of the Request. Consequently,
the NGOs were concerned that the absence of a definition of "technical criteria"
opened a huge loophole which any Executive Director who was opposed to an
investigation would exploit, or through which the management could lead the
Board to reject an investigation.
The third problem was that the report sought to set a standard for
determining harm that compared the current situation of the requesters to what
it would have been if there had been no project as opposed to what it would
have been if there had been full compliance with all the Bank's operating rules
and procedures. This would to make it more difficult for the Requesters to
show harm. It also seemed to reduce the burden on the management to comply
with all the applicable operating rules and procedures.
There were other problems with the report. These related to the flexibility
of the deadlines for the Panel to submit its recommendation to the Board and
limits on the Panel contacts with the media during a Panel process.
B. The NGO Campaign Against the Working Group Report
The Washington-based NGOs, knowing that the Board had scheduled a
meeting for late January 1999 to discuss the Working Group report, reacted
swiftly to the report. Acting through the United States Treasury and the United
States Executive Director at the Bank, they demanded that the Board publicly
release the report and asked for consultations with the Board to discuss the
report. Faced with the fact that the report had been leaked and had engendered
such a strong response, the Board decided to delay its scheduled January
meeting. This was done so that the Working Group could meet informally with
an invited group of NGO representatives and one academic to discuss the report
that the NGOs supposedly had not seen. 9 This meeting was unprecedented in
that it was the first time that a committee of the Board had discussed its report
with outsiders before it formally presented the report to the whole Board.
As a result of this meeting, the Board decided to publicly release the
Working Group report, and call for public comments on the Report. It also
scheduled a Board meeting for March 16, 1999. In response to these
developments, the NGOs and the one academic who had attended the meeting,
began distributing information about the report and encouraging people to
submit comments to the Bank. There were also a number of unfavorable press
reports. In addition, the NGOs and the one academic began lobbying the
Executive Directors.'0 In the event, the Bank received twenty-two comments
8. Id.
9. The author was the one academic participating in this meeting.
10. During this time, the author met personally with almost all the Executive Directors representing
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from United States, Mexican and Brazilian NGOs, and from a number of private
individuals. These comments were from all sides of the issue.1 In addition,
members of the United States Congress sent a letter to the President of Bank
opposing the Working Group's proposal.
As a result of these efforts, and concerned about the impression that the
Board was trying to undermine the Panel, the Working Group took an
unprecedented step. It once again delayed the meeting of the Board, scheduled
for March 16, 1999, and invited representatives of civil society, including a
number of groups that had submitted Requests for Inspection, to attend, at Bank
expense, an informal meeting with the Board of Directors. The purpose of the
meeting, which was held on March 24, 1999, was to discuss the Working Group
Report. This meeting was the first time that the Board had agreed to meet to
discuss a policy matter with NGOs and other representatives of civil society.
The meeting was attended by all the Executive Directors or a representative
from their offices. It was co-chaired by the Dean of the Board, the Russian
Executive Director, and a representative of the NGOs, Kay Treakle of the Bank
Information Center. It was also attended by the members and staff of the Panel.
The meeting was remarkably cordial. It was dominated by a frank discussion
of the NGO concerns with the Report. The Board members discussed their need
to balance different interests in their report and in the design of the Panel
procedures. They also sought to assure the NGOs that their goal was not to
undermine the Panel. In fact, a number of Directors made a point of expressing
their support for the Panel. After the meeting, some NGOs submitted a second
round of comments to the Board.
In April 1999, the Working Group completed the final version of their
Report and presented it to the Board, which duly adopted it. This final version
contained some significant modifications from the first version of the Report.
The changes represented an important victory for the NGOs in that they
addressed some of the NGOs key concerns. In addition, the Report adopted a
number of the proposals that had been made in the comments that had been
submitted to the Bank.
The effect of the Final Report is to reduce the first phase of the proceedings
to a relatively simple determination of whether or not, on the face of the
documents, the requester has stated an eligible claim. This should be clear on
the basis of the documents submitted by the Requesters and should not require
any detailed field investigation by the Panel. In cases where the Panel has made
a positive recommendation for an investigation, the Board should adopt the
Part 1i countries.
11. The author was one of the individuals who submitted comments. A copy of the author's
comments are available from the author. See Shihata, supra note 2, at 193-96, for a biased discussion of these
public submissions.
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recommendation without discussion, unless there are technical issues that can
be raised.
Importantly, the Working Group defined the "technical criteria" that could
trigger a Board discussion of the Panel's recommendation. The "technical
criteria" are limited to such clearly verifiable facts as whether or not the affected
party consists of two or more people; the request includes an assertion of serious
violations by the Bank; the request asserts that the subject matter of the request
has been brought to the attention of Bank management and management has
failed to respond; and the matter is not precluded from being the subject of a
Panel investigation because it relates to issues of procurement, a substantially
disbursed loan, or the Panel has already investigated the complaint.
2
The second important change was that the final report eliminated any
reference to the Bank Management submitting a compliance plan to the Board.
It was replaced by the language of the Resolution, which requires management
to provide the Panel with "evidence that it has complied or intends to comply
with" the Bank's operating policies and procedures. The Panel then decides if
the evidence submitted is adequate. The Management is now only allowed to
submit an action plan together with its response to the Panel report on its
investigation during the second phase of the proceedings. It is no longer
allowed to submit an action plan during the first phase of the Panel proceeding.
Another notable change was that the final report insists on the strict
observance of time deadlines by all parties. The Working Group also stipulated
that the Panel needs to keep a low profile when conducting its work and should
limit its contacts with the press. Finally, the Board decided that the Bank must
engage in more effective outreach to educate the public about the Panel and
should release information on the Panel proceedings in the language of the
requesters.
It is important to note that the Board retained the original Working Group's
recommendation on the standard for determination of harm.
III. LESSONS FROM THE SECOND REVIEW
There are four key lessons that can be learned from this case study. The
first is the value to international organizations of having clear rulemaking
procedures that allow for public comment before the rule is actually finalized.
While the Board did not originally choose to follow this procedure in regard to
the Working Group report, the Bank Management seems to have adopted an
informal rule making procedure in other cases. This informal procedure is that
the proposed rule or policy is published on the World Bank website and public
12. This definition was similar to the one contained in the comments the author submitted to the
Bank. A copy of these comments is available from the author.
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comments are invited. The final rule or policy is only decided after the end of
this comment period.
The Bank has followed this rule in regard to some particularly contentious
social and environmental policies, for example its policy on indigenous people.
Interestingly, some other international organizations have followed the Bank's
example. The International Finance Corporation adopted this approach in
developing its social and environmental policies. The International Monetary
Fund, albeit under some public pressure, utilized a similar procedure in
developing the guidelines for its newly established independent Evaluation
Office.
The problem with this informal approach to rulemaking is precisely that it
is informal and can be used on an ad hoc basis. Thus, the Working Group was
not required to follow this procedure and only did so under the threat of NGO
protests. The use of outside pressure to force the Bank to follow its informal
procedures suggests that the Bank would be well-served by formalizing the
procedure. It would add an element of predictability and transparency to its
rulemaking that would have a positive impact on its governance.
The second lesson is that NGOs, particularly Washington-based NGOs and
their transnational allies, have sufficient influence that they are coming to play
a growing role in policymaking in the Bank. While their role is still limited to
specific issues, it is clear from the case of the second review of the Inspection
Panel that they are gaining influence and the ability to play a role in
policymaking in regard to those issues of most interest to them. Other examples
of where they have played an influential policymaking role are in the design and
creation of the new Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman in the International
Finance Corporation; the development of the Bank's policy on indigenous
people, and in the IMF Board's decision to establish a permanent independent
Evaluation Office.
The third lesson is that even though the NGOs have gained some influence
in policymaking in the Bank and the IMF, their influence is still dependent on
their national governments' being willing to support them. This can be seen
from the fact that the United States Treasury and United States Executive
Director played an important role in persuading the Working Group and the
Bank's Board to meet with the Washington based NGOs. They also helped
persuade the Bank to post the first draft of the Working Group report on the
Bank's website and invite comments on it. The United States was able to gain
support from other Part I countries for these positions. It is not clear that the
NGO campaign against the Working Group report would have been as
successful without the support of these governments.
The final lesson is that this case study is one of a growing number of
examples of increasing conflict between developing country governments and,
primarily, Northern NGOs. It is intriguing that these two groups, both of which
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are seeking to change the current international economic system from the
current one that is dominated by the G-7 countries, are in conflict with each
other rather than tactical allies. In fact, in regard to issues like the Inspection
Panel, the NGOs find their allies among the G-7 powers, who are the primary
beneficiaries of the system they are trying to change, rather than among the
developing countries.
There are two reasons that seem to explain the current tension between the
developing country governments and the NGOs. The first is that they are the
protagonists for two competing visions of development. 3 The developing
country governments advocate a traditional view of development. According
to this view, the development process is primarily about economic growth and
the economic aspects of development can be treated separately from the social,
environmental, political and cultural aspects of life. It sees development
projects (such as dams, roads, telecommunications systems, mining projects or
building a new factory) as discrete, well defined events. The responsibility of
the project sponsor and the project contractors, who supply the goods and
services required by the project, can be analyzed only in economic, technical
and financial terms. The non-economic, that is, social, environmental, political
and cultural impacts of the project, are the prerogative of the sovereign in whose
territory the project is being constructed. The project sponsor and contractors
can treat these issues as externalities and its primary responsibility in this regard
is to defer to the sovereign's decision on these issues.
The NGOs, on the other hand, view development as an integrated process
in which the economic, social, environmental, political, cultural, and technical
dimensions of development projects and policies are all so intertwined that they
must be considered together as part of one complex holistic process. According
to this view of development, development projects should be seen as episodes
of social, economic, environmental, cultural and political transformation that
form part of an ongoing process of change. In this process, all actors must
account for all the impacts of their own actions. This suggests that this view
involves a reduction of the authority of the sovereign who, in reality, is only one
out of many actors in the development process. Since each actor is responsible
for all the consequences of their actions, it may not be prudent for the other
actors to defer to the views of the sovereign in regard to dealing with the
impacts of a particular project.
The second reason is that it is relatively cheap and easy for the
governments of the G-7 countries to support the NGOs in their efforts to reform
the Bank. The work of the Bank has no direct impact on the citizens of the G-7
13. See Daniel D. Bradlow, The Times They Are A-Changin': Competing Conceptions of
Development and the Reform of the WTO, GEO. WASH. INT'L L REV. (forthcoming 2001) for more detailed
discussion of these competing views of development and some of their international legal ramifications.
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countries and therefore is unlikely to influence the outcome of any elections in
the G-7 countries. Furthermore, these governments can show that they are
doing something to deal with the difficult social and environmental issues that
affect all societies without actually having to engage in a full debate about the
domestic implications of these issues. This means, in effect, that the G-7
countries are able to exercise power without responsibility in relation to the
Bank and the IMF.
IV. CONCLUSION
The campaign around the second review of the Inspection Panel was an
important victory for the NGOs. They were able to block proposed changes in
the Panel proceedings that would have substantially undermined the legitimacy
and efficacy of the Panel. In addition, they were able to get the Bank's Board
of Directors to agree to unprecedented consultations with them. They were also
given some role in the rulemaking process relating to the Panel. Interestingly,
this is not an isolated episode of NGOs playing a policymaking role in the
international financial institutions. They have, on occasion, played a similar
role in the International Finance Corporation and the International Monetary
Fund.
This case study, however, also serves to highlight that, to some extent, the
influence of the NGOs is dependent on the inordinate power that the G-7
countries have in these institutions. In addition, it indicates that the tension that
exists between the NGOs and the developing countries is attributable to their
very different views of development and to the existing power relations in the
international financial institutions.
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization
composed of Members that are states or customs territories.1 Like every
international organization, the WTO connects in some ways to the individuals,
which inhabit the states. The main impact of the WTO on the individual springs
from the substantive disciplines of the trading system. For example, eliminating
quotas can change the structure of production and employment within a country.
But the WTO also has an important connection to individuals through its
procedural disciplines applying to Members, and through other means. This
article looks at the broadening rights and opportunities for natural and corporate
persons. I will survey the key issues and present some policy recommendations.
The connections between the WTO and private actors can be divided into two
types: those with economic actors and those with social actors. Economic
actors pursue their self-interest. Such actors include exporters, importers,
producers, merchants, and workers.2 They may be individuals, companies,
corporations, trade associations, or labor unions. Social actors pursue their
visions of the public interest. These actors are multifarious. A typical actor is
the non-governmental organization (NGO), but social actors can be religious
leaders, academics, and scientists. Business associations and labor unions can
also be social actors, whether or not one counts them as an NGO. A social actor
need not be a group; an individual can be a social actor.
* Attorney, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. The views expressed are those of the author. Support
for this research was provided by the Ford Foundation through the Global Environment & Trade Study.
1. See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
arts. XI-XII, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-elegal.e/final-e.htm [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2. Governments can also be economic actors - for example, state trading entities.
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Admittedly, this typology is fuzzy. The pursuit of self-interest cannot be
disentangled from the pursuit of public interest. Social actors can act with
economic motives and economic actors can act with social motives.
Nonetheless, the distinction is a useful one. When a person lodges a
complaint about the way an agency deals with him, he is performing a different
function than when he offers a prescription for how a law should be changed.
In my view, the social actor is distinguished from the economic actor by the
nature of the activism rather than the identity of the actor. Thus, a nonprofit
business association can act in both ways. It can act narrowly as an economic
actor and also broadly as a social actor.
My presentation has three parts. Part I looks at the interaction between the
WTO and economic actors. A much shorter Part Il looks at the interaction
between the WTO and social actors. Part III analyzes both relationships briefly
and presents a few recommendations for new WTO policies.
I. THE WTO AND ECONOMIC ACTORS
The WTO agreements are a code of obligations and rights for member
governments.3 None of these obligations apply directly to individual actors.
With one exception, no rights exist for economic actors within the WTO. Yet
as we will see, the rights and obligations apply to economic actors indirectly.
Many economic actors do very well by the WTO. The biggest gain from
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-94) came in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS
Agreement requires each member government to award private rights to
individual "right holders" from other countries. TRIPS specifies a broad range
of such rights embracing copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, and
patents. These are substantive rights that are forcing changes in every country's
law. Another big gain for economic actors emerged in the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS requires governments to grant non-
3. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
3.2, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/egal-efinal_e.htm [hereinafter DSU Agreement]. This Agreement states
that recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body cannot add to or diminish the "rights and
obligations" provided in the covered agreements. The WTO agreements do not explicitly specify these
"rights." Id.
4. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1.3, reprinted in World
Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press. 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_et
inal_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. See also id. art. 8.2. The drafters anticipated that these rights
would also be granted to nationals because it would be politically difficult for a government to give greater
rights to aliens than to citizens.
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discriminatory treatment to "service suppliers" of other WTO member
countries.5
The innovator and service provider do not acquire these substantive rights
directly from the WTO, but rather from governments via the implementation of
their WTO obligations. Thus, if the promise is not fulfilled, an economic actor
does not have a cause of action at the WTO. Its only recourse would be to
petition the government denying the right, or lobby its own government for
diplomatic protection.6
Some WTO agreements transmit obligations indirectly to economic actors.
For example, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement requires
governments to "take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to
ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories" comply with the
SPS Agreement.7 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) also
conveys indirect obligations. It requires governments to take such reasonable
measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-governmental bodies
comply with certain TBT rules.8 In addition, the TBT Agreement sets up a
Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Application of
Standards.9 Governments are directed to "take such reasonable measures as
may be available to them to ensure that local government and non-governmental
standardizing bodies.., accept and comply with this Code of Good Practice."''
A. Enhancing Domestic Rights
To assist economic actors in gaining the benefits of the WTO Agreement,
governments established numerous procedural and administrative requirements
5. General Agreement on Trade in Services, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 LLM. 1125, Annex 1B, art. 1: I [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
6. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 103-04 (1992).
7. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 13, reprinted in
World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orgenglish/docs--e
legale/final.e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
8. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 3. 1, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orglenglish/docs_etlegale/final-e.htm [hereinafter TBT
Agreement]. See also id., art. 8.1 & Annex 1, 18. These non-governmental bodies might also be viewed as
social actors.
9. Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Application of Standards, TBT
Agreement, Annex 3, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available
at http:/www.wto.org/english/docse/legaelfinal_e.htm [hereinafter TBT Code of Good Practice].
10. Id. at art. 4. See also id. at art. 8; id. at art. 14.4 (discussing procedures for conformity
assessment by non-governmental bodies and dispute settlement).
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to be met within member countries. These rules are sometimes referred to as
"transparency," but they are broader than that term suggests. They are due
process obligations giving an economic actor the right to submit comments to
agencies and to appeal rulings.
The idea of using a trade treaty to mandate procedural economic rights did
not originate in the Uruguay Round." It was always part of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), written in 1947. For example, GATT
Article X:3(b) requires each party to maintain "judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt
review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters," and
further requires such tribunals to be independent of the administering agency.'
2
Another provision in GATT Article X calls for the prompt publication of trade
regulations in order to enable both governments and "traders" to become
acquainted with them.'3
Recently, GATT Article X was the subject of a landmark WTO panel
decision in the Argentina Bovine Hides case.14 The panel found that Argentina
was violating GATT Article X:3(a), which requires governments to administer
trade regulations in a "uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner .... ", At
issue was a regulation that permitted two domestic leather and tanning trade
associations to observe Customs agency inspections wherein products are
classified for an export tax assessment." The plaintiff European Communities
(EC) called this regulation a violation of GATT Article X because the presence
of the trade associations inhibited the export of raw hides.'7 One problem was
that the export procedures gave downstream slaughterhouses access to
confidential business information. The WTO panel was called upon to interpret
GATT Article X provisions which, surprisingly, had not received much
attention during the previous five decades.' 8 Noting that Article X uses the
1I. The principle goes back at least as early as 1923 with the International Convention relating to
the Simplification of Customs Formalities, Nov. 3, 1923, 30 L.N.T.S. 373. Article 4 of the Convention directs
parties to publish customs regulations in such a manner as to enable "persons concerned" to become
acquainted with them "and to avoid the prejudice which might result from the application of customs
formalities of which they are ignorant." Id. Article 5 directs parties to enable "traders" to procure official
information in regard to customs tariffs. Id.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. X:3(b)
[hereinafter GAT']. The GATT is now incorporated and updated in the WTO Agreement, Annex IA.
13. Id. at art. X: 1.
14. Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather,
Report of the Panel, Dec. 19, 2000, WT/DS 155/R (hereinafter Argentina Bovine Hides Report].
15. Id. 11.101, 12.2.
16. Id. '2.30-2.31, 2.39.
17. Id. 11.22, 11.36, 11.87, 11.89, 11.95.
18. WTO, GUIDEToGAT ILAW ANDPRAcrICE 294-98 (World Trade Organization ed., 1995). The
issue of GATTI Article X arose in a few WTO cases, but no violations were found. In the United States Cotton
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terms "traders" and "importer," the panel held that the Article X discipline
requires more than treating all governments the same. 9 After considering what
information the trade associations were gaining access to, the panel held that
Argentina's regulation was not being administered in an impartial and
reasonable manner." The implication of the holding is that Argentina is being
unreasonable to its exporters, who may suffer injury from the presence (during
inspections) of private actors with competitive economic interests. 2' Although
the panel does not vindicate the due process right of the exporter directly, its
holding for the EC is centered on a finding that Argentina is disadvantaging its
domestic economic actors.
The advance in jurisprudence in this case is subtle, and so let me clarify it.
Every WTO dispute has private actors lurking behind it.22 Nevertheless, the
typical dispute is couched in state-centric terms-that is, the claim is that one
government is failing to fulfill the WTO obligations it owes to another.
Argentina Bovine Hides can be viewed in that normal way too. Yet the panel
could only reach its legal conclusion by finding that the Government of
Argentina was being unreasonable to someone, and in this case, it was to its
exporters. In most WTO disputes in which a victim appears in the story, that
victim resides in the plaintiff country. This case is different because the EC
exercises its GATT cause of action against Argentina for, in effect, victimizing
a domestic economic actor in Argentina.
In requiring parties to accord limited procedural rights to economic actors,
the original GATT laid the foundation for the broader rights now championed
in WTO agreements. Like the GATT, the WTO does not accord rights directly
to individuals, but rather mandates that member governments do so. Although
case, the Appellate Body noted that an essential implication of Article X:2 is that "Members and other persons
affected, or likely to be affected, by govenmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other
burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and
accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures."
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, Report of the Appellate
Body, Feb. 25, 1997, WT/DS24/AB/R, 16.3. In the EC Bananas case, the panel found a violation of GATT
Article X:3(a), but this finding was reversed by the Appellate Body. European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, Sept. 25, 1997, Ift 199-201.
In the EC Poultry case, the Appellate Body upheld the decision of the panel dismissing Brazil's Article X
claims on their merits. European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, July 13, 1998, WT/DS69/ABIR, II 109-16. In the Shrimp-Turtle
case, the Appellate Body used GATT Article X:3 to interpret the chapeau of GATT Article XX. United States
- Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R, " 182-83.
19. Argentina Bovine Hides Report, supra note 14, '1 11.67-11.68.
20. Id. 'fl 11.91, 11.94, 11. 100.
21. Id. "1 11.93, 11.98.
22. Jeffrey L Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO, I J. INT'L ECON.
L 432,441-51 (1998).
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a few commentators have pointed to this important legal development-most
notably the perspicacious Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann-this dimension of WTO
law has often been left to the specialists for each trade agreement.2
In at least three WTO agreements, the guarantee of individual economic
rights is central. Consider the agreements on antidumping, subsidies, and
intellectual property. The Antidumping Agreement requires governments: (1)
to initiate antidumping investigations upon an application by (and on behalf of)
a domestic industry; (2) to give all interested parties notice and an ample
opportunity to present evidence and to defend their interests; (3) to give public
notice upon initiating an investigation; (4) to provide judicial review of
antidumping decisions; and (5) to give interested parties the right to seek review
of the continued need for an antidumping duty, and to terminate the duty if no
longer needed.2' The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM) contains analogous provisions regarding countervailing duties. 5 Part III
of the TRIPS Agreement assigns to governments numerous procedural
obligations toward the holder of private rights.' For example, governments
must enable an individual right holder to institute administrative or judicial
proceedings to block the importation of a good lacking an authentic trademark
or copyright."' In effect, TRIPS defines illicit trade and commits governments
to ban it at the behest of an economic actor.
The attention to economic actors is less central in other WTO agreements,
but still very important. Consider the agreements on services (GATS),
safeguards, customs valuation, rules of origin, and TBT. The GATS requires
governments to maintain "judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
procedures which provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the
prompt review of, and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative
23. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATTWTO Dispute Settlement
System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw AND THE GATr/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEmENT SYSTEM 3, 19, 60, 72-74, 108-15, 119 (Petersmann ed., 1997). Two other WTO Secretariat
staffers provide a sophisticated discussion of these developments too. Gabrielle Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen,
Is the WTO Open and Transparent?, 33 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1999, at5, 21-32, 37-43.
24. See generally Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, arts. 5.1,5.4, 6.1, 6.2, 8, 11.2, 12, 13 reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orglenglish/docs-e/legalefinaLe.htm (hereinafter
Antidumping Agreement]. Interested parties include the foreign exporter or producer. Id. at art. 6.11.
25. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, arts. 1], 12, 21, 22, 23,
reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at
http:/www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
26. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 41-62.
27. ld. at art. 51.
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decisions affecting trade in services. ' 28 The GATS also requires governments
to work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations towards the adoption of common international standards for
qualifications of service providers.29 The Safeguards Agreement requires
governments, when commencing a safeguard investigation, to give public notice
and to hold hearings in which importers, exporters and other interested parties
can provide evidence and respond to the presentations of other parties."0 The
Customs Valuation Agreement requires governments to establish in law the
right of the importer to appeal a determination of customs value.3 An appeal
must lie to ajudicial authority and be without penalty. The Agreement on Rules
of Origin provides that an exporter or importer may ask a government for a
determination of the origin of a good.32 This is to be provided as soon as
possible but no later than 150 days. The TBT Code of Good Practice calls for
a sixty-day comment period on new standards by "interested parties."33 The
standardizing body is directed to "take into account" the comments, and to reply
if requested.3
In a lecture to the American Society of International Law in 2000, Anne-
Marie Slaughter presented a "liberal theory of international law" in which she
contended that the "primary function of international law is not to create
international institutions to perform functions that individual states cannot
perform by themselves, but rather to influence and improve the functioning of
domestic institutions."'35 Professor Slaughter does not point to the WTO as an
example of such a function, but it would seem to fit her liberal theory. By
installing new due process requirements, the WTO enhances the domestic rule
of law. Governments become more accountable to domestic and foreign
economic actors.
28. GATS Agreement, supra note 5, at art. VI:2(a).
29. Id. at art. V 11:5.
30. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 3.1, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University
Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orglenglish/docs_elegal.e/finaLe.htm.
31. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, arts. 11.1-11.2, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available
at http:/www.wto.org/engish/docs_/legaLe/finaLe.htm GA7f Article VU:5 provides that the methods for
determining value should be "given sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable degree
of certainty, the value for customs purposes."
32. Agreement on Rules of Origin, arts. 2(h), 3(F), reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orgtenglish/dcs-elegal-e/final_e.htm.
33. TBT Code of Good practice, supra note 9, L.
34. Id. I N.
35. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 ASILPROC. 240, 246 (2000).
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B. Enforcing WTO Rules Domestically
The WTO sets rules for governments, but does not require governments to
allow private actors to enforce WTO obligations in domestic courts.36 To my
knowledge, no government does so. Professor Petersmann has been a tireless
advocate of strengthening trade rules by allowing adversely affected citizens to
invoke and enforce GATT/WTO guarantees in domestic courts.37 Meinhard
Hilf is another scholar who promotes such a reform. He points out that
"domestic courts would offer the best guarantee of protection of interests and
rights of individual operators, thus making the entire GATT system more
effective."3 In July 2000, the International Law Association Committee on
International Trade Law recommended that WTO Members:
strengthen the legal and judicial remedies of their citizens and
residents (natural and legal) if the latter are adversely affected by
violations of precise and unconditional WTO guarantees of freedom
and non-discrimination, especially where such violation of WTO
rules has been ascertained in a legally binding manner by rulings of
the [WTO Dispute Settlement Body] DSB.39
C. Enforcing WTO Rules at the WTO
Another way to strengthen the rule of WTO law would be to allow
economic actors to invoke WTO dispute settlement on their own. Several
commentators have advocated this approach.' At present few, if any, WTO
Members would feel confident enough about their record of implementation to
subject themselves to this new source of criticism.
36. Petersmann, supra note 23, at 120.
37. See, e.g., Ernst-Uhich Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European
Community Law, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L1, 35 (1992).
38. Meinhard Hilf, The Role ofNational Courts in International Trade Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, supra note 23, at 559, 579. For an excellent survey
of the issue of direct effect and the WTO, see Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The
Relationship Between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, I J. INT'L ECON. L 83,
92-122 (1988).
39. Res. 2/2000, Committee on International Trade Law, International Law Association, 69th
Conference, Report of the Sixty Ninth Conference 2000, at Annex 3 Recommendation 4 (2000),
http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/REStrade.pdf.
40. See. e.g., Martin Lukas, The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1995, at 181, 191, 202-06; Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People:
Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2275 (1997); Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International
Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L 587,627-30, 638 (1998).
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The closest the WTO gets to private invocation is the Agreement on
Preshipment Inspection (PSI), which is the exception referred to at the
beginning of Part I. Preshipment inspection verifies the quality, quantity, price,
and customs classification of goods. Some governments mandate that goods be
inspected before shipment. The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection obligates
those governments to require the inspection entity to make available a grievance
procedure for exporters.4 ' Then, two working days after such a grievance is
lodged, either the exporter or the inspector may refer the dispute for review by
an "Independent Entity.-4 2 The WTO established the Independent Entity in
1995, in conjunction with the International Federation of Inspection Agencies
and the International Chamber of Commerce.43 If such referrals occur, the
Independent Entity will set up an arbitral panel whose decisions are binding on
the exporter and inspector." The role of the panel is to decide whether the
parties have complied with the PSI Agreement.'
This review procedure gives an economic actor-the exporter-a
procedural right of action under WTO rules. The exporter's claim would be that
the agent of the importing government (i.e., the preshipment inspector) is
violating the PSI Agreement. The WTO member government in the country of
intended importation is one step removed from being a party to the dispute.
The arbitrations under the Independent Entity are separate from the
arbitrations (or adjudications) carried out through the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). The DSB considers only disputes between WTO member
governments. Nevertheless, some WTO panels have looked through the
governmental veil to see the economic actors who are the real stakeholders in
the dispute.
The leading case is United States Section 301. The panel held that a
controversial United States trade law did not violate WTO rules.' 6 In reaching
that decision in 1999, the panel explained that:
41. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.LM. 1125, Annex IA, art. 2 [hereinafter
PSI Agreement].
42. ld. at art. 4.
43. Press Release, WTO, Operation of the Independent Entity Established under Article 4 of the
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with author). The PSI Agreement states that the
Independent Entity will be constituted jointly by an organization representing preshipment inspection entities
and an organization representing exporters. The IFIA and the ICC were quickly identified as those
organizations, but they were not willing to constitute the new Entity on their own without exemption from
legal liability. Therefore, the Independent Entity was set up by the WTO.
44. PSI Agreement, supra note 41, at art. 4(h).
45. Id. at art. 4(0.
46, Sections 301-3 10 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, Dec. 22, 1999, WTIDS 152/R.
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[T]he GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of
which comprise both contracting parties or Members and their
nationals. However, it would be entirely wrong to consider that the
position of individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal
matrix. Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as
a result of the acceptance of various disciplines under the
GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual economic operators
in the national and global market places. The purpose of many of
these disciplines, indeed one of the primary objects of the
GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce certain market conditions
which would allow this individual activity to flourish .... The
multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States
but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators.'
In line with the panel's reasoning, one can view economic actors as the
beneficiary of the WTO contract. The trading system will build on this insight
in the future, as economic operators push governments to comply with their
WTO obligations.
The lack of formal procedures for economic actors to participate in WTO
dispute settlement has led to pressures to permit amicus curiae briefs. At the
compliance stage of the Australia Salmon dispute, the "Article 21.5" panel
accepted a brief from the Concerned Fishermen and Processors in South
Australia, but did not discuss the brief in finding continuing violations by
Australia.48 (The decision went against the interests of the Concerned
Fishermen.) In the United States Hot-Rolled Lead dispute, the Appellate Body
accepted briefs from two trade associations, but then declared that it did not find
it necessary to take their briefs into account.49 As of December 2000, the state
of WTO law is that non-governmental persons do not have the right to submit
an amicus curiae brief to a panel, although they may try to do so.
The lack of a right to intervene as an interested third party or to submit an
amicus brief was most glaringly absent in the Australia Leather case. In that
WTO dispute, the United States government was successful in characterizing
an Australian government grant to the leather producer Howe and Company as
47. Id. U 7.72, 7.73, 7.76.
48. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada,
Report of the Panel, Feb. 18, 2000, WT/DS I8/RW, '17.8. DSU Article 21.5 permits the plaintiff government
to ask that a panel be convened to review whether the defendant government has complied with the
recommendations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
49. United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, May 10, 2000,
WTIDSi38/AB/R, 1 42. The Appellate Body held that it had the legal authority to accept the briefs. It did
not actually say that it had "accepted" the briefs, but implied that it had in declaring that it did not find it
necessary to take the briefs into account.
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a prohibited export subsidy, in violation of the SCM Agreement.50 The panel
did not give Howe any opportunity to argue that the grant was not an export
subsidy. That incapacity is not unusual. The WTO has adjudicated several
export subsidy cases all of which have stakeholders who are not heard from in
the proceedings. What was unusual, and troubling, in the Leather case was
Howe's absence during the compliance review proceedings. The "Article 21.5"
panel ruled that Australia had failed to comply because it had not required Howe
to repay the subsidy to the government.5 This was the first time any GATT or
WTO panel issued a judgment that would require a private actor to pay money
to a government.52 Given the important precedent being set in this case, which
might be characterized as a WTO-required expropriation, it was unfortunate that
the panel did not offer Howe a right to reply. The DSU gives every panel the
authority to seek information from any individual or body that the panel deems
appropriate. 3
In summary, notwithstanding its state-centric nature, the WTO interacts
with private economic actors in significant ways. In TRIPS and GATS,
governments are mandated to treat economic actors according to substantive
rules. In several WTO agreements, governments are mandated to accord private
actors various procedural rights. In the PSI Agreement, the exporter can avail
itself of arbitration at the WTO. All of these advances are important. Yet in
many other areas, economic actors are still excluded from WTO law and
implementation.
II. THE WTO AND SOCIAL ACTORS
The status of social actors at the WTO is better in some ways than the
status economic actors enjoy, but worse in most others. It is better because the
WTO Agreement permits direct involvement by NGOs in WTO affairs. It is
worse in that social actors did not achieve the gains that economic actors did in
the Uruguay Round.
Constitutionally, the WTO can be open to social actors. The WTO
Agreement (Article V: 2) says that "The General Council may make
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the
50. Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Report of the
Panel, May 25, 1999, WT/DS 126/R.
5I. Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Report of the Panel, Jan. 21, 2000, WT/DSI26/RW, I 6.48.
52. There were GATI' cases in which the government was directed to repay an antidumping duty
erroneously collected from an importer, but there the private actor was being compensated. See Petersmann,
supra note 23, at 42-43. In Leather, the assets of the private actor were to be confiscated.
53. DSU Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 13.1.
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WTO. ''54 This provision was implemented in 1996 by the General Council, but
its Guidelines provide for only very shallow participation by NGOs.5 The main
consultation so far has been a series of symposia organized by the WTO
Secretariat at which selected NGOs were invited to speak. NGOs are also able
to seek accreditation to attend WTO Ministerial Conferences as observers.
About 915 NGOs did so and attended the Seattle Ministerial in 1999.
The WTO has several councils, committees, and bodies, but social actors
are not allowed to participate in them. Thus, the TRIPS Council does not
consult medical NGOs concerned about drug patenting; the Committee on
Agriculture does not consult farm NGOs concerned about food security; and the
Textiles Monitoring Body does not consult development NGOs concerned about
continued protectionism in textiles. In the DSB, the opportunities for social
actors as a friend of the court are about the same as for private actors-that is,
very limited to nil. Even the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which
appraises government trade policies, does not solicit input from social actors.
Social actors do have one advantage over private actors however. Most
private actors cannot apply for accreditation to attend WTO Ministerial
Conferences. Thus, exporters, importers, and service suppliers cannot apply,
although associations of these private actors can apply (and do).
Although most of the WTO provisions that mandate procedural rights at
the national level pertain only to economic actors, there are two instances where
such rights pertain to social actors. These are in the Antidumping and SCM
agreements. The Antidumping Agreement directs governments to give
interested parties the right to participate in domestic antidumping proceedings,
and states that when the target product is commonly sold at the retail level,
"representative consumer organizations" shall have an opportunity to provide
information relevant to the ascertainment of dumping, injury, and causality.56
SCM has a similar provision with respect to subsidization, injury, and
causality." While it is possible to characterize consumer NGOs as economic
actors, they are better conceived as social actors because the interest of the
consumer is a general interest, not a special interest.
m11. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Even with its fuzziness, the distinction between economic and social actors
is helpful in showing how WTO law weaves in non-state actors. The economic
actors got new rights as market participants. The social actors got a special door
54. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at art. V.2.
55. Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, July 18,1996,
WT/L/162 [hereinafter NGO Guidelines].
56. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 6.12.
57. SCM Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 12.10.
Charnovitz
to the WTO, but the door is almost always closed. So one might say that the
WTO is more solicitous of homo economicus than homo politicus.
But that is too simplistic an explanation. The economic actors obtained
more from the Uruguay Round because they were better organized and asked
for more. In asking for more responsive administrative procedures at the
national level, the economic actors aligned themselves with an existing norm of
the GATT system (i.e., Article X). Social actors could follow this same track
in the next trade round. Strengthening due process for social actors could be
justified as a WTO goal because regulatory procedures that provide for public
participation may be more stable and less susceptible to special interest
influence. Consider the following example: The SPS Agreement calls for the
harmonization of standards and the acceptance of foreign standards as
equivalent in certain circumstances.58 These goals are more likely to be
achieved when each government has a fair, inclusive standard-setting procedure
that allows economic and social actors to participate. Presently, the
transparency provisions in the SPS Agreement apply only to state actors.59
When one looks at the international level, economic actors are no better
positioned for influencing WTO results than are social actors. Both lack formal
opportunities to participate. With respect to the WTO's legislative and
executive functions, the case for participation by social actors seems stronger
than for economic actors. That's because as an international agency, the WTO
should be more open to hearing assertions of public interest than individual
interest. With respect to the WTO's judicial functions, the prospect of giving
private groups a right of action seems remote. If that were to occur, economic
and social actors should have an equal right to participate after qualifying for
standing. As amici, economic and social actors should have similar access.
NGO participation is being debated at the WTO, but most governments
resist opening the doors.60 Such exclusivity is justified on the grounds that
government actors are the only legitimate participants in the WTO.
Governments are elected by "The People," while NGOs are merely selected by
their members. The fact that the WTO does not require its Member
Governments to be democratic (and many are not) is considered too
undiplomatic to mention in WTO debate.
The claim that an individual may lack legitimacy to speak is an
authoritarian idea. The right of an individual to speak for oneself, to form
associations, and to petition government is a natural right that undergirds
democracy. To suggest that when governments meet together to bargain, social
58. See SPS Agreement, supra note 7, at arts. 3.1, 4.1.
59. See Id. at Annex B, art. 7 (Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations).
60. Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 709 (1998).
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actors consequently lose their voice is both illogical and anti-democratic. The
creation of an international organization cannot deprive individuals of their
voice to the governments that run the organization. Indeed, the personality of
an international organization includes being open to some extent to public input.
In 1945, the drafters of the United Nations Charter recognized this truism
when they wrote Article 71 which provides that the Economic and Social
Council "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence."'" Some commentators view Article 71 as enshrining a new
principle of law. But in my view, Article 71 was merely reflective of customary
international law-namely, that in establishing international organizations with
legislative or executive functions, governments have an obligation to provide
a channel for NGOs.62
The continued influence of state-centrism among the delegates to the WTO
is understandable. These delegates work for governments. Furthermore, they
may prefer not having to compete intellectually with non-government actors.
What is surprising, though, is how state-centrism continues to distort the
thinking of academics and even social actors. Let me give two recent examples.
In September 2000, a group of academics sent a letter to 535 college presidents
criticizing the "Anti-Sweatshop" campaigns on college campuses. The letter
states: "Little attention has been given to whether the views of the Anti-
Sweatshop campaign are representative of the views of governments, non-
government organizations and workers in the poor countries."63 But why should
it matter whether the anti-sweatshop campaigners are representing the views of
developing country governments who are tolerating, if not promoting, the
sweatshops? (The professors' point about foreign NGOs and workers has
merit.) In December 2000, the United States labor federation (the AFL-CIO)
wrote the Office of the United States Trade Representative to offer views on the
ongoing United States negotiations with Singapore for a free trade agreement.
The AFL-CIO opposed inclusion of an investor-to-state dispute resolution
system, explaining that "Investors ought not to be able to bypass their own
governments to determine when a dispute merits international arbitration .... 964
To hear such a constipated view from the AFL-CIO is particularly startling
given the longtime role of the American labor movement in championing
61. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 250-52 (1997).
62. The other institutions considered in this panel session, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, are not really contrary practice because when they were set up in 1944, they were conceived
as financial institutions. Today, both the Bank and the Fund are more open to NGO input than is the WTO.
63. Nancy Dunne, Professors take on campus protestors, FIN. TiMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at 12.
64. AFL-CIO Comments on U.S. - Singapore FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 22, 2000, at 16.
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opportunities for NGOs to bypass their governments in international
organizations.
Change will come to the WTO. If I may offer a prediction, I think that
social and economic actors will gain significant participatory rights at the WTO
within the next decade. Both NGOs and the private sector are far better
positioned to influence the trading system in 2000 than they were in 1990.
Furthermore, the trends inducing that change will continue. The most important
trends are the increase in international transactions and the widening of W'TO
law. Each new WTO agreement brings new private actors into the trading
system, all asking the same initial questions as to how they can participate.
Eventually, the resistance of the WTO to greater cooperation and consultation
with NGOs will melt away.
In closing, let me offer three suggestions for what can be done to improve
the interface between the WTO and the private and non-profit sectors. First, we
ought to begin thinking about an Optional Protocol for the WTO wherein parties
would agree to WTO jurisdiction for disputes lodged by private actors. 65 A
minimum number of governments would be required to ratify the accord. One
might wonder why any government would ratify. The answer is the same as for
analogous protocols in human rights treaties. Governments do so to
demonstrate and lock in their commitment to international rules.
A second suggestion is that the WTO negotiate an Agreement on Public
Participation in National Trade Policymaking." This idea follows from the
statement in the WTO's NGO Guidelines: "Closer consultation and cooperation
with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate processes at the
national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-
making." 67
In drafting such a Protocol, inspiration could be drawn from the 1976
Tripartite Consultation Convention (No. 144) of the International Labor
Organization and the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters." One might also recall the recommendation by the GATT's Leutwiler
Group (in 1985) that governments consider setting up "advisory groups made
65. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding permits using WTO dispute settlement for
"plurilateral" agreements, which apply to parties inter se. DSU Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2.1.
66. See Christophe Bellmann & Richard Gerster, Accountability in the World Trade Organization,
30 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1996, at 31,41-62.
67. NGO Guidelines, supra note 55, 16.
68. Convention Concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote the Implementation of International
Labour Standards, June 21, 1976, 1089 U.N.T.S. 354; Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, arts. 6-8.
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up of influential and active representatives of the main stakeholders in
international trade-business, finance, labour, and consumers." 9
My final suggestion is that the WTO set out a place on its website to solicit
comments from the public on pending decisions, declarations, and agreements.
Eventually, there should be one website posting such notices for all international
organizations-in other words, a global "Federal Register." So far, however,
only a few international organizations regularly seek public comment, such as
the World Bank and the North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation. That will surely change early in the 21 st century.
69. GAT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FrURE 37 (1985). Today more stakeholders would be
acknowledged.
CIVIL SOCIETY AT THE WTO: THE ILLUSION OF
INCLUSION?
Jeffrey L Dunoff"
In this brief essay, I want to link our panel's focus on civil society-and
related issues of inclusion and participation-with the broader conference theme
of international law and organizations as we enter the 21st century. In short,
what can a focus on inclusion and participation tell us about the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as it enters the new millennium?
I believe that a focus on inclusion and participation suggests a three-part
thesis about the WTO. First, the WTO is in a time of fundamental transition.
Second, the strategies used to date to address this transition have been, at best,
ineffectual, and at worst, counterproductive. Third, the transition issues reveal
the limits of current WTO practices and strategies. Successful approaches to
transition issues will require not only new political strategies, but also new
understandings of the trade regime.
I can do no more than outline this thesis here. To do so, I will explore a
few simple sounding questions: "who," "what," and "where." "Who" is a
question about constituents: who has a meaningful voice, and who is excluded
from the trade system? "What" is a question about competence: what subject
areas fall within the trade system? "Where" is a question about coherence:
where does WTO law and doctrine fit within the larger international law
universe?
Each of these questions implicates civil society, and issues of inclusion and
.participation. The "who" question focuses directly on Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) participation at the WTO. The "what" and "where"
questions focus on issues that NGOs have pressed upon the WTO. As we will
see, in each area, there are significant pressures for the WTO to be less closed
or isolated, and more inclusive, open, or integrated. In each area there are
moves towards these goals, but upon examination, it is not clear whether
progress is real or illusory.
* Professor of Law and Director, Transnational Law Program, Temple University School of Law.
This paper is a slightly revised version of a presentation at the International Law Association's International
Law Weekend in October 2000. An expanded treatment of the ideas presented here can be found in Jeffrey
L Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO.WASH. INT'L L
REv. (forthcoming 2001). I am grateful to Padideh Ala'i for the opportunity to participate in this conference,
and to Jane Baron for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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I then want to explore a final question: "How?" How are these transition
issues related? How come they seem so intractable? How might they be
solved?
The "who" question asks who has a meaningful voice in the WTO. Until
recently, there was a short and simple answer to this question-the United
States and the Europeans. But, after the Uruguay Round, increasing pressure
from both inside and outside the WTO signaled that this was no longer an
adequate answer.
Inside the WTO, developing countries raised concerns about the nature and
quality of their participation. The procedural concern was that developing
nations had been largely excluded from the most important Uruguay Round
negotiations. The substantive concern was that the Uruguay Round Agreements
favored developed nations at their expense. Developing nations saw an
asymmetry between the very limited progress on developed nations' Uruguay
Round commitments on textiles and apparel, and the increasing pressure on
them to timely implement their Uruguay Round commitments. By 1999, this
asymmetry made the Uruguay Round's "grand bargain" look more like a "bum
deal."
Developing nations resolved not to be effectively excluded from the
process again. In retrospect, the protracted debates over selection of a new
WTO Director General signaled that developing nations were no longer willing
to conduct business as usual. The procedural demands that developing nations
raised at Seattle underscored how important this issue had become. There are
also, of course, external pressures, from NGOs and other sectors of civil society.
Here, the concern has less to do with the quality of participation than with near-
total exclusion, and related concerns about WTO transparency.
In Seattle, these internal and external trends coalesced. In the streets, NGO
theatrics captured public and media attention. In the suites, developed and
developing nations were unable to reach agreement on either procedural or
substantive issues. On the procedural front, developing nations rejected the
United States proposals for working groups. On the substantive front, there was
deep disagreement over the scope of a new round, including the possible
inclusion of, for example, labor and environmental standards and reform of anti-
dumping rules.
Since Seattle, much time has been spent on how to improve the quality of
developing nations' participation. There have been numerous meetings,
proposals, and reports. But many thoughtful observers question whether much
progress has been made.
On the NGO front, there has been substantial activity and some important
progress. However, this limited progress is often oversold. An example here
is the ostensible opening of WTO dispute resolution to NGOs. In this regard,
the most dramatic development was the Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body (AB)
report holding that Panels had legal authority to receive amicus briefs from
NGOs.' This is widely heralded as an important breakthrough in NGO
participation at the WTO.
But it may be too soon to conclude that this doctrinal development should
be celebrated. It is instructive to look at actual practice. Prior to the Shrimp-
Turtle dispute, NGOs had submitted amicus briefs in two disputes. In each
case, the panel simply refused to consider these submissions.
2
In Shrimp-Turtle, the panel followed this pattern and concluded that NGO
briefs were inadmissible as a matter of WTO law. However, the panel then
invited the parties to append NGO briefs to their own, which the United States
did. While the AB explicitly rejected the panel's legal determination, it
expressly approved the panel's decision to permit parties to append NGO briefs
to their own and adopted a similar procedure itself. The AB then specifically
asked the United States to state whether it "agree[d] with or adopt[ed]" the NGO
arguments. It then "focused" solely on the NGO arguments that were already
in the United States submission.
Since the AB report, amicus briefs have been submitted in a handful of
disputes. In one case, a panel actually appeared to have relied on an amicus
submission. This occurred, however, not in determining the merits of the
dispute, but rather in a later compliance proceeding.3
In every other case in which amicus briefs or other materials have been
submitted, it appears that they have had little or no impact. For example, in the
course of the European Community challenge to a portion of the United States
Copyright Act, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) asked the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) for
information in response to a series of queries from the panel. A law firm
representing ASCAP responded, by letter, to the USTR, and forwarded a copy
of this letter to the panel. The panel stated that while "it did not reject outright
the information contained in the letter," it did not rely on the letter "for our
reasoning or our conclusions."4
1. Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
2. Appellate Body, United States-Standards on Reformulated Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20,
1996); Appellate Body, EU-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18,
1997).
3. Award of Arbitrator, Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS 18/9 (Feb.
23, 1999).
4. Report of Panel, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS 160R, l 6.8
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In India's challenge to the European Union's imposition of antidumping
duties on certain Indian bed linens, the panel received an unsolicited amicus
brief from the Foreign Trade Association supporting India's arguments. The
panel's entire discussion of this submission, found in a footnote, reads as
follows: "We did not find it necessary to take the submission into account in
reaching our decision in this dispute."5
In the British Steel case, the United States asked the panel to open up the
hearing to outside observers. This request was denied. The panel also refused
to accept an amicus brief submitted by the American Iron and Steel Institute
(AISI) on the grounds that it had not been timely filed.6 On appeal, amicus
briefs were submitted by AISI and the Specialty Steel Association of America.
The European Union, Mexico, and Brazil argued that the AB had no authority
to accept these briefs; the United States argued that such authority existed. The
AB stated:
We are of the opinion that we have the legal authority under the DSU
to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we
find it pertinent and useful to do so. In this appeal, we have not found
it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in
rendering our decision.7
The most recent-and the most telling-developments on this front have
come in the Asbestos Case. At the panel stage of this dispute, five NGOs
submitted amicus briefs. The European Community incorporated by reference
two of these briefs, which the panel considered. The other three NGO briefs
were rejected, again with minimal discussion.8
The European Community appealed the decision. When it became
apparent that many NGOs wanted to submit briefs in this action, the AB issued
a "communication" setting out a procedure whereby interested entities could file
a petition for leave to file a written brief with the AB. In response, the WTO's
General Council scheduled a special meeting to discuss this communication and
the larger issue of NGO participation. At this meeting, a large majority of WTO
(June 15, 2000).
5. Report of Panel, European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, at n.10 (Oct. 30, 2000).
6. Report of Panel, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS 138/R, '16.3 (Dec. 23,
1999).
7. Appellate Body, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS 138/AB/R, 42 (May
10, 2000).
8. Report of Panel, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DSI35/R, 11 6.1-6.4 (Sept. 18, 2000).
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members who spoke criticized the AB for issuing this communication. The
Chair of the General Council stated that he would forward a note to the AB
urging it to exercise "extreme caution" on this issue. The AB denied each of the
seventeen applications for leave to file an amicus brief that had been filed in the
case.
So, on the doctrinal front, there is an apparent advance-panels and the AB
now clearly have legal authority to accept NGO submissions. But,
paradoxically, the resulting practice is actually a step backwards for those who
urge greater NGO involvement. In practice, NGO submissions are frequently
rejected. In those few instances when they are even considered, they typically
are considered only when adopted by a party. In these cases, NGOs do not
participate as independent actors, but rather as "appendages" to the parties'
submissions. In practice, they participate at the sufferance of the parties to the
dispute. But, by effectively turning NGOs from independent actors into entities
that simply echo government arguments, the panels eliminate the potential
advantages of NGO participation.
Moreover, this process reinforces many of the conventional argument
against NGO participation--that NGOs most appropriately participate at the
domestic level, that states are free to adopt or reject NGO positions, and that
NGOs should not have "two bites at the apple" by participating at the
international level. While doctrinal developments deprive NGOs of a powerful
rhetorical argument about the closed nature of WTO dispute resolution, actual
practice effectively keeps NGOs excluded from WTO dispute resolution. 9
In short, despite substantial activity, there is a real question whether
meaningful progress has been made on the inclusion front. Do we, in practice,
have only the illusion of inclusion?
II
Let me know turn from the "who" question to very briefly touch upon the
"'what" question. What issue areas are properly in the trade regime? What
topics are--or should be-properly considered in other fora?
There is substantial debate over whether certain "social" issues, such as
environment or labor, should be within the WTO. NGOs have, of course,
played a key role in these debates. While a full discussion of this controversial
topic is outside the scope of our focus on civil society, I suggest below why this
debate-forcefully raised by civil society-is unlikely to reach closure anytime
soon. For present purposes, however, the salient point is that NGOs have put
9. This is particularly disturbing when one considers the access the other types of non-state actors
have to WTO dispute resolution proceedings. See, e.g., Jeffrey L Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO
Participation at the WTO, I J. oF INT'L ECON. L 433 (1998) (outlining the considerable roles that business
entities play in WTO dispute resolution).
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this issue on the table, and absent progress toward a consensus on this question,
negotiations on a new WTO round are unlikely to make significant progress.
III
There is a third important transitional question, "where?" Where does
WTO law fit into the broader international law universe? This is a question
about coherence. Again, NGOs have been at the center of the debate, urging the
WTO to account for non-trade law and values. Once again, there is apparent
movement on this front, as recent WTO panels have been much more likely to
invoke non-WTO law. The question, as above, is whether, in this context,
appearances are deceiving.
Again, the Shrimp-Turtle dispute provides a good example. The AB
reviewed relevant provisions of several international environmental instruments
in interpreting General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade Article XX. This was
unprecedented, and the environmental community and other NGOs have largely
celebrated this move. Again, this appears to be a move from a relatively
insulated legal regime toward a more open regime.
But the underlying question is whether the incorporation of non-WTO law
will be a "selective" incorporation? For example, as long as the AB was
invoking international environmental law in this dispute, why did it not examine
whether complainants had any duties under international environmental law
towards endangered sea turtles? Why did it not directly address whether the
United States embargo was either authorized or required by international
environmental law--even though this issue was squarely presented in an NGO
amicus brief? So, the critical question here is whether panels will use all or only
some non-WTO law. More pointedly, with future panels rely on non-WTO law
where to do so does not interfere with the goal of market access and trade
liberalization, but fail to do so where non-WTO law impedes these objectives?
So, in the "who," "what," and "where" issues there is tremendous pressure
from civil society to be more inclusive, more open, and more integrated. In
response, there has been much activity apparently designed to move towards
this goal. But, in each case, progress may be more apparent than real. Again,
the open question is whether all the activity represents real progress or merely
the illusion of inclusion?
IV
The "who," "what," and "where" questions illustrate the nature and scope
of the issues facing the WTO as it enters the new century. Now let's explore
another question: "how?" How are these issues related? How come they seem
so difficult? How might they be solved?
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Let me suggest three ways these transition questions are related. First,
each of the three questions are not only central to the WTO's transition, but also
raise fundamental questions about nature of the international legal order.
Consider again the question of what issues belong in the trade system. On one
level this is a question about the competence and limits of the WTO. But on a
deeper level, this question is a profound challenge to the current conventional
vision of public international law. We usually view international law as
consisting of a series of substantive fields (e.g., trade, human rights,
environment, etc.) that exist as independent and autonomous areas, each subject
to its own practices, norms, and institutions.
But this way of organizing the field is historically contingent. Today trade
is a hugely visible area of international law. However, in the 1960s, leading
casebooks considered trade to be outside the mainstream of international law,
and, in 1971, the French Society of International Law sponsored its famous
debate on whether international economic law was part of international law or
an autonomous discipline.10 All of this suggests that there is nothing necessary
or natural in current doctrinal divisions. Elsewhere, I have argued that the
"who" and "where" questions also raise foundational international law issues.
So one way that the transitional issues are related is that they transcend the trade
context and raise foundational questions about the international legal order.
There is a second way that the three questions are related. Each of them
reveals and subverts a fundamental myth about the trade system. Given space
constraints, I will again give just one example. Consider again the question of
who participates in the WTO. In this context, many invoke the "fact" that the
WTO is an intergovernmental body as a justification for not providing NGO
access to WTO processes. It is surely true that, as a formal textual matter, the
WTO is an intergovernmental body. But, again, it is helpful to shift our
attention from doctrine to actual practice.
There can be little doubt that non-state actorg have long played very
significant-albeit informal and unofficial-roles in both the legislative and
dispute resolution processes. Consider, for example, the role of the software
and pharmaceutical industries in driving the intellectual property agenda in the
Uruguay Round negotiations. Or, how firms like American Express and AIG
shaped the negotiations over what would eventually become the General
Agreement on Trade in Services.
Non-state actors also play significant roles in dispute resolution. Indeed,
a number of WTO disputes-including the Kodak-Fuji dispute and the
Reformulated Gas dispute1 -are only nominally between WTO parties, and can
10. SOCIETE FRANCAISE POUR LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, COLLOQUE D'ORLEANS, ASPECTS DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE (Paris, editions Pedone 1972).
11. Report of Panel, Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
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be more fruitfully understood as components of complex international corporate
battles. 12
Close examination of the role of civil society reveals that the truism that
the WTO is an intergovernmental body is formally accurate, but in practice
largely a myth. The "what" and "where" questions likewise reveal myths about
the trade system. The underlying question is whether these myths serve some
purpose. Or, at this point, do they instead frustrate efforts to move ahead on the
WTO transition issues?
Let me briefly outline a third answer to the question of how the "who,"
"what," and "where" questions are related. In a nutshell, what is at stake in
these issues is fundamentally different from what is at stake in more traditional
trade issues. Let me try quickly to explain what I mean here.
The conventional wisdom about trade disputes runs along the following
lines: Nation A restricts trade in goods from nation B. If B prevails in WTO
dispute resolution, A is supposed to remove the offending trade measure. While
A "loses" the particular dispute, the conventional understanding is that A "wins"
because removing the trade restriction increases welfare.
But for many of the most controversial of the current disputes, this
conventional understanding of the "win-win" nature of disputes is inapposite.
Consider disputes over intellectual property rights in the traditional knowledge
of indigenous peoples; over trade in GMOs; over the "multifunctional" nature
of agriculture; over trade in cultural products; or over the role of civil society
at the WTO. Why are these disputes so highly charged, and why do they seem
so intractable?
I wonder if it is because participants in these disputes do not understand
them to be about maximizing welfare. Rather, they understand these disputes
to be about the social and moral standing of competing communities, whether
regional or racial, cultural or economic. Groups directly involved in these
debates often understand their resolution as a signal about their political and
social standing. The traditional consequentialist logic of trade law and doctrines
is unlikely to adequately capture this important "expressive" dimension of these
issues. 13
V
Identifying the ways that these three questions-the "who," "what," and
"where" questions-are related also shows how hard they are to solve. If they
WT/DS44 (Apr. 22, 1998); Appellate Body, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
12. For an extended discussion, see Dunoff, supra note 9.
13. This idea is explored in Jeffrey L Dunoff, Some Costs and Benefits of Economic Analysis of
International Law, 94 PRoC. AM. SOC'Y. INT'L L. PRoc. 185 (2000).
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each reveal myths of the system; if they each reveal how our conventional
consequentialist rhetoric is insufficient; if they all raise foundational
international law questions; then the resolution of these issues will be
exceedingly difficult. How should these issues be addressed?
Given space limitations, let me simply suggest here that the primary
institutional mechanism used to date is inadequate. Who has decided whether
WTO panels should use non-WTO law? The answer has come from dispute
resolution panels. Who has decided whether NGOs should participate in dispute
resolution processes? Again, the panels have been, defacto, the body to answer
this question. This is problematic in several respects.
I'll mention just one. Consider institutional roles and politics. When a
domestic legislature confronts difficult issues like, for example, how to balance
conflicting trade and environmental interests, it is perfectly appropriate for that
body to declare that it has resolved a value conflict, and made policy, through
majority vote. But the same is not true of WTO panels. They are not policy-
making bodies. Instead, they are supposed to apply law to fact to decide
according to principle, not politics. Indeed, WTO dispute resolution would be
delegitimated if it were seen as a forum for the political resolution of value
conflicts.
But this poses an unavoidable obstacle to successful panel resolution of
questions like the "who," "what," and "where" questions. Why? Precisely
because these transition issues are so contested. While numerous issues are
contested, the transitional issues are today contested in a way that appears to
take them outside of the legal domain, and squarely into the political domain:
Now, paradoxically, it has been sustained and effective NGO advocacy that has
made these issues so contested; but it is precisely this contestedness that would
make it difficult for panels to address these issues in ways that seem consistent.
But inconsistency in these areas would signal that politics-not law-is at play.
And for institutional reasons, panels should rarely send that signal.
In other words, these transitional issues threaten to overwhelm WTO
dispute resolution. While the WTO dispute resolution system is, of course, a
tremendous achievement, the plea here is to be cognizant of its limitations.'
Where does all this leave us? Let me conclude with two thoughts about
transitions.
First, in transitional times, procedure is substance. There are strong
procedural elements to the "who," "what," and "where" questions. These are
all a search for ways to surface the appropriate voices and values. In this sense,
at least in the short term, it may be less important that the resolution of any of
14. For more on the ways that the new trade agenda threatens to overburden WTO dispute
resolution, and what to do about this, see Jeffrey L Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INr'L
L. 733 (1999).
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the questions is "correct" in some substantive sense, than that the resolution
ensure that all the relevant interests are identified and taken into account.
Finally, we should not be surprised by the ubiquity. The ancient Greek
philosopher Heraclitus said that "one cannot step into the same river twice."
There is a useful insight here about the constancy of change. We should not be
surprised to see that the WTO is in transition. Like people, legal rules and
institutions have life cycles. They are born because of a practical need. If well-
designed, they flourish for a time. But changing conditions pose new
challenges. When the tensions between a rule and social necessity finally
become too intense, the rule dies. It is replaced by another rule that is destined
to experience the same fate. So it may be that we will come to see that for the
WTO-and the other international bodies we will discuss at this conference-
to be in a time of transition is more a norm than an aberration, and more an
opportunity than a crisis.
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE TO EMERGING AND TRANSITION
ECONOMIES AND STATES IN CRISIS
Karen Hudes*
Reconstruction of countries emerging from conflict is at the heart of
development. Since 1980, almost half of all low-income countries have
experienced conflict, and nearly every country in Africa has either experienced
major conflict, or borders on a country which has.' Conflict has brought
Yugoslavia into poverty, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, postwar incomes were
about one-fourth of 1990 incomes. Real per capita income in Lebanon in 1990
was estimated at one-third its 1975 level in dollar terms. Fifteen of the world's
poorest countries have experienced significant periods of conflict since the
1980s.
What is post-conflict reconstruction? This is a process which supports the
transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through rebuilding the
socioeconomic framework of the society. Reconstruction does not refer only
to reconstruction of physical infrastructure. What is needed is a reconstruction
of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society in the framework
of governance and rule of law. The role of external agencies, including the
World Bank (Bank) is not to implement this process but, rather, to support it.
Often, conflicts are linked to competition for scarce resources, and in this
context development strategies can play a role in enhancing or reducing
tensions. In the past five years the World Bank has made more than $400
million in grants from its surplus earnings to post-conflict governments and to
the United Nations system. The World Bank is part of a Conflict Prevention
and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network, which consists of the United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as bilateral donor
agencies, humanitarian aid agencies, and foundations. 2 This network met in
* Senior Counsel, the World Bank. This article represents the views of Karen Hudes and are not
those of the World Bank or its members.
I. During the 1990s, there have been 39 major conflicts, and since 1989 the United Nations has
mounted more than twenty-five peacekeeping forces.
2. Canadian International Development Agency, Department for International Development,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische
Zusammenarbeit, European Community Humanitarian Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and
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Ottawa in June 1999, and in New York last November, to exchange
information, improve coordination, and strengthen partnerships. The Bank is
involved in a collaborative effort with other members of the Conflict Prevention
and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network to provide a more coherent planning
process that draws upon organizations' particular strengths.
Perhaps one of the greatest advantages the Bank can bring to post-conflict
settings is its knowledge of comparable situations. Local stakeholders benefit
from hearing how the special problems of transition worked, or did not work,
in other countries that had similar problems. The Bank is generally not among
the first humanitarian assistance organizations to begin programming in post-
conflict countries. Therefore, Bank staff have the opportunity to survey what
others are doing in order to selectively focus on sectors which are under-
supported by other humanitarian assistance agencies.
Collaboration with the IMF on stabilization and other macroeconomic
issues is also important. Early consultations between the United Nations
agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions are important. For example,
following the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, donors agreed that Bank funds
would be applied, along with other donor aid, to reinforce those cities that had
shown ethnic tolerance. In Tajikistan, World Bank programs were targeted to
areas specified in the peace accords, at the encouragement of stakeholders,
including the government.
The Bank developed post-conflict experience in Sub-Saharan Africa,
including Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and Rwanda. The Bank was also involved
in two recent post-conflict situations, in the West Bank and Gaza, and in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and West Bank/Gaza, mechanisms for
cooperation with the United Nations system as part of the Conflict Prevention
and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network were set up.3 In El Salvador and in
Nicaragua, the Bank became involved in the process at a later stage.
Financing of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities must be justified
on economic grounds. The Bank focuses primarily on post-conflict
Development, Federal Republic of Germany, International Committee of the Red Cross, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, The Netherlands, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, United Nations
Children's Fund, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization. United Nations High Commission for Refugees, United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office for Project Services, United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations World Food Program, United States Agency for
International Development, War-tom Societies Project, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Carter
Center, Human Rights Watch, InterAction: American Council for Voluntary International Action,
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Rescue Committee, Mercy
Corps International, Search for Common Ground, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
3. Other UN partnerships also exist with UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and UNFPA to slow
the spread of AIDS.
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reconstruction and subsequent development, although it may play an indirect
role in other activity areas, i.e., providing technical input to peace negotiations,
assessing the long-term implications of relief programs, etc. The Bank also
does not provide relief assistance. However, the Bank does provide early
information sharing with relief agencies on planning activities. Peace treaties
require economic underpinning. At the Dayton talks on Bosnia, the Bank
provided practical technical advice on budgets, economic incentives, and
taxation arrangements.
Innovative and catalytic funds are available from the World Bank, United
Nations High Commissioner Refugees, United Nations Development
Programme, and certain bilateral agencies to address post-conflict needs, but
they are not sufficient. The challenge is addressing the gaps within our
institutions and funding systems. A key step is developing a consistent and
coherent assistance strategy. Roles should be defined based upon capacity and
comparative advantages, with principles to guide allocation and use of
resources, with a common strategy, and agreed sequence and plan. Allan
Gerson recently concluded a study for the Council on Foreign Relations, in
which he recommended that the collaboration between the United Nations, the
Bank, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) be institutionalized into a
"Peace Transitions Council."
The Bank must follow legal, mandate, and administrative restrictions in
post-conflict situations. The Bank does not play a direct role in conflict
prevention due to the following three provisions of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement relating to political influences upon its lending, decision-making,
and the allegiance of its staff and officers:
a) The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of
any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was
granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and
efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic
influences or considerations. (Article III, Section 5(b));
b) The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the
political character of the member or members concerned. Only
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the
purposes stated in Article I. (Article IV, Section 10);
c) The President, officers and staff of the Bank, in the discharge of
their offices, owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no other
authority. Each member of the Bank shall respect the international
character of this duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence
any of them in the discharge of their duties. (Article V, Section 5(c)).
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The World Bank cannot seek to influence the political course of events in
post-conflict settings. In this aspect, the World Bank is less flexible than many
bilateral funders. The basic principle is that Bank financing should not be based
upon, or conditioned by, political or military goals. Rather, the financing of
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities must be justified on economic
grounds. The World Bank must also obtain agreement among the Bank's
governing members before allocating its net income to fund the Bank's post-
conflict programs. Also, the Bank's Board is consulted on crucial decisions
regarding Bank involvement.
There are essentially five stages the World Bank employs in its assistance
to a country as it moves out of conflict:
1) A watching brief in conflict countries in which there is no active
portfolio;
2) Preparation of a transitional support strategy as soon as resolution is
in sight;
3) Transitional early reconstruction activities, proceeding as soon as
field conditions allow;
4) Post-conflict reconstruction (under emergency procedures); and
5) Return to normal lending operations.
When no active lending portfolio exists in a country due to conflict, the
World Bank maintains a Watching Brief to track circumstances. It serves four
purposes: a) to forewarn the Bank about the likely time when operations can
restart; b) to improve understanding of special political risks, and economic and
social needs that occur in conflicts; c) to identify areas of comparative
advantage where the Bank should plan to work; d) and to examine and compare
potential counterparts that the Bank should work with.
The Watching Brief is a process for organizing existing information about
a country and involves communication with potential partners. The process
may involve consultations, workshops, and negotiations. The Watching Brief
also establishes thresholds for entry into technical assistance, or resumption of
regular operations. They include absence of systematic violence, signing of a
peace agreement by conflicting parties, re-entry of other organizations, (UNDP
and foreign embassies), return of foreign direct investment. External triggers
include recognition by neighbor governments of national governments.
As soon as resolution is in sight, a transitional support strategy is prepared.
There needs to be an effective counterpart for the Bank, and evidence of strong
international cooperation. The transitional support strategies typically cover a
two year period, and are based on social assessments, which are carried out
flexibly to target time-sensitive needs that are specific to the phase of the peace
or reconstruction effort. The assessments also recognize sources of social
conflict and tension, engagement with civil society, increased focus on
governance, and a frank exploration of the costs of both random and organized
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violence. Creativity and political sensitivity are needed to design programs that
reinforce peace, population return, and social rebuilding.
Violence may recur in the fragile post-conflict situation; hence it is difficult
to draw a definite line between the "humanitarian" and "development"
components of rehabilitation and reconstruction. There is often a need for
simultaneous relief, rehabilitation, and development interventions. Resource
mobilization for development assistance requires round tables, consultative
groups, and country-specific trust funds. Development interventions often
require a planned response because of procurement and disbursement
mechanisms. Operational linkages are being established among the
humanitarian agencies and the development agencies. Also, debt arrears may
delay the full participation of international financial institutions.
Many times, the Bank's comparative strength is in household survival
strategies, informal trade, rebuilding infrastructure critical to market access, and
informal credit systems. Much of the Bank's work has been in rebuilding
physical infrastructure such as roads and buildings. There are also operations
designed to promote economic adjustment, including targeted employment
creation programs. Promoting employment can provide jobs to ex-combatants,
displaced persons, and other people affected by war. Educational and medical
systems need to be kept operating.
The challenge of moving war-torn countries from a situation of dependence
to one that is self-sustaining and engaged in the world economy depends upon
a comprehensive assistance strategy. The process needs to be inclusive,
involving active participation of the government and civil society. Other
vulnerable and marginalized groups need to be involved such as women,
children, the elderly, ex-combatants, and displaced populations.
Some of the other areas in which the Bank has broad experience include
issues involving governance, participatory approaches, and social policy. In the
past decade, the Bank has become increasingly involved in governance issues,
which are defined as the management of public resources on behalf of all
citizens with fairness and openness.4 For example, there are more than 300
Bank-financed projects containing components for legal and judicial reform.'
In a pilot anticorruption6 program, the World Bank Institute worked with teams
4. The definition of governance used by the Bank in SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - FROM CRISIS TO
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH A LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY xii (November 1989), is "the exercise of political
power to manage a nation's affairs."
5. M. Dakolias, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (2000).
6. Corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, a definition also used by the
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representing seven countries in Africa to formulate governance programs in
those countries.7
Another important function, which the Bank serves, is analyzing and
disseminating information on issues and lessons learned. The Bank manages
a knowledge dissemination network (Web pages and other sources), maintains
a database on issues related to post-conflict activities, brings together Bank staff
from different regions to share lessons in reconstruction strategies, and develops
best practices. Much remains to be learned about reconstruction; the Bank has
no panacea for the international management of violent conflict. Bank
operations in countries emerging from conflict are not "business as usual," there
are risks involved:
1) The nature, intensity and origin of the hostilities;
2) Weak institutional capacity; and
3) Security risks.
In conclusion, the World Bank plays a complementary role to the United
Nations and other members of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network. The
Bank will engage in areas in which it has a comparative advantage, such as
physical reconstruction, institutional and social development, and donor
coordination. The Bank's presence may help to leverage or open up other areas
of assistance and mobilize the resources of other agencies-bilateral, multilateral,
or private.
7. The Governance, F'mance and Regulatory Group at WBI, Controlling Corruption: Towards an
Integrated Strategy, with respect to Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, in
Preparation for the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference in Durban, South Africa, October 10-15,
1999, available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gac (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
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THE INCREASING ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS
IN INVESTMENT TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Mark Kantor*
I would like to welcome you to our panel on the Increasing Role of Interest
Groups in Investment Transactions Involving International Financial
Institutions. Our objective today is to discuss the growing impact on
international investment transactions of local and international interest groups-
organizations such as business associations, consumer, environmental and
human rights groups, community activists and labor associations. As will
become apparent from the presentations, the role of interest groups has grown
in parallel with the increased participation of international financial institutions
(IFIs) as financing sources for these investments. Our panel will focus on
individual projects in which IFIs participate, not (as other panels are addressing
during this conference) on the impact of interest groups on change within the
institutional frameworks of those financial institutions.
For many years, multilateral development organizations like the World
Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank focused their efforts on the public sector. Indeed, the
Articles of Agreement of the World Bank limit World Bank loans and
guarantees solely to public sector entities. Since the early 1990s, however,
multilateral institutions have become important contributors to the financing of
private sector investments in emerging markets. The International Finance
Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency have led this
reorientation within the World Bank Group, and the World Bank itself has
placed a carefully circumscribed toe in the waters of privately financed
infrastructure though its partial-risk guarantee program and through sector
adjustment loans intended to assist privatizations. Faced with fewer charter
constraints, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank also moved in the mid-nineties to provide direct debt and equity support
for private sector projects in areas considered central to economic and social
development in member countries.
* Mr. Kantor recently retired from partnership at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, where
he focused for twenty years on international finance and investment transactions. He is currently assisting
several non-profit organizations on law reform projects in developing countries. He is also teaching as an
adjunct faculty member at Georgetown University Law Center.
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National governments also refocused their financial support in the 1990s
towards the private sector in emerging markets, particularly to support
purchases of goods and services exported from their own markets. National
export credit agencies (ECAs) such as United States Eximbank, CoFACE,
ECGD, JBIC and Hermes and investment promotion agencies such as the
United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) have become
substantial providers of guarantee and loan assistance to privately owned
infrastructure projects and other investments in emerging market economies.
The participation of multilateral and national IFls in private direct
investment transactions has carried with it an increasing voice for local and
international interest groups in those transactions. The growing role of interest
groups is not surprising in hindsight. Multilateral financial institutions have
been under great pressure to open their own processes to these groups, as have
ECAs in various countries. The involvement of an IFI in a private transaction
creates a natural platform for interest groups to seek a more forceful role in
structuring and implementing the investment.
Examples of recent investment transactions in which interest groups are
playing prominent roles abound. For example, the Chad-Cameroon petroleum
development and pipeline project has achieved considerable attention, as
environmental and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
community groups have challenged the role of the World Bank, the European
Investment Bank and several ECAs in providing support for the project.
The Chad-Cameroon project is a $3.5 billion oil field development and oil
pipeline project to develop the Doba oilfields in southern Chad and transport the
oil by means of a 1070 km pipeline to a marine terminal at Kribi on the Atlantic
coast of Cameroon. The project was approved by the World Bank in June 2000,
but remains mired at this time in controversy over a number of issues, including
the alleged diversion towards arms purchases by Chad of part of an initial
payment by the project sponsors. The principal international sponsors are
Exxon Mobil, Petronas and Chevron, and both Chad and Cameroon will also
participate as equity investors in the project. The World Bank and the European
Investment Bank propose to lend approximately $115 million to these
governments to finance acquisition of the equity interests. In addition, about
thirty-seven percent of the cost of constructing the project will be raised as loans
from IFIs or in the commercial bank debt markets, with virtually all of that
indebtedness covered by political risk or comprehensive support provided by
ECAs or funded directly by IFIs.
The World Bank also anticipates providing loans of $17.5 million to Chad
and $5.77 million to Cameroon to finance "capacity-building" for the purpose
of enabling those governments to maintain adequate oversight of the project and
its effect on the affairs of the host country. The International Development
Association (IDA), the World Bank's lending arm for the poorest countries, will
provide further capacity-building support of $23.7 million and $5.8 million,
respectively, in equivalent credits. The impact on Chad will be especially
pronounced. As the World Bank has stated, "Chad's capacity weakness is of
particular concern. This weakness is all-encompassing and greater than in most
sub-Saharan countries, reflecting the impact of almost three decades of civil
strife.... ." Once revenues commence, the project could bring Chad revenues
of about $200 million each year for the next quarter-century, resulting in a
doubling of the country's budget. The capacity-building loans are intended to
finance the building of the institutional capability within the two governments
to effectively absorb and allocate the large anticipated in-flows. Taking
together all forms of IFI assistance, official credit support is thus directly
necessary for raising about forty percent of all project costs, and additional
World Bank loans are financing reforms to mitigate the adverse impact of the
projected flood of revenues on weak government institutions in the host
countries.
Local and international NGOs have criticized the proposed oil field and
pipeline project severely for a number of reasons and in a number of forums.
Environmental and social objections include concerns over the loss of
livelihoods and resettlement of rural peoples; loss of biodiversity; the impact of
leaks from underground pipelines; and the impact on coastal areas of a heavily-
trafficked marine terminal. Broader criticisms include the risks to Chad and
Cameroon of relying on oil production to fuel development, the risks of non-
transparency and corruption resulting from large flows of hard currency into
destitute economies, the potential for re-igniting the civil war in Chad and the
clash between "traditional peasant culture and the expatriate oil business way
of life." 2 As broad as these criticisms may be, the range of organizations raising
these questions and criticisms has been equally broad, including over eighty
local and international NGOs. Those NGOs have employed several platforms
to encourage debate over these issues: formal presentations to the World Bank,
the European Investment Bank and those ECAs with organized program for
public comment; open letters to the World Bank and others; lobbying
campaigns aimed at national government representatives to the World Bank or
aimed at Western legislators; a sustained campaign to bring media attention to
bear on the project; and flooding of the sponsors, the financial advisor and
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report No. 19427-CD, Project
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 12.6 Million. (USD 17.5 Million
Equivalent). The Government of Chad for Management of the Petroleum Economy Project, at 3 (December
29, 1999), downloadable at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited May 17, 2001).
2. See generally Korinna Horta, Questions Concerning The World Bank and Chad/Cameroon Oil
and Pipeline Project. Makings of a New Ogoniland? Corporate Welfare Disguised as Aid to the Poor?,
available at http:/Avww.edf.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
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various public organizations with mail and e-mail messages objecting to the
project.
As a consequence of this clamor, a number of actions occurred. Two
original sponsors, Shell and ELF, withdrew from the project amid speculation
that the strong opposition to the project influenced their decisions. The pipeline
location itself was modified significantly. A host of local consultation meetings
occurred. Faced with criticism of its own procedures in approving the project,
as well as the impact of the project on the host countries, the Bank determined
to establish an International Advisory Group (lAG) that would monitor
implementation of the project, although disagreements between NGOs and the
Bank still exist over membership on the lAG and the Terms of Reference for the
panel.
Of special importance, the World Bank, the host governments and the
project also structured a system of controls over project disbursements and
revenues intended to assure future transparency in the use by Chad and
Cameroon of those monies. For example, under the revenue management
program for Chad, the government of Chad has agreed to an extraordinary level
of extra-governmental involvement in control over its portion of project
revenues. Petroleum revenue from the project will be channeled through the
project's audited offshore accounts and ninety percent of Chad's portion of that
revenue (once released to Chad by the project company) will be transferred to
special accounts of the Chad Treasury maintained at two designated commercial
banks acceptable to the World Bank. Disbursements from those accounts will
only be made in accordance with pre-agreed development objectives set out in
the revenue management program and approved by the Chad Parliament, and
must be reviewed in advance by an Oversight Committee composed of
representatives of the Chad Government, the Chad Parliament, a local NGO and
a trade union representative. The Oversight Committee will issue quarterly
reports and all audits and reports of the Oversight Committee will be published.
The special accounts will be audited by auditors acceptable to, and with terms
of reference agreed by, the World Bank, and the World Bank and the IMF will
conduct periodic joint expenditure reviews. A separate investment fund
covering the remaining ten percent of Chad's project revenues will be subject
to similar auditing and oversight arrangements, as well as investment criteria
pre-agreed with the World Bank. These control and audit procedures were
established by means of legislation enacted by the Chad Parliament, not merely
contracts and government decrees, to maximize support across all political
institutions. The commitment of the government of Chad to the principles
underlying these procedures, however, has been called into controversy by the
alleged diversion to military expenditures of a portion of a twenty-seven million
advance payment, even though the procedures have yet to be put into place.
I have handed out an excerpt from ExxonMobil's project web page
summarizing the scope of public consultation by the Chad-Cameroon project
with local communities, local and international NGOs and resulting actions.3
NGOs, though, continue to criticize the project's consultation process as
inadequate. Regardless of one's personal view of the project or the efficacy of
its consultative process, the twenty-two pages from this excerpt demonstrate that
a large quantity of project time, resources and planning has been devoted toward
addressing the issues raised as a result of the activities of the NGOs, community
activists and the media. The impact of interest groups on the time and resources
of the project, its private sector participants and the IFIs is apparent. Moreover,
this short summary also illustrates the leverage for NGOs created by IFI
involvement in the project. It is hard to imagine such a process for a petroleum
project just 10-15 years ago.
In addition to focusing on individual investment transactions, of course,
these interest groups are also engaged in active lobbying and negotiating
campaigns to dramatically change the institutional frameworks of IFIs. It is
very difficult to draw a conceptual line between the pressure on IFIs to
institutionally accommodate interest group concerns and the pressure on
individual IFI-supported investments to restructure themselves in response to
interest group concerns. Lobbying for institutional change is, of course,
intended to result in changes in how IFIs treat individual projects, and lobbying
about individual projects will necessarily carve new channels within the
institutions that result in institutional changes as well as changes to the targeted
projects. There is, however, a very practical difference. The practicing bar,
particularly private sector lawyers, are finding the day-to-day activities of their
clients in individual investment transactions are being affected by these interest
groups, and therefore the nature of the work undertaken by project participants
is beginning to change in a significant fashion. These investors now develop
environmental impact, community development and public affairs programs as
essential components of their project development activities.
Why are these changes occurring now? First, as the Chad-Cameroon story
illustrates, the direct participation of IFIs in the financing of individual private
sector investments creates formal and informal platforms for NGO involvement
that did not previously exist. As IFIs continue to shift their attention toward
promoting the private sector in weak economies, the opportunities for interest
groups to use IFI leverage will continue to grow.
Another development in international economic relations is also likely to
accelerate the involvement of NGOs in individual transactions. The web of
international agreements on commercial matters now extends far beyond the
3. Chapter 9, Public Consultation Process and Results, available athttp://www.essochad.com/eaff
/essochad/documentation/summary/9.html (last visited Mar. 17. 2001).
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purchase and sale of goods and services, and related tariff and non-tariff
barriers. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and
the investment-related provisions of NAFTA are examples of increased
multilateral involvement in individual investment transactions. Although
neither the WTO dispute settlement understanding nor NAFTA dispute
resolution procedures permit direct NGO intervention in disputes over breaches
of TRIMS or NAFTA commitments, NGOs are increasingly adept at pressing
national governments to incorporate interest group views into positions taken
by those governments on those disputes. And pressure continues to grow for
direct participation of NGOs in dispute procedures under those agreements.
Three recent NAFTA disputes, one involving issues of environmental licensing
in Mexico, the second claiming expropriation in light of a large award of
punitive damages by a Mississippi jury in civil litigation and the third seeking
damages for the ban by California of the gasoline additive MTBE, have
highlighted for many United States activists the importance of finding a means
of participating in NAFTA dispute proceedings involving individual
investments."
More generally, the provisions in NAFTA and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), and subsidiary understandings such as the Reference
Paper on Telecommunications Services, requiring Member States to maintain
transparency, impartial administrative tribunals and review of such matters as
tariff and pricing, anti-competitive conduct of certain service monopolies and
the like encourage the development of host government institutions accessible
to NGOs as well. For example, to head off a United States complaint to the
WTO that Mexico has violated GATS telecommunications commitments by
permitting the former public telecoms monopoly, Telnex, to charge high
interconnection tariffs, the Mexican government has proposed among other
matters to make available additional resources to COFETEL, Mexico's
telecommunications regulatory agency. This GATS-encouraged enhancement
of the resources and independence of a national regulatory agency should result
in the growth of another forum for interest group involvement in decisions (in
this case, the pricing of telephone services and the availability of consumer
choices) affecting individual telecommunications investments.
Further, notions of privatization are deeply affecting the structure of
international investments in emerging markets. Many high-profile privatization
transactions of public infrastructure or sensitive industries now combine private
and public participants in transactions that politicians and public affairs
4. Metalclad v. United Mexican States, available at http://www.naftalaw.orgi metalclad.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001), R. Loewen and Loewen Corp. v. United States of America, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2001), and Methanex Corporation v. United States of
America, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
specialists fondly call "public-private partnerships." The participation of private
investors and public authorities in the same transaction assures the interest of
local and international groups in the public sector decision-making process
regarding the project. As public and private participants become intertwined
within the confines of a single project, interest group access to the public sector
parties creates opportunities for NGO access to decisions made by the private
sector participants as well.
The impact of interest groups on individual investment transactions will
only increase over the next decade, as these groups gain experience in using
newly provided platforms and in mobilizing attention and resources to focus on
particular projects. By way of illustration, the International Program of Friends
of the Earth, a prominent and aggressive environmental protection organization,
includes ten staffers (underpaid as they may be) following the environmental
impact of individual IFI-supported investment project worldwide. Accordingly,
the day-to-day activities of the private sector participants in these projects, and
their counsel, are rapidly changing to address the defacto involvement of new
parties in structuring the project.
Let me now introduce our panelists to continue to explore these issues.
Barry Metzer is a partner with Coudert Brothers and former General Counsel of
Asian Development Bank. Barry has extensive experience with international
projects and investments, both as a result of his many years at Coudert Brothers
and as a result of his service at the Asian Development Bank. Jon Sohn, our
second panelist, is an International Policy Analyst/I Campaigner at Friends
of the Earth, where he focuses on international financial institutions, primarily
ECAs, such as OPIC and US Eximbank. He was formerly Counsel and
Environmental Program Officer at OPIC. Amelia (Amy) Porges, our third
speaker, is Of Counsel at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, where she
focuses on international business matters. Before joining Powell Goldstein, Ms.
Porges was Senior Counsel for Dispute Settlement at the Office of the United
States Trade Representative. Please join me in welcoming our panelists.
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INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO: LEGAL?
EFFECTIVE?
H.B. McCullough, Ph.D.*
A retrospective look at the 1999 war in Kosovo is in order. What Bishop
Butler called a "cool calm hour" is now upon us and we are well placed to make
some comments, however brief, on the authority and modalities of intervention
by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations in what
had formerly been an autonomous province of Serbia, and to make some
comments on efforts made in the aftermath of the intervention by way of
holding individuals accountable for atrocities committed.
The Kosovo war of 1999 must be seen against the background of the
disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a state
that had been severely affected by the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s.' The
precipitous recognition by Germany of both Slovenia and Croatia, coupled with
the subsequent recognition of these two states by western powers,2 virtually
guaranteed that the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina would explode and that the
region of Krajina in Croatia would erupt in violence and ethnic cleansing by
Croats of Serbs. Several factors in addition to the recognition contributed to the
turmoil in the former Yugoslavia, and these included the country's foreign debt
crisis, the absence of democratic institutions, fervent nationalism, and the
* Member of the Department of Political Science; Okanagan University College, British
Columbia, Canada. Ph.D. in government from the London School of Economics. Areas of specialization are
constitutional law, public international law, and political thought. Publications in International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, Australian Journal of Political Science, History of European Ideas, Skepsis, and
The European Legacy. Edited two editions of PoLmcAL IDEOLOGiES AND POLrICAL PHILOSOPHIES.
Currently writing a book on the Kosovo War 1999.
1. See Michael MccGwire, Why Did We Bomb Belgrade, INT'L AFFAIRS, Jan. 1, 2000, at 2, for the
development of this line of thinking. For an extended discussion of the impact of the foreign debt crisis on
Yugoslavia, see SUSAN L WOoDwARD, THE BALKAN TRAGEDY ch. 3 (1995).
2. See the comments of Ivo Daalder that it was well understood by the United States that the
disintegration of Yugoslavia would probably be violent as well as his comment that "political settlement in
the former Yugoslavia was doomed by Germany's oft-repeated intention to recognize the independence of
Slovenia and Croatia unconditionally." See Ivo Daalder, Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENsIoNS OF INTERNAL CoNFIcr 50, 63 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996). See also the
comments of Stevan Lilic, University of Belgrade Law School and 1993 Visiting Researcher, University of
Pittsburgh, when he said "As argued by many experts on the matter, the premature recognition of certain
republics of the former Yugoslavia as independent states (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and Herzegovina)
was the cause of, or at least helped to create, the existing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in
Bosnia." See Stevan Ulic, Remarks on Yugoslavia: A Case Study of International Consequences of
Independence Movements, 87 ASILPROC 205, 213 (1993).
300 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:299
absence of any regional solution to the problems developing in the SFRY.3
When Bosnia Herzegovina exploded in 1991-1992 tragedy ensued with Serbs
ethnically cleansing and seizing control of parts of the country and culminating
in the horrific events in Srebrenica in 1995 in which 7,000 Bosnian Muslims
were slaughtered by Serbs in a United Nations safe haven. In the same year the
Croatian army drove Serb forces from Krajina and compounded the misery by
cleansing the area of 200,000 Serbian inhabitants."
The failure to incorporate regional considerations into the Dayton Peace
Agreement of 1995, an agreement which resulted in the cessation of hostilities
in Bosnia Herzegovina, meant that Kosovo was left out of the equation. The
effect of this was that the frustration among Kosovar Albanians, which had been
building in Kosovo since 1989 when Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
pressured the Kosovo Assembly into abolishing the province's autonomous
status, simply increased. Kosovar Albanians who became progressively
disillusioned with the peaceful approach adopted by their leader Ibrahim
Rugova in dealing with Serbia, threw their support behind the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). This organization was, as Falk says, "dedicated to
waging an armed struggle to achieve an independent Kosovo" and by 1996 it
carried out "a variety of violent provocations that provided an ongoing pretext
and rationale for harsh Serb security measures. ' 5
From 1996 to 1999 hostilities tended to escalate between Serbians inside
and outside of Kosovar and Kosovar Albanians. Even with the presence of the
Kosovar Verification Mission (KVM) mandated by the United Nations and
headed by Ambassador William Walker, forty-five Kosovar Albanians were
massacred in Racak on January 15, 1999. This attack on alleged civilians was
'the final warning bell' and initiated considerable political activity in European
capitals and in Washington. The upshot was the convening of talks in France
at Chateau Rambouillet under the auspices of the Contact Group. The terms of
the agreement struck at Rambouillet were, it appears, excessive as made evident
by Appendix B, article 8 which gave NATO unimpeded access throughout the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In the event, the exaggerated
conditions of the drafted agreement meant that a dark shadow was cast over the
line of authority pursued by NATO in justifying its subsequent military
intervention. It therefore seems unsurprising that the FRY delegation did not
agree to the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement. On March 18, 1999, the talks,
having shifted to the Kleber Centre in Paris, were suspended when the Serbian
3. For an excellent discussion of these and other points, see WOODWARD, supra note 1.
4. According to MccGwire, "The Croatian modus operandi was so effective that the Serbs adopted
the same approach when they occupied Kosovo in March 1999." See MccGwire, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Richard Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L
847, 849 (1999).
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delegation "refuse[d] to budge."6 On March 19, the KVM withdrew from
Kosovo and on March 20, Yugoslav armed units launched an offensive against
the Kosovar Albanians. Finally, on March 24, NATO airstrikes began.
So much for a brief historic background to NATO intervention in Kosovo.
What line of authority is there to support this intervention? And what
modalities did NATO use to intervene in Kosovo?
The starting point of this discussion is the United Nations Charter.
NATO's own North Atlantic Treaty turns us towards this document for it says
in its Preamble: the Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter and their desire to live in peace with
all peoples and all governments. More needs to be said later about NATO, its
treaty, and the Charter. For the moment it suffices simply to hold the Charter
front and center in any discussion of NATO's authority for military engagement
in Kosovo.
Under the Charter there are only two permissible uses of force in
international relations, both found in Chapter VII, Article 51. The first is
enforcement action by the Security Council aimed at maintaining international
peace and security, and the second is self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations. The second of these justifications
cannot function as a rationale for NATO involvement in Kosovo,7 and therefore
only the first remains as a way of making right the conduct of NATO.
Even allowing that the purposes of the United Nations as given in the
Charter include not only maintaining peace and security but also achieving
international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights,8 they do not provide a wedge for legalizing NATO's unilateral action in
Kosovo. The reason for saying this lies in Article 2(4) which prohibits threats
6. See Kosovo Chronology, available at http:llwww.state.gov/www/regionsleur/
fs_kosovo timeline.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
7. Article 51 reads in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Clearly,
NATO was not under attack and so it could not claim self-defense. Moreover, Kosovo was not a member of
the United Nations and so the Province of Kosovo could not claim a right of self-defense under Article 51.
Here, I take issue with the suggestion of Ruth Wedgwood that, in the context of Article 51, "surely self-
defense of a population warrants as much consideration as defense of a political structure." See Ruth
Wedgwood, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. IN'L L 828, 833
(1999). Clearly, Article 51 applies only to the juidical state.
8. To concede this is to concede a lot, for as Charney has persuasively argued, though protection
of human rights is among the purposes of the United Nations Charter, it is "subsidiary to the objective of
limiting war and the use of force in international relations, as found in the express Charter prohibitions on the
use of force. This interpretation is supported by the travauxpreparatoires of the Charter." See Jonathan 1.
Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834, 835 (1999). Chamey's view would
seem to support the view that Article 1 (1) dominates Article 1 (3), i.e. that the objectives of peace and security
dominate the objective of human rights.
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or the use of force by any members against the "territorial integrity or political
independence of any state," and in Article 2(7) which prohibits United Nations
intervention in matters which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state." Article 2(4) itself would seem to render illegal any unilateral
action by any member state, acting alone or in concert with some other member
states without the blessings of the Security Council, against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state. This would imply that NATO's
military actions in Kosovo were illegal. And while Article 2(7) might well
allow for United Nations intervention inside a state on the grounds that human
rights violations are not solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, this does
nothing to justify unilateral NATO action, action which was undertaken without
the blessings of the Security Council. And although Article 52 states that
nothing in the Charter precludes regional arrangements for peace and security,
these arrangements and activities must be "consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations." This means that Article 52 has to be read
alongside of the "territorial integrity" provision of Article 2(4). And this would
seem sufficient to make unilateral action by NATO in Kosovo illegal. 9
Furthermore, Article 53 of the Charter does not afford a legal justification
for NATO' s intervention in Kosovo. First of all, though the article provides that
the Security Council shall utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action
under its authority, it also provides that no enforcement action shall be taken
without the authorization of the Security Council. So even if NATO were a
regional organization, the absence of any Security Council authorization for
NATO intervention is sufficient to remove its legal justification in the case of
Kosovo. But, as Bruno Simma has argued successfully, NATO is not a regional
organization but an international one.' ° In the result the requirement found in
Article 53 is not 'formally applicable' to NATO.
Against the foregoing, it is difficult to see any authority based on the
Charter for NATO military intervention in Kosovo. This is a conclusion that is
9. Something should be said here about Article 24 of the Charter. This article confers on the
Security council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The
secondary responsibility impliedly referred to here applies, it would seem, to regional arrangements already
discussed, which are in turn subject to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations including Article 2
(4), the territorial integrity provision. It would seem, therefore, that the effect of Article 24 is not to spawn
other agencies which can maintain peace and security independently of the Security Council, but to structure
the process of conflict resolution so that regional agencies attempt pacific settlements "before referring them
to the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 25, available at htp://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww
/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ ibasicunchart.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). There is nothing in any of this
which implies that by conjoining Article 24 with Article 52 that regional agencies such as NATO have a legal
right to initiate unilateral intervention.
10. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use ofLegal Force: Legal Aspects, EUR. J. INT'LL
10(1999). Suggestions in conversation by Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell encouraged me to reconsider this
aspect of the Charter and the relevance of it to the Kosovo conflict.
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not eroded by three resolutions passed by the Security Council under Chapter
VII prior to NATO's bombing campaign or by one resolution passed after the
cessation of hostilities. Here, I am referring to Resolution 1160 (March 1998),
Resolution 1199 (September 1998), Resolution 1203 (October 1998) and
Resolution 1244 (June 1999)." None of these resolutions authorized NATO
bombing, nor "retroactively legalized" them. The Council for its part, in
addition to passing three resolutions to reign-in the FRY prior to the bombing
and one resolution to authorize a peace mission after the cessation of bombing,
on the third day of the bombing refused to condemn NATO bombing. By a vote
of 12-3, the resolution proposed by Russia, India, and Belarus charging that
NATO in its bombings violated Articles 2(4), 24, and 53 of the Charter, failed.
And the Secretary-General, finding himself in the unenviable position of
attempting to make credible the organization he headed notwithstanding its
inaction when faced with a humanitarian catastrophe, went on to assert that it
was tragic that diplomacy had failed but there are times when the use of force
"may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace."' 2 Regrettably, scour though we do
these collective resolutions of the Security Council and the comments of the
Secretary-General, there is nothing which legalizes and thereby authorizes
NATO's military intervention in Kosovo.
Some might be tempted to think that, regardless of the foregoing, the
international legal system has changed owing to the erosion of state sovereignty
and that this erosion is predicated on the growth of human rights, environmental
concerns, and globalization. Those so thinking might conclude that there is no
real legal impediment to NATO-like intervention in so-called sovereign states
in defense of human rights. To this it seems fair to say that while state
sovereignty may have experienced some diminution, those who make this claim
tend to overplay their hand. Geoffrey Garrett has argued convincingly that the
policy constraints on governments generated by global trade,
multinationalization of production and the internationalization of financial
markets are "weaker and less pervasive than is often presumed."' 3 Moreover
whatever erosion of state sovereignty that might have occurred it is difficult to
11. These resolutions dealt with, respectively: the imposition of an arms ban on the FRY and the
withdrawal of special police units, the cessation of the use of force and the violation of human rights, the
authorization of an observer force called the KVM, and authorization of an international civilian and security
presence after the cessation of the war. Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 833; Chamey, supra note 8, at 835;
Kosovo: A Human Tragedy: United Nations Efforts Aim to Alleviate Suffering of180,00, U.N. CHRONICLE,
Jan. 1, 1999, at 5.
12. Id Later before the General Assembly he added "the imperative of effectively halting gross and
systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences" is an "equally compelling
interest." Press Release, United Nations, Secretary General Presents His Annual Report to the General
Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
13. Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?,
52 INT'L ORG. 787, 805 (1998).
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see a consensus emerging at the international level authorizing this kind of
intervention. The absence of widespread state practice and opiniojuris as well
as the condemnation of the General Assembly of specific interventions, e.g.,
India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 to protect Bengalis, make clear that
such consensus does not now exist. In addition, it seems that important
international players such as Russia and China, and possibly some NATO
countries as well, 14 would oppose a development of international law in such a
direction. One may fairly conclude from this that no new general law or
customary law of intervention has emerged nor is likely to in the near future.'5
The legality of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo aside, what can
be said of the modalities of NATO's involvement? The modalities of this
military involvement included initially the use of "smart weaponry" which was
"confined to military targets,"" but when this failed to produce the desired
results NATO extended its targets. This resulted in damage to manufacture
enterprises, power supply, transportation facilities, agriculture and forestry,
water management, construction industries, trade, catering, and banks.'7 Over
27,000 sorties'8 (including sorties of B-52s) were flown and 23,000 bombs
(including cluster bombs and depleted uranium ordnance) and missiles, 35%
being smart weapons,' 9 were dropped. It is believed that a quarter of the SAM
radar sites were destroyed and there have been reports of "significant collateral
damage to civilian facilities including two hospitals and several schools."' The
dollar value of the total damage is estimated by European Union officials to be
in the neighborhood of United States $30 billion and by Yugoslav officials to
be between United States $30 and 100 billion.2'
I want now to pass on to consider a different aspect of the war in Kosovo.
Previously I focused on the authority, if any, NATO had in intervening in what
was otherwise an internal conflict. In what follows, I wish to look at the efforts
made to bring about peace and security in Kosovo as well as the efforts to
secure accountability for the atrocities the intervention intended to end.
14. Germany would probably oppose such development. See the comments on Germany's
reluctance to make NATO's decision to intervene a precedent in Bruno. Simma, supra note 10, at 13.
15. This does not augur well for what I call the Blair Doctrine: acts of genocide can never be a
purely internal matter, and reform of the Security Council needs to reflect the "propriety of intervention to stop
genocide." See Michael J. Glennon, The Charter: Does It Fit?, U.N. CHRONICLE, Jan. 1, 1999, at 33.
16. Falk, supra note 5, at 851.
17. Economic, Humanitarian and Ecological Consequences of NATO Aggression against
Yugoslavia - Basic Facts and Appraisals, 40 YUGOSLAV SURV. 9, 10 (1999).
18. See also MccGwire, supra note 1, at 10.
19. See Martin L Cook, Immaculate War: Constraints on Humanitarian Intervention, 14 ETHICS
& INr'L AFF. 55, 64 (2000).
20. See McGwire, supra note I, at 11.
21. Economic, Humanitarian and Ecological Consequences of NATO Aggression Against
Yugoslavia - Basic Facts and Appraisals, supra note 17.
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On June 3, 1999, a peace plan was brokered which was expanded on a
week later in United Nations Resolution 1244. This resolution included three
principles: 1) the deployment of an international security and civil presence
(KFOR) in Kosovo under United Nations rather than NATO auspices; 2) the
omission of any reference to KFOR's right to unrestricted passage and
unimpeded access to Serbia; and 3) the omission of any reference to a
referendum to decide Kosovo's future. More now needs to be said about the
first of these points.
Security Council Resolution 1244 provided for the presence of 50,000
KFOR international troops. Their deployment has for the most part met with
success, for it has brought peace and a measure of security. But it has faced and
continues to face difficulties. Retaliation by Albanian Kosovars against Serbs
and Gypsies has been an issue with which KFOR has had to contend. Some
have claimed that this has "made a mockery of any attempt to build a multi-
ethnic Kosovo."2 There is still concern that extremists, called the Liberation
Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), are "bent on stirring up
trouble in southern Serbia."23 In addition, there has been considerable
displacement of Serbs from Kosovo; "it appears that well over 164,000 Serbs
fled Kosovo since early June [1999]."'24 Perhaps the condemnation on August
4, 2000 by the Interim Administrative Council for Kosovo of the recent spate
of violence there2" is sufficient to make clear that what exists in Kosovo is an
uneasy peace and incomplete security. That this is still very much a problem
was made evident in an open meeting between Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the head
of UNMIK, and the Security Council. There he said on September 27, 2000
that the situation of non-Albanian communities is the biggest problem in
Kosovo. He maintained "Serbs and Roma, in particular are often still excluded
from daily life and are under great personal security risks." 2' Unease and
apprehension remain in Kosovo notwithstanding the very great efforts of KFOR
and UNMIK to make the situation better.' The issue of peace and security now
22. Michael Gove, Only Now Can We See How We Lost In Kosovo, TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 2000,
at 22.
23. Ed Vulliamy & Helena Smith, US Faces Rebel War in Kosovo: Pentagon Bracedfor Bloodshed
After Raids on Guerillas, OBSERVER, Mar. 19, 2000, at 22.
24. Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, Human Rights Watch 81 (1998).
25. Kosovo News, available at hnp:/www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kostor.htm (last visited Mar.
17,2001).
26. Complete Kosovo Coverage, available at http://www.un.org/peacekosovofnews/99/kosarc.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
27. It is obvious why this unease and apprehension should remain. Sher has remarked "There have
been more than 330 serious ethnic crimes in Kosovo since January 2000, two-thirds committed by ethnic
Albanians against Serbs and other minorities." Julian Sher. Ethnic Albanians Use Web in Fight Against Serb
Control, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 12, 2000, at A14.
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treated, I should like to turn attention to the issue of justice and the role of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was unanimously adopted on May 25, 1993 through
Resolution 827 of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. The Tribunal's statute conferred jurisdiction of subject matter
over the following crimes: Article 2: Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, Article 3: Violations of the Laws or Customs of War,
Article 4: Genocide, and Article 5: Crimes Against Humanity. According to
Article 8, the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTY shall extend to the territory of
the former Yugoslavia and apply to actions carried out since January 1,1991.
National courts and the ICTY are to have, according to Article 9, concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international
humanitarian law, though according to Article 9(2) the Tribunal shall have
primacy over national courts.
Resolution 827 established the ICTY. The legal issues surrounding the
authority of this tribunal are the following: 1) does the Security Council have
authority to establish tribunals?; and 2) even if the ICTY has authority over
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia as it applies to the independent
republics which have exercised their right to self-determination under the
Constitution of the SFRY, does the ICTY have authority over humanitarian law
inside Serbia, i.e. inside Kosovo? The answer to the first of these questions is
generally thought positive.2 The second question is more problematic not
because the terms of the Statute of the ICTY leaves any doubt about its
authority, but because the ICTY has justified its authority to try individuals in
Bosnia Herzegovina on the grounds that Serbia enforced the Dayton Agreement
of 1995.29 And clearly the Dayton Agreement has nothing to do with the
Kosovo war apart from contributing to its development.
But there is no need to predicate the Tribunal's authority in the former
Yugoslavia on the Dayton Agreement for it can be predicated on Security
28. There are issues worth discussing here. As Bodley points out, "Chapter VII makes no explicit
provision for the establishment of international tribunals. A literal reading of the Chapter permits the
conclusion, therefore, that the Security Council was acting ultra vires in creating the International Tribunal.
This was precisely the argument put forward by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
against its establishment." See Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 417,428 (1999).
But it would appear that the Security Council did act within its mandate by satisfying Article 39 of the Charter
"in determining that the international humanitarian law violations in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat
to peace and security. It then properly invoked Article 41 to employ measures short of the use of armed force
in attempting to restore international peace and security." Id. at 440.
29. Bodley points out that in its 1996 submission to the United Nations Yearbook, the ICTY said:
"By signing the [Dayton] Accord, the parties thereto, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) ... have formally recognized the Tribunal .... " Id. at 449.
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Council Resolution 827. In this way the problem of the authority of the ICTY
in Kosovo vanishes which it does not do if the Dayton Agreement is relied
upon. This agreement was meant to apply to problems in Bosnia Herzegovina.
It has no bearing on Kosovo and certainly does not give authority over
humanitarian law to the ICTY in Kosovo. What gives authority to the ICTY is
Security Council Resolution 827.
As indicated above, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia gives the tribunal jurisdiction of subject matter over
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of
war, genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the distinction in
international law between international and non-international (internal) armed
conflicts3" means that some of these have application in Kosovo and some do
not. The Kosovo war was an internal armed conflict: internal because it took
place in an autonomous or formerly autonomous province of Serbia 31 and armed
because it was so declared by the ICTY on July 7, 1998.32 Therefore, the
Tribunal's jurisdictional subject matter in Kosovo is limited to crimes
committed in an internal armed conflict. Accordingly, grave breaches of the
30. See the comment made by Human Rights Watch, "International humanitarian law makes a
critical distinction between international and non-international (internal) armed conflicts, and a proper
characterization of the conflict is important to determine which aspects of international humanitarian law
apply." Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, supra note 24.
31. Whatever its status, Kosovo was not a republic and did not have a constitutional right to self-
determination, a right possessed by all the republics until 1994. The 1946 Constitution of the Federal Peoples
Republic of Yugoslavia in Article I. says "The Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's
state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-
determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state."
CONsTrrTrrIONS OF NATIONS 522 (Vol. 11 1950). See also The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles No. I, "he nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the rights of every nation
to self-determination, including the right to secession ...." See also Article I which reads, "The Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united
nations and their Socialist Republics." The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; The
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, available at http://www.uni-
wuerzburg.de/law/sr000O_.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). See also Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia 1994, which says nothing at all about the right of nations to self-determination. CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD Vol. XX (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 2000). What these
suggest is that republics in the form of nations, not nationalities, had the right to self-determination until 1994.
For a discussion of the national question in Yugoslavia, see Banac's seminal work, Ivo BANAC, THE
NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1984), especially Part VI. It
should be pointed that he does not seem to preserve the distinctions which the various constitutions make
between "nation" and "nationality."
32. Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, supra note 24, at 89. This is important because the
ICTY Statute says that the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons for crimes committed in armed
conflict, whether the conflict is international or internal.
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Geneva Conventions are not within the purview of the Tribunal in Kosovo for
such breaches presuppose an international conflict.3
3
It is, however, within the purview of the Tribunal to prosecute cases arising
from the Kosovo war based on Article 3: Violations of the laws or customs of
war, Article 4: genocide, and Article 5: crimes against humanity. In the matter
of violations of the laws or customs of war, the Tribunal could turn to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which is really a convention
within a convention, and could turn to Protocol II which supplements Common
Article 3.' In the matter of genocide, the Tribunal could in turn assert that
"customary law establishes universal jurisdiction over genocide"35 and maintain
that the International Court of Justice has claimed that the principles behind the
Genocide Convention "are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States,
even without any conventional obligation. 36 And in the matter of crimes
against humanity, the Tribunal could confidently maintain that since
Nuremberg, crimes against humanity have been universally enforceable against
authorities inside the state in which they were committed. So notwithstanding
the internal nature of the Kosovo armed conflict, the Tribunal has three arrows
in its quiver.
It is from this quiver that on May 22, 1999 Louise Arbour Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal pulled out two arrows and, pursuant to her
authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the Tribunal, charged Slobodan
Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajiko
Stojiljkovic with crimes against humAnity and violations of the laws or customs
33. A similar point in a different context is made by two commentators. In discussing Tadic, they
have remarked, "In order for grave breaches to have been committed, the conflict in the Prijedor region would
have to be characterized as an international armed conflict." See Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson,
International Decision: Prosecutor v. Tadic, 94 AM. J. INT'L L 571, 572 (2000).
34. Common Article 3 is the only part of the Geneva Convention that applies to internal armed
conflicts. This article protects persons who take no active part in the hostilities and expressly prohibits
violence to ife and person; in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages;
outrages upon personal dignity; and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without proper
judicial involvement. Protocol U, which also applies to internal armed conflict, prohibits the following:
orders that there shall be no survivors; acts of violence against all persons captured; torture; pillage and
destruction of civilian property; and the desecration of corpses.
35. See Diane F. Ortentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2565 (1991). It is crucial that jurisdiction be rooted in some
customary law basis since the Genocide Convention, Article VI claims that persons charged with genocide
shall be tried in the state in which they have committed the act or by an international tribunal which has its
jurisdiction accepted by the contracting parties. The FRY has not accepted the ICTY's jurisdiction in Kosovo.
This would mean that acts of genocide could only be tried in the FRY, hardly an acceptable position for either
the Kosovar Albanians or the United Nations.
36. Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idecisions/isummaries/ippcgsummary5lO528.htn (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
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of war.37 Four counts were brought against these individuals. Three of these
were for crimes against humanity including deportation, murder, and
persecutions. One of these was for a violation of the laws or customs of war,
namely murder. To date, there have been no convictions in this case. Indeed,
down to March 21, 2000, very little had happened by way of indicting persons
for violations of humanitarian law in connection with the Kosovo conflict. Of
the thirty-seven indictments against individuals by the ICTY, only one of these
had any connection with Kosovo.
It seems that in response to a perceived need to handle more cases related
to war and ethnic crimes in Kosovo, by way of supplementing the work done
by the ICTY, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo headed by Dr. Bernard
Kouchner decided in the spring of 2000 to "create an internationally run court
to try war and ethnic crimes in the province."38 The new court, called the
Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court, was to be a specialized agency with
"precedence over local courts" and would have a mandate to cover war crimes
committed by Serbs during the war and to try Albanians for abductions and
killings of Serbs after and during the war. The Court was to be comprised of an
international judge, an ethnic Albanian, and a Serb.39 It appears however that
up to the present, nothing has come of Dr. Kouchner' s suggestion. Nothing is
said of it in UNMIK Regulations for 2000,40 and this would imply the Court has
yet to be established.
Although the above suggests a slow start to prosecution of war crimes in
Kosovo, with most attention given to the "big fish" (Milosevic et al), some
attention is now being given to the "small fry." The approach UNMIK is now
taking in this matter is trying individuals for war crimes in district courts with
internationally appointed prosecutors. Evidence for this is found in the
commencement of a trial, of a man charged with committing acts of genocide,
in Mitrovica district court with the international prosecutor Michael Hartmann.4'
In trying an individual for this offense, the court reached into the quiver referred
37. The Prosecutor of the TribunalAgainst Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic,
Dragoljub Ojdanic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, at http://www.un.orglicty/indictrnentl english/mil-ii990524e.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001). The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The charges filed
in this case relate to events in Racak, Bela Crkva, Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde - Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel,
Dakovica/Gjakove, CrkolezPadalishte, lzbica, and (for a second time) Dakovica/Gjakove. Only the events
in Racak on January 15, 1999, occurred prior to the bombing on March 24, 1999.
38. Carlotta Gall, U.N. Mission in Kosovo Proposes to Set Up a War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2000, at A3.
39. Alexandra Poolos, Kosovo: War Crimes Court to Be Established, at http://www.rferl.org/
nca/features/2000/04/F.RU.000427133027.htmI (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
40. See UNMIK Regulations, available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/
regulations/regs.html. (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
41. UN Mission In Kosovo, at http://www.un.org/peacekosovo/news/kostor.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2000).
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to above and pulled out the third arrow, the crime of genocide.42 By early
September, 2000, UNMIK had appointed three prosecutors (Hartmann of
Germany, Garland of the United Kingdom, and one other) and seven
international judges (including Ingo Risch of Germany)43 in Kosovo." In
addition, a two-day seminar organized by the Kosovo Judicial Institute (run by
OSCE) took place in Pristina on September 5, 2000 to introduce Kosovo
judiciary to international humanitarian law.45 On August 10, 2000, UNMIK
appointed 139 local judges and prosecutors bringing the total to 405.4 And on
September 5, 2000, UNMIK dismissed the director of the Mitrovica Detention
Center from which fifteen Kosovo Serbs, most charged with war crimes,
escaped. What all of this suggests is that UNMIK is attempting to use
domestic courts topped up with a few international judges and prosecutors to
facilitate the prosecution of cases dealing with humanitarian law.48 In this way,
the action of UNMIK to utilize domestic courts for the prosecution of war
crimes complements the work of the ICTY.
The foregoing has explored two different kinds of intervention by the
international community in Kosovo, first military intervention by NATO and
secondly legal intervention in the form of the ICTY. The first was judged by
me to be illegal and the second legal. As for the effectiveness of these two
forms of intervention, one may say the following.49
It appears that over the short-run NATO achieved what it wanted in
Kosovo: it stopped the displacement of persons, rapes and atrocities.
Accordingly, it appears as if NATO intervention was effective. However, this
might be a less compelling virtue than first meets the eye. If, for instance, it
42. Other events in Kosovo under UNMIK have occurred recently that reflect on a changingjudicial
environment there. Dr. Bernard Kouchner has recently announced the appointment of an additional 139
judges and prosecutors and 309 lay judges "as part of his effort to improve the functioning of the judicial
system in Kosovo." See Kosovo News, at http://www.un.org/ peace/kosovo/news/kostor.htm. (last visited
Mar. 17, 2001).
43. See id
44. Kosovo Swears In New International Prosecutor and Judge, at http://www.un.orgt
peacelkosovolnews/99/sepOO.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
45. See Kosovo News, supra note 42. The focus of the seminar was on the legal concepts of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and individual criminal responsibility. UN Mission Rejects
Belgrade-Organized Elections in Kosovo as "Farce", at http://www.un.org/peace/
kosovo/news/99/sepO0_ .htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
46. Kosovo Swears in New International Prosecutor and Judge, supra note 44.
47. UN in Kosovo Dismisses Director of Detention Centre Following Escape of Prisoners, at
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
48. Cases pertaining to humanitarian law are coming before the domestic courts of Kosovo. See
Kosovo Hosts Seminar On International Humanitarian Law, at http://www.un.org/
peace/kosovolnews99/sep00jl.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
49. The effectiveness of United Nations intervention in Kosovo is a separate topic to be treated on
another occasion.
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could be shown that the Serbian attack on Kosovo was intended as a pre-
emptive strike in anticipation of NATO bombing, especially in light of the
Rambouillet Agreement, then NATO intervention would turn out to be effective
in bringing to a close the very actions it helped cause. So the virtue of
effectiveness might turn out to be gratuitous and hardly deserving of praise.
Preliminary evidence suggests, however, that this interpretation of events is
incorrect. Serbian practice in Bosnia provides inductive support for the
proposition that Serbian forces were capable of committing atrocities without
being under the threat of NATO bombing. But admittedly the evidence is
incomplete with respect to Kosovo and one will not know with certainty the
answer to the counterfactual-what the Serbians would have done in Kosovo
if NATO had not threatened bombing-until archival records are examined in
Belgrade in future years. The evidence that one does have suggests that this
counterfactual would be answered: the Serbians would have done exactly what
they did though on an even larger scale. With this in mind the effectiveness of
NATO intervention can be provisionally asserted.
One may also say that over the short-run the ICTY did not achieve very
much apart from the indictment of Milosevic and his associates. In the result
and taking into consideration only what has thus far transpired, the military
intervention has proven to be illegal but effective, while the legal intervention
has proven to be legal but ineffective. With these in mind, I wish to conclude
with a consideration of two residual issues.
First, in assessing NATO's intervention, arguably unilateral intervention
in Kosovo,5° one cannot help but be struck by the dissonance between NATO's
actions and the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty which reads: the Parties
to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter and their desire to live in peace with all the peoples and
governments. And one cannot help but be struck by the dissonance between
NATO's actions and Article 7 of the Treaty which states: "This Treaty does not
affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and
obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security."'" It is worth noting that,
though western writers made virtually nothing of it, this dissonance was noted
50. Wedgwood takes issue with the claim that NATO's actions were unilateral when she alleges that
NATO is "close to an objective regime." She reasons "NATO's decision deserves greater deference than
purely unilateral action." Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 833. It is difficult to see how this line of reasoning
would not have applied to the Warsaw Pact when it acted in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.
51. Escor REID, 1iME oF FEAR AND HOPE app. 2 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).
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separately first by Yugoslav authorities and then by France at the NATO fiftieth
anniversary in Washington in April 1999.52
Secondly, given the illegality of NATO's actions, is there room for the
argument that its actions were nonetheless justified on moral grounds, say on
grounds ofjustice? Those answering in the affirmative would presumably argue
that NATO had to intervene to prevent another Bosnia and to prevent regional
instability. 53 Since there was deadlock in the Security Council, no relief could
be expected from that quarter and the result was that NATO was the only game
in town. Therefore, NATO action was morally justified. But this argument is
persuasive only if a capacious utilitarianism or far-sighted consequentialism is
employed to measure the long-term effects of NATO action. Setting aside
lingering doubts concerning NATO action in the first place, objections turning
on the severity of the Rambouillet Agreement and on the premature withdrawal
of KVM personnel, a capacious utilitarianism would demand that any moral
assessment of NATO's actions be forward-looking and directed at the
commitments of the United Nations and KFOR to Kosovo in the future. What
I am suggesting here is that a moral assessment of NATO's actions requires a
careful analysis not only of what harm it prevented in the short run but of what
harm it prevents in the long run.
Relevant to the foregoing observation are the following comments of two
military figures with experience in the Balkans. The remark of retired Admiral
Leighton W. Smith Jr. who commanded the NATO forces in Bosnia in 1996 is
in order. He said in the spring of 2000 "I don't think we are going to get out of
Kosovo for a while unless we are willing to allow the Kosovar Albanians to
declare independence and take over Kosovo in its entirety and run all the Serbs
out, and then forment trouble in Macedonian which I am convinced they will
do." '54 And the former supreme commander in NATO in Europe, General
Wesley Clark, said while talking generally of the NATO mission in the Balkans,
"But that mission requires a vital political component, a long-term strategy for
the region." 55 So if the effect of NATO's intervention is to set the stage for an
apologetically and rhetorically clothed exit that results in more civil strife,
regional instability and ethnic cleansing, the moral argument from justice seems
paper thin.
52. See International Law and Order and NATO Aggression Against Yugoslavia, in 40 YUGOSLAV
SuRV. 5 (1999); Richard Caplan, Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward?, 14 ETHics AND Nrr'L
AFF. 23, 31 (2000).
53. At least for NATO supporters, it is important that there be a conjunction of reasons here to block
critics of NATO from saying the West's indifference to the tragedy in Rwanda in which 800,000 people
perished is evidence of racism.
54. George C. Wilson, Kosovo Has Been Hard on NATO, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 21, 2000, at
6.
55. Preparing to Step Down, Clark Warns NATO Needs New Strategy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr.
28, 2000, at 12.
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A capacious utilitarianism requires something quite different to make
acceptable the interventionist argument on moral grounds. What it requires is
a long-term commitment, or at least the willingness for a long-term
commitment, from the United Nations and KFOR and possibly NATO for peace
and security in Kosovo. Those who shun this and wish to exit in a moment of
triumphalism grounding their convictions on justice are in effect echoing the
views of the deontological tradition in ethics, a tradition which emphasizes non-
negotiables like truth, promise-keeping, and justice. The high-minded who are
fond of rights-talk probably fall well within this tradition. But there remains the
utilitarian tradition of Hume, Bentham and John Mill and J.S. Mill, and this
tradition looks at things in terms of where they might lead. It is this tradition
which I am suggesting needs once again to be heard in the case of Kosovo. A
capacious utilitarianism or far-sighted consequentialism would hold off
delivering its final moral judgment of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, waiting
to see where NATO and KFOR go from here.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2000, an eagerly anticipated joint trial, dubbed "the media
trial," began at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR or Tribunal), in Arusha, Tanzania.' One of the accused, Jean Bosco
Barayagwiza, a former high-ranking Rwandan government official and a
founding member of the hate-radio, Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), along with Ferdinand Nahimana, the ex-director of the RTLM, and
Hassan Ngeze, ex-editor of the infamous Kangura newspaper were scheduled
to appear in court. As he made his opening statement, the prosecuting attorney
compared these alleged genocidaires to Nazi propagandist Heinrich Himmler.
However, Barayagwiza (the accused) was absent from court.2 He had issued a
statement, "refusing to associate himself with a show trial" in which he claimed
the proceedings were inherently unfair because "the ICTR was manipulated by
the current Rwandan government and the judges and the prosecutors were the
* B.S., James Madison University, 1989, J.D., Howard University School of Law, 1997. The
author is a former ICTR Associate Legal Director.
1. The trial began after several delays and postponements, the last of which was on September 18,
2000.
2. Hassan Ngeze was also sitting outside the courtroom, in protest of the incomplete translation
of his newspaper's articles, to be used as evidence against him and other discovery issues.
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hostage[s] of Kigali.",3 More recently he has demanded political prisoner status
from the International Committee of the Red Cross.4
Barayagwiza is not the first accused to claim ICTR proceedings are
"unfair." He has, however, come closest to avoid having to answer charges
made against him by the Tribunal's Prosecutor. On November 3, 1999, the
ICTR Appeals Chamber dismissed the indictment against him, "with prejudice,"
and ordered his immediate release (November decision) because it found that
Barayagwiza's procedural rights had been repeatedly violated.5 Shortly
thereafter, the Rwandan government threatened to completely sever relations
with the ICTR. The Tribunal's fear of the Rwandan threats becoming a reality
was in all likelihood, partly the reason for its poorly reasoned, but properly
concluded, reversal of the November decision, on March 4, 2000 "March
decision."6
In this essay I will discuss how the Tribunal and other actors created a
situation where an alleged architect of the 1994 Rwandan genocide was almost
released without a trial on the merits and how such a scenario may possibly be
avoided in the future. In section II, I will examine how this particular accused
person's case took some four and one half years to come to trial. I will then
briefly outline the logical gaps in the November and March decisions and the
effects of the controversy on the credibility of the international justice in section
III. As a supporter of the Tribunal, I will conclude by offering a few
recommendations on how to avoid such a potentially disastrous situation in the
future, in section IV.
11. FROM RWANDA TO ARUSHA: BARAYAGWIZA'S JOURNEY TO A TRIAL ON
THE MERITS
After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza fled to the
Republic of Cameroon. According to the findings of the ICTR Appeals
Chamber,' the Accused and approximately a dozen other Rwandans, including
Nahimana, were arrested in that country on April 15, 1996. It was unclear
whether the Cameroonian authorities made this arrest based on a request from
the Tribunal's Prosecutor or international warrants emanating from Rwandan
3. Foundation Hirondelle, Rwandan Media Suspects Boycott Start of Their Trial, Hirondelle News
Agency (2000), available at http://www.hirondelle.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2000).
4. Foundation Hirondelle, Barayagwiza Demands Political Prisoner Status, Hirondelle News
Agency (2000), available at http://www.hirondelle.org (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
5. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, No. ICTR-97-19 AR72 (Nov. 3, 1999), available
at http://www.ictr.orgIENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisionsldcs991103.htim. [hereinafter November
Decision].
6. Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, No. ICTR-97-19 (Mar. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisionsdcs991103. htm. [hereinafter March Decision].
7. Supra note 5, at app. A, (chronology of events).
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and Belgian authorities. Nevertheless, the ICTR's Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) requested that the Accused be provisionally detained under Rule 40
(Provisional Measures) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE)8
only two days later. On May 6, 1996 the Prosecutor sought a three-week
extension for the detention of the Accused in Cameroon and ten days later he 9
sought the transfer of four of the Rwandans detained by Cameroon, excluding
Barayagwiza. At the end of May 1996, the Court of Appeals in Cameroon
issued a decision to adjourn without consideration of the Rwandan
government's extradition request based on the pleadings of the Cameroonian
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions who grounded his arguments on Article
8(2) of the Tribunal's Statute (ICTR primacy over national courts).'0
Thereafter, Barayagwiza wrote to the Tribunal's Prosecutor complaining
about his detention in Cameroon. On October 15, 1996 the Prosecutor
responded that he was not being held in Cameroon at his behest. Over four
months later, the Cameroonian court rejected Rwanda' s extradition request, and
ordered Barayagwiza's release, but he was immediately re-arrested upon a
request from the OTP. On March 3, 1996, an ICTR judge signed an order,
pursuant to Rule 40 bis (Transfer and Provisional Detention of Suspects), which
required Cameroon to transfer the Accused to the Tribunal's Detention Unit in
Arusha. The Accused was finally shown a copy of the Rule 40 bis order, which
included the general nature of the charges against him, on March 10, 1997,
almost a year after his initial arrest. On September 29, 1997, more than six
months after the March transfer order, and some sixteen months after his initial
arrest, Barayagwiza filed a writ of habeas corpus, which apparently has not
been heard as of the writing of this essay. It is interesting to note that at that
point the OTP still had not submitted an indictment against the Accused for
confirmation. This only took place on October 22, 1997, the day after the
President of Cameroon signed a decree ordering the Accused's transfer to
Arusha. Thus, the Appeals Chamber found that, based on the record, from
March 4 through October 22, 1997 the Tribunal took no action with regard to
the Barayagwiza matter."
When Barayagwiza was finally transferred to Arusha, on November 19,
1997, the Tribunal's winter judicial recess was imminent. Most of the judges
were preparing to leave Arusha and some were not scheduled to return until
8. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 40, available
at http://www.ictr.org, (adopted on July 5, 1995); as amended on January 12, 1996, May 15, 1996, July 4,
1996, June 5, 1997, June 8, 1998, July 1, 1999, February 21, 2000 and June 26, 2000.
9. Richard Goldstone, of South Africa. was the ICTR Prosecutor until October 1996, at which time
Louise Arbor began her tenure.
10. Statute of the International Tribunal, G.A. RES 955, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/955 (1994); G.A. Res.
1165, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/955 (1998).
11. November decision, supra note 5, 144.
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February of the following year. Therefore, in scheduling an initial appearance
-the common law equivalent of an arraignment-for Barayagwiza, the
Tribunal's Registry not only had to address the usual scheduling difficulties of
identifying dates suitable for the OTP and the Defense Counsel, but also may
have faced a shortage of judges. The accused finally made his initial
appearance on February 23, 1998, after spending nineteen months in the
Cameroonian jails, during the bulk of which time he was not formally made
aware of the charges against him, and an additional three months in the
Tribunal's detention facilities, despite the fact that Rule 62 of the RPE required
this proceeding to take place "without undue delay."
The day following his initial appearance, on February 24, 1998, the
Accused filed an Extremely Urgent Motion seeking to nullify his arrest, which
was not heard by the Trial Chamber until September 11, 1998. A decision
dismissing the motion was issued on November 17, 1998- The Accused
appealed the decision some ten days later and the Appeals Chamber, after
receiving additional submissions from the parties, issued an order, on June 3,
1999, directing the Prosecutor to specifically address six questions regarding the
delays, and to provide supporting documentation. 2
The Appeals Chamber then ordered Barayagwiza's release on November
3, 1999, finding that "the combination of delays at virtually every stage of the
Appellant's case"1 3 made the case so egregious that it had no choice but to
dismiss the indictment with prejudice to the Prosecutor as to avoid putting the
Accused through a revolving door of being re-arrested by the Prosecutor. 4 The
Appeals Chamber simultaneously ordered the immediate release of the accused,
while directing the Registrar to make necessary arrangements to deliver
Barayagwiza to the authorities of Cameroon, 5 with one Judge filing a separate
opinion and another appending a declaration to the November decision on this
matter, the relevant substance of which is discussed infra.
The order for a return to Cameroon caused Barayagwiza to file a motion
for review of the modalities of his release.' 6 He complained that there was no
reason for him to be returned to Cameroon, as he had no legal status, family or
business there, nor did he have any means to support himself. 7 That motion
was quickly withdrawn when the Prosecutor asked to be heard on the same
12. Id. 111.
13. Id. 11 09.
14. Id.
15. Id. I 13(4).
16. March decision, supra note 6, 14.
17. The Appeals Chamber should have anticipated this problem and, in fact, Judge Nieto-Navia, in
his separate statement, and Judge Shahabuddeen in his a dissenting opinion, appended to the November
decision, raised this question, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/
Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
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point.' The Prosecutor also filed a motion for review and reconsideration
claiming she had "new facts," which would alter the November decision. 9
Therefore, the Accused remained in the custody of the Tribunal.
The November decision also set into motion a flurry of filings from the
parties and angry and highly publicized protest from not only the Government
of Rwanda, but also from many others in the international community, such as
the European Union,2 Human Rights Watch 2' and a number of academics. The
Rwandans announced that they would suspend cooperation with the Tribunal
and officially condemned the decision at the United Nations. They did allow
the OTP to continue its operations in Kigali, but did not grant the Tribunal's
then new Chief Prosecutor a visa to enter the country for some time.22
Simultaneously, interventions were made by international justice NGOs to mend
relations. They convinced Rwanda to remain engaged with the Tribunal, by
inter alia, filing a request to appear as amicus curiae to address the Tribunal on
the modalities of release, if that question was reached.
By mid-February the Prosecutor produced "new facts" supported, in part,
by a Cameroonian judge's explanations of the politics of the transfer process
from Cameroon to Arusha.' To further prove her case that Barayagwiza was
not simply forgotten, the Prosecutor produced a United States State Department
affidavit to show that attempts to transfer Barayagwiza was an on-going process
for which the OTP had sought outside assistance, in the form of U.S.
intervention.u These claims were all made in an effort to show that the lengthy
delays should not have been attributed to the Prosecutor. The Rwandan amicus
curiae memorial was filed' also by the time the Appeals Chamber heard oral
arguments in Arusha.
On March 31, 2000 the Appeals Chamber ruled that because the new facts
showed that "the violations suffered by the [Accused] and the omissions of the
Prosecutor are not the same as those which emerged from the facts on which the
18. Id.
19. The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, (1999),
available at http: /lwww.ictr.org/ENGLISH/decisions/Barayagwiza/dcs/20000331 .htm.
20. European Parliament resolution on the situation in the Great Lakes Region with special reference
to Rwanda, B5-0276, 0294 and 0300 (1999), available at
http://www3.europari.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP-PV2&LANGUE=EN (last visited May 17,
2001).
21. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Prosecutorial Incompetence Frees Rwandan Suspect (Nov.
10, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/99/nov/Rwandal 109.htm.
22. Rwanda Agrees to Visit of the United Nations' Chief Prosecutor, Internews Wire Report (1999),
available at http://www.intemetub.orglactivities/ICTR-reports/ICTR News Dec.99.html (last modified Dec.
3, 1999).
23. March decision, supra note 6,1 65(1).
24. Id.1 65(2).
25. March decision, supra note 6, 18.
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[November] Decision is founded,"' the November decision should be
"altered."27 Therefore, it rejected Barayagwiza's application for release, and
decided that for the violations suffered the Accused would be entitled "to a
remedy to be fixed at the time of the judgment at first instance."2
In August 2000, Barayagwiza's case was joined with three others involved
with Rwanda's hate media and allegedly responsible for the genocide,29 one of
whom pled guilty.30 This trial was scheduled to begin on September 18, 2000,
but faced delays yet again, this time as a result of the numerous motions filed
by the defense.3'
Ill. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE NOVEMBER AND MARCH DECISIONS
At the outset, I should note that I do not intend to recount all the factual
findings and legal reasoning behind these decisions, because Professor William
Schabas has published an analysis of the November and March decisions, in
which he examines the issues in dispute and the findings, in sufficient detail.32
So, I will briefly outline the points relevant to my argument that this and future
international criminal tribunals should take due process rights more seriously.
A. The November Decision
In the November decision, the Appeals Chamber found that: 1) the failure
to hear Barayagwiza's writ of habeas corpus and the delay in considering and
deciding his extremely urgent motion; 2) the period of his provisional detention
having been too long-spanning some eighteen months; 3) the failure to promptly
inform the accused of the charges against him; and 4) the protracted wait to
answer charges against him - 96 days after his transfer to Arusha, all combined
amounted to such an egregious breach of his due process rights that the
Prosecutor should no longer have the authority to try him.
33
26. Id. ' 74.
27. Ia
28. Id. 75.
29. In addition to Nahimana and Ngeze, mentioned in the introduction of this essay, the Prosecutor
joined Georges Ruggio, an Italian-Belgian RTLM announcer who resided in Rwanda prior to and during the
1994 genocide.
30. Georges Ruggiu pleaded guilty to incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity and
agreed to testify for the Prosecutor in the media trial. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment in June
2000. Prosecutor v. Ruggio, Case. No. ICTR-97-32-I.
31. Hirondelle Report, Defence Motions Delay Start of Media Trial (2000) (reporting that a number
of motions filed by Nahimana and Barayagwiza would need to be ruled upon before the trial could begin).
32. William A. Schabas, International Decision: Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Decision, and
Decision (Prosecutor's Requestfor Review or Reconsideration)), ICTR-97-19-AR 72,94 AM. J. INT. L 563,
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (2000) [herinafter Schabus].
33. Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion by the Defence for Orders to Review and/or Nullify
320
Momeni
At this juncture in the discussion, the outcome of this decision, in terms of
whether the accused should have been tried by the Tribunal, is unimportant.
What is of consequence is that the majority failed to give appropriate weight to
the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed, vis-6-vis the gravity of the due
process violations, since the order was not based on the merits of the case, and
that the majority apparently did not sufficiently consider: 1) the logistical
requirements of his release;34 2) whether the Accused could subsequently be
tried in another jurisdiction; 3) the impact of his release on the reconciliation
process;31 and 4) to a lesser degree, the inevitable fallout with the Government
of Rwanda, without whose cooperation the Tribunal would have to suspend its
operation. Although as the Appeals Chamber noted in the March decision,
Rwanda's non-cooperation would have to be addressed by the United Nations
Security Council, based on Article 28 of the ICTR Statute.
Therefore, the Chamber's decision was inadvisable for the circumstances
of this particular case. That is to say, given the information available to the
Judges at that juncture, the Chamber could have addressed specifically to which
jurisdiction the Accused should be delivered upon his release, so that perhaps
he could be given a fair trial, since the reason for release were procedural.
Alternatively, the Chamber could have found other means by which to sanction
the Prosecutor, and others responsible for the due process violations, and to
allow for compensation should the Accused be found innocent after a trial on
the merits.
B. The March Reversal
In the March decision, which contained a brief four-and-one-half page
analysis of the merits of the Prosecutor's claims, the Appeals Chamber
"altered"36 its November decision. It found the Accused's due process rights
had been violated, however, based on the "new facts" presented by the
Prosecutor, these violations were neither grave, nor were the Prosecutor
omissions offensive. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber decided that:
the Arrest and Provisional Detention of the Suspect, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Nov 17, 2000).
34. The majority based its decision to return Barayagwiza to the authorities of Cameroon based on
Rule 40 Bis of the RPE which states that the accused "shall be released or, if appropriate, be delivered to the
authorities of the State to which the request was initially made." R.P.E. supra note 8. In the circumstances
of this particular case it was inadvisable to order the return Barayagwiza to Cameroon, as that state is not a
signatory to the 1949 Genocide Convention. As such, he could have evaded justice there because Cameroon
would not have been under an obligation to try him.
35. The United Nations Resolution establishing the ICTR explicitly recognizes reconciliation as a
purpose for the establishment of the Tribunal.
36. Id. 151.
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[F]or the violations of his rights the Appellant is entitled to a remedy,
to be fixed at the time ofjudgment, at first instance, as follows: a) If
the Appellant is found not guilty, he shall receive financial
compensation; b) If the Appellant is found guilty, his sentence shall
be reduced to take into account the violation of this rights."
There are two primary concerns I would like to raise with regard to the
March decision. First, the so-called new facts offered by the Prosecutor did not
meet the two-prong test that a party must satisfy in order to introduce such facts
under the RPE. Second, the remedy offered by the Appeals Chamber is
problematic.
First, with regard to the introduction of new facts, in order to compel the
Chamber to review or reconsider a final decision, a party must show that the
facts were not available to the party at the time of the proceedings "nor would
they have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence"3 and that "if
it had been proven, [the fact] could have been a decisive factor in reaching a
decision. . . ."" In the March decision, the Appeals Chamber remarked, "In the
wholly exceptional circumstances of this case, and in the face of a possible
miscarriage of justice, the Chamber construes the condition laid down in Rule
120 [the first prong of the above mentioned test] as directory in nature."'
Feeling bound by the interest of justice, the Appeals Chamber simply
disregarded the fact that the OTP was aware of the "new facts" in question prior
to filing its response to the Barayagwiza's initial appeal. In fact, the OTP had
even failed to exercise due diligence in providing answers to the questions the
Appeals Chamber judges had raised about the events of the due process
controversy, prior to rendering the November decision. Instead the OTP only
felt obligated to perform its duty diligently after the Appeals Chamber ordered
the release.
In effect, in the March decision, the Appeals Chamber distorted its own
rules in an effort to achieve the desired result, that is, to allow the Prosecutor to
proceed with the case while acknowledging that "the appeal process... is not
designed for the purpose of allowing parties to remedy their own failings or
oversights during trial or sentencing."' The March decision simply claimed
that the ICTR statute does not explicitly address the situation presented and cites
37. Id. 175.
38. ICTR supra note 8, R. 120.
39. ICTR supra note 8, R. 120.
40. March decision, supra note 6,165.
41. Id. 43, citing the Appeals Chamber's findings in The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic. Case
No. IT-96-22, available at http://www.un.orglictylind-e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
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to clearly distinguishable cases noting that it "does not cite these examples as
authority for its actions in the strict sense." '42
Second, the remedy offered for the violations is no remedy at all. Deciding
that the sentence shall be reduced if the Appellant is found guilty is already
standard procedure. With regard to "compensation if he is found not guilty, 43
it is interesting to note that first, it is unclear what sort of compensation is
contemplated here; and second, nothing in the ICTR Statute or Rules provides
for such measures. Only in October 2000 did the ICTR President send a letter
to the United Nations Secretary General, to be forwarded to the Security
Council, proposing an amendment to the Statute to allow for compensation to
remedy situations of wrongful arrest and/or conviction, violation of rights,
deprivation of liberty and the like."
Furthermore, political considerations apparently also influenced the
alteration of the November decision despite the judges' insistence that the
revision of the decision was in light of the new facts and that political
considerations had no role in their deliberations. The majority's decision, as
well as the separate statements of Judges Vohrah and Nieto-Navia, openly
acknowledge the Rwandan threats of non-cooperation. In fact, the majority
remarked that "the Tribunal is an independent body whose decisions are based
on justice and law. If its decision in any case should be followed by non-
cooperation, that consequence would be a matter for the [UN] Security
Council."'45 To this Professor Schabas has written "Me thinks they insist too
much," 46 although he acknowledged "the volume of new facts sheds a very
different light on the nature of the prosecutorial abuse., 47 The outcome, that
release was not warranted because the nature of the due process violations
Barayagwiza suffered were not as grave and as attributable to the Prosecutor,
is an appropriate one nonetheless.
It is unfortunate that the majority's decision is generally not well reasoned
and lowers certain procedural standards. Furthermore, a number of other
questions remain outstanding in the March decision. For example, it fails to
answer why the habeas petition filed three years ago, which is still before the
Tribunal, is now irrelevant to the violation of due process rights of the Accused
when it was treated previously as an egregious violation. Additionally, the new
facts did not show that the Prosecutor had fulfilled its obligation to timely
inform the Accused of his rights. They simply showed that Barayagwiza knew
42. ld. 169.
43. Id. 175 (3)(b).
44. Hirondefie News Agency, Rwanda Tribunal President Asks for Statute Changes, (Oct 15, 2000),
available at http://www.Hirondelle.orgtsites/Hirondelle.rsf/nefd9rdd48f5826c125 64cf004f793d / 5853206.
45. November Decision, supra note 5.
46. Schabas, supra note 28, at 568.
47. Id.
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the nature of the charges against him in Cameroon in 1996, although not
through the actions of the OTP.
Ultimately, the March decision's conclusion is correct-the procedural
violations suffered by the accused did not outweigh the crimes with which he
is charged. However, in order to deter the Prosecutor from engaging in such
negligent behavior, the Tribunal did have alternatives. It could have released
the Accused into the custody of another jurisdiction where he would have been
give a fair trial, including Rwanda or Belgium, or it could have sanctioned the
prosecution team responsible for this case, through personal fines or reference
to their national bars. Instead the Appeals Chamber rendered a weakly reasoned
decision setting bad precedent.
Ill. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BARAYAGWIZA CONTROVERSY FOR
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TRIBUNAL?
What procedural delays mean for the credibility of the Tribunals and, by
extension, for furthering the rule of law internationally, is that opponents of
such institutions become armed with examples of why international justice will
not work. This also sets the stage for Barayagwiza and other accused persons
to have an excuse to boycott "unfair" trials, halting the wheels of justice. When
the Tribunal puts itself in situations where it is faced with non-cooperation from
Rwanda, and forces the Appeals Chamber to render decisions with negative
implications for the reconciliation process, it damages not only its own
reputation, but also hampers the pursuit of international justice by extension.
Although it has accomplished more than the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in many ways,4 it is no secret that the ICTR
has had its share of judicial, prosecutorial and administrative troubles.4 Some
of these troubles are attributable to the logistical difficulties-due to a the lack
of infrastructure in Arusha-and others to the exceedingly unclear lines of
responsibility within the Tribunal, which results in a severe lack of
accountability in this 700 plus person bureaucracy. This lack of accountability
has led to insufficient support for the work of the judicial chambers. One of the
violations cited in the November decision was the 96 days that the Accused was
forced to wait to make his initial appearance. This, as the Appeals Chamber
later discovered, was a scheduling problem, which I will discuss below.
48. For example, the ICTR has arrested over 40 persons who presided over the 1994 genocide, both
at a national or regional level. The former Rwandan Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, pled guilty to genocide
in 1998 and was cooperating with the Prosecutor. The ICTY is still struggling to capture many suspects at
the top of its wanted list.
49. The original Registrar and Deputy Prosecutors of the Tribunal were forced to resign due to
serious questions of competence and a lack of efficiency in their respective offices.
In fact, an expert report regarding the problems of support for the work of
Chambers, issued in July 2000, noted that "there is evidence of poor
communication, blurred lines of responsibility, a lack of training at crucial
levels and some tensions in terms of relationships, all of which serve to frustrate
the overriding objective of providing efficient, effective and expeditious support
to the judiciary and Trial Chambers." 5° It is also interesting to note that for the
six years it has been in existence, the ICTR has never had an effective Deputy
Registrar, whose duties include, inter alia, the proper operations of court
management, which includes scheduling hearings. Indeed, the position has been
left unfilled for prolonged periods of time, which points to hiring difficulties.
How was the Barayagwiza case affected by this lack of proper support?
There are two possible problem areas that could be considered here. Fault was
primarily placed with the OTP in the November decision. But the Appeals
Chamber also acknowledged that the Registry, and Chambers contributed to the
delays as well. Furthermore, as mentioned above, in the March decision
Cameroon was also apportioned some responsibility for the delay in the transfer.
The Appeals Chamber was right to note that there were no clean hands in
the matter. The Registry works alongside the OTP on transfers of accused
persons. Obviously, the OTP left Barayagwiza detained in Cameroon for
months before it made a serious attempt to transfer him, while it had transferred
a number of other Rwandans with whom he was detained, and not until after the
Accused had filed a writ of habeas. Therefore, the OTP bears some
responsibility. Perhaps the Registry could have been more insistent with
Cameroon on expediting the transfer, also.
With regard to the delay in scheduling the initial appearance, the
scheduling of the judicial calendar is the responsibility of the Court
Management Section of the Office of the Registrar. However difficult a task it
may be to find common dates on which all parties are available, an organized
and persistent Registry official could ensure that all concerned are consulted for
availability and the final approval is given by the appropriate judges for a
hearing to take place, in a timely manner.
In the Barayagwiza matter, although it may be true that the Defense
Counsel agreed to a February 3rd initial appearance date, one must ask the
question, "why?" When the Accused was transferred in November 1997, the
Judges were about to depart for their winter recess and some were not scheduled
to return until February. Therefore, the long judicial recesses, which the
Registry has had no difficulties in publicizing when it suits its purposes, have
50. Robin Vincent International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: The Court Service for England
and Wales (Jul. 2000) [hereinafter Vincent Report]. On file with the author.
20011 Momeni
326 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:315
also been a factor in contributing to the delays and the Barayagwiza case was
no exception.5'
The situation also begs the question why the Registry does not find creative
solutions to address the lingering problems of delays. For example, for the
Barayagwiza initial appearance, if it was just some of the judges who were away
late into February, why did the Registry not suggest that a substitute judge sit
in with the rest of the appropriate chamber to hear the accused plead to the
charges? If counsel was not available, why could the Registry not substitute
temporary local counsel for the proceedings? Perhaps it is again a question of
training and experience.52
The ICTR is in a sense a victim of its own success. The Tribunal's
investigators have located and arrested over 40 of the indicted persons, most of
whom are reputed to have been the true architects of the genocide, either
nationally or within their own regions. Like Barayagwiza, the majority of the
accused have been in detention for three years or more. The pace of trials has
simply not kept up with the pace of arrests. As of the writing of this essay, only
eight persons have been judged by the Tribunal, two of who, had pleaded guilty
and thus avoided protracted and expensive trials. If the Tribunal is to dispense
justice effectively and efficiently, it must avoid situations similar to
Barayagwiza in the future.
IV. AVOIDING FUTURE BARAYAGWIZA SCENARIOS
As a supporter of the Tribunal, there are three basic suggestions that I offer
for preventing persistent and problematic procedural delays. First, structurally,
the organization is set up to fail. There is no single head of the Tribunal, as
there are in most domestic courts.53 For the purposes of this portion of the
discussion, I am referring only to the Judicial Chambers and the Registry, as
obviously, the OTP should be left independent in conducting its operations to
avoid any appearance of impropriety. Although there is a President of the
Tribunal, she is unable to interfere in the administration of the Tribunal. United
Nations officials initially vested this power in the Office of the Registrar, who
is responsible for all administrative, budgetary and recruitment matters. Thus,
there is no ultimate authority and much slips through the proverbial cracks. The
United Nations needs to clarify who is ultimately responsible and reform the
Tribunal's structure so that accountability is maintained and requirements for
51. Although there is at least one judge in Arusha during recess, a suspect must make his initial
appearance before a full chamber.
52. In the last year, serious efforts have been made to ensure that certain staff and even the Judges
participate in various training seminars.
53. In most national courts, the judges have clear authority over the administrative arm of the court.
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administering an effective operation are satisfied. Due process rights cannot be
guaranteed otherwise.
Second, the Tribunal must clarify lines of responsibility not only between
but also within each organ. Moreover, it must either ensure that personnel in all
organs are persons highly experienced in the relevant fields of international
criminal law, court administration and the like, or provide sufficient training for
those who may need it. On this issue the expert report of July 2000 notes that
"[t]here is overwhelming evidence that a number of those working in the
Tribunal either do not understand the real purpose of the Tribunal or, for some
of those who do, do not relate their individual routines and responsibilities to
the achievement of that purpose, directly or indirectly."54 As in most large
bureaucracies, at the Tribunal the buck rarely stops. Until recently, there has
been very little accountability in any of the three organs, although those familiar
with the Tribunal's history will recall that the first Deputy Prosecutor and the
Registrar were asked to resign in 1997.
Recent media reports told of serious disarray in the OTP. In mid-2000
three senior trial attorneys were asked by the Chief Prosecutor to resign
immediately, but "benefiting from the recourses available from the UN system,
it turns out that they will, at worst, simply be distanced from the trials, awaiting
the expiration of their contracts.""5  In addition, another senior attorney
associated with the media trial left the Tribunal for another United Nations post,
just days before the trial was scheduled to begin, reportedly because the OTP
was unprepared to begin the highly publicized trial. In protest, two others on
the same team left the Tribunal. Instances of lack of accountability like these
are not uncommon in other organs of the Tribunal and obviously slow the pace
of the proceedings. When responsibilities are plainly carved out and well
trained, or better yet, experienced personnel are in place, when a Barayagwiza
situation arises again, the problem can be addressed at its source.
Finally, the Tribunal's rules must be clarified and amended to allow
sanctions to be imposed against both the defense and prosecution and the judges
should not hesitate in addressing unprofessional behavior. As it stands, Rule 46
of the RPE, speaks to the issue of misconduct "by counsel" and what the
Chambers are empowered to do against counsel, in such cases. Although, at
last, at plenary session in 2000, the judges agreed that "counsel" in Rule 46
refers to both parties, the implications in the text point primarily to the defense.
A few defense counsel have been referred to their national bars for
misconduct in the past. More recently, the judges have been denying defense
counsel fees for frivolously filed motions. As of the writing of this essay,
54. Vincent report, supra note 49, at 5.
55. A Serious Crisis, UBUTABERA, Editorial, (2000), available at http:Ilwww.
Diplomatiejudiciaire.com.
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however, no Prosecutor has been subjected to Rule 46 sanctions. In order to
ensure that a balance is maintained, especially in cases like the one in question,
the judges should have and indeed exercise the option against both parties.
Should the Tribunal ever face a Barayagwiza situation again, where it is
deemed that releasing the accused is not an option, after making finding of due
process violations and before hearing the merits of the case it should then have
alternatives for addressing the problem. It should be able to impose sanctions
against the individual prosecutor or the prosecuting team for misconduct. For
example, the prosecuting attorney could be held in contempt or monetary fines
could be imposed. The prosecuting attorney could also be referred to his or her
national bar. The efficacy of such an approach may be limited in a United
Nations Tribunal, but the option should still exist. In the Barayagwiza
controversy, it seems that division of responsibility was unclear and one could
say there was negligence on the part of the OTP. But what if a situation arises
where the misconduct is intentional? In this context, the judges have the tools
with which to conduct proper trials with the accused person's due process rights
in tact. They must use these tools even handedly.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal barely saved itself from embarrassment in the Barayagwiza
case. The situation would not have unfolded as it did had the Tribunal's three
organs acted diligently, acknowledging that the due process rights of an accused
were respected. If safeguards and policies exist and are enforced properly, the
Tribunal can better ensure that due process rights are protected.
If the Appeals Chamber had truly desired to take the instant case out of the
Prosecutor's hands it could have arranged that Barayagwiza be transferred to a
jurisdiction where he would face a fair trial. But it chose to keep the case at the
ICTR, using faulty legal reasoning and lowering standards. It also was forced
to negotiate a delicate standoff with the Government of Rwanda, whether it
chooses to acknowledge this fact or not.
To avoid similar future circumstances, the ICTR must reform its structure,
ensure that each section and each organ is clear about its responsibilities and
that accountability is not swept under the rugs of the United Nations
employment/staff rules, and finally hold the Prosecutor to the same standard as
the Defense Counsel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Andreopoulos notes that no crime matches genocide in the moral
opprobrium that it generates.' Constituting a criminal intent to destroy or
cripple permanently a human group, acts of genocide shock the collective
conscience of the world's community perhaps like no other act. While the
commission of genocide dates to antiquity, it is in response to the atrocities
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of Penn. Press 1994).
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committed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War that the
international community undertook the development of international laws
designed to both prevent and punish acts of genocide. The authoritative legal
statement on the issue of genocide is the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which entered into force in 1951.
The Convention's nineteen articles define genocide and establish the offense as
an international crime. The product of a politicized codification process, the
Genocide Convention has been criticized by legal scholars as a compromise
convention that fails to both fully define the crime of genocide and provide the
necessary legal institutions for its adjudication. The fact that no international
prosecution for acts of genocide took place for more than four decades after the
Convention's entry into force was viewed by many as an indication of the
treaty's ineffectiveness. Since 1993, however, the international adjudication of
both individuals and states alleged to have committed acts of genocide has taken
place. As such, the impact of the Genocide Convention has increased
significantly.
The focus of this article is the international adjudication of the crime of
genocide. Cases brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are presented. First, however, the
concept of genocide is reviewed, followed by an assessment of the Genocide
Convention.
II. THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE
The act of genocide is ancient, while the concept itself is contemporary.
Chalk and Jonassohn note that we have no historical evidence of acts of
genocide during the hunting and gathering stage of early man.2 Genocide
emerged only after the world was divided into nomads and settlers, when
conflicts over agriculture became increasingly destructive. In order to end the
cycle of war, recuperation, and war seeking to avenge defeats, the victors began
to adopt strategies of annihilation. After battle, the victors killed, sold into
slavery, or dispersed the defeated populations. With the centralization of power
in the hands of the state, along with an increased capacity to kill associated with
revolutions in military technologies, the ability to commit mass murder on an
unprecedented scale became more common, including acts targeted at
individuals due to their group characteristics. Since 1900 most destructive acts
of genocide have taken place, ranging from the Armenian genocide to the
Holocaust to the killing fields of Cambodia. To state that genocide is a
2. FRANK CHALK & KuRT JOHASSOHN, THm HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press 1990).
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twentieth century phenomenon is misleading; however, to label the 1900s the
century of genocide is accurate.
A. Typologies
A number of typologies have been used by scholars for analytical and
comparative studies of genocide. Lemkin offered the first typology,
differentiating incidents of genocide based on the intent of the perpetrator.3
Accordingly, the first type of genocide, which emerged in antiquity and
continued until the Middle Ages, was the total, or near total, destruction of
victim groups and nations. The second type of genocide, characteristic of the
modem age, was aimed at the destruction of a culture without an attempt to
physically destroy its bearers. Lemkin's third type of genocide is reflected in
the Nazi-style genocide of the 1930s, which combined ancient and modem
forms of genocide in targeting some groups for immediate annihilation and
others for ethnic assimilation.
Others have offered typologies based on the type of society.4 Horowitz, for
example, articulates eight types of societies, ranging from permissive to
genocidal societies.' Additional typologies of genocide are based on the type
of perpetrators, the type of victims, the type of groups, the types of accusation,
the types of results for the perpetrator society, and the scale of casualties. Chalk
and Jonassohn,6 similar to Lemkin,7 provide a typology that classifies genocide
according to the motives of the perpetrators. Motives, according to Chalk and
Jonassohn, can be differentiated according to the following desires:
1) to eliminate a real or potential threat;
2) to spread terror among real or potential enemies;
3) to acquire economic wealth; or
4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology.'
Recognizing that more than one of the aforementioned motives may be at work,
Chalk and Jonassohn categorize acts of genocide by determining which of the
four motives was the dominant one.' In their analysis, Chalk and Jonassohn
conclude that while the first three types of genocide date to antiquity, the fourth
type is more reflective of modem times.' ° The commission of the act of
genocide in order to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology is clearly
3. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944).
4. JEssiE BERNARD, AMERICAN COMMUNITY BEHAVIOR (1949); IRVING LOUIS HORowrrz,
TALKING LIVES: GENOCIDE AND STATE POWER (1980).
5. HOROWITZ, supra note 4, at 13-14.
6. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 2.
7. LEMKIN, supra note 3.
8. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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distinct from types I-rn. First, type IV genocides are targeted toward citizens
of the perpetrator state instead of aliens. Second, while genocide to eliminate
a threat (type I), spread terror among enemies (type II), or acquire economic
wealth (type III) produce tangible benefits to the perpetrator state, ideological
genocide (type IV) is carried out in spite of tremendous costs to the perpetrator
state. Chalk and Jonassohn" note that such costs to the state can be measured
in economic, political, and development terms.
Kuper, as well, clusters genocide according to motive.' His three
categories of modem genocide include:
1) genocides designed to settle religious, racial, and ethnic differences;
2) genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing
empire; and
3) genocides perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideology. 3
Later, Kuper divides genocide into two main groups: domestic genocides
carried out by a state on its territory against its own citizens and genocides
arising in the course of international warfare. 4 The four types of domestic
genocide adopted by Kuper are:
1) genocides against indigenous peoples;
2) genocides against hostage groups;
3) genocides following upon decolonization of a two-tier structure of
domination; and
4) genocide in the process of struggles by ethnic or racial or religious
groups for power or secession, greater autonomy, or more equality. 5
The inability of scholars to reach a consensus on the most appropriate
typology of acts of genocide underscores both the issue's complexity and the
scholarly community's continued effort to reveal its primary sources. The lack
of consensus also reflects diverging views on the very definition of genocide,
a problem that continues to hamper the international adjudication of the crime
of genocide.
B. Definitions
The term genocide became part of legal terminology only after World War
H, although scholars note its first use by jurist Raphael Lemkin during the latter
stages of the war.'6 The term genocide was derived from the Greek word genos,
11. Id. at 37.
12. LEo KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1985).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally ARTHUS JAY KLINGHOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA (N.Y. Univ. Press 1998); ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTETHCENTURY
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which translates to race or tribe, and the Latin cide, which translates to killing.
Lemkin explained the concept as follows:
[G]enocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of
a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members
of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration
of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national
feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and
the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and
even the lives of the national group as an entity, and the actions
involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual
capacity, but as members of the national group. 7
The inclusion of "nonlethal acts" such as actions aimed at the destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups'" makes Lemkin' s definition
extremely broad, resulting in the articulation of several alternative definitions
of the term. However, as Chalk and Jonassohn note, there is no generally
accepted definition of genocide in the literature. 9 Fein focused her attention on
developing a broader and deeper sociological definition of genocide, as follows:
"genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy
a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and
social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or
lack of threat offered by the victim."' Like Remkin, Fein does not limit acts of
genocide to activities carried out by the state, as many other scholars do.
Horowitz defines genocide as: "A structural and systematic destruction of
innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus."'"
Horowitz's definition does limit the range of perpetrators of acts of
genocide to state bureaucratic apparti. His definition expands the range of
victims, which are defined in terms of their perceived innocence, making no
reference to their collective characteristics. Harff and Gurr recognize that such
a definition fails to differentiate state-sponsored murder for reasons other than
(N.Y. Univ. Press 1995); SAMUELTOTEN ET AL., GENOCIDE IN THETWENTIETH CENTURY: CRIICAL ESSAYS
AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS (1995); Andreopoulos, supra note 1; ERVIN STAUB, THE RoOTs OF EVIL: THE
ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP VIOLENCE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989); Kuper, supra note 12.
17. LEMKIN, supra note 3.
18. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 2, at 9.
19. ld. at xvii.
20. HELEN FEIN, LIVES AT RISK: A STUDY OF VIOLATIONS OF LIFE INTEGRITY IN 50 STATES IN 1987
BASED ON THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 1988 REPORT (1990).
21. HOROwrrz, supra note 4, at 17.
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group characteristics, termed politicides, from acts of genocide.2" Their
definition, provided below, accepts Horowitz's limitation to state activities:
[G]enocides and politicides are the promotion and execution of
policies by a state or its agents which result in the deaths of the
substantial portion of a group. The difference between genocides and
politicides is in the characteristics by which members of the group are
identified by the state. In genocides the victimized groups are defined
primarily in terms of their communal characteristics, i.e., ethnicity,
religion, or nationality. In politicides the victim groups are defined
primarily in terms of the hierarchical position or political opposition
to the regime and dormant groups.23
Chalk and Jonassohn define the term as follows: "Genocide is a form of one-
sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group,
as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator."' This
definition expands the range of perpetrators, limited by Horowitz and Harff and
Gurr to a state's bureaucratic apparatus, by including other authorities. This
definition fails, however, to include actions by individuals aimed at the
destruction of groups based upon characteristics associated with the group.
Charny defines genocide in such a way that allows for actions by non-state
agencies to qualify.' His definition reads as follows: "Genocide in the generic
sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in
the course of military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the
essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims."'  Charny's
definition, however, is exceptionally broad with no reference to either the
intentions of the perpetrator or the group characteristics of the victims, issues
of central concern to Lemkin and the Genocide Convention.
What is clear from this review of the leading definitions of genocide is that
both the range of perpetrators and the range of victims are as important as, if not
more important than, the manner in which the destruction takes place. A result
of the divergent views on the proper definition of genocide is an inability of the
scholarly community to arrive at a consensus of what actions constitute
genocide and the number of victims of genocide. Walliman and Dobkowski
estimate, for example, that between nineteen and twenty-eight million people
22. Barbara Harff & Ted R. GurT, Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides, 37 INT'L
STUD. Q. 359 (1998).
23. Id.
24. Chalk & Jonassohn, supra note 2.
25. ISRAELCHARNY, How CAN WE COMMIT THE UNTHINKABLE?: GENocIDE, THE HUMAN CANCER
(1984); ISRAEL CHARNY, THE STUDY OF GENocIDE (1988).
26. Id.
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during the twentieth century were victims of genocide27 while Smith calculates
that number to be sixty million. 8 Undoubtedly, the debate over the proper
definition of genocide will continue unabated. Any acceptable definition of the
term, however, must include both the "intent to destroy" motive of the
perpetrator as well as the "group characteristic" of the victims.
III. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
Codified in 1948, the legal framework for the Genocide Convention was
provided by the United Nations General Assembly and the Economic and Social
Council. The General Assembly, at its 47th plenary meeting on November 9,
1946, referred to the Sixth, or Legal, Committee a draft resolution submitted by
the representatives of Cuba, India and Panama inviting a study of the possibility
of declaring genocide an international crime. At its 24th meeting on November
29, 1946, the Sixth Committee decided to entrust a Sub-Committee with the task
of drafting a unanimously acceptable resolution on the basis of various
proposals submitted. The Sixth Committee, at its 32nd meeting on December
9, 1946, unanimously adopted the draft resolution. On the recommendation of
the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly, at its 55th plenary meeting on
December 11, 1946, unanimously adopted Resolution 96(I), which reads:
Genocide is the denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual
human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the
conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form
of cultural and other contributions represented by these groups, and
is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations. Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred,
when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed,
entirely or in part. The punishment of the crime of genocide is a
matter of international concern.
The General Assembly, therefore, Affirms that genocide is a crime
under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for
the commission of which principals and accomplices - whether
private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the
crime is committed on religious, racial, political or other grounds -
are punishable; Invites the Members States to enact the necessary
27. ISIDOR WALLIMANN & MICHAEL N. DOBKOWSKI, GENOCIDEANDTHE MODERN AGE: ETIOLOGY
AND CASE STUDIES OF MASS DEATH ix (2000).
28. Roger Smith, Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of
Genocide, in ISIDOR WI.UMANN &MICHAEL DOBKOWSKI, GENOCIDE ANDTHE MODERN AGE: ETIOLOGY AND
CASE STUDIES OF MASS DEATH 21-39 (1987).
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legislation for the prevention and punishment of this crime;
Recommends that international co-operation be organized between
States with a view to facilitate the speedy prevention and punishment
of the crime of genocide, and, to this end, Requests the Economic and
Social Council to undertake the necessary studies, with a view to
drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to be
submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly.29
The General Assembly reaffirmed the 1946 resolution on November 21,
1947 by resolution 180(H) and requested the Economic and Social Council to
continue its work on the subject. The Council, empowered by the General
Assembly to prepare a draft convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide, felt that the necessary studies should be undertaken in
consultation with the Committee for the Codification of International Law and
with the Commission on Human Rights. In view of the urgency of the question,
the Economic and Social Council enlisted the services of the Secretary General,
who was asked to enlist the assistance of Member States of the United Nations
in preparing the draft convention. In 1948, the Economic and Social Council
appointed an ad hoc committee consisting of seven members, including Raphael
Lemkin, to revise the original draft. The ad hoc committee met from April 5-
August 26, 1948.
When the drafting project was completed, the Council, after a general
debate, decided by resolution 153(VII) on August 26, 1948, to send the draft to
the General Assembly Third Committee for study and action. The General
Assembly then referred the report to its Sixth Committee for consideration. The
Sixth Committee devoted fifty-one meetings during two months to an
examination and discussion of the draft convention. On December 9, 1948, the
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. On December 11, 1948 the representatives of twenty
states signed the convention, which entered into force in 1951. To date, 127
states have ratified the treaty.
A. Preamble to the Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention's preamble reflects both the accomplishments
of the prior General Assembly resolution and sets the normative stage for the
Convention's binding articles. The preamble states:
29. G.A. Res 96 (1). U.N. GAOR, 55th mtg. (1946).
Morton
The Contracting Parties
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in the resolution 96(I) dated 11 December 1946
that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit
and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized
world;
Recognizes that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great
losses on humanity; and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge, international co-operation is required.
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided."
B. Articles of the Genocide Convention
The Convention's preamble is followed by nineteen articles which can be
divided into three categories, as follows: substantive articles (I-IV); procedural
articles (V-IX); and technical articles (X-XIX). Since it is the first nine articles
of the Convention that are directly related to the adjudication of acts of
genocide, those articles are reiterated and analyzed here.
Article I. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.3"
The first article establishes the fact that acts of genocide, regardless of the
presence or not of war, constitute international crimes and also commits Parties
to the Convention to undertake actions to both prevent and punish the acts. The
recognition that an act of genocide constitutes a crime against humanity is
rooted in Lemkin's insistence that: "[T]o treat genocide as a crime that only
concerns an individual nation makes no sense because by its very nature the
author is either the state itself or powerful groups backed by the state .... By
its legal, moral and human nature, genocide must be regarded as an international
crime.
' 32
Article I was targeted for criticism by many, including the Committee on
Peace and Law Through the United Nations, which concluded that "what is left
30. Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
adopted by Res.260 (1) A of the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1948 [hereinafter
1948 Genocide Convention].
31. Id. at art 1.
32. Lemkin, supra note 3.
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of the Convention is a code of domestic crimes which are already denounced in
all countries as common law crimes.' 33 While it may be true that acts of
genocide are criminal on the domestic plane, the contribution that Article I
makes is significant. Acts that the Convention defines or lists in the two articles
that follow (Articles I and Ell), which hitherto if committed by a government
in its own territory against its own citizens have been no concern to
international law, are made a matter of international concern and are, therefore,
taken out of the "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state., 34  While genocide by a state against its own citizens was morally
condemned prior to the Convention, it was "generally recognized that a state is
entitled to treat its own citizens at its discretion and that the manner in which it
treats them is not a matter with which international law.. . concerns itself."35
Elevating the status of the crime of genocide to the international plane,
therefore, is an important contribution of the Convention's first article.
The provisions codified in Article I, importantly, provide legal bases for
third party intervention to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The
Convention does not, however, obligate states to intervene in response to the
commission of the act of genocide as is commonly assumed.
Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.3"
As stated in Article II, the Convention's approach is that of individual crime and
not of persecutions instigated by governments. 37 For this and other reasons, the
Convention's definition of genocide has sparked a heated scholarly debate over
its utility and completeness. Andreopoulos articulates some of the shortcomings
of the Convention's definition of genocide. 38 First, the definition excludes
political and social groups from those deemed worthy of protection. In addition,
economic groups are not provided explicit protection under Article II. With the
33. George A Finch, The Genocide Convention, 43 AM. J. OF INT'L L 735 (1949).
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, 1 7.
35. LASSAOPPENHEIM & IAUTERPACHTHERSH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 1(7th ed. 1948).
36. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. II.
37. George A. Finch, The Genocide Convention, AM. J. OF INT'L L 732 (1949).
38. ANDREOPOULOS, supra note 1, at 2.
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establishment of anti-capitalist ruling parties this century, the prospect of states
liquidating property owners and others who believe in private enterprise was
very real during the Convention's drafting. The failure to include political,
social and economic groups in Article II, therefore, is a serious omission, which
can be explained only with reference to the political debate process by which the
Convention was drafted. Also absent from the Convention's provisions is a
reference to "cultural genocide," which Dadrian includes in his five types of
genocide.39
Second, the exact meaning of the intentionality clause in Article 11 remains
evasive. Intent represents the psychological element of crimes of genocide, and
is central to the term's definition and application. By not providing a clearer
guideline for the determination of intent, the Convention leaves to the judge and
jury the subjective responsibility of doing so. Also of note in this regard, the
article's reference to "serious mental harm," which was proposed by China, is
vague and subject to wide degrees of interpretation.
Article III. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.'
In its third article, the Convention expands the domain of acts that fall within
its legal parameters, reflecting the complexity of the acts that contribute to
genocide. In the first verdict ever handed down by an international court on
charges of genocide, delivered against Jean Paul Akayesu by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1998, the defendant was found guilty
of not only genocide but also public incitement to commit genocide." Two
days later, the same court convicted Rwanda's former Prime Minister, Jean
Kambanda, of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and incitement of
genocide.42 By criminalizing related acts of genocide, the Convention expands
the domain of prosecution into important areas.
Rather than providing a definition of the acts other than genocide that are
deemed criminal, Article I1 simply lists them. The inclusion of sub-paragraph
c, which lists "direct and public incitement to commit genocide" raised concerns
39. Vahakn N. Dadrian, A TypologyofGenocide, 5 INT'LREv. OFMODERN SOCIOLOGY 201 (1975).
40. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. I.
41. S.C. Res. 995, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
42. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
(1998), available at http:lwww.ictr.orglENGUSHIjudgements/AKAYESU/AkayOOl .htm.
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in the United States, in particular, about the dividing line between incitement
and the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech.
Article IV. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.43
The fourth article both reflects the historical tendency of complicity at the
highest levels of state office in the commission of genocide and seeks to
undermine sovereign immunity defenses of leaders. Traditionally, the
application of international law to state officials has been undermined by the
principle of immunity, which is granted internationally to heads of state and
domestically to other state officials. By clearly stating in Article IV that
criminal responsibility extends not only to private individuals but also to rulers
and public officials, the Convention expands the range of culprits that can be
held accountable for their genocidal actions. This article could have been
strengthened by an explicit rejection of the plea of superior command. A Soviet
amendment to specifically exclude the plea, however, was rejected at the
convention's drafting."
Article V. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give
effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular,
to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III.
The fifth article seeks to internalize the prohibition on genocide into the
national laws of Parties to the Convention. The drafting of Article V reflects a
recognition that genocide often takes place within the boundaries of the state
and that the municipal criminalization of such acts is essential to the
effectiveness of the legal regime.
Article VI. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.'
43. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. IV.
44. Report of the G.A. Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1 December 3, 1948.
45. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. V.
46. Id. at art. VI.
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The original draft of the convention provided for universal jurisdiction,
permitting the state whose authorities had arrested those charged with the crime
to exercise jurisdiction regardless of the nationality of the accused or of the
place where the offense was committed. After heated debate, it was concluded
that universal jurisdiction would not be incorporated into the final convention.
As a result, the first part of Article VI only recognizes the jurisdiction of the
state in the territory of which the act of genocide was committed. To expand
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, the second part of Article VI extends
jurisdiction to an international penal tribunal, as long as the contracting parties
have accepted that tribunal's jurisdiction. Since no such international tribunal
existed at the time of the Convention's drafting, this provision did little to
expand jurisdiction as it relates to crimes of genocide. The establishment in the
1990s of criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, along with
the drafting of the Statute for an International Criminal Court, however, greatly
increases the impact of Article VI's reference to an international penal tribunal.
Article VII. Genocide and other acts enumerated in Article III shall
not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in accordance with their
laws and treaties in force. 7
The ability to secure the extradition of international criminals is central to
prosecution when the state seeking prosecution does not physically possess the
accused. While states have entered into extradition agreements that include a
wide range of acts deemed criminal, modem extradition treaties specifically
exclude political offenses. A political offense is defined as an overt act, in
support of a political rising that is connected with a struggle between two
groups in a state for control of the state. Since states complicit in genocidal acts
may easily escape their legal obligation to extradite an individual or individuals
accused of genocide on the grounds that the offense is political in nature, Article
VII closes a legal loophole that otherwise would greatly undermine the
Convention's effectiveness.
Article VIII. Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent
organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of
the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention
and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article 1II.48
47. Id. at art VII.
48. Id. at art VIII.
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Article VIm places at the disposal of states seeking to prevent or punish
genocide the institutions and organs of the United Nations. Several United
Nations bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council, the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have
played a constructive role in the prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide. On several occasions, these bodies have qualified acts as genocide,
publicly proclaimed states complicit in genocidal acts, and established tribunals
for the prosecution of accused. Mendlovitz and Fousek argue that Article VIII
may serve as the basis for creating innovative preventive mechanisms, such as
the United Nations Constabulary that they propose."
Article IX. Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted
to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties
to the dispute.'
While Article IX was weakened by reservations submitted by several states,
which declared that they were not bound by the article's provisions unless all
parties to the dispute agreed to submit the issue to the International Court of
Justice, the ICJ has been called upon to adjudicate genocide cases and to
provide advisory opinions upon request by the General Assembly and Parties
to the Convention. In 1951, the General Assembly requested an advisory
opinion from the Court regarding the impact of reservations made by Parties to
the Genocide Convention that were objected to by other Parties to the
Convention. The Court ruled that Parties registering reservations, which are
subsequently objected to by other Parties to the Convention, remain Parties to
the Convention. The Court's ruling, contrary to some legal opinion, worked to
strengthen the Genocide Convention, since the complete exclusion from the
Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its
application but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian
principles which are its basis. On three occasions during the 1990s, states
initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice on the charge of
genocide, as provided for in Article IX.
49. Saul Mendlovitz & John Fousek, A UN Constabulary to Enforce the Law on Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity, in NEAL RIEMER, PROTECTION AGAINST GENOCIDE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 105
(2000).
50. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. XI.
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
If the decade of the 1940s was characterized by the international effort to
codify the legal regime on genocide, the decade of the 1990s was characterized
by international efforts to adjudicate the crime of genocide. During the 1990s
several instances of international adjudication of the crime of genocide have
taken place. Numerous cases against individuals have been adjudicated by the
two ad hoc tribunals established in response to the conflicts in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, and three genocide cases against States were adjudicated by the
International Court of Justice. These cases represent the first international legal
adjudications of the crime of genocide.
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The massive violence and brutality in the war that erupted in the former
Yugoslavia, with an unprecedented scale of mass killings in Europe since 1945,
the implementation of genocidal "ethnic cleansing" policies, the existence of
concentration camps, murder, organized torture, rape, and other atrocities, drew
international attention and condemnation. As the situation deteriorated, the
United Nations Security Council received requests from some of its members
to convene a meeting and take action in the Yugoslav conflict. On September
25, 1991 the Council responded to those requests and met to discuss the
unfolding situation in Yugoslavia.5' In response to the failed sanctions to halt
the conflict and atrocities committed on all sides, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 780 in 1992, requesting the establishment of a Commission of
Experts to report on the grave breaches of international law in the former
Yugoslavia. The Secretary General, at the request of the Security Council,
compiled and submitted a report recommending the creation of a criminal court
expressly for the conflict in Yugoslavia. By Resolution 827 (1993) the Council
established the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTF). A statute of the tribunal was drafted and approved by the
Council, setting into motion the creation of the tribunal.
Seated in The Hague, Netherlands, the ICTF is mandated to prosecute and
try persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The Tribunal
enjoys jurisdiction over four clusters of offenses:
1) grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
2) violations of the laws or customs of war;
3) genocide; and
4) crimes against humanity.
51. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (1991).
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To date, the Yugoslav Tribunal has indicted ninety-four individuals, with sixty-
seven public indictments outstanding, including nine indicted for the crime of
genocide. To date, however, the Yugoslav Tribunal has adjudicated only one
case involving genocide.
1. The Goran Yelisic Case52
The trial of Goran Jelisic before Trial Chamber I of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 opened on November 30, 1998 and ended on November
25, 1999. The indictment of Goran Jelisic included thirty-two distinct counts
of genocide, violations of the laws or customs of war, and crimes against
humanity. The first count of the indictment pertains to genocide and reads as
follows:
In May 1992, Goran Jelisic, intending to destroy a substantial or
significant part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a national, ethnical
or religious group, systematically killed Muslim detainees at the
Laser Bus Co., the Brcko police station and Luka camp. He
introduced himself as the "Serb Adolf' said that he had come to
Brcko to kill Muslims and often informed the Muslim detainees and
others of the numbers of Muslims he had killed. In addition to killing
countless detainees, whose identities are unknown, Goran Jelisic
personally killed the victims in paragraphs 16-25, 30, and 33. By
these actions, Goran Jelisic committed or aided and abetted:
Count 1: Genocide, a crime recognized by Article 4(2)(A) of the
Tribunal's Statute.53
The indictment was issued against the accused on June 30, 1995, and
Goran Jelisic was arrested on January 22, 1998 in accordance with the arrest
warrant issued by the Tribunal and transferred to its Detention Unit in The
Hague. At his initial appearance before the Tribunal, the accused plead not
guilty to all the counts on which he was charged, including the count of
genocide. The indictment was amended on October 19, 1998 when Goran
Jelisic plead guilty to all counts except the charge of genocide.
In its prosecution of Goran Jelisic on the charge of genocide, the Trial
Chamber focused upon the two key elements of the crime, the material effect
and the mens rea of the offense. To prove material effect the prosecution first
52. Case No. IT-95-1O-PT, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. (1995),
available at http://www.un.orgicty/brko/trialcl/j udgement/jel-tj991214e.htin.
53. Id.
established that the actions of the accused, namely the murder of members of a
group at the Luka camp in Brcko in May 1992, constitute the crime evoked by
the Prosecutor in support of the genocide charge. Associating the acts of
murder with the accused was not problematic, since Goran Jelisic had earlier
admitted to having committed thirteen murders at the Luka camp. Next, the
Trial Chamber addressed the mens rea element of the charge. Accordingly, the
underlying crime or crimes must be characterized as genocide when committed
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group. The Trial Chamber concluded that the Prosecutor had not
established beyond all reasonable doubt that genocide was committed, since the
accused appeared to have killed arbitrarily rather than with the clear intention
to destroy a group. As such, the Trial Chamber concluded that it had not been
proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated by the dolus
specialis of the crime of genocide.
B. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
In Rwanda, ethnic violence was unleashed in the aftermath of the sudden
death in a plane crash of Rwanda's president. In shocking speed, as many as
one million Rwandans were massacred in a brutal one-hundred-day period. The
clear ethnic division between victims and perpetrators indicated that crimes of
genocide were taking place. Having failed to prevent the human destruction, the
Security Council took action to prosecute those believed responsible for the
killings. In July of 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935,
establishing a Commission of Experts to investigate human rights violations in
Rwanda. Next, following the Yugoslav model, the Security Council decided to
establish the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).m
The ICTR was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and December
31, 1994. It may also deal with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible
for such acts in the territory of neighboring states during the same period. The
Tribunal has secured the arrest of over forty individuals accused of involvement
in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and convicted several prominent members of
the former Rwandan government, including its prime minister. At present, the
Tribunal is holding forty-three detainees for trial. While an exhaustive review
of genocide cases completed by the ICTR is not possible in this article, a review
of three cases illustrates the Tribunal's adjudication powers.
54. S.C. Res. 995, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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1. The Jean-Paul Akayesu Case"
Jean-Paul Akayesu was arrested in Zambia on October 10, 1995, and
charged by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on February 16,
1996, with thirteen counts56 of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations
of the Laws and Customs of War. Jean-Paul Akayesu made his first appearance
before the Chamber on May 30, 1996, where he plead not guilty to all counts
against him. During the trial, which opened on January 9, 1997, the Chamber
heard forty-two witnesses and entered into evidence 125 documents, generating
more than 4,000 pages of transcripts. While acknowledging that massacres
aimed mainly at the Tutsi took place in 1994 Taba commune, where the accused
held a prominent position as bourgmestre,57 the defense claimed that its client
did not commit, order to be committed, or in any way aid and facilitate the acts
with which he was charged. In fact, the defense continued, Akayesu was
himself the target of harassment, as evidenced by his decision to flee to
neighboring Zambia.
In its ruling, the Trial Chamber established the material effect in view of
the widespread killings of victims of which were mainly Tutsi. In
demonstrating the mens rea element of the charge of genocide, the Trial
Chamber referenced many facts showing that the intention of the perpetrators
of the killings was to cause the complete disappearance of the Tutsi people. In
this connection, Alison DesForages, a specialist historian on Rwanda who
appeared as an expert witness, stated as follows:
[tin the basis of the statements made by certain political leaders, on
the basis of songs and slogans popular among the interahamwe, I
believe that these people had the intention of completely wiping out
the Tutsi from Rwanda so that - as they said on certain occasions -
their children, later on, should not know what a Tutsi looked like,
unless they referred to history books."
55. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
(1998), available at http://www.ictr.orglENGLISH/judgementsAKAYESU/ akayOOOI.htm.
56. In the course of the trial on June 17, 1997, the Chamber granted the Prosecutor leave to amend
the Indictment in order to add three new counts relating to allegations of rape and sexual violence, to which
several witnesses had testified earlier during the appearance before the Chamber. The accused plead not guilty
to these three additional counts. Id.
57. The structure of the executive branch, and the authority of the members therein, is set forth in
the laws of Rwanda. In the Prefecture, the Prefect is the highest local representative of the government, and
is the trustee of the State Authority. In each commune within a Prefecture there exists the council of the
commune, which is led by the Bourgmestre of that commune. The Bourgmestre is nominated by the Minister
of the Interior and appointed by the President. While subject to the hierarchical authority of the Prefect, the
Bourgmestre is in charge of governmental functions within his commune, including shared authority over the
Gendarmerie Nationale in his commune.
58. Summary of the Judgement in Jean-Paul Akayesu Case: ICTR-96-4-TDeliveredon 2 September
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Two prosecution witnesses, who testified separately before the Tribunal,
confirmed the testimony.
The Trial Chamber found that the accused, Jean-Paul Akayesu, in his
capacity as bourgmestre, was responsible for maintaining law and public order
in the commune of Taba and that he had effective authority over the communal
police. Moreover, as "leader" of Taba commune, of which he was one of the
most prominent figures, the inhabitants respected him and followed his orders.
Akayesu himself admitted before the Chamber that he had the power to
assemble the population and that they obeyed his instructions. The Chamber
ruled that Akayesu was present during the acts of violence and killings, and
sometimes gave orders himself for bodily or mental harm to be caused to certain
Tutsi, and endorsed and even ordered the killing of several Tutsi. Absent of a
confession from the accused, the Chamber was required to infer the intent of
Akayesu from his actions. The Chamber ruled on September 2, 1998, that Jean-
Paul Akayesu was guilty of commission of the crime of genocide. On the
charge of complicity in genocide, the Chamber ruled that the same person could
not be both the principal perpetrator of, and accomplice to, the same offense.
As such, the Chamber ruled not guilty on the charge of complicity in genocide.
2. The Jean Kambanda Case59
Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, was arrested by the
Kenyan authorities, on the basis of a formal request submitted to them by the
Prosecutor on July 9, 1997, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. After being transferred to the Detention
Facility of the Tribunal an indictment was filed on October 16th, charging:
1) genocide,
2) complicity in genocide,
3) conspiracy to commit genocide, and
4) crimes against humanity.
On May 1, 1998, during his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber, the
accused plead guilty to the six counts contained in the indictment. As such, the
Trial Chamber moved directly to the sentencing phase of the proceedings.
1998, at http://www.un.org/ictr/engfish/singledocs/jpa-summay.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2001).
59. Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
(1998), available at http://www/ictr.org/ENGLUSH/judgements/kambanda.hml.
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3. The Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana CaseWo
Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana were indicted by the Prosecutor
on April 11, 1997, on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity
stemming from their alleged participation in a series of massacres that took
place between April 10 and June 30, 1994. During this period, at several sites
which included two churches, a stadium, and other public domains, the
indictment alleges that thousands of men, women and children were killed and
injured by the accused. Clement Kayishema was charged with twenty-four
counts, including four counts of genocide. Obed Ruzindana was charged with
four counts, including one count of genocide.
On May 21, 1999, the Trial Chamber rendered its judgment, finding each
defendant guilty on all counts of genocide but not guilty on all other counts.
61
In so ruling, the Chamber accepted the defense argument that the alleged crimes
were based on the same conduct and therefore a concur d'infraction, or
concurrence of violations, prevented guilty verdicts for both genocide and
crimes against humanity. The Chamber ruled that it is only acceptable to
convict an accused of two or more offenses in relation to the same set of facts
where the offenses have differing elements or where the laws in question protect
the same social interests.
C. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) superceded the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) following the Second World War. Described by
the United Nations Charter as the principal judicial organ of the Organization,
the ICJ is, in essence, a continuation of the Permanent Court with virtually the
same statute and jurisdiction. Composed of fifteen judges elected by the
General Assembly and Security Council, the ICJ is empowered to rule on cases
brought by nation-states against other nation-states.62 A second, and more
limiting, restriction on the Court's jurisdiction is its consent requirement.
Unless states accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction clause, in essence an
a priori commitment to appear before the Court when a case has been filed
against them, the Court's jurisdiction is contingent upon the expressed consent
60. Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda (1999), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/
Kayishemaruzindana/judgementtindex.htm.
61. Clement Kayishema was found not guilty on four counts each of crimes against humanity,
violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, and violation of Additional Protocol 11 of the
Geneva Conventions. Id. Obed Ruzindana was found not guilty on one count of each of the aforementioned
charges. Id.
62. Notwithstanding the restriction on the Court's jurisdiction limiting it to interstate cases, the ICJ
is capable of rendering "advisory opinions" requested by certain principal organs of the United Nations.
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of states party to a dispute. The ICJ's dismissal of the Yugoslav cases brought
against Spain (1999) and the United States (1999), in which the crime of
genocide was charged, illustrate this weakness. During the 1990s, three
genocide cases were filed by states in the International Court of Justice.
1. The Bosnia v. Yugoslavia Case63
In 1993, the ICJ heard its first case regarding genocide, brought by Bosnia
and Herzegovenia versus Yugoslavia. In its application, Bosnia claimed that the
Serb effort to create a "Greater Serbia" resulted in the systematic bombing of
Bosnian cities and the intentional targeting of its Muslim citizens. The Bosnian
application also contends that the Serb policy of driving out innocent civilians
of a different ethnic or religious group from their homes, so-called "ethnic
cleansing," was practiced by Yugoslav/Serbian forces in Bosnia on a scale that
dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi times. The application declared that
the evidence indicates a prima facie case of genocide against Bosnia, and
requested that all appropriate actions be taken by the Court in accordance with
the standards of the Genocide Convention.
In its 1994 ruling, the Court did not issue a finding on whether genocide
was being committed in Bosnia; however, it did ask the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to:
[e]nsure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which
may be directed or supported by it.. .do not commit any acts of
genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether
directed against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovena
or against any other national, ethnical, racial or religious group."
2. The Yugoslavia v. N.A.T.O. Case65
On April 29, 1999 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia instituted
proceedings before the Court against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
accusing those states of bombing Yugoslav territory in violation of their
international obligations, including the obligation not to deliberately inflict
63. Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovnia v.
Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. (April 8).
64. Id.
65. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Yugoslavia v. N.A.T.O.), 1999 I.C.J. (April 29).
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conditions of life calculated "to cause the physical destruction of a national
group." The reference to the "physical destruction of a national group" caused
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) bombing campaign
constituted a charge by Yugoslavia of the commission of the crime of genocide.
By a vote of eleven to four, the Court ruled in Yugoslavia v. the
Netherlands that the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself
constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide
Convention. The Court further ruled that it does not appear at the present stage
of the proceedings that the bombings which form the subject of Yugoslavia's
Application "indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group" as required
by the Convention's provisions.
3. The Croatia v. Yugoslavia Case68
On July 2, 1999, the Republic of Croatia instituted proceedings before the
Court against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for alleged violations of the
Genocide Convention between 1991 and 1995. In its application Croatia
contends that acts of genocide were committed on Croatian soil by Yugoslav
armed forces, intelligence agents, and various paramilitary detachments.
Croatia's application goes on to state that "in addition, by directing,
encouraging, and urging Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity, Yugoslavia
engaged in conduct amounting to a second round of ethnic cleansing."69 The
Croatian case against Yugoslavia is currently under consideration by the Court,
with a ruling expected in 2001.
V. CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can be reached concerning the international
adjudication of the crime of genocide. First, the establishment of ad hoc
tribunals, particularly in the Rwandan case, has greatly increased the number of
genocide cases adjudicated at the international level.70 Without the Security
Council decisions to establish these tribunals, adjudication of the perpetrators
66. In two cases (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States) the Court concluded that
it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and it accordingly ordered that those two cases be removed from its docket.
67. Id.
68. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Yugoslavia), 1999 I.C.J. (July 2).
69. Id.
70. This is not to say, however, that the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals have been wholly effective
in adjudicating instances of genocide. Each tribunal has faced difficulties relating to the apprehension, arrest
and transfer of indicted criminals to face trial. n Yugoslavia, cooperation from N.A.T.O. forces in
apprehending indicted war criminals has been minimal, while in Rwanda the ICTR competes with Rwandan
national courts over the prosecution of the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.
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of the crime of genocide would have remained at the municipal level. Second,
as a result of the Bosnian war and the Kosovo air campaign, the International
Court of Justice has emerged as a potentially useful legal arena for the
international adjudication of the crime of genocide. The limitations of the ICJ,
namely its jurisdictional limitations to hear only consensual cases brought by
nation-states against other nation-states, however, continues to limit the utility
of the Court in the adjudication of genocide cases.
The international adjudication of genocide cases by ad hoc tribunals and
the International Court of Justice is possible as a result of two forces, one legal
and the other political. The legal force is the emergence of the legal regime on
genocide, in the form of General Assembly resolutions, the 1948 Genocide
Convention, and the parallel development of human rights laws. Without the
Genocide Convention as a legal cornerstone, which both criminalized acts of
genocide on an international plane and provided a working legal definition of
genocide, the international community's basis for adjudicating genocide cases
would be weak. The political force that made international adjudication of the
crime of genocide increasingly possible is the monumental changes in the
international environment following the end of the cold war. The dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reordering of world politics translated
into a concerted interest by the Security Council to address matters historically
considered to fall within the domestic affairs of states. The Security Council
took no legal action, for example, in response to Pol Pot's genocidal reign of
terror in Cambodia or Idi Amin's massacre of rival tribes in Uganda. But with
the cold war's end came a consensus in the Security Council that the destructive
internal affairs of states fell within the parameters of the Council's authority.
As a result, the tribunals were established for the conflicts in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.
The limitations of prosecuting the crime of genocide by both ad hoc
tribunals and the International Court of Justice, however, indicate the utility of
establishing a permanent international criminal tribunal with far-reaching
jurisdictional powers. With an international criminal court the ability of the
international community to prosecute individuals for acts of genocide would be
greatly enhanced. While an international criminal court does not presently
exist, positive steps have been taken to establish such a court. In 1998, the
Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC) was completed in Rome.
While the proposed court's jurisdiction is severely limited both in terms of the
crimes that it may adjudicate and its relationship to the Security Council, the
court's statute does include genocide as one the "core crimes" that can be
adjudicated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994 and 1996, respectively, the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were created by the United
Nations Security Council to hold accountable those responsible for genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and other violations of international laws
and norms. The genesis of the ICTY, created during the latter half of the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was seen by many as a half-hearted effort by some
European countries and the United States to address the perpetration of
atrocities in the Balkans without actually intervening to cease and prevent their
continued commission. The ICTR, created only after the genocide had taken
place in Rwanda, amounted to a mea culpa on the part of an international
community that expressly refused to intervene during the slaughter of that
country's Tutsi and moderate Hutu populations.
Despite the cynicism surrounding their creations, the ad hoc tribunals have
accomplished more that most expected, or may have intended. The
jurisprudence stemming from the ICTY and the ICTR will undoubtedly
contribute to the development and expansion of international humanitarian law,
and the creation and continued operation of both Tribunals, augers well for
those seeking to establish mechanisms of accountability for egregious crimes
that have all too often gone unpunished.
Despite the impact the ICTY and ICTR have had on the development of
humanitarian law and the impetus their existence provided for the creation of
other ad hoc courts in Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone and for the
International Criminal Court (ICC), one must ask whether the existing ad hoc
tribunals and those that will follow truly do address the need for justice,
accountability, reconciliation and deterrence in their respective countries and
regions. To that end, one could begin by asking the following questions:
1) To what extent have the tribunals held accountable those they were
intended to prosecute? To what extent have they provided justice to
the victims of genocide, war crimes, and "ethnic cleansing" in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia?
2) To what extent have the existing tribunals affected civil society and
contributed to truth and reconciliation in Yugoslavia and Rwanda?
3) Has the existence of the ICTY and ICTR deterred the commission of
further crimes in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere in
the world?
4) Are the existing tribunals exemplary of what the world wants to see
in a permanent international criminal court?
5) To what extent have the experiences of the former Yugoslav and
Rwandan tribunals affected formation of similar tribunals for
Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone?
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The following remarks provide an admittedly brief and cursory overview of
issues raised by each of the aforementioned questions, focusing on the former
Yugoslav tribunal in this case.
fl. To WHAT EXTENT HAS THE ICTY PROVIDED JUSTICE, ELUCIDATED
TRUTH, AND CONTRIBUTED TOWARD RECONCILIATION IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA?
Unfortunately, the ICTY has been woefully deficient in these respects.
Anyone who knows the facts of, and persons associated with, the commission
of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia during the
past decade cannot avoid the sad fact that the ICTY has been slow and
inadequate in providing justice to the victims of the Balkan wars.
Few in the former Yugoslavia believe that the ICTY is going to prosecute
those that deserve prosecution, that it will establish the truth of what happened
during the war, or that it will serve as a vehicle or impetus for reconciliation
among the various peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Even proponents of the
ICTY in the former Yugoslavia are disillusioned by its performance.
The Tribunal is not a serious "issue" in the former Yugoslavia. Until
recently, some of the governments in the region ignore it, while others
cooperated. But the cooperation that does exist is driven, in large part, by the
need to satisfy the international community so that the respective state can
continue receiving foreign aid and continued membership in international and
regional institutions. The people of the former Yugoslavia view the ICTY as
an amorphous body in the Hague that was created by the international
community to ameliorate its own guilt. They do not believe that the Tribunal
is there to provide justice to them; it is "someone else's" tribunal.
Why has the ICTY failed to address the needs for justice, truth and
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia? One can point to several reasons.
A. Lack of Factual Knowledge and Strategic Vision at the Outset
When the ICTY was being formed, the international community focused
on the Tribunal's Statute and its Rules of Evidence and Procedure, while
glaringly ignoring factual and operational requirements of the Tribunal.
Similarly, when staff began arriving during the early days of the Tribunal, little
effort was made to thoroughly and objectively assess the facts and personalities
relevant to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and to craft an informed
investigative strategy based on that information. The following criticisms
levied against the Tribunal stem, in large part, from the international
community's and Tribunal staff's failure to recognize and address the need for:
a) educating staff and management as to the facts, personalities, and opposing
views relevant to the wars in the Balkans; and b) crafting an investigative
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strategy that would identify and, if necessary, revise areas and topics of
investigation, targets for potential indictment, and evidentiary requirements for
a successful prosecution.
I preface the following remarks by pointing out that I do not, by any
means, intend to create the impression that all sides are equally to blame for the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former
Yugoslavia. Rather, I highlight criticisms often heard by the Serbs, Croats,
Bosniaks and others vis-a-vis the Tribunal's track record to date.
To the people of the former Yugoslavia and the victims of its wars, the
Tribunal has taken too long to indict too few responsible for the crimes
committed in their countries during the past decade. Many people in the former
Yugoslavia who are not necessarily hostile to the ICTY have asked, "Why have
you indicted him but not her? Why are you focusing on such minor figures
without having addressed notoriously egregious abusers and leadership figures?
Why are you looking at 'minor' crime scenes and seemingly ignoring other
minor and major crime scenes?"
Similarly almost all informed, objective observers of the Balkans in the
past decade are befuddled as to why the ICTY has not prosecuted crimes
committed in obviously abusive areas but has often focused on less-significant
sites and persons, and why has it taken so long to indict those that have been
indicted. For example:
1) The ICTY has appropriately indicted persons associated with the
commission of crimes in detention camps in northwestern Bosnia, the
siege of Sarajevo, the massacre of approximately 7,000 Muslim men
in and around Srebrenica, and the systematic rape of women in Foca.
However, arguably the most systematic and egregious pattern of
"ethnic cleansing" took place throughout eastern Bosnia particularly
in the Zvornik, Bratunac and Bijeljina municipalities in April and
May 1992 but public indictments stemming from these crimes have
not been issued. Moreover, evidence also points to the direct
participation of agents of the Republic of Serbia and its then
president, Slobodan Milosevic, in this region and at that time.
However, Milosevic and his accomplices notably Jovica Stanisic,
Mihalj Kertes, and Frenki Simatovic have not been indicted for their
direct involvement and sponsorship of "ethnic cleansing" throughout
the Balkans. Although Milosevic has been indicted for crimes
committed in Kosovo in 1998-1999, his responsibility for the "ethnic
cleansing" of non-Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 is
glaringly absent from the Office of the Prosecutor's (OTP's) list of
indictments. Similarly, Croats complain that with the notable
exception of Vukovar and very recently Dubrovnik, crimes
committed by agents of the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina, the
Yugoslav Army and the government of the Republic of Serbia during
the 1991 war in Croatia have been ignored by the Tribunal.
2) Arguably the most egregious crimes committed by ethnic Croatian
troops were perpetrated by Bosnian Croat forces in and around the
Mostar area in Herzegovina. These troops were supported by agents
of the Croatian government in Zagreb and its then president, Franjo
Tudjman, and defense minister, Gojko Susak, both of whom are now
deceased. Despite this fact, the OTP has chosen to focus on crimes
committed by Croats in central Bosnia that have resulted in
prosecution of relatively low- or mid-level figures while ignoring the
culpability of higher-level and arguably more culpable counterparts
in Hercegovina and their sponsors in Zagreb. Indeed, Tudjman,
Susak and their lackey in Hercegovina, Mate Boban, have all died as
"heros" in the eyes of many of their countrymen and women. At the
time of their deaths, little attention focused on their responsibility for
the commission of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia, and they will
never be called account because they died before the Tribunal acted.
Similarly, Serbs who fled after the Croatian government's offensive
to re-capture the "Krajina" region in 1995 only to have their homes
and villages torched and their elderly and disabled family members
killed often complain as to the lack of indictments against Croatian
military, police or civilians responsible for those crimes.
3) With the exception of crimes committed in the Celebici detention
center, Bosniak-perpetrated crimes against Serbs and Croats in
eastern Bosnia and Hercegovina have not been addressed via an
indictment. Despite evidence of Bosniak-perpetrated crimes
committed against Croats in the Jablanica-Konjic pocket, and against
Serbs in and around Sarajevo and in small pockets in eastern Bosnia,
the Tribunal has only been able to muster one related indictment in
seven years.
Many of the aforementioned criticisms address the relative paucity of
indictments of high-level officials in the former Yugoslavia. Although recent
indictments of additional Bosnian Serb civilian and military leaders
significantly addressed responsibility for war crimes within the Republika
Srpska leadership, similar civilian and military officials affiliated with the
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian
Community of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina have not
been indicted. Some of these persons live peacefully throughout the Balkans,
and some have run for, or hold, high-ranking public office in their respective
countries/entities. Others remain in positions of power at the municipal and
local level, thereby preventing the return of displaced persons to their homes.
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Still others are being promoted within their own governments. In the case of
Serbia, Montenegro, and to a lesser extent Bosnia-Hercegovina, persons who
should at the very least be investigated for their involvement in the commission
of crimes throughout the 1990s, serve as advisers and ministers to present
governments in each of these republics. The Tribunal is mandated to investigate
and, if appropriate, indict such persons, but it has to date failed to do so.
In addition to its spotty record on leadership-level indictments, the
investigations, indictments and prosecutions of lower-level individuals are
viewed by some as arbitrary. Thousands of villages were torched and thousands
of people were killed in scores of massacres over a five to six year period. Yet
the OTP has only focussed on some (e.g., Ahmici) but not other massacres (e.g.,
Gospic, Skabmje, Grabovica, etc.). What criteria, it is often asked, are used to
determine what cases get investigated and who gets indicted? To many victims
of the war in the former Yugoslavia and to those who have followed that war
closely, there is little logic to the OTP's investigative focus and little
justification for the time it has taken to indict those that have, eventually, been
indicted.
These are legitimate questions that people in the former Yugoslavia have
asked and for which they are entitled to an answer. Unless these matters are
addressed by the ICTY, there will not be an accurate historical record of the war
and the establishment of "truth" will have failed. To date, the historical record
reflected by the Hague's indictments and jurisprudence does not accurately
reflect what transpired during the war. Nor do the ICTY indictments adequately
reflect the figures primarily responsible for the crimes committed therein. At
best, the ICTY has established a partial historical record with significant gaps
vis-a-vis the facts of the war and responsible perpetrators of the war's attendant
crimes.
Future ad hoc tribunals and the ICC should learn from the early oversights
made by the Tribunal that have continued to plague its progress and efficiency.
Namely, before a tribunal embarks on investigation and indictment of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in a given area, concerted efforts
must made to educate staff and management about the facts of and personalities
affiliated with the given region, and the interpretations and sensitivities of
various parties and/or groups vis-i-vis the issue under investigation. Thereafter,
a strategy must be crafted that reflects the "big picture," namely the factual
reality of the war, conflict, genocide or criminal behavior at issue. Finally, a
preliminary but detailed identification of potential targets, appropriate avenues
of investigation, and type and quality of evidence necessary to bring the case to
court must be undertaken. Only then should investigations commence,
necessary resources be allocated, and indictments be written.
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B. Problems with the Determination of Targets
Was it realistic to expect a Hague-based Tribunal to address crimes
committed at all levels (from heads of state to local murderers and looters) in
three separate conflicts that involved a vast array of different state and quasi-
state actors?
As noted above, the Tribunal did not clearly determine who it wanted to
investigate and possibly prosecute, and what was the best avenue through which
to achieve those goals at the outset. The Tribunal should have focused on
investigating, indicting and prosecuting leadership figures, and egregious
perpetrators and "notorious" offenders. Instead, the ICTY's initial focus had
been on camp guards and low-level "hoods" with few clear connections to the
true power-brokers of the war and the crimes perpetrated at their behest and/or
with their active assistance. This has resulted in use of resources to complete
investigations and prosecutions of low-level perpetrators, while many, but
admittedly not all, of their superiors retain their positions of power and
attendant privilege.
One must obviously prove that a crime took place before one can hold an
individual responsible for having perpetrated that crime or ordered the
commission thereof. As a result, there are those who argue that one must first
prosecute low-level offenders to prove that a crime base existed before one can
hold a civilian or military superior responsible for such crimes. I have no
quarrels with this general principle.
However, an international tribunal faced with thousands of war crimes
cases and with limited resources should only be expected to prosecute mid- and
high-level war criminals. Such persons can be divided into two catagories: a)
those who qualify as "notorious offenders," namely persons who have
systematically perpetrated large-scale and particularly egregious crimes (e.g.,
-Milan Lukic); or b) those who may be linked in the chain of command leading
to the pinnacle of command and responsibility. Prosecutions of camp guards,
and even some military officers, are not necessarily the best avenue to build a
case against heads of state, paramilitary leaders, interior ministry officials, and
intelligence officials that orchestrated, or encouraged, the commission of war
crimes in the field.
Crimes of vast scale such as Srebrenica should have been prosecuted.
However, an international tribunal's determination to investigate and/or
prosecute one massacre over another massacre of similar proportion and
character should be determined by whether or not that investigation and/or
prosecution will lead to additional evidence of criminal behavior by persons
higher up the chain of command.
This is not to say that the camp guards, local police officers and individual
civilians who murdered, tortured, raped, or otherwise brutalized disarmed
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combatants and civilians should go unpunished. Insofar as international
tribunals, third-party governments or local officials can conclusively develop
a case of such individual culpability and provided that such investigations are
done in accordance with due process requirements, such low-level war criminals
could be tried: a) in a third country where due process requirements will be
respected; b) by a "mixed" tribunal of international and local jurists either in the
country where the crimes were perpetrated or in a third country; or c) by the
courts of the country of which the perpetrators is a citizen, provided such courts
are objective, and can provide due process guarantees to the defendant and
protection for victims and witnesses. However, it would be premature to expect
the countries of the former Yugoslavia to "try their own" and, given the present
political climate, such low-level individual perpetrators should be tried in a third
country. But it is not realistic to expect an international Tribunal charged with
investigation of three separate wars over a ten-year period to be able to
investigate, indict and prosecute all those responsible for war crimes. Priorities
must be set, tasks appropriately delegated, and resources and energies
apportioned accordingly.
C. The Tribunal's Lack of Deterrent Effect
The existence of the Tribunal during the latter half of the war in Bosnia in
1994 and 1995, in the aftermath of the Croatian government's offensive to re-
capture the Krajina region in 1995, and during the armed conflict and war in
Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, seemingly had little impact on the level of atrocities
committed therein. Most glaringly in Kosovo, Serbian and Yugoslav forces
undertook methods of "ethnic cleansing" that were virtually identical to those
employed by these same forces and their agents during the war in Croatia and
Bosnia.
The Tribunal had been in existence for over four years when the armed
conflict in Kosovo began, and it was clear to the Serbian and Yugoslav
leadership that the Tribunal was actively investigating and indicting persons
affiliated with that leadership vis-i-vis their alleged and actual commission of
war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. Yet, the conduct of the Yugoslav Army, the
Serbian Interior Ministry, and the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic indicate
that they paid little, if any attention, to the Tribunal before or during their
military campaign in Kosovo.
The lack of the Tribunal's ability to arrest those it indicts, and the
international community's reticence or inability in doing so, is probably the
most significant factor that emasculates any deterrent effect supporters of the
Tribunal hoped to achieve. Indeed, Milosevic, his generals, intelligence
officials, and political envoys appear to have paid little heed to the possibility
of their indictment and arrest at the time they were planning or prosecuting the
war in Kosovo. Although they may be concerned for their fate now that some
of them have been indicted and removed from power, there is little reason to
believe that the Tribunal's existence and operation played any role in preventing
or alleviating the commission of atrocities in Kosovo.
Moreover, victims and others who claim-sometimes illegitimately-to be
acting on their behalf have resorted to revenge killings to achieve justice they
believe they have been denied. The abuses that took place against Serbs
following the Croatian offensive to re-take Krajina and after the withdrawal of
Yugoslav forces in Kosovo only highlight the lack of deterrence on all sides in
the conflict. Croats and the Albanians seeking to "avenge themselves" against
those Serbs who may or may not have committed atrocities against them,
against members of their family, or against members of their ethnic group, did
so by committing atrocities against Serbs who remained in Krajina and Kosovo
after Serbian and Yugoslav forces withdrew from those areas. In the case of
Kosovo, members of the Roma population and others who were viewed as
having collaborated with the Serbs were also attacked and murdered by
Albanians. Revenge was not sought against the perceived perpetrator but
against any member of the same ethnic group as the perceived perpetrator. The
Tribunal's goal of providing individual rather than collective justice has clearly
not yet been met.
D. The Need for Outreach
Although the Tribunal's inability to deter future atrocities is largely due to
the fact that it cannot arrest those it indicts, its inability to act as a vehicle for
reconciliation or to be respected in the Balkans is due, in large part, to its lack
of outreach to the peoples of the region. Although the Office of the Registrar
has an outreach staff in Zagreb and parts of Bosnia, this staff usually amounts
to one person in one or two locations in the Balkans and focuses on
disseminating general information about the Tribunal. Conversely the Office
of the Prosecutor has made little effort to communicate with the public of the
former Yugoslav countries despite the fact that one of its primary goals is to
provide justice to the victims of the region.
The Office of the Prosecutor cannot and should not disclose any
information concerning the details of its respective investigations. However,
this does not mean that it should completely absent itself from public fora in the
region. The Tribunal staff is reluctant and often prohibited from giving
interviews on even the most innocuous subjects. However, the time, resources
and effort needed to conduct war crimes investigations and prosecutions is not
understood in the Balkans and, with a few very rare exceptions, no one from the
Tribunal has made an effort to explain what a forensic investigation, an
exhumation, document analysis, and translation of a foreign language entails.
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These are all neutral subjects that could be addressed to help foster
understanding and at least tolerance for the Tribunal, rather than the hostility
with which it is faced in many parts of the region.
For example, although Croatia's recent support for the Tribunal and its
willingness to re-examine its role during the 1990-1995 period has dramatically
improved since Tudjman's death and the subsequent election of a new
government, the nascent willingness to re-assess its past is due in large part to
internal factors rather than the Tribunal. Croatia's new president, Stipe Mesic,
its prime and deputy prime ministers, Ivica Racan and Goran Granic,
respectively, and members of the independent press have played a major role in
calling for accountability on all sides. But the Tribunal has played little role in
Croatia's re-assessment of its recent history and reconciliation with its
remaining Serbian population.
In most places around the world, the United Nations and other
internationals who are sent to an area to help the local population, are perceived
as arrogant, ignorant and imperialist. In many instances these perceptions are
unjustified or instigated by governments or quasi-governmental entities or rebel
groups in a given area. However, it is also a sad fact that many internationals
are disdainful or ignorant of the culture, history and sufferings of the local
population they are supposedly there to protect or for whom they are
purportedly working to provide justice.
Thus, where feasible, future Tribunals should make provisions to employ
an outreach staff that will explain their work generally to the public in a given
country either via the media, symposiums, conferences, and town hall meetings
throughout the country and not just in capitol cities. Outreach should also
include informal and semi-regular contact with victims and the family of victims
in order to dispel the often wide-spread cynicism that international staff are
more interested in their salaries than in the suffering of others. If feasible, such
outreach staff should include persons who are fluent in the respective
language(s) and dialect(s) of a region and others familiar with the area and its
history and culture.
III. To WHAT EXTENT CAN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS ACCOMPLISH THEIR
MANDATES?
It was once highly unpopular to argue that war crimes trials should take
place in the country in which they were perpetrated. There are credible reasons
for this. In some countries, local courts are politicized and controlled by the
very agents that perpetrated or ordered the crimes they are called upon to
adjudicate; there is an obvious lack of due process in many such countries;
persons genuinely responsible for such trials will never stand trial and those
who are members of the "enemy" group will never get a fair trial.
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These are all valid reasons and, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, I
agree that it would have been ludicrous to expect the peoples of the former
Yugoslavia to try members of their own ethnic and national group while
Tudjman and Milosevic were still in power. Indeed, I do not believe that truth
commissions or tribunals can function in a country where crimes were
committed unless there has been a radical change of regime(s) and until the new
government(s) makes a concerted effort to address its country's recent history.
However, if the political climate is not overtly hostile to an international
war crimes tribunal and if victim and witness protection and general security
can be facilitated, such tribunals should consider basing a significant portion of
their investigative operations and holding trials in the country where the crimes
were perpetrated. These trials could be adjudicated solely by "international"
judges or by "mixed" tribunals that include both international and "local"
judges.
The point of such an effort would be to ensure that the tribunals provide
justice to the victims, the families of victims, and civil society of the respective
country(ies) in which heinous crimes were committed. However, such trials are
not feasible in all places. Despite my call for increased outreach by the ICTY,
I do not believe that war crimes trials can yet be held in the former Yugoslavia.
Because the Balkan wars were fought between ethnic groups who had and now
do live in separate countries/entities, because the war therein involved eight
separate entities and states, and because at least in present-day Yugoslavia those
who are the architects of the war remain in a position to harm witnesses and
informants, such trials cannot yet be held in that region.
Nevertheless, burgeoning attempts at "mixed" tribunals (e.g. in Sierra
Leone, Cambodia, and East Timor) have commenced in other parts of the world.
This hybrid attempt to fuse both international and national participation in
adjudicating war crimes cases may, in some cases, be preferable than the
existing "elitist" models (i.e., ICTY and ICTR). A hybrid tribunal should use
both international and national law (i.e., aspects of a country's legal code that
incorporate relevant and complementary elements of international treaty and
customary law, civil and human rights, etc.). Such an approach would add
legitimacy to the international tribunals in the eyes of the local people and
would breathe "life" into the laws that exist in countries that have either been
ignored or usurped by abusive regimes in the past. It would also serve to
facilitate respect for the rule of law from within the country, rather than
imposing it from afar.
The "hybrid" aspect of these tribunals should also be reflected in the
staffing of these tribunals in the office of the Prosecutor, Chambers, and
Registrar. Often and understandably, "local" populations are not objective, but
there are some portions of the population that have stood up in the face of
tyranny and their opinions and expertise should be used and listened to by the
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tribunals. For example, while a prosecutor could be an international, two
deputy prosecutors-one from the respective region and the other an
international--could operate immediately below him or her. A variation of this
is being considered for the Sierra Leone tribunal and may prove successful.
However, one must concede that the nature of certain trials will require that
they be held in the Hague or in some other removed setting. When heads of
state, armies and powerful paramilitary or police forces are indicted, and when
their supporters retain some level of power or influence within a country or
region, it will be difficult if not impossible to try such persons in the area where
their crimes were committed. Because such investigations and trials include
testimony of sensitive witnesses, including informants close to the accused, the
security of such witnesses could probably not be guaranteed in the respective
country. Moreover, incarceration of such persons may also not be feasible if
their supporters retain significant military or paramilitary power to force their
release. In such circumstances, it would be irresponsible and naive to suggest
that such trials be held in-country.
The difficulties and obstacles posed by holding "local" trials and of
incorporating "local" participation into an international court are admittedly
significant, e.g., protection of both local and international staff;
ethnic/tribal/political divisions among the local population(s) and the risk of
appearing biased if one is favored/appointed over another; lack of or damaged
local infrastructure; and lack of experienced local lawyers, judges, investigators,
analysts, etc. But this should not preclude exploration of the possibility.
For example, despite Hun Sen's obstruction and criticisms of the
Cambodian tribunal, one should not negate the importance of Cambodian
participation in trials in that country. The crimes being adjudicated were
perpetrated in their country, and the international community did nothing to
prevent the slaughter at the time of its commission. The same can be said for
the victims of the Rwandan genocide. The international community cannot
have an elitist, paternalistic attitude toward these crimes and toward the victims
of these crimes, i.e., viewing local participation as inherently biased, tribal,
inexperienced, and inept. Recent efforts to involve local populations in East
Timor, and possibly in Sierra Leone, are steps in the right direction. The ICC
should continue to support local participation when it begins functioning.
Preferably, the ICC should largely exist in the Hague as an administrative
headquarters of sorts, but the bulk of its investigative and trial efforts should
take place either within the country where the atrocities were committed or, if
that is not possible, as close to that country as possible.
The ICC should not aspire to the "disconnectedness" of the ICTR, which
is at least partly based in Kigali, and the ICTY, which has virtually no
connection whatsoever with the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Even if a
country truly cannot try its own or participate in that process, the people of that
Nizich
country should at the very least be consulted and kept informed of what the
international ad hoc or permanent tribunals are doing, ostensibly on their behalf.
IV. To WHAT EXTENT CAN ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES BE
BETTER ADDRESSED BY FUTURE AD Hoc TRIBUNALS AND THE ICC?
The attention to Statutes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure of ad hoc
tribunals and the ICC are obviously necessary and integral to their workings.
However, appreciation for country and fact-based expertise, operational aspects,
and organizational structures of these tribunals are not properly if at all
addressed when these tribunals are formed, despite the fact that they have
enormous effect on the extent to which the Tribunals can function and achieve
what they were meant to do.
The following general suggestions are posited in the hope that future
tribunals will provide the attention and resources necessary to properly support
these factual, operational and organizational necessities.
A. Develop and Maintain Country-Specific and Regional Expertise within a
Respective Ad Hoc Tribunal and within the ICC
Any ad hoc tribunal and the ICC should maintain a staff that serve the need
for in-house expertise relating to the background and facts relating to a war,
armed conflict, genocide, or other event that the tribunal is mandated to
investigate, indict and prosecute.
This proposed staff should play a minimal role in developing the facts of
a specific crime scene under investigation. Rather, it should focus on providing
tribunal and ICC staff with the following:
1) The "big picture" of what transpired during a respective war,
genocide or conflict, and how events in one area relate to those in
another;
2) The relevant positions and ideologies of the various parties to the
conflict, political factions, ethnic groups, religious groups, etc.;
3) Who's who in the country/countries and their relationship to one
another; and
4) The structure and hierarchy of a relevant government, interior
ministry, military, and paramilitary or guerrilla group(s).
This staff need not be large in number, and it should not resemble an academic
think-tank. Rather, it should focus its efforts on providing information
necessary to making informed decisions as to what crimes and which
individuals are to be investigated. As noted above, an effective investigative
strategy cannot be formulated if staff remains ignorant of overall facts relevant
to the area under investigation. Moreover, this staff should craft its analysis in
a fashion consistent with the requirements for trial preparedness of trial
20011
366 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:353
attorneys and, to a lesser extent, judges. While factual background knowledge
is of imperative importance during the early stages of a tribunal's existence, the
subsequent development of factual information must be tailored to meet the
requirements of a trial.
B. Specialize and Improve Victim, Witness, and Informant Protection
Significant discussion has been devoted to victim and witness protection
vis-a-vis the existing ad hoc and future tribunals. However, this effort has
focused on direct victims of, and witnesses to, violence criminal activity.
Although there is significant room for improvement in this regard, consideration
must also be given to the arguably more difficult protection of potential
informants and other high- and mid-ranking officials who can implicate, and are
willing to testify or provide evidence against, heads of state, intelligence
officials, high-ranking military personnel, and other related leadership figures.
The "handling" of such persons necessarily requires staff experienced in
dealing with such sensitive situations. However, certain general issues present
themselves vis-g-vis such situations that future tribunals should consider:
1) Third countries generally are not willing to grant refuge to war crimes
tribunal informants if such persons do not fit the profile of a
"refugee" or "asylum seeker." If the individual is a perpetrator of
crimes who is willing to inform on his co-perpetrators, countries are
even more reluctant to provide refuge to such persons. The laws of
individual countries do not allow entrance and re-settlement of
persons into their countries unless they meet the criteria of the
country's laws. To date, most countries do not have legislation that
would permit for relocation, resettlement and protection of the very
specialized but potentially very important informant witnesses for
international war crimes presecutions.
2) The establishment of new identities for such "witnesses" must be
addressed. High-ranking officials who inform for a tribunal are not
likely to assimilate in countries where they are complete strangers
who must conceal their past, and lack the necessary language
proficiency, relevant job skills, housing, and means through which to
make a living.
3) The agreement of third countries to assist with such witness
relocation must be negotiated with various states before a tribunal
commences operating. One cannot spend months negotiating on such
matters when an individual has a justifiable and credible fear of
discovery and subsequent harm.
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C. Improve Due Process Guarantees for the Defense
Defendants are not always afforded a right to a speedy trial by the present
Tribunals. This is due in large part to the fact that the defendants usually have
not retained lawyers and developed defenses prior to arriving at the tribunals.
The development of a defense necessarily takes weeks and often months of
preparation. While this delay is understandable on the part of the defense, all
indictments that are issued by the prosecutor's office must be "trial ready" when
they are approved and signed by the prosecutor. Although the defense must be
given time and resources to develop its case, there is little excuse for
prosecutorial ill-preparedness to commence trial once a suspect is in custody.
Another issue that has caused delay, at least at the ICTY, concerns the lack
of courtroom space. As more persons are apprehended, there are not enough
facilities available to allow for concurrent trials of various defendants to take
place. As a result, trials are held on a rotating basis: defendant X in case A is
on trial during the first two weeks of the month, and then defendant Y in case
B is on trial for the next two weeks. This rotating schedule aims to address the
lack of courtroom facilities, but future tribunals must ensure that it has
appropriate courtroom, judicial, interpretation, and other resources available to
ensure that a trial commences and concludes with brevity.
Moreover, the quality or motives of some defense counsel does not, at
times, serve the best interests of their client. Although defendants must
obviously have the right to choose their own counsel, tribunals should be careful
to ensure that such lawyers are representing the interests of their clients rather
than the governments by whom they were employed or to whom they are
otherwise beholden. A defendant may be used as a scapegoat by an abusive
government, and that defendant's lawyer may be under instructions to deflect
culpability from others onto the defendant. International tribunals must explore
avenues to prevent such situations, and judges should also consider grounds that
would justify their intervention during trial in such cases.
D. Equity of Punishment
When the ICTR was created, the Rwandan government voiced its
disapproval that high-level officials who might be convicted for their role in the
country's genocide would serve their sentences outside Rwanda, probably in a
comfortable jail in a third country that opposes the death penalty but which
Rwanda retains. Others pointed out that while the architects of the genocide
would be in relative "comfort" in Western prisons. Low-level perpetrators and
possibly some wrongly accused of such crimes would be tried by the Rwandan
government, incarcerated in over-crowded prisons under inhumane conditions,
or put to death. Moreover, those persons convicted by the ICTY are placed in
prisons in Western Europe and are subject to the respective European countries
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parole and criminal justice laws that are infinitely more lenient than those in
other parts of the world where persons convicted of less serious offenses are
forced to serve longer and more difficult sentences.
I am opposed to use of the death penalty under any conditions, even for
genocide, and I am not by any means implying that those convicted of such
crimes should be incarcerated inhumanely. However, the inequity of
punishment for those who are convicted by international tribunals and those
convicted by domestic courts where the crimes took place can often be
inordinately disparate. Thus, international tribunals should consider efforts to
address this inequity.
E. Protection of Sensitive Information and Confidentiality
Various countries cooperate with international tribunals by sharing
sensitive information, re-locating witnesses and other such matters. These
countries have a legitimate right to insist that information they provide to the
tribunals be handled appropriately and that confidentiality be strictly respected.
The international tribunals cannot dismiss the concerns of cooperative
governments in this respect as "interference in the court's independence." This
is a legitimate and valid concern that must be addressed by tribunals by ensuring
that security and confidentiality of such information are competently and strictly
enforced and protected.
V. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned observations and recommendations were meant to
provide an admittedly cursory, but hopefully constructively critical, observation
of an ad hoc tribunal's workings to date. It is hoped that future tribunals and
especially the ICC will look to their predecessors and improve on their workings
and accomplishments in their future endeavors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of admissibility of human rights petitions involves a broad
field of legal issues, which include exhaustion of domestic remedies, duplication
of procedures and other technical procedural matters. I will, however, focus on
three legal issues that have special importance in the inter-American system
because of their impact on the individual petition system. These are: the
"victim" requirement of individual communications, the so-called "fourth
instance formula" and the notion of "person" in the individual complaint
procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission).
All these questions directly refer to the admissibility ground established in
Article 47(b) of the Convention. I have decided to refer to these issues
considering that rejection of a petition on these grounds is closely related to the
merits of a case, and, consequently, those cases generally cannot be amended,
completed or corrected by the petitioner if they are dismissed by the
Commission.
The Commission has jurisdiction to review petitions that claim the
violation of the rights of individuals guaranteed in the American Convention on
* J.D., Universidad de Los Andes, ..,M., American University-Washington College of Law, and
S.J.D. Candidate, George Washington University. Visiting Professor at the Washington College of Law and
Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at that institution. He has been
Consultant Attorney for the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Organization of American
States (OAS), and the Latin America Officer of the International Human Rights Law Group, in Washington,
D.C.
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Human Rights (American Convention or Convention). Additionally, the
Commission has competence to review alleged violations of the rights
recognized in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration or Declaration).' This competence ratione materiae of
the Inter-American Commission is therefore broader than that of the European
human rights supervisory bodies or the Human Rights Committee (HRC) which
is limited to, respectively, the European Convention and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The Commission examines petitions in accordance to the procedures
established in the American Convention, the Commission's Statute and its
Regulations. The individual petition mechanism is gaining in importance in the
inter-American system of promotion and protection of human rights. Under the
petition system, the Commission can issue public reports on its findings of fact
and law in each individual case and can file cases before the Inter-American
Court. This Commission's individual complaint jurisdiction must not be
confused with its authority to issue reports on the general human rights situation
of a specific country or on a particular human rights issue or topic.
3
Petitions before the Commission are filed through written submissions.
Victims, other persons or group of persons as well as any nongovernmental
entity4 have standing before the Inter-American Commission pursuant to Article
44 of the American Convention. States can also file petitions against another
state, only if both states have expressly recognized the competence of the
Commission to hear such cases.5 Once a petition is filed, the Commission will
examine the formal admission requirements for the communication and will
transmit it to the respondent state for its observations.
1. On admissibility in the Inter-American system see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., MANUAL
INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 94, 95 (1990); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS 24-44 (1995); DANIEL O'DONNELL,
PROTECCION IWrERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 418,419 (1989); Jo M. Pasqualucci, Preliminary
Objections Before the Inter-American Court on Human Rights: Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate Tactics, 40
VA.J. INT.'L L 1 (1999); MONICAPINrO, LA DENUNCIAANTELA COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOs 49 (1993); BERTHA SANTOSCOY, LA COMMISSION INTERAMEmCAINE DEL DE DROrrS DE L'HOMME
EL LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE SA COMPETENCE PAR LE SYSTEME DES PETITIONS INDIVIDUE.ES 31 (1995).
2. Current Statute and Regulations of the Commission can be found in Basic Documents Pertaining
to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS/ser.L/V/I.4, rev. 7 (2000), available
at http://www.oas.org.
3. These reports can be found in separate reports colloquially called "Special Reports" which
usually follow an on site visit to a country, or in "General Reports" which are included in the Annual Report
of the Commission.
4. It is a unique provision in international human rights systems. The European System and the
UN Human Rights Committee only give standing to victims or their representatives.
5. INTER-AM. C.H.R. CHARTER arts. 45.1- 45.2.
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II. ARTICLE 47(B) OF THE CONVENTION: GENERAL SCOPE
The Commission will declare inadmissible petitions that do not
characterize a prima facie violation of the rights recognized in the Convention
or Declaration.6 The Commission's Statute and Regulations have a set of rules
that intend to differentiate between State Parties to the American Convention
and other OAS member States subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under
the American Declaration. For our purposes, a main conclusion is that the
grounds for dismissal of a petition established in Article 47, paragraph b of the
American Convention, applies in a very similar way to all Organization of
American States (OAS) member States, under the Convention or the
Declaration, by virtue of the authority recognized in Article 24 of the Statute,7
and Articles 26.1, 31, 35 b and c, and 41.b of the Regulations of the
Commission (that basically reproduce the Article of the Convention in this
matter). Consequently, inadmissibility of a claim can be declared if it is evident
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction because the petition does not state facts
that tend to establish a violation of the Convention.8
Questions under this provision are usually related to issues that can not be
clearly characterized as rights protected in the Convention. For example, it
remains to be seen to what extent environmental9 and labor claims," and in
general, economic social and cultural rights, can be directly protected under the
Convention. There are specific treaties in the universal system (e.g.
International Labor Organization treaties or the United Nations International
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) as well as in the regional
system that recognize those rights. However, their protection through individual
complaint procedures is still very limited. The Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (known as the Protocol of San Salvador), which recently entered
into force, only establishes two rights that can be subject to the Inter-American
system's individual complaint procedure.
Another issue that falls under this provision is the "victim requirement."
The Commission requires the petition to indicate a violation of the rights of a
victim, in order to establish the Commission's jurisdiction under the individual
6. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 201 (1995).
7. Article 24.1 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights states: "The Regulations shall
establish the procedure to be followed in cases of communications containing accusations or complaints of
violations of human rights imputable to states that are not Parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights."
8. INTER-AM. C.H.R. CHARTER art. 47(b).
9. Which could be linked, in certain circumstances, to the right to life, personal integrity and
judicial protection.
10. Which can be related to the right of association, free speech, and judicial protection, among
others.
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petition system. According to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights'
jurisprudence, in order for the Commission to hear an individual case, it is
necessary to lodge "a communication or petition alleging a concrete violation
of the human rights of a specific individual."" Consequently, a case without a
victim will be declared inadmissible by the Commission. Similarly, petitions
claiming the violation of the rights of juridical persons (corporations,
nongovernmental organizations, etc.) are reputed to be inadmissible by the
Commission. We will explore some of the issues that these admissibility
requirements raise in the Inter-American system.
Ill. THE "VICTIM" REQUIREMENT
As a consequence of the broad standing established by Article 44 of the
American Convention, petitioners do not have to prove before the Commission
that they, themselves, are victims, nor that they have the consent of the victim
to present the petition on their behalf.' 2 However, the Commission requires the
petition to indicate a violation of the rights of a victim, in order to establish the
Commission's jurisdiction under the individual petition system. According to
the Court, in order for the Commission to hear an individual case, it is necessary
to lodge "a communication or petition alleging a concrete violation of the
human rights of a specific individual."' 3 A case without a victim will be
declared inadmissible by the Commission.
The Court has further referred to what it calls "self-executing laws," as
opposed to "non-self-executing laws," which require additional government
implementation in order to affect the "legal sphere of specific individuals.' '
In this regard, the Court stated that:
In the case of self-executing laws, as defined above, the violation of
human rights, whether individual or collective, occurs upon their
promulgation. Hence, a norm that deprives a portion of the
population of some of its rights - for example, because of race
automatically injures all the members of that race.'
As mentioned above, the Court considers that it is necessary to have a
"concrete violation" of the rights of a "specific person," thereby permitting it to
hear cases where a person or group of persons have been actually affected by
1i. International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the
Convention (Arts. I and 2 of the American Convention of Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion
OC-14/94, ser. A, no. 14(1994)), available at http:llwwwloas.org [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-14/94].
12. PINTO, supra note 1.
13. Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, supra note 11.
14. Jd. 41.
15. Id. 143.
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an action or measure of the state.16 Consequently, the Court has rejected
competence to review in abstracto claims regarding laws that have not affected
the rights of individuals under the Convention.' 7 The European Convention
requires the petitioner to be a victim, disallowing petitions in abstracto
concerning national laws.'8 However, the victim requirement has been
expanded through a notion of "potential victim," which opens the possibility for
the Commission and Court to examine laws that have not yet been enforced or
applied. The European Court has developed the notion of "potential victim" in
certain cases where, even though a measure has not been applied, the person is
at risk by the mere existence of a law or certain administrative measures.'9 In
the Klass Case, the European Court considered that the existence of legislation
in Germany that permitted the secret surveillance of mail and
telecommunications of persons, even if such measures had not been applied in
the case argued, satisfied the victim requirement2 ° The same approach was
followed by the European Commission in the Campbell and Cosans Case where
it considered that a system of corporal punishment in schools of Scotland
violated the rights of children attending those schools, even though the alleged
victims had not yet been punished.2' According to the Commission, to require
that corporal punishment be applied to the boys so that they could be considered
victims, would be too restrictive of the rights of the boys.
The Court's notion of victim, it argues, follows the European Court's
jurisprudence.22 While it is true that the European Court rejects in abstracto
claims, the Inter-American Court's approach is still not clear regarding the
notion of potential victim. The Inter-American Court in Advisory Opinion OC-
14 did not clearly addressed if the existence of a law or practice incompatible
with the Convention, such as the corporal punishment law of Scotland in the
Campbell and Cosans Case, would be a "self-executing law" or a "non-self-
executing law." By developing these notions the Court did not give a clear
indication on how the concept of victim would operate in such a case.
According to the test of the Inter-American Court, a corporal punishment law
could require additional Government action (the punishment itself) in order to
affect the legal sphere of an individual, which would be a questionable
16. Id. 147-49.
17. Case 10.792, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 144, OEA/ser.L/VIl.95, doc. 21 (1995) (Genie Lacayo Case).
18. DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OFTHIE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 44 (1996).
19. P. VAN DUK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (1998).
20. id. at 52.
21. Id. at 53.
22. Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, supra note 11, 147.
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conclusion. However, it remains to be seen how the Inter-American Court
would approach such a case.
In the cases in which these questions has been raised, the Inter-American
Court has adopted different approaches when requested to declare the
incompatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention. For example, in
its decision in the Genie Lacayo Case, the Court considered that it did not have
jurisdiction to declare the incompatibility in abstracto of Decrees 591 and 600
with the Convention.' Following its previous views in Advisory Opinion OC-
14/94, the Court considered that its competence was limited to the conduct of
the state and the effects of applying such laws in the case before it. It further
stated that such incompatibility in abstracto could be declared through its
advisory jurisdiction. Later, in the decision on the merits of the Genie Lacayo
Case, the Court found that even though the Decrees were in force at the time of
the criminal proceedings, they were not entirely applied in the case, and
consequently there was no violation of the Convention.' In the Loayza Tamayo
Case, however, the Court declared that "Article 2(a), (b) and (c) of Decree-Law
No. 25.659 (crime of treason) and Articles 2 and 4 of Decree-Law No. 25.475
(crime of terrorism)" were contrary to "Article 8(4) of the American
Convention."'25 The Court fell short of explicitly ordering the Decree-Laws to
be repealed, but stated "[t]hat the State of Peru shall adopt the internal legal
measures necessary to adapt Decree-Laws 25,475 (Crime of Terrorism) and
25,659 (Crime of Treason) to conform to the American Convention on Human
Rights."' A question remains as to what specific reparations the Court could
order when finding that a law violates the Convention, considering that the
repeal of incompatible laws could be an important remedy for the victims.
More importantly, the repeal of incompatible laws can constitute satisfaction
vis-d-vis the State Parties to the Convention by preventing future violations due
to its application in other cases.
The HRC also considers that it does not have competence under the
Optional Protocol of the ICCPR to review in abstracto national legislation.'
The Committee requires the alleged victim to be "actually and personally
affected. ' ' 28 The approach of the Committee, as in the Inter-American Court's
jurisprudence, is also rather restrictive. However, some scholars consider that
23. Case 10.792, supra note 17, IN 48-51 (prelimrinary objections).
24. Case 10.792, supra note 17.
25. Case 11.154, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 144, OEA/ser.IJVII. 97, doc. 33 (1997).
26. Id.
27. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY
660(1993). DOMINIC MCGOLDRiCK, THE HUMAN RIGrrS COMMITTEE 175 (1994).
28. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 27, at 175.
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it would be instructive for the Committee to follow the European system
experience in this area.29
In Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala," regarding the notion of victim, the
Commission received a petition claiming that several provisions of the
Guatemalan Civil Code that granted the husband more conjugal rights than to
the wife violated the Convention.3 Initially, the petitioners requested the
Commission to render a decision finding such provisions incompatible in
abstracto with the Convention. The Commission was reluctant to consider the
case without a victim." Later, the petitioners provided the Commission with the
name of a victim, Mrs. Morales de Sierra. This allowed the Commission to
focus the discussion on a specific victim regarding the existence and effects of
the provisions of the Civil Code by identifying an affected person.
The Commission examined the nature of the existence of the provisions of
the Civil Code and considered that the demonstrated direct effect in the daily
life of the victim was sufficient to provide the Commission with competence
ratione materiae to hear the case. The Commission additionally stated that the
"relevance" and "impact' of the provisions of the Civil Code were to be studied
in the merits phase. This case can constitute an important precedent to further
understand the "self-executing" or "non-self-executing" character of a law.
Moreover, it will contribute to a better understanding of the notion of "potential
victim" regarding a "norm that deprives a portion of the population of some of
its rights," as stated by the Court in Advisory Opinion OC-14, which it
considers to be a "self-executing law."
In Montoya Gonztlez v. Costa Rica,33 a confusing inadmissibility decision,
the Commission appears to restrict the access of petitioners to the Inter-
American system by rejecting the claim ratione personae on the basis of lack
of standing. The Commission considered that the petitioner did not have
standing because she had to be a victim in order to have access to the
Commission. Presumably the Commission was attempting to develop the
notion of "potential victim" in order to establish its competence ratione
materiae. The substance of the claim argued that the rules of a competition
discriminated against women by assigning lower awards to the winners of that
gender. The petitioner, an athlete, decided not to participate in the competition
29. id. at 177.
30. Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 144, OEA/ser.LIVII.98, doc. 7 (1998).
31. Under the Guatemalan Civil Code, wives are given the right and obligation of taking care of the
children and the home, and, therefore, they can only work if such activity does not interfere with these
obligations. The husband can stop his wife from working if he can demonstrate that he is supporting the
family. The Civil Code further states that the husband has primary responsibility in representing the children
of the marriage and administering their assets.
32. See supra note 30, 1i 4-18.
33. Case 11.553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 119, OAS/ser.L/V/I.95, doc.7 (1997).
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for this reason. The Commission decided that, by not participating in the race,
she could not be considered a victim. From our perspective, the facts of the
petition presented enough elements to constitute an arguable claim for purposes
of admissibility. However, the Commission, apparently trying to protect its
jurisdiction from in abstracto petitions, rejected the case as inadmissible.
IV. THE FOURTH INSTANCE FORMULA
Based on Article 47(b) the Commission developed the so-called "fourth
instance formula,"' by which it considers that decisions of impartial and
independent domestic courts are not subject to scrutiny under the American
Convention. In Marzioni Case v. Argentina, it stated:
50. The nature of that role also constitutes the basis for the so-called
"fourth instance formula" applied by the Commission, consistent with
the practice of the European human rights system. The basic premise
of this formula is that the Commission cannot review the judgments
issued by the domestic courts acting within their competence and with
due judicial guarantees, unless it considers that a possible violation
of the Convention is involved.
51. The Commission is competent to declare a petition admissible
and rule on its merits when it portrays a claim that a domestic legal
decision constitutes a disregard of the right to a fair trial, or if it
appears to violate any other right guaranteed by the Convention.
However, if it contains nothing but the allegation that the decision
was wrong or unjust in itself, the petition must be dismissed under
this formula. The Commission's task is to ensure the observance of
the obligations undertaken by the States parties to the Convention, but
it cannot serve as an appellate court to examine alleged errors of
internal law or fact that may have been committed by the domestic
courts acting within theirjurisdiction. Such examination would be in
order only insofar as the mistakes entailed a possible violation of any
of the rights set forth in the Convention."
The Commission developed the formula pursuant Article 47(b) of the
Convention, to dismiss any claim that would argue exclusively ajudicial error.36
However, the formula does not apply when there is violation of due process,
34. The "fourth instance formula" was developed initially in Case 9260, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154,
OEA/ser. LV/II.74, doc. 10, rev. 1 (1988).
35. Case 11.673, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 76, OEA/ser.L/VII/95. Doc. 7 (1997); Case 11/472, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 302, OEA/ser.L/V/I1.95, doc. 6 (1998); Rep. No. 34/97, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.LI./V/., doc. 6
(1997).
36. See supra note 35, 153.
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discrimination, or a violation of other rights recognized by the Convention.37
In Marzioni v. Argentina, a former worker that was seeking compensation from
his employer for a work related disability claimed that Argentina's tribunals
wrongly applied the laws governing damages in labor disputes. The
Commission considered that it could not review the alleged judicial error and
consequently the petition was inadmissible. In explaining the fourth instance
formula, the Commission also relied upon jurisprudence of the European Court
and Commission on Human Rights.
Both the HRC and the European system have develop similar mechanisms
to ensure that the supervisory bodies of the corresponding human rights treaties
do not act as an appellate courts. The European Commission consistently
rejects communications that claim that a domestic court erroneously interpreted
domestic law or that it failed to make appropriate finds of fact and evidence,
unless such errors could constitute a violation of the ECHR.38 Similarly, the
HRC considers that it is not competent to review findings of fact or law by a
domestic court, unless the domestic proceedings are manifestly arbitrary or
constitute denial of justice.39
The Marzioni v. Argentina case plays an important role in the evolution of
the standards of the system, considering the current trend in the hemisphere of
transition to democracy. The case clearly shows that states with functioning
judiciaries in the framework of a democratic society will benefit from a degree
of deference that the Commission gives to domestic courts. Conversely, in
authoritarian regimes or states where the judiciary's independence or
impartiality is in question, the decisions of domestic courts will be subject to
closer scrutiny by the Commission.
It is important to note that the fourth instance doctrine is directly related to
the existence of a functioning judiciary and to the level of discretion to be
afforded to a domestic court in, for example, estimating the value of evidence
or establishing the domestic law applicable to a case. Therefore, to override the
threshold set by the Commission, a petitioner would have to prove that there is
a manifest arbitrariness that violates a right protected by the Convention in the
domestic judicial proceedings.'
From an exclusively legal point of view, the fourth instance formula simply
recognizes that if agents of the state in the judiciary act in such a way that they
violate the Convention, the Commission will review the case and declare their
international responsibility. This reasoning is also valid when the Commission
37. Id. U 40, 63.
38. TOM ZwART, THE ADMISS[BILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETMONS 150 (1994).
39. ld. at 151.
40. Case 11.67 1, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 193. OEA/ser.I/Vll.98, doc. 7 (1998); Case 11.673 supra note
35, 7 60-62.
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reviews petitions that claim the violation of the Convention by agents of any
organ of the state. However, the basic difference relies in the fact that the
violation must be "manifestly arbitrary" signaling to certain states with
problems in their judiciaries that it is clearly in their interest to improve the
independence and impartiality of the administration of justice.
Interestingly, in Narciso Palacios v. Argentina,"' the Commission
examined a petition that involved a judicial decision by Argentina's Supreme
Court in a case in which the alleged victim was dismissed from his official job
as municipal accountant and filed a suit against the decision of the Mayor of the
city. The issue in question before the Commission referred to the interpretation
of domestic law by the Supreme Court on whether Argentinean law required
exhaustion of administrative remedies before a person could resort to judicial
remedies. The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court arbitrarily changed its
jurisprudential interpretation, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies
before being able to file a judicial complaint (a contentious administrative suit),
requirement that was not mandated by the same Court at the time he filed the
judicial suit. The Commission found that "at the time the petitioner filed his
contentious administrative suit, on August 23, 1985, against the administrative
decree of June 11, 1985, issued by the Mayor of Daireaux, mandating his
dismissal from the post of municipal accountant, it was not necessary to exhaust
the administrative process in order to accede to contentious administrative
proceedings." Furthermore, the Commission considered that "the petitioner was
denied access to this proceeding [the judicial remedy], by virtue of the
retroactive application of ajurisprudential criterion that altered the interpretation
of a legal provision applicable to his case." Presumably the Commission
considered that the petition was admissible because the violation was closely
related to due process guarantees, one of the exceptions to the application of the
fourth instance formula.
In another interesting case, Carranza v. Argentina,"2 the Commission found
that the refusal of the courts of that country to hear the case in the merits
violated several provisions of the American Convention. The Superior Court
of Chubut heard the case in which a former judge claimed the illegality of his
dismissal as judge during the defacto military regime. The Chubut Court found
it was "non-justiciable" based the inappropriate application of the "political
question doctrine." The case was then filed in "extraordinary appeal" before the
Supreme Court of Argentina (a recourse similar to the United States Supreme
Court certiorari) and this court rejected hearing the case. The Commission
considered that the lack of review of the case in the merits by the Superior Court
41. Case 10.194, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 106, OEA/ser.lJV/U, doc. 3, rev. 1 (1999).
42. Case 10.087, Inter-Am C.H.R. 254, OEA/ser.L/VII, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1998).
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of Chubut and the Argentinean Supreme Court could characterize a violation of
the Convention.
Interestingly, the Argentinean courts, particularly the Superior Court of
Chubut, interpreted and applied domestic law and appeared to have afforded all
due process guarantees in the case, which could have justified the application
of the fourth instance formula by the Commission. However, the exception to
the fourth instance formula was triggered, arguably, by the existence of a clear
and manifest violation of the American Convention due to the "utter disregard"
for constitutional procedure when dismissing the judge. The Commission
stated:
It is not for the Commission to pass judgment on the wisdom or
efficacy of a judicial doctrine per se, unless its application results in
a violation of any of the rights protected by the American Convention
.... [Tihe Commission notes that the effect of the political question
doctrine has been to preclude a decision on the merits of the
petitioner's claims.
The removal of magistrates by order of the competent body and in
accordance with established constitutional procedure is one thing, but
the "dismissal of a magistrate" by an illegitimate authority without
competence, with utter disregard for the procedure prescribed by the
Constitution, is quite another. The first under internal legislation,
might well be non-justiciable, but the second would be
unconstitutional and unlawful, and it is up to the Courts to review it
and declare so.
This precluded any decision on the merits of the petitioner's claim
that in 1976 the military authorities had unlawfully dismissed him
from his position as a judge.43
Some authors consider that this "formula" establishes a "double
standard."'M I partially agree with such a characterization (although I prefer to
call it a differential standard). Usually adjudicatory bodies have legal doctrines
that allow for certain levels of discretion and margin of appreciation for the
local authorities being supervised. The Commission focused such level of
deference on the judiciaries, based on accepted principles and practice of
international law: 1) interpretation of domestic law is, in general, reserved to
the national courts; and 2) international human rights supervisory bodies are
complementary or subsidiary to the domestic mechanisms of human rights
43. id. at W 45, 58, 64.
44. See paper presented by Andrds Gil Dominguez to the Argentinean Association of Constitutional
Law Professors (Sept. 1998) (on file with author).
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protection. These doctrines, therefore, permit different state practices to coexist
regarding the protection of the same right. Similarly, the Commission has
signaled that it-will exercise a closer scrutiny of domestic judicial decisions
depending on the right involved (the right to life or to personal integrity require
closer scrutiny). This presumably also allows for a differential standard
depending on the right affected.
Additionally, the mandate of the Commission has a dual dimension:
political and judicial. In a hemisphere where States with different levels of
democratic development coexist and there are certain states that still have gross
and systematic violations of human rights in their jurisdiction, the Commission
must use its mechanisms in a creative and effective way to induce progress in
the general human rights situation. This means that all states that have
independent and impartial judiciaries will be treated with more deference than
those states where such independence or impartiality is compromised. The later
will receive closer scrutiny by the Commission. In a way, we believe that the
Commission is creatively resorting to legal presumptions similar to those used
by the Inter-American Court in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case45 when
documenting the practice of forced disappearance of persons in Honduras as
way to shift the burden of proof to the State.
V. THE NOTION OF "PERSON" IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Article 1.2 expressly states that, for the purposes of the Convention, the
notion of "person" refers to human beings. This provision excludes from
protection under the Convention other notions of person, such as NGOs, private
corporations and other juridical persons.
The Commission has, however, admitted and decided cases under the
American Declaration in which the alleged victim was a private organization.
In this respect, it must'be noted that neither the Declaration or the Statute or
Regulations of the Commission define the notion of "person" as the Convention
does. The Declaration only refers to "human being" in Article I; in all other
articles the Declaration refers to "person." In light of the fact that the ECHR,
for example, extends its protection to non-governmental entities, it is possible
to conclude that the American Declaration may be properly interpreted as
protecting the rights of juridical persons.
One clear example is Case No. 9250, ABC Color v. Paraguay.4 In this
case, the Commission considered that it had competence to examine a claim
filed against Paraguay regarding "the closing of the newspaper, ABC Color, that
was printed in the city of Asuncion, Paraguay." The Commission stated that
45. Vellsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.C.H.R., Series C No. 4.
46. Case 9250, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 72, OAS/ser. IJV/nl.63, doe. 10, rev. 1 (1984).
Rodriguez Pinz6n
Articles IV (right to freedom of investigation, opinion, expression and
dissemination) and XXVI (right to due process of law) of the American
Declaration were violated by Paraguay. The Commission did not refer to
individual members of ABC Color or to other human beings and their right to
receive information. Therefore, the state was found to have violated the rights
of ABC Color, a juridical person under Articles IV and XXVI of the
Declaration, by revoking its license to operate.
Similarly, Case No. 2137, Jehovah Witnesses v. Argentina,47 the
Commission also examined a petition filed under the Declaration. The
Commission found that the Argentinean state violated several rights under the
Declaration, including the right to freedom of religion (Art. V) and the right of
association (Art. XXI), as against the Jehovah Witnesses as a group. The
decision makes no reference to individuals, and, only in one fragment, refers to
"members of the Jehovah Witnesses group" when discussing the rights to life
and personal security as well as to equal opportunity in education.
This notion of person under the Declaration gives rise to several questions
regarding the relationship between the American Convention and the American
Declaration. If we accept the analysis above as accurately reflecting the
Commission's approach, we will in fact be accepting that there are two different
notions of "person" in the individual complaint procedures of the Inter-
American system, one under the Declaration, which establishes that
nongovernmental entities (juridical persons) also have protection under the
Declaration, and another under the Convention, which only provides protection
for violations of the rights of human beings. A question remains whether
juridical persons could assert their rights under the Declaration, when the
respondent state has ratified the American Convention. Arguably, according to
Article 29.d., ratification of the American Convention by a member State of the
OAS does not supersede the obligations under the Charter of the OAS/American
Declaration. The less restrictive criteria to interpret the relationship between the
Convention and the Declaration could be used in order to avoid the regressive
effect of eliminating the rights of certain group of "persons" through the
ratification of the Convention.
Under the American Convention, the Commission rejects petitions
regarding alleged violations against juridical persons (e.g. private corporations).
The Commission reviewed such issue in Shareholders of Banco de Lima v.
Peru,48 and considered the petition inadmissible based on the lack of
47. Case 2137, Inter-Am C.H.R. 43, OEA/ser. IV/II.47, doc. 13, rev. 1 (1978).
48. Case No. 10.169, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 423, OEA/ser. LIVII1.79, doc. 12, rev. 1 (1991). See also
Rep. No. 39/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 102, OEA/ser.L/V/ll., doc. 6, rev. 1 (1998); Rep. No. 106/99, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 106, OEA/ser.I/V/l., doc. 3, rev. 1 (1999); Rep. No. 103/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 106, OEA/ser.LIV/fI.,
doc. 3, rev. 1 (1999).
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competence to review claims regarding "juridical beings" under the American
Convention. The Commission considered that "what is at issue here are not the
individual property rights of the individual shareholders, but rather the
collective property rights of the company, the Banco de Lima. 49
More recently, the Commission, in Tabacalera Boquerdn S.A. v.
Paraguay,-" similarly rejected the claim that Paraguay violated the right to
property, among other rights, of the organization and its shareholders.
Following its previous case Shareholders of Banco de Lima v. Peru, the
Commission considered that Tabacalera was not protected under the
Convention and that the shareholders could not argue that their individual
property was affected. In making this decision, the Commission also considered
the fact that domestic remedies were exercised exclusively on behalf of the
Tabacalera and not the shareholders.5
In this connection, the approach of the Commission raises some questions.
In many instances, property rights by human beings are exercised through
juridical persons such as Tabacalera S.A. or the Banco de Lima. In domestic
courts shareholders do not usually have individual standing before the courts
regarding claims of the company against third parties on matters related with the
normal course of business. The company performs, in practice, as a
representative of the individual interests of the shareholder. So it would be
desirable for the Commission to re-think this approach, because the current
jurisprudence may be limiting inappropriately the right to private property of
persons under the Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
Decisions of inadmissibility on grounds set in Article 47(b) of the
American Convention have a preclusive character, arguably ending any avenue
for a petitioner to bring its claim before the inter-American system. As we have
mentioned, these decisions are very closely related to the merits of the petitions.
They, in fact, are setting human rights standards in specific cases which, of
course, increases their importance for the protection and promotion of human
rights.
The boundaries of the fourth instance formula are being drawn by the
emerging case law of the Commission on this matter. Although these limits are
yet to be clearly stated, the Commission's decisions, both in admissibility and
in the merits, are the primary reference by which we will be able to discern a
reviewable case from a fourth instance formula petition. Much academic work
is needed to understand the impact of this doctrine in the human rights
49. Case No. 10. 169, supra note 48, 13.
50. Rep. No. 47/97, later-Am. C.H.R. 225, OEA/Ser.i/VII, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1998).
51. Id. ) 26-27.
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individual petition system and more active public scrutiny is required to avoid
inconsistencies in its application.
In contrast with the European and United Nations human rights
adjudicatory systems, the notion of "victim" in the inter-American system is
more related to the merits of a case than to the admissibility requirements of
petitions. It is for this reason that the Commission should have a lower level of
review of this requirement in its admissibility stage and leave a more
comprehensive study of this question to the merits phase of the case.
The question regarding the notion of "person" in the inter-American
system requires a more rigorous treatment and further discussion in order to
ensure that certain rights and persons are not overlooked by the Commission.
It is probably necessary to inquire if the current defacto legal situation requires
clarification through amendment of its case-law by the Commission or through
a Protocol to the American Convention. In either case, it is necessary to
recognize the problem and to forward proposals to further improve the current
regional machinery.
Finally, we must note that in the Commission's practice, the admissibility
decisions were taken by the Secretariat before communicating the petition to the
state and in many instances without any close scrutiny by Commissioners
themselves and without public and reasoned decision. Only until recently, the
Commission has issued inadmissibility decisions based on Article 47(b), among
others, to be published separately and in its Annual Report, which is an
important step towards guaranteeing scrutiny by the Commissioners themselves
as a safeguard for petitioners. Hopefully, this practice will ensure that no case
will be processed by the Commission without a transparent legal debate, and
consequently, the substantive standards set in those admissibility cases will be
publicly known so that the States can conform their domestic practices to the
required international standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the waning days of his presidency, William J. Clinton authorized the
United States signature of the Rome Treaty establishing an International
Criminal Court (ICC), making the United States the 138th country to sign the
treaty by the December 30th deadline. According to the ICC Statute, after
December 31, 2000, States must accede to the Treaty, which requires full
ratification-something that was not likely for the United States in the near term
given the current level of Senate opposition to the Treaty. While signature is
not the equivalent of ratification, it sets the stage for United States support of
Security Council referrals to the International Criminal Court, as well as other
forms of United States cooperation with the Court. In addition, it enables the
United States to continue to seek additional provisions to protect American
personnel from the court's jurisdiction.
Clinton's action drew immediate reaction from Senator Jesse Helms,
Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has
been one of the treaty's greatest opponents. In a Press Release, Helms stated:
"Today's action is a blatant attempt by a lame-duck President to tie the hands
of his successor. Well, I have a message for the outgoing President. This
decision will not stand. I will make reversing this decision, and protecting
America's fighting men and women from the jurisdiction of this international
kangaroo court, one of my highest priorities in the new Congress."'
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, New England
School of Law; formerly Counsel to the Counter Terrorism Bureau, Attorney Adviser for Law Enforcement
and Intelligence (1989-1991), and Attorney Adviser for United Nations Affairs (1991-1993), United States
Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser.
I. Press Release, Helms on Clinton ICC Signature: This Decision Will Not Stand (Dec. 31, 2000)
(on file with author).
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During the 107th Congress, Helms is likely to resurrect the
"Servicemembers Protection Act," Senate Bill 2726, which he initially
introduced in June 2000. The Act would prohibit any United States
Government cooperation with the ICC, and cut off United States military
assistance to any country that has ratified the ICC Treaty (with the exception of
major United States allies), as long as the United States has not ratified the
Rome Treaty. Further, the proposed legislation provides that United States
military personnel must be immunized from ICC jurisdiction before the United
States participates in any United Nations peacekeeping operation. The proposed
legislation also authorizes the President to use all means necessary to release
any United States or allied personnel detained on behalf of the Court.2
II. INFLUENTIAL INSIDER OR HOSTILE OUTSIDER?
The inescapable reality for the United States is that the ICC will soon enter
into force with or without United States support. As this is being written, thirty
countries have already ratified the treaty, and 139 have signed it indicating their
intention to ratify.3 Sixty ratifications are necessary to bring it into force. The
Signatories include every other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
State except for Turkey. Three of the Permanent Members of the Security
Council (France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) have signed it. Both of the
United States' closest neighbors (Mexico and Canada) have signed it. And even
Israel, which had been the only Western country to join the United States in
voting against the ICC Treaty in Rome in 1998, later changed its position and
signed the Treaty.4
The question facing the Bush Administration, then, is whether its interests
are better served by playing the role of a hostile outsider (as embodied in Jesse
Helms' "American Servicemembers Protection Act") or by playing the role of
an influential insider (as it has done for example with the Yugoslavia Tribunal).
In deciding on a course of action, the Bush Administration must recognize the
consequences that would flow from the hostile approach.
First, the hostile approach would transform American exceptionalism into
unilateralism and/or isolationism by preventing the United States from
participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations and cutting off aid to
many countries vital to United States national security. Further, overt
opposition to the ICC would erode the moral legitimacy of the United States,
which has historically been as important to achieving United States foreign
2. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4654, 106th Cong. §2(5) (1999).
3. Rome iCC Treaty Conference: Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, at
http://www.igc.org/icc (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
4. Nomi Bar-Yaacov, In Change of Heart, Israel Considers Signing War Crimes Treaty, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 20, 2000, at International News.
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policy goals as military and economic might. Perversely, the hostile approach
may even turn the United States into a safe haven for international war
criminals, since the United States would be prevented from surrendering them
directly to the ICC or indirectly to another country which would surrender them
to the ICC.
Second, the United States would be prevented from being able to take
advantage of the very real benefits of an ICC. The experience with the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has shown that, even absent arrests, an international
indictment has the effect of isolating rogue leaders, strengthening domestic
opposition, and increasing international support for sanctions and even use of
force. The United States has recognized these benefits in pushing for the
subsequent creation of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Sierra Leone, as
well as proposing the establishment of tribunals for Cambodia and Iraq. But the
establishment of the ICC will signal the end of the era of ad hoc tribunals.
Under the hostile approach, when the next Rwanda-like situation occurs, the
United States will not be able to employ the very useful tool of international
criminal justice.
The United States opponents of the ICC have suggested that without
United States support, the ICC is destined to be impotent because it will lack the
power of the Security Council to enforce its arrest orders. But as the ad hoc
Tribunals for Rwanda and Sierra Leone indicate, in most cases where an ICC
is needed, the perpetrators are no longer in power and are in the custody of a
new government or nearby states which are perfectly willing to hand them over
to an ICC absent Security Council action. Moreover, the Security Council has
been prevented (by Russian veto threats) from taking any action to impose
sanctions on States that have not cooperated with the Yugoslavia Tribunal
despite repeated pleas from the Tribunal's Prosecutor and Judges that it do so.
Indeed, in the Yugoslavia context, where the perpetrators were still in power
when the Tribunal was established, it was not action by the Security Council,
but rather the withholding of international loans that have induced Croatia and
Serbia to hand over two dozen indictees. This indicates that, unlike the League
of Nations (which United States opponents of the ICC have frequently referred
to in this context), the ICC is likely to be a thriving institution even without
United States participation. In other words, the United States may actually need
the ICC more than the ICC needs the United States.
The third problem with the hostile approach is that the United States
achieves no real protection from the ICC by remaining outside the ICC regime.
This is because Article 12 of the Rome Statute empowers the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States who commit crimes in the
territory of State Parties. Opponents of the ICC have attempted to negate this
problem by arguing that international law prohibits the ICC from exercising
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jurisdiction over the nationals of non-parties.5 In a lengthy article in Law and
Contemporary Problems, I provide a detailed critique of this legal argument,
pointing out that it is not supported by the historic record or guiding
precedents.6 But far more important than what I have to say is the fact that the
representatives at the ICC Prep. Con. have rejected the argument, indicating that
the ICC Assembly of State Parties and the ICC itself are extremely unlikely to
accept it.
If United States officials can be indicted by the ICC whether or not the
United States is a party to the Rome Treaty, then the United States preserves
very little by remaining outside the treaty regime, and could protect itself better
by signing the treaty. This has been proven to be the case with the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, which the United States has supported with contributions exceeding
$15 million annually, the loan of top-ranking investigators and lawyers from the
federal government, the support of troops to permit the safe exhumation of mass
graves, and even the provision of U-2 surveillance photographs to locate the
places where Serb authorities had tried to hide the evidence of its wrongdoing.7
This policy bore fruit when the International Prosecutor opened an
investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by NATO during the
1999 Kosovo intervention. Despite the briefs and reports of reputable human
rights organizations arguing that NATO had committed breaches of
international humanitarian law, on June 8, 2000 the International Prosecutor
issued a report concluding that charges against NATO personnel were not
warranted. 8 I am not suggesting that the United States co-opted the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, but when dealing with close calls regarding application of
international humanitarian law it is obviously better to have a sympathetic
Prosecutor and Court than a hostile one.
Il. A RECOMMENDATION BASED ON REAL POLMCK CONSIDERATIONS
I served as Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence and
Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs at the State Department under the
first President Bush. Unlike much of the commentary on both sides of this
issue, which is clouded by emotionalism and idealism, I have sought here to
5. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4654,106th Cong. § 2(5), at pmbl.
(1999).
6. Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique
of the U.S. Position, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2000).
7. Ruth Wedgwood, Improve the International Criminal Court, at http:lwww.
foreignrelations.org/public/pubs/CriminalCourtCPI.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
8. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2000) (on file with the author).
provide a detached risk-benefit analysis of the foreign policy and national
security consequences of the question facing the new Administration.9
The risks to United States servicemembers presented by the ICC have been
greatly exaggerated, while the safeguards contained in the ICC Treaty have been
seriously underrated. But to the extent that such fears are valid, United States
opposition to the ICC will only increase the likelihood that the ICC will be more
hostile than sympathetic to United States positions. And, ironically, by
opposing the Court, the United States would likely engender more international
hostility toward United States foreign policy than could result from an
indictment by the Court. Thus, whether or not the United States is able to
achieve additional safeguards to prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction
over United States personnel, it will be in the interests of United States national
security and foreign policy to support, rather than oppose, the ICC. This does
not require immediate ratification. Perhaps it is better to let the Court prove
itself over a period of years before sending the treaty to the Senate. But when
the next Rwanda-like situation comes along, the Bush Administration will find
value in having the option of Security Council referral to the ICC in its arsenal
of foreign policy responses.
9. For a more detailed analysis, see THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COuRT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sewall and Kaysen, eds., 2000) (A project of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences of which the author served as Co-Director).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of defining "terrorism" has vexed the international
community for years. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly
called for the convening of an international conference to define terrorism and
distinguish it from legitimate acts in furtherance of national liberation
struggles.' A decade ago, representing the United States, I gave a speech in the
United Nations Sixth (Legal) Committee, in which I pointed out that general
definitions of terrorism "are notoriously difficult to achieve and dangerous in
what all but the most perfect of definitions excludes by chance.",2 Today, we
hear calls for a renewed effort to reach international agreement on a definition
of terrorism, drawing from existing definitions of war crimes as a way around
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, New England
School of Law, formerly Counsel to the Counter Terrorism Bureau, Attorney Adviser for Law Enforcement
and Intelligence (1989-1991), and Attorney Adviser for United Nations Affairs (1991-1993), United States
Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser.
I. See e.g., G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/46/654 (1991).
2. See Press Release, Michael P. Scharf, United States Advisor to the Forty-Sixth General
Assembly, in the Sixth Committee, on Item 125, Terrorism (Oct. 21, 1991) (on file with author) (USUN 63-
(91)).
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the definitional quagmire.' This presents a case study for the topic of today's
panel and raises the question: Is the convergence of the laws of war and
international criminal law always a good thing?
II. THE CASE FOR DEFINING TERRORISM AS THE PEACETIME EQUIVALENT OF
WAR CRIMES
Terrorism can occur during armed conflict or during peacetime (defined
as the non-existence of armed conflict). When terrorism is committed in an
international or internal armed conflict (including a guerrilla war), it is covered
by the detailed provisions of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols of 1977.4 These conventions provide very specific
definitions of a wide range of prohibited conduct, they apply to both soldiers
and civilian perpetrators, they trigger command responsibility, and they create
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those who engage in prohibited acts. The
Conventions specifically prohibit use of violence against non-combatants,
hostage taking, and most of the other atrocities usually committed by terrorists.
The key is the "armed conflict" threshold. By their terms, these
conventions do not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions
such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence." '5 In those situations,
terrorism is not covered by the laws of war, but rather by a dozen anti-terrorism
conventions, which outlaw hostage-taking,6 hijacking,7 aircraft' and maritime
3. See Alex P. Schmid, The Definition of Terrorism, A Study in Compliance With CTL/9/91/2207
for the U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch (Dec. 1992) (on file with the author).
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
5. Waldemar Soilf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U.L REv. 53, 62-63 (1983) (quoting Article 1(2) of
Protocol 11).
6. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV), U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146 (1979).
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641,
I.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
sabotage,9 attacks at airports,' ° attacks against diplomats and government
officials," attacks against United Nations peacekeepers, 2 use of bombs 13 or
biological, chemical or nuclear materials. These peacetime anti-terrorism
Conventions establish universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators, require
states where perpetrators are found to either prosecute them or extradite them,
and establish a duty to provide judicial cooperation for other states.
There are significant gaps in the regime of the peacetime anti-terrorism
conventions. For example, assassinations of businessmen, engineers, journalists
and educators are not covered, while similar attacks against diplomats and
public officials are prohibited. Attacks or acts of sabotage by means other than
explosives against a passenger train or bus, or a water supply or electric power
plant, are not covered; while similar attacks against an airplane or an ocean liner
would be. Most forms of cyber-terrorism are not covered by the anti-terrorism
conventions.
Defining terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes would fill
most of these gaps. As described below, domestic and international judicial
bodies are beginning to apply the laws of war to peacetime acts of terrorism,
thereby setting a precedent for this approach.
A. The Juan Carlos Abella Human Rights Case
The most recent example is the Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina case,
decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1997." The
case concerned the January 23, 1989 attack by 42 civilians, armed with civilian
weapons, on the La Tablada military barracks in Argentina during peacetime.
The Argentine government sent 1,500 troops to subdue this terrorist attack.
Allegedly, after four hours of fighting, the civilian attackers tried to surrender
by waving white flags, but the Argentine troops refused to accept their surrender
and the fighting raged on for another thirty hours until most of the attackers
were killed or badly wounded by incendiary weapons.
9. Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, adopted by the International Maritime Organization, at Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc.
SVA/CON/l 5.
10. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention of September 23, 1971, Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-19 (1988).
11. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. 8532.
12. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 34 I.LM.
482 (entered into force on Jan. 15, 1999).
13. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, (Mar. 1998) 37 I.LM. 249.
14. Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V./I.95, doc. 7 rev. 271 (1997).
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The Inter-American Commission first held that international humanitarian
law (the laws of war) was part of its subject matter jurisdiction by implied
reference in Article 27(1) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 15
Next, the Commission held that the confrontation at the La Tablada barracks
was not merely an internal disturbance or tension (in which case it would not
qualify as an armed conflict subject to the laws of war). The Commission stated
that international humanitarian law "does not require the existence of large scale
and generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which
dissident armed groups exercise control over parts of national territory." The
Commission found the confrontation at the La Tablada barracks to qualify as an
armed conflict because it involved a carefully planned, coordinated and
executed armed attack against a quintessential military objective-a military
base-notwithstanding the small number of attackers involved and the short
time frame of the fighting. 6 The Commission thus stated that had the
Argentinean troops in fact refused to accept the surrender of the civilian
attackers, or had they in fact used weapons of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering, this would have constituted a war crime. 17
However, "because of the incomplete nature of the evidence," the Commission
was unable to find against Argentina concerning these allegations. 8
The Juan Carlos Abella case is an important precedent because it lowers
the armed conflict threshold so that many terrorist situations could now qualify
for application of the laws of war. But it also highlights several potential
problems with applying the laws of war to terrorist attacks. First, by confining
their attack to a military barracks, the terrorists themselves acted lawfully under
the laws of war. Conversely, the laws of war would constrain the methods the
government could use to quell the attack.
B. The Fawaz Yunis Prosecution
A second case in which a court applied the laws of war to a peacetime
terrorist act was United States v. Yunis. 19 Fawaz Yunis was a member of the
Amal militia which opposed the presence of the PLO in Lebanon. On June 11,
1985, Fawaz Yunis hijacked a Jordanian airliner from Beirut and attempted to
fly it to the PLO Conference in Tunis to make a political statement. At his trial
in the United States for committing acts of terrorism (hijacking and hostage
taking), Yunis sought to use the obedience to orders defense." This is the
15. Id. M 157-164.
16. Id 155.
17. Id. 180.
18. Id. 1185.
19. United States v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
20. id. at 1095.
defense made famous in the case of Lieutenant William L. Calley who was tried
for the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.2" According to U.S. law, "acts of a
subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order by his superior are
excused unless the order was one which a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know to be unlawful."'2
The Yunis Court instructed the jury that Yunis could prevail on the
obedience to orders defense if it found that the Amal Militia was a "military
organization." To make that finding, however, the judge indicated that the jury
had to determine that: (1) the Amal Militia had a hierarchical command
structure; (2) it generally conducted itself in accordance with the laws of war;
and (3) its members had a distinctive symbol and carried their arms openly.'
Although the jury did not find that the Amal Militia met this test, at least some
terrorist organizations would qualify as a "military organization" under it, and
thus have the right to rely on the obedience to orders defense.
C. The Ahmed Extradition Case
In the Mahmoud EI-Abed Ahmed Extradition case, a United States district
court used the rules of armed conflict by analogy to determine whether a
peacetime terrorist act could qualify for the political offense exception to
extradition.' In 1986, Ahmed attacked an Israeli passenger bus near Tel Aviv,
and then fled to the United States. At his extradition hearing, his lawyer, former
United States Attorney-General Ramsey Clark, argued that this was a non-
extraditable political offense.
The Court held that a person relying on the political offense exception must
prove the acceptability of his offense under the laws of war, even when there did
not exist an armed conflict as such at the time of the offense.' The Court found
that Ahmed's acts did not qualify for the political offense exception because
they violated Additional Protocol H's prohibition on targeting civilians.26 While
this result ensured that Ahmed would be prosecuted in Israel, the implication of
the holding is that if a terrorist targets military personnel or a government
installation, the terrorist would be protected by the political offense exception.
21. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 C.M.A. 534 (1973).
22. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1097.
23. Id.
24. Ahmed v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. N.Y. 1989), afftd. 910 F. 2d 1063 (2nd Cir.
1990).
25. Id. at 404.
26. Id. at 406.
2001] Scharf
396 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:391
H. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR TO
PEACETIME ACTS OF TERRORISM
The Abella, Yunis, and Ahmed cases show that domestic and inteffnational
judicial bodies are beginning to apply the laws of war to terrorist acts outside
the traditional concept of armed conflict. These cases thus provide a precedent
for treating terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes. But these cases
also indicate some of the problems inherent to this approach, which stem from
the fact that the laws of war establish rights as well as obligations for those over
whom they apply.
The first problem is that, under this approach, terrorists can rely on the
"combatant's privilege," under which combatants are immune from prosecution
for common crimes.27 For example, killing a combatant is justified homicide,
not murder. This means that terrorist attacks on military, police, or other
government personnel would not be prosecutable or extraditable offenses.
Similarly, kidnapping a combatant constitutes a lawful taking of prisoners.
Consequently, taking military or government personnel hostage would generally
not constitute a crime. Finally, government installations are a lawful target of
war. Thus, terrorist attacks on military, police, or government buildings would
not be regarded as criminal. And the collateral damage doctrine would apply,
such that injury or deaths to civilians would not be regarded as criminal so long
as the target was a government installation, and reasonable steps were taken to
minimize the risk to innocent civilians.
The second problem is that the approach would permit assassination of
political leaders while they are within their own borders. The Internationally
Protected Person Convention only protects heads of state, high level officials,
and diplomats when they are on a mission outside of their home state.28 The
laws of war, which would apply to such persons while within their country,
make it a war crime to kill "treacherously," 29-understood as prohibiting
assassination.' But this prohibition has been narrowly interpreted to, for
example, permit targeting military or civilian commanders during a conflict. 31
27. See Netherlands Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals, in 11 UNITEDNATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 86 (1949); Baxter, The Municipal and
International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 382, 384-85 (1951);
Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and
Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U.L REv. 53 (1983).
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1037 U.N.T.S. 167.
29. Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23 (b), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
30. Department of the Army, the Law of Land Warfare art. 31 (1956) (Army Field Manual No. 27-
10, Washington, D.C.).
31. W. HAYS PARKS, Menwrandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW
Executive Order 12,333, which prohibits United States government personnel
from engaging in assassination,32 has been subject to a similarly narrow
interpretation. Shortly after the 1986 bombing of Libyan leader Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi's personal quarters in Tripoli, Senior Army lawyers made
public a memorandum that concluded that Executive Order 12,333 was not
intended to prevent the United States from acting in self-defense against
"legitimate threats to national security" even during peacetime.3 3 If the laws of
war apply to terrorists it would logically follow that they have the same right as
governments to target military or civilian commanders and others who pose a
threat to the security of their self-determination movement.
The third problem is that the approach would entitle terrorists to prisoner
of war (hereinafter POW) status, which requires that they be given special rights
beyond those afforded to common prisoners. In United States v. Noriega,34
General Noriega argued that Article 22 of the Third Geneva Convention
required that he not be interned in a penitentiary. 35 Although the District Court
held that Article 22 did not apply to POWs convicted of common crimes, it
agreed that General Noriega was entitled to POW status and therefore entitled
to the protections of Article 13 ("humane treatment"); Article 14 ("respect for
their persons and their honour"); and Article 16 ("equal treatment"). General
Noriega's jail cell has been described as having all the amenities of a hotel suite,
including a television, phone and fax machine, and a private bathroom.
Finally, as the Fawas Yunis Case demonstrated, the approach would enable
terrorists to rely on the obedience to orders defense. This may be a fair tradeoff
for providing the prosecution with the use of the doctrine of command
responsibility, but at least in some cases it will render it more difficult to obtain
a conviction of accused terrorists.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposal to define terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes
necessitates application of the laws of war to terrorists. The approach would fill
some of the gaps of the current anti-terrorism treaty regime. It would give the
prosecution the ability to argue the doctrine of command responsibility, which
was not previously applicable to peacetime acts. And it will encourage terrorist
5 (Dec. 1989) (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-204).
32. Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 (Dec. 8, 1981).
33. PARKS, supra note 31, at 8.
34. United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
35. Article 22 provides: "Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and
affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the
interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries." Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of war, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135, Art.
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groups to play by the rules of international humanitarian law. On the other
hand, the approach virtually declares open season on attacks on government
personnel and facilities. It would encourage insurrection by reducing the
personal risks of rebels. And it would enhance the perceived standing of
insurgents by treating them as combatants rather than common criminals.
It is important that those advocating this new approach to the definition of
terrorism be fully aware of all the legal consequences that stem from the
approach. It is no panacea, and in the final analysis the negative consequences
may render it another dead end in the age-old struggle to define terrorism.
Thus, this may be a case of too much convergence.
THE IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE WORLD
BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
CASE OF THE WORLD BANK*
Dr. Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte**
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 400
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR "INTERACTION" BETWEEN CIVIL
SOCIETY AND THE WORLD BANK ............................ 401
I. EVOLUTION OF "INTERACTION" BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE
BANK IN PRACTICE ........................................ 402
A. Participation of Civil Society in the Bank's Work .......... 403
B. The Bank's Accountability to People Affected by
Bank-Financed Projects .............................. 407
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE BANK .... 410
A. The Establishment of the Inspection Panel and the Two
Reviews of the Bank's Experience with It ................. 412
B. The Bank's Anti-Corruption Strategy .................... 420
C. The Bank's Child Labor Reduction Strategy .............. 420
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................... 425
* This paper is based on a presentation made at the panel discussion on "The Impact of Inter-
national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO" on the occasion of the International Law
Weekend 2000 "International Law in the 21 st Century: The United Nations and Other International Entities"
held on October 26-28, 2000 in New York City, New York. The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author and should not be attributed to the institutions with which she is affiliated. The author has delibera-
tely broadened the topic of the panel discussion for her presentation and paper and referred to "civil society"
as opposed to "international civil society" in order to include in her presentation and paper a discussion of the
manner in which the World Bank interacts with people and NGOs in its borrowing member countries, i.e. local
civil society. In the World Bank, the reference to "civil society" generally included a role of associations,
social norms and practices that comprise activities of a society on an organizational basis representing social
groupings and being separate from its state and market institutions. The World Bank's dialogue with civil
society, however, is generally restricted to groupings with an economic, social, and developmental agenda.
** Senior Counsel, Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank; Member of the Committee on
Accountability of International Organizations of the International Law Association (ELA); Dr. jur., LLM.
(International Business Law), LLM. (European Banking Law), LLM. (General EU-Law), LLB., LE.D.;
Attorney-at-Law; Adjunct Professor for European Union Law at the Washington College of Law of American
University and the School of Advanced International Services of Johns Hopkins University, both Washington,
D.C.; and Adjunct Professor for International Trade, Finance, and Development Law at John Marshall Law
School in Chicago, IL. The author would like to thank Professor Padideh A'lai from the Washington College
of Law of American University and Chair of the Panel on "The Impact of International Civil Society on the
World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO" for inviting her to participate in the panel.
400 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:399
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the international community has both in theory and in
practice called for reform of the development process.' Development, it was
felt, would only be sustainable if an enabling participatory environment in a
country and appropriate accountability mechanisms of the country's government
were existing. Very soon, similar calls for participation of affected people and
their representatives, i.e., the local and/or international civil society, in
development assistance processes supported by international development
agencies, and calls for mechanisms in these organizations that would ensure
these organizations' accountability to the local and/or international civil society
were expressed.3 While international development agencies have introduced
innovations in terms of participation and accountability on the basis of their own
internal conviction that change to adjust to new challenges is needed as well as
in response to the external calls for reform, the recent demonstrations at the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund Spring and Fall 2000
Meetings show that in the view of many outsiders changes made are not
sufficient in an era of continued, even in some places increasing, poverty despite
a trade and investment boom under the new international framework for trade.4
This paper will, first, lay out the legal framework for "interaction" between
the Bank and civil society both local and international; second, describe the
evolution of such "interaction" in practice; third, assess the impact of local and
international civil society on the Bank; and, fourth and finally, share some
reflections on future developments for the relationship between the Bank and
local and international civil society.
I. See generally PETER SLINN, LAW ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DEVELOPMENT, THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES § vii-xx (Int'l Third World Stud. Ass. 1991), and the chapters on the evolution of (he concept of
sustainable development, participatory development, and human rights in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
GOOD GOVERNANCE (Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters & Paul J.I.M. de Waart eds., 1995).
2. See, e.g., Olusegun Obasanjo, Democracy and Good Government - Basis for Socio-Economic
Development (Lecture Delivered at the Vienna Social Issues Forum Oct. 24, 1991) (arguing that sustainable
development in developing counties requires both "empowerment and capacity building of and for the
people").
3. See, e.g. JAMES C.N. PAUL, Law and Development into the 1990s: Using international Law to
Impose Accountability to People on International Development Actors, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 1- 16
(1992), and KONRAD GINTHER, Participation and Accountability: Two Aspects of the Internal and
International Dimension of the Right to Development, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 55-77 (1992).
4. For details regarding the major changes in the World Bank's operations in terms of participation
and accountability, see 3 IBRAHIM Fl. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (2000).
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR "INTERACTION" BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND
THE WORLD BANK
Under its Articles of Agreement, the World Bank5 was created as an
international development finance institution. Its purposes are to finance the
economic and social development of its borrowing members.6 It is prohibited
from taking political considerations into account in its lending decisions.7 The
Bank finances development by primarily making loans and guarantees for
specific programs and projects to member governments.8 When it makes a loan
or gives a guarantee on repayment of a loan to a private business, i.e., a
borrower or recipient of a guarantee other than a member government, an
additional guarantee by the government in whose territory the project to be
financed is located is required.9
In essence, the Bank's operations may be described as the Bank's entering
into contractual relations with borrowing member governments, or with private
business provided the member government in whose territory the project will
be executed supports this contract through a guarantee. In practice, the vast
majority of Bank operations consist of loans to borrowing member
governments.
The Bank's charter explicitly provides for "[d]ealings between members,
i.e., the members' treasury, central bank, stabilization fund or other similar
fiscal agency" for the entering into loan and guarantee contracts With the
5. The term World Bank is used here to mean the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), unless the context indicates
otherwise.
6. In the words of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the Bank's express purposes are to "facilitate
the investment of capital for productive purposes," "to promote private foreign investment for productive
purposes," and to "encourage international investment for the development of the productive resources of
members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their
territories." See IBRD's Articles of Agreement, art. I, available at
http://www.worldbanl.org/htmllextdrlbackgrdlibrd/artl.htm (last visted Mar. 17, 2001) [hereinafter IBRD];
compare also IDA's Articles of Agreement, art. I, available at http:l/www.
worldbank.org/htmllextdr/backgrdlibrd/artl.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001 [hereinafter IDA], which, to a
certain degree, uses similar language.
7. The relevant provision of the Bank's Articles of Agreement state that "the Bank and its officers
shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced by the political character
of the member or members concerned" and that "only economic considerations shall be relevant to [the
Bank's] decisions." IBRD, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
8. IBRD, supra note 6, at art. M, § 4, with IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 2 (limiting the
Association's form of financing to loans). According to its Articles of Agreement, the Bank enters into loan
and guarantee agreements with governments, (or any political sub-division thereof) of its member countries.
See IBRD, supra note 6, at art. V, § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
9. Compare IBRD, supra note 6, at art. l, § 4. with IDA, supra note 6, at art. 5. § 2(d) (leaving
the requirement of a government guarantee up to the discretion of IDA).
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members.'" The charter provides further that the Bank shall cooperate "with any
general [public] international organization and with public international
organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields."'"
Neither the contractual loan and guarantee related relationship nor the
cooperation with other international organizations, as envisaged under the
Bank's Articles of Agreement, include clauses on contracts with, or
participation by, affected people, local, or international civil society. No other
provision in the Bank's Articles of Agreement contemplates contracts between
the Bank with, negotiation of contracts with, or participation in the operations
of any nature by, people potentially affected by Bank-financed projects, or local
civil society. Nor is cooperation with civil society in other respects envisaged.
From the supervisory perspective of Bank operations (or the perspective of
checks and balances between Bank Management and the Board of Executive
Directors which supervises Management in the realization of the Bank's
operations), no possibility of, or requirement for, people from borrowing
countries or civil society to participate in this supervision by the Board of
Executive Directors of Management is envisaged by the Articles of Agreement.
Im. EVOLUTION OF "INTERACTION" BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE BANK
IN PRACTICE
Despite the silence of the Bank's charter regarding participation of civil
society in the Bank's work or accountability by the Bank to civil society,
participation of and accountability vis-a-vis civil society has evolved over the
years. Thus, while no voice has been contemplated for civil society according
to the Bretton Woods Agreement under which the Bank was created in the
1940s, civil society, by now, has a voice in the Bank's activities. The voice
given to civil society in practice does, however, not yet reach as far as scholars
and parts of civil society have called for; its overall scope, nevertheless, is quite
remarkable.
Participation of civil society exists in many areas of Bank operations and
keeps expanding although it takes the form of "meaningful consultation" rather
than participation in the sense of vesting full or partial powers of decision-
making in civil society.12 It does not mean negotiation and does not imply a
10. IBRD, supra note 6, at art. I11, § 2. Article V, Section 2(c) of IDA's Articles of Agreement
provide that IDA can provide financing to a member, the government of a territory included within the
Association's membership, a public or private entity in the territories of a member or members, or to a public
international or regional organization, implying that contacts by IDA can go beyond government bodies.
II. id. at art. IV, § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
12. See IBRAJiM F.I. SHINAA, THE WORLD BANKGENERAL COUNSEL'S LEGAL PAPERS: 1983-1998
(2000).
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priori acceptance of the views of the consulted civil society.13 Similarly,
accountability mechanisms developed in the Bank's context do not go as far as
outsiders ask for, i.e., they do not enable civil society to ask for redress or
remedy of harm it has either suffered itself, or asks for on behalf of people
adversely affected by development projects. 14
A. Participation of Civil Society in the Bank's Work
Since the 1980s, participation of civil society has been made possible and
has, in some instances, even been made mandatory in connection with project-
lending by the Bank. 5 For several years now, it has been part of the policy-
making process. It further, since recently, exists in the context of adjustment-
lending. It is also part of the policy-dialogue, i.e., the dialogue on medium-and
long-term lending program, in which the Bank engages in with its borrowing
member governments. Finally, further informal dialogue with NGOs and civil
society with the Bank is evolving in conjunction with events organized by the
Bank, e.g. seminars on research and policy evaluation, the Bank/Fund joint
Board of Governors' meetings, and sector strategy paper formulation.
The Bank has built participation into the so-called project cycle which
characterizes its lending activities for development.' 6 The project cycle consists
of several stages: 1) selection of the project to be financed; 2) design and
preparation of the selected project; 3) appraisal of the project (plus following
approval of the loan financing the project); 4) implementation of the approved
project; 5) supervision of the project's implementation; and 6) evaluation of the
project. Each, the Bank and the borrower, has a specific role in the project
cycle. The selection of the project is both the Bank's and the borrower's task.
Design and preparation of the project is the borrower's responsibility. Appraisal
of the project is done by the Bank. Implementation of the project is the
borrower's responsibility while the supervision of the implementation rests with
the Bank as well as project evaluation.
13. Id.
14. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE 237-42 (2nd
ed. 2000). See also SABINE SCHLEMMER-SCHULTE, The World Bank, Its Operations and Its Inspection Panel,
45 Recht der Interationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 352-59 (1998); 2 THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:
ACCOUNTABILITY TO NON-STATE ACTORS, TRANSLEX, no. 1 (Apr. 1999); THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL: A MODEL FOR OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL IssuEs 483, 506-511 (HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER eds., 2000) (all
discussing the distinction between the concepts of accountability, liability, and international responsibility in
the context of activities of international organizations in general and the Bank's work and its Inspection Panel
in particular).
15. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 97-101 (2000)
(describing the evolution of the Bank's participatory approach to project lending).
16. For a description of the project cycle, see WARREN C. BARUM, THE PROJECT CYCLE (1982).
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The inclusion of a diversity of stakeholders other than the borrowing
member's government is, according to Bank policies which bind Bank staff and
which bind also the borrower after their incorporation into loan agreements,
made an obligation at particularly two stages of the project cycle, i.e., the
preparation and implementation of the project. 17 As these stages fall into the
responsibility of the borrower, the Bank requires the borrower to ensure
participation of ultimate beneficiaries of the projects it finances.
For example, during the design and preparation of a hydro-electric dam
project, Bank policies and procedures require the undertaking of environmental
studies," the elaboration of resettlement plans, 19 and the identification of
indigenous people." Participation in the context of such studies and plans will
involve consultation with the people living in the area proposed as the
construction site of the dam as well as with local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to determine the environmentally most sustainable
framework for the project, elaborate appropriate resettlement measures, and
work out protection measures for indigenous people. 2' Again, during the
execution of the Bank-financed project by the borrower or its sub-contractors,
for example, a resettlement plan will have to be followed, people moved from
one location to the other will have to be compensated for any losses, and people
will have to be consulted in the course of the implementation of the project.
It may be noted that Bank policies on disclosure of information to the
outside greatly facilitates the ability of beneficiaries of projects, local and
international civil society to be involved in Bank's projects and offer their
views, especially beyond what the Bank is required to ask for.22
Participation of civil society has been for years a regular feature in the
Bank's formulation of new policies, its conversion of operational directives and
17. See SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 41-49 (discussing the legal nature and function of Bank policies
and procedures in detail).
18. See, e.g., The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies: Environmental
Assessment, OP 4.01 (1999) (standardizing a process in which projects to be financed by the Bank undergo
a specific assessment to ensure that the environmental effects of Bank-financed projects are discovered as
early as possible in the project cycle and that measures are incorporated to minimize, mitigate or compensate
for adverse impacts of the projects or to enhance their environmental benefits).
19. See The World Bank Operational Manual, Involuntary Resettlement, OP 4.12 (1999)
(establishing procedures to ensure that the population displaced by a project receives benefits from it by
compensating them for their losses, assisting them with the move and their efforts to improve their former
living standards, income earning capacity, and production levels, or at least to restore them).
20. d.; The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive: Indigenous Peoples, OD 4.20
(1991) (describing Bank policies and processing procedures for projects that affect indigenous peoples to
ensure that the latter do not suffer adverse effects during the development process).
21. See The World Bank Operational Manual, Good Practices: Involving Non-Governmental
Organizations in Bank-Supported Activities, OP 14.70 (2000).
22. The World Bank Operational Manual, Disclosure of Operational Information, BP 17.50 (1993).
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other older instruments into operational policies and procedures, or the latter's
amendmentsY3
The Bank engages civil society in the review of its structural adjustment
strategies and has established a global network of civil society organizations to
discuss ways to improve mutual understanding of policy impacts on the poor
and explore improvements in economic reform programs.2 The Structural
Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), as this review is called,
was launched in 1997.
The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is the primary tool in the Bank
prepared for all borrowing countries considering lending from it. The CAS
report contains a description of the countries' priorities and the composition of
assistance required. It is prepared with the participation of the government. In
some instances, civil society, the private sector, and other country stakeholders
are consulted about the CAS contents before consideration by the Bank's Board.
In July 1998, the Bank's Board directed Bank staff to publicly disclose CAS
reports at the request of governments.
In the vein of implementing the Comprehensive Development Framework
(CDF), the Bank is also working in partnership and in a dialogue with a variety
of partners, including civil society.' The CDF, introduced in January 1999 by
the Bank's President James D. Wolfensohn, proposes a long-term holistic
approach to development. It acknowledges a country's macroeconomic
fundamentals but stresses further the importance of the institutional, structural,
and social underpinnings of development. As a process and tool for
development effectiveness, the CDF emphasizes strong partnerships among
governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development
actors working toward the goal of poverty reduction.
The growing rather informal dialogue between the Bank and civil society
beyond project-lending, policy formulation stricto senso, adjustment strategy
review, and policy dialogue (CAS and CDF), relies primarily on several focal
points within the Bank, e.g. its NGO unit to establish and organize a dialogue,
or its office for external relations. However, frequently, the specialized
networks in the Bank, when they feel this to be opportune, initiate themselves
23. For a detailed description of the conversion process of Bank policies, see SHIHATA, supra note
14, at 41-46.
24. Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Annual Report 1998 (Sept. 23,1998) (on file with
author); see also Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Annual Report 1999 (Sept. 16, 1999) (on file
with author).
25. See The World Bank Group, Comprehensive Development Framework, available at
www.worldbankorg/cdf(last visited Mar. 17, 2001). For description and analysis from a legal perspective,
see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank and Human Rights, 4 Aus. REV. OF INT'L & EuRoPEAN L
(ARIEL) 230, 252-255 (1999).
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the contracts with relevant specialized NGOs or particular parts of civil society
to receive comments on draft sector strategy papers or discuss research.
In conjunction with major institutional reform on new initiatives, the Bank
often receives unsolicited comments from NGOs and civil society, or engages
deliberately in a dialogue with outsiders. Such dialogue, for example, occurred
on the occasion of the establishment of the Inspection Panel itself as well as
Bank internal reviews of the experience with it. A similar dialogue is taking
place in conjunction with major Bank events, e.g., the joint Bank/Fund Board
of Governors' meetings.
From a legal point of view, it is important to note that participation of civil
society, i.e., mainly beneficiaries of Bank-financed projects and local NGOs
concerned with the projects for the purposes of the Bank's operational work,
and local and international NGOs when it comes to adjustment strategies and
policy-making, is defined in terms of meaningful consultation with civil society
before the Bank takes a decision on the financing of or measures for the
supervision of the projects it supports, or on the design of strategies and
contents of policies. That means that the Bank gives civil society the
opportunity to comment on projects, strategies and policies before those are
submitted for approval to its decision-making organ. Consultation in this
context does not mean negotiation and it does not imply acceptance of the views
of the consulted party or a mandatory influence (in whatever form) on the
decisions taken by the Bank. However, it means receiving adequate information
from the ultimate project, strategy, and policy beneficiaries and their
spokesmen, listening to them with an open mind and readiness to take their
views into account before the Bank reaches its own conclusion.
The organ of the Bank which is mostly consulting with stakeholders from
civil society is the Bank's Management. It is the Bank's Management which is
giving project beneficiaries and NGOs the opportunity to express their views
and concerns regarding projects and programs financed by the Bank. It is also
Management calling for comments in the formulation of strategies and policies.
Participation of or consultation with project beneficiaries and NGOs is thus, as
a general rule in the Bank's practice, tied to Management's work, i.e., the organ
which conducts the ordinary business of the Bank according to its charter.2 As
an exception from this rule, the Board of Executive Directors, i.e., the Bank's
principal decision-making organ, has recently also allowed for comments by
NGOs before taking a decision on the second review of the Inspection Panel.27
Nevertheless, whatever organ has listened to Bank outsiders, such listening has
always taken the form of consultations as any other influence on the decision-
making procedure of the Bank impairing on or interfering with the decision-
26. IBRD, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 10; IDA supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
27. For details, see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 196-199.
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making powers of Bank organs would have been in violation with its Articles
of Agreement.
B. The Bank's Accountability to People Affected by Bank-Financed Projects
The Bank does not establish any contractual relations with the ultimate
beneficiaries of the projects it finances. It also does not take any actions vis-at-
vis them. Nevertheless, it can be the Bank's failure to comply with its own
standards, e.g. having failed to properly supervise the implementation of a
project that could potentially result in harm to people.
Before the Inspection Panel was established, people adversely affected by
such failures could, of course, write to the Bank's Management and ask for
appropriate actions to stop such harm but no institutionalized, independent
complaint mechanism for them existed.
To enhance the Bank's accountability vis-ti-vis project beneficiaries as well
as to improve the Board's ability to supervise Management, the Bank
established in 1994 the Inspection Panel.28 The Inspection Panel provides a
formal mechanism for people directly affected by Bank-financed projects to
bring complaints before it on grounds of the Bank's failure to abide by its own
policies and procedures in the design, appraisal and implementation of the
projects it finances.29
The Panel's role is in principle to be performed in two stages. In the first
stage, the Panel registers the request provided it is not frivolous or manifestly
outside the Panel's jurisdiction. Management, thereafter, has the opportunity
to respond to the request. Then, the Panel has to assess whether the request for
inspection meets the eligibility requirements of the Resolution." The main
eligibility requirements include that the request must have been brought by a
group of project beneficiaries from the territory of the borrowing member, that
it relates to a failure of the Bank to comply with its own policies and
procedures, and that harm for project beneficiaries has or is likely to result from
that Bank failure.31 A local NGO can bring the complaint on behalf of affected
28. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Development
Association, The World Bank Inspection Panel, Res. Nos. IBRD 93-10, IDA 93-6 (1993), reprinted in 34
I.LM. 503 (1995) [hereinafter Inspection Panel].
29. The most detailed description of the history leading to the establishment of the Inspection Panel
and the most comprehensive analysis of its functioning may be found in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994), and THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2000).
For an analysis of the cases before the Panel and its first review in terms of their contribution to the
development of international law, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Experience with its
Inspection Panel, 58 Zeitschrift fUr auslalndisches Offentiches Recht und V0lkerrecht (ZaORV) Heidelberg
J. of Int'l Law 353-88 (1998).
30. Inspection Panel, supra note 28, i 12, 13, 14.
31. In the first stage, the Panel has to establish four elements ofjurisdiction, the first of which does
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people.32 In case local representation is not available, an international NGO can,
with the approval of the Bank's Executive Directors, bring the complaint.3 3 On
the basis of the eligibility assessment, the Panel recommends to the Executive
Directors whether to authorize an investigation.34
In the second stage, which takes place only after the Board authorizes an
investigation, the Panel carries out its investigation and reaches its findings on
whether the Bank has been in serious violation of its operational policies and
procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of the
project involved.35 If the Panel finds Bank failures in its investigation,
Management may propose corrective measures or the Board may decide on such
measures. 36 That latter decision is, while binding on Management, resulting
from the Board's discretionary power to supervise Management. It is not the
enforcement of a right of project beneficiaries to such corrective measures.
Management's own proposal on corrective measures is based on Management's
duty to conduct the Bank's day-to-day operations properly according to the
applicable rules.
It must be emphasized that the concept of the Inspection Panel is, unlike
the concepts of liability under domestic law or international responsibility under
international law, not based on the philosophy of legal action and remedies. 37
This means that the essence under the old maxim of "ubi jus, ibi remedium,"
i.e., that someone who has been wronged by another has a right to be remedied
not apply in the exceptional case where a request for investigation is made by a member or members of the
Bank's Board of Executive Directors: (i) the Panel's competence relating to the person of the complainant
(ratione personae); (ii) its competence regarding the subject matter of the complaint (ratione materiae); (iii)
its competence relating to the timing of the complaint (ratione temporis); and (iv) the admissibility of the
complaint in the absence of other grounds excluding the request's eligibility under the Resolution (e.g. when
Management has already dealt with the subject-matter or is taking adequate steps in that direction). For a
comprehensive description of the Panel's role in the first stage, see IBRAHIM F.I. SHHATA, THE WORLD BANK
GENERAL COUNSEL'S LEGAL PAPERS: 1983-1998 (2000) (The Role of the Inspection Panel in the Preliminary
Assessment of Whether to Recommend Inspection).
32. Inspection Panel, supra note 28, 1 12.
33. id.
34. Id. j 19.
35. The Panel conducts the investigation by checking pertinent Bank records, interviewing Bank
staff and other persons and, if needed, carrying out an investigation in the territory f the borrowing country
with the borrowing country's consent.
36. Id. 23.
37. For a detailed analysis between the Inspection Panel's accountability concept and the concept
of legal liability, see IBRAHam F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 106-15 (1994), and THE
WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2000). See also 2 SABINE SCHLEMMER-SCHULTE,
THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: ACCOUNTABILITY TO NON-STATE ACTORS, TRANSLEX, 1 (1999)
(discussing the distinction between the concepts of accountability, liability, and international responsibility
in connection with the activities of international organizations in general and the Bank's work and its
Inspection Panel mechanism in particular).
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and will receive an enforceable court judgment if he brings an action before the
court requiring the wrongdoer to correct the wrong, compensate the wronged,
or put him in the position he was before the wrongdoing occurred, does not
apply to the Panel. 38  By contrast, the accountability concept, for which the
Inspection Panel stands, is essentially not a remedy concept.39 It does not give
a right to remedial measures and it also does not provide for a corresponding
enforceable judgment. 4°
By contrast, the concept of legal liability under domestic law is a legal
remedy. Under this concept, an action could theoretically be brought against the
Bank by any individual having standing under domestic law on the basis of
applicable domestic law (e.g. on the basis of the law of contracts, torts, or lender
liability) in a domestic court.4 The latter would, if the claim is valid on its
merits, require the defendant to take remedial measures (e.g. pay damages or
give restitution). In practice, such action can, however, not be brought against
the Bank as the Bank is immune from suit in domestic courts with respect to its
operational activities and is not likely to waive its immunity.
42
While, like states, international organizations such as the Bank are in
principle responsible for any breaches of their international obligations under
an international agreement to which they are a party or an established principle
of customary international law applicable to them adversely affecting
individuals' rights, the establishment of any such international responsibility on
the part of the Bank vis-bi-vis non-state actors meets in practice insurmountable
obstacles. 3 There is in particular no judicial international forum before which
individuals could bring claims against the Bank for violation of international
38. See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank its Operations, and its Inspection Panel, 45
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 175-81,180(1999). See also AVERY LEISERSON, RESPONSIBILITY
IN A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 599, 600 (Julius Gold & William L. Kolb eds., 1964) (discussing
the distinction between accountability and legal responsibility and, in this context, pointing out that legal
responsibility includes the elements of an obligation, the breach of that obligation. harm caused to third parties
by the breach, and the duty to remedy the harm, while accountability does not include the element of liability
for harm caused to third parties).
39. See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 181. See also SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 241-258.
42. As a general matter, the Bank is under its Articles of Agreement and its Headquarters and
Establishment Agreements it entered into with the countries where its headquarters or resident missions are
located, immune from suit in domestic courts with respect to its operational activities. IBRD, supra note 6,
at art. IV § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
43. For a discussion of the World Bank's potential international responsibility and the Inspection
Panel's role in clarifying some of this notion's complex aspects, see Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-
Schulte, The World Bank's New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the
International Legal Order, 54 Zeitschrift fUr auslandisches offentliches Recht und Vblkerrecht (ZatIRV)
Heidelberg J. Int'l L. 392, 409-11 (1994).
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legal standards conferring rights on them even if a borrowing country would
espouse such a claim against the Bank.'
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE BANK
Participation in project-lending, adjustment strategies, and policy-making
has been introduced by the Bank on the basis of the conviction that broad
consultation with many stakeholders and their advocates enhances its
operations' impact on poverty reduction and increases its activities'
sustainability. Likewise the new accountability mechanism of the Inspection
Panel entertaining complaints by third party non-state actors over Bank failures
has been established in order to improve the Bank's portfolio performance.
From a quantitative point of view, it may be noted that the extent of NGO
participation in some capacity in the Bank's operations goes beyond fifty
percent of the operations approved every fiscal year.4" Over 500 NGOs are
participating in the review of the structural adjustment initiative. As of the end
of fiscal year 1999, all SAPRI countries have held national forums in seven
countries, organized by multi-stakeholders follow-up committees.' Local
NGOs in three other countries are conducting their own debates and research
through their involvement in a global NGO network set up to follow up the
SAPRI exercise. This process is expected to culminate in a global forum
sometime in 2000.4' Of the twenty-five CASs prepared during fiscal year 1999,
twenty-two (or eighty-eight percent) included some involvement of NGOs and
civil society.48 This represents a remarkable increase over fiscal year 1998
when only 20 percent of the CASs demonstrated an effort to reach poor and
marginalized stakeholders. Moreover, ten of the twenty two CASs prepared in
fiscal year 1999 provided details in the CAS report about the participation of
NGOs or civil society and included, for example, annexes listing consultation
participants, descriptions of the discussions, and findings resulting from the
discussions. As to the CDFs prepared in the twelve pilot countries, NGOs and
civil society have been involved in various forms in the CDF dialogue.
In response to a Board discussion on the progress made in the
implementation of the pilot CDFs, a "Questions & Answers" document on the
CDF was posted on the Bank's CDF webpage. One of the major concerns
44. See, e.g., JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PARTIES TO CONTENTIOUS
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) 141 (A.S. MUleret al eds., 1997) (noting
that the ICJ is not a forum for claims brought by individuals and discussing the various proposals advanced
during the past half of the century to change this situation).
45. See World Bank Annual Report 1999, supra note 24.
46. See WORLD BANK CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS FISCAL 1999 PROGRESS REPORT 20-21 (2000).
47. Id at 21.
48. Id. at 11.
Schlemmer-Schulte
addresses in the Q&A paper was the ongoing involvement of NGOs and civil
society in the CDF process and in building effective partnerships. In May and
June 1999 a world wide on-line consultation was held. Many NGOs from both
developed and developing countries took part in the electronic discussion,
which involved about 800 subscriptions from ninety-eight countries."9
The Bank is also actively contributing to many of the over fifty different
global policy and research networks which combine NGOs with international
institutions, especially international financial institutions (IFIs), and private
business organizations or academic institutions and has received comments from
hundreds of NGO in its policy drafting (including the conversion exercise
regarding old policies as well as the formulation of new policies). Such
comments are also often received where the bank engages in institutional
reform, e.g., as mentioned earlier, on the occasion of the establishment of the
Inspection Panel itself and its two revisions. The informal dialogue with civil
society on the occasion of the recent Spring and Fall 2000 meetings of the
Board of Governors of the Bank and the Fund has increased as well.
The accountability mechanism of the Inspection Panel has been frequently
used. The Panel opened for business in 1994. By October 15, 2000, it had
received twenty-one requests for inspection. Three of these requests fell clearly
outside the Panel's mandate and were, therefore, not registered. Of the other
eighteen requests, seventeen were either brought by local people allegedly
adversely affected by Bank failures in connection with the Bank-financed
projects and their local NGO representatives, or by local NGOs on behalf of
affected peoples whose names and identities were often asked to be kept
confidential and not to be disclosed for fear of potential reprisals. One request
was submitted by an international NGO headquartered in the United States on
behalf of people in a borrowing member country to whom local representation
was not available.
From a qualitative point of view, the impact of civil society, and especially
NGOs, is harder to measure. 50 However, some concrete examples are showing
that participation of and accountability to civil society can indeed have a great
impact.
Participation of civil society can in particular change the project,
adjustment strategy, or policy design. It can be a contributory factor for Bank
activity. It can even be the major catalyst for a Bank activity in cases where
such activity would not have been undertaken but for civil society engagement.
49. Id. at 15.
50. In conjunction with its project-lending, qualitative assessments of NGO and civil society impact
is most advanced. Analysis of the Annual Reports on Portfolio Performance indicates that NGO involvement
reduces the risk of poor project performance. See also, e.g., Carmen Malena, NGO Involvement in World
Bank- Financed Social Funds: Lessons Learned (World Bank, Environment Department papers, 1997).
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Thus, the Bank's reviews of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel,
especially the second review, and the Bank's strategy to assist its borrowing
countries in eliminating corruption carry, to some extent, the works of NGO
comments/involvement. Most likely, the Bank would not at all have adopted
guidelines to help countries reduce harmful child labor, or would have only
done so later.
A. The Establishment of the Inspection Panel and the Two Reviews of the
Bank's Experience with It
The creation of the Inspection Panel was the result of both internal and
external demands on the Bank to be more transparent and accountable in its
operational work by providing the Bank's Board with the results of an
independent review of controversial Bank projects and, thereby, to improve
quality control in project design, appraisal, and implementation.5
Inside the Bank, the creation of an operations' inspection function
emanated from an internal review of the Bank's work following the appointment
of Lewis Preston as President of the Bank in September 1991. The report of the
task force commissioned by him, which was submitted to the Board in
November 1992 and which came later known as the Wapenhans Report after its
chairman, found, when examining the quality of the Bank's loan portfolio, that
Bank staff was often concerned about getting as many projects approved as
possible under the Bank's lending program.52 In such an "approval culture,"
less attention had, however, been given to the commitment of borrowers and
their implementing agencies to the implementation of projects and to the
supervision by the Bank of such project implementation. The task force
recommended a change in the Bank's policies and practices in order to improve
performance of its portfolio management and an enhancement of the role of the
Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) which carries out ex post
evaluations of projects after project completion. A subsequent action plan,
prepared by the Bank's Management in July 1993, in response to the task
force's recommendations, introduced new business practices and processes.53
It recommended greater participation in the design and implementation of bank-
financed projects by the people affected by these projects and greater
51. For a detailed account on the developments which led to the establishment of the Inspection
Panel, see SHIHATA, supra note 37, at 1-34; 3 THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD ch. XVII (The
World Bank Inspection Panel- Its Historical, Legal and Operational Aspects).
52. See THE WORLD BANK, GETTING RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (1992). The findings of the Wapenhaus Report are summarized in GETrING
RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT EFFEcTIVENESS 1-7 (World Bank
1993).
53. See THE WORLD BANK, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: NEXT STEPS, A PROGRAM OF ACTION
(World Bank 1993).
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involvement of relevant NGOs in project design and implementation. It also
highlighted the need for the Bank's access, when necessary, to a reliable source
of independent judgment about specific operations that may be facing severe
implementation problems, such as an independent Inspection Panel. 4
External criticism of the Bank by NGOs and influential circles in certain
member countries with large subscriptions/contributions to the Bank's affiliate,
the International Development Association (IDA), no doubt influenced that
conclusion. The essence of the external criticism was that international
organizations including the Bank were not adequately accountable for their
activities and that they needed to be more open and responsive. The criticism
escalated in 1993 in the course of final negotiations by donor countries on the
tenth Replenishment of IDA and the call for the establishment of an independent
inspection function by the Bank was linked by the US to its willingness to
contribute to IDA."
Another major external pressure pushing the Bank to think about the
establishment of a special mechanism improving its accountability came from
the mistakes made by the Bank regarding a project in India, i.e., the Narmada
dam and canal project which was financed by the Bank to ten percent.5 6 Under
construction since 1987, the project was in particular criticized for not
responding to major environmental concerns and having greatly underestimated
the number of people that needed to be resettled from the submersion area of the
dam. The Bank, under Barber Conable, then President, commissioned an
independent review of the project and the commission's chairman, noted a
failure by the Bank to incorporate Bank policies in the project credit and loan
agreements and a subsequent failure to require adherence to enforceable
provisions of these agreements." While Management disputed some of the
Morse Commission's findings, it agreed with the thrust of them after carrying
out a further review.58
54. Id. 160.
55. Dick Thornburgh, Today's United Nations in a Changing World, 9 AM J. L. & POL'Y 215, 220
n.7, 222 (1993).
56. See Loan Agreement No. 2497-IN (1985) and Development Credit Agreement No. 1553-IN
(1986).
57. The Report was published by its authors, without prior Bank permission, as B. Morse/T.R.
Berger/Sardar Sarovar, The Report of the Independent Review (Ottawa: Resource Futures International 1992)
(hereinafter Morse Report); see also T.R. Berger, The World Bank's Independent Review of India's Sardar
Sarovar Projects, 9 AM. UNIv. J. INT'L LAW AND POL'Y 33 (1993).
58. See India: The Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) Projects Management Response (SecM 92-849), June
23, 1992. The Bank-wide Resettlement review, initiated in 1993, was completed in April 1994. See The
Bankwide Review of nvoluntary resettlement 1968-1993, Report prepared by the Task Force for the
Bankwide Resettlement Review, Environment Department (April 1994). For the details of the further internal
review, see H. Wyss, Bankwide Lessons learned from the Experience with the India Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
Project, annexed to SecM 93-516, May 24, 1993.
2001]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:399
The above mentioned circumstances led several Executive Directors in
February 1993 to come forward with a proposal for the establishment of an in-
house inspection capacity for ongoing projects.5 9 Outsiders' proposals included
the appointment by the Board of a Bank ombudsman and another for an
independent commission with judicial powers, including the power to issue
binding decisions on the Bank." Because of the political support of these
external proposals in particular in the US House of Representatives in the course
of IDA tenth Replenishment, Bank Management moved toward the
development of a plan for the establishment of a standing inspection function.
After the discussion of various Draft Resolutions prepared by the Legal
Department, a final text was adopted by the Board of Executive Directors on
September 22, 1993.
The first review of the Inspection Panel was required by the Resolution
establishing it.6 This review took place in 1996. Along the process of the
review within the Bank, especially discussion of the issue in the Board's
Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE), suggestions from several
NGOs and academics were received by management and circulated to the
Committee which discussed these outsiders' suggestions together with
Management's and the Panel's suggestions. 62 The first review resulted in the
issuance by the Board of Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution
establishing the Panel.63  As to the substance of the 1996 clarifications,
including, inter alia, issues of the Panel's functions such as the two-stage
procedure (with the addition of a "preliminary assessment in the first stage),
issues of access and eligibility, outreach, composition of the Panel, and
disclosure of documents in the Panel process outsiders' views have to some
extent had. a direct and/or indirect impact on the Board's formulation of the
1996 Clarifications in a number of aspects.
59. See SIHATA, supra note 14, at 22-23.
60. See Daniel D. Bradlow, Why World Bank Needs an Ombudsman, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 14,
1993, at 13. See further David Hunter & Lori Udall, Proposal for an Independent Appeals Commission
(Environmental Defense Fund and Center for International Environmental Law, 1993).
61. Inspection Panel, supra note 28.1 27.
62. For a summary of the discussion on the occasion of the first review of the Resolution
Establishing the Panel and the results thereof, see SHnHATA, supra note 14, at ch. 4; see also Louis Forget, Le
"panel d'inspection" de la Banque Mondiale, Annuaire Franais de Droit International 645 (1996).
63. Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (1996),
at http://www.wblnOO18.worldbank.org [hereinafter Clarifications]. For a comprehensive analysis of the 1996
Clarifications, see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at ch. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the 1996 Clarifications
as an "authoritative commentary" the Resolution, including interpretations of notions in the Resolution and
flexible practices developed under it, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Experience with Its
Inspection Panel, 58 Zeitschrift fUr auslandisches iffentliches Recht und Vblkerrecht (ZaORV) HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L. 353 (1998).
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In connection with the Panel's function and procedures, the Board agreed
to the flexible extension of the Panel's time frame for ascertaining the eligibility
of a request as an exception to the general rule while not agreeing with the
suggestion made by some NGOs to eliminate the first phase of the Panel process
altogether and have the Panel alone decide on the eligibility of a request." The
Board clarified further that the Panel's investigations should continue to result
in "findings," not in recommendations to the Board on remedial measures
alleviating the project's flaws, or on overall improvements of the Bank's
policies and procedures, as suggested by some NGOs.65
In terms of access to the Panel and eligibility of requests for inspection,
Management had not objected to the suggestion of several NGOs to extending
access to the Panel to all affected parties, including a single individual. The
Board, however, declined to follow that suggestion." It also did not agree to
another NGO-supported suggestion which favored the extension of the
inspection function to requests submitted by foreign NGOs, local NGOs whose
right or interests were not affected by the project, or even to complaints
submitted in the general public interest.
67
On the question of disclosure of information, the Board agreed to make
Management's response to the request for inspection as well as the opinions of
the General Counsel of the Bank on matters related to the Panel available to the
public after Board discussion of these documents, as requested by some
NGOs.68 In the case of the General Counsel's opinion, the Board, however,
reserved its right to decide otherwise in a specific case.69 Regarding another
dimension of outreach, the Board decided that Management would make
significant efforts to make the Inspection Panel better known in borrowing
countries, as asked for, among others, by several NGOs.7° The Board clarified,
however, that the Bank would not provide technical assistance or funding to
potential requesters.7 '
The Board reiterated the requirement of the Resolution that "[t]he Panel
shall seek the advice of the Bank's Legal Department on matters related to the
Bank's rights and obligations with respect to the request under consideration. '
64. See Clarifications, supra note 63. It may be noted that the second review reduced the possibility
of an extension for the Panel to ascertain the eligibility of a request.
65. Id.
66. Id. (under the section of eligibility and access).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Available at http://www.wblnOOl8.worldbank.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (under the section on the role of the Board, following the emphasis in the clarifications that
the authority to interpret the Resolution was vested in the Board of Executive Directors).
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The request of some NGOs that the Board should have to separate legal counsel
to advise on Panel matters distinct from the Bank's General Counsel was
rejected.73 It was recalled that the General Counsel provided independent legal
advice to both the President and the Board on all matters.74
Controversies in connection with some requests over the decision on
whether to authorize investigations in these cases led the Bank's Board in
September 1997 to initiate a second review of the Panel. This review resulted
in April 1999 in the issuance of another set of clarifications of the Resolution
establishing the Panel, the so-called 1999 Conclusions of the second review of
the Panel's experience.75
Unlike in the case of the first review of the Resolution of the Inspection
Panel, the second review was in its major part concluded by an ad hoc Working
Group formed following two informal Board meetings on Management
proposals and Panel comments by Board decision and composed of six
Executive Directors (representing both non-borrowing and three borrowing
member countries). 76 The Working Group's deliberation took place without
representation from Management and the other Board members not chosen to
be Working Group members. The Working Group only heard the General
Counsel and the Inspection Panel before asking the corporate secretariat to
circulate its final proposal to all Board members and schedule it for discussion
in the Board. After the Working Group's proposal for a second set of
clarifications of the Resolution had been put on the agenda of the Board of
Executive Directors' meetings, the fact that a paper by the Working Group was
scheduled to be discussed by the Board and the text of the paper itself leaked to
the outside. As a result, several NGOs and academics criticized the Working
Group's proposal openly in the media and/or wrote to the Bank and requested
an open discussion of the Working Group's proposal with civil society before
the Board would take a decision on the proposal. In a move unprecedented in
the Bank's history, the Board invited NGOs and academics to send written
comments on the proposal as well as to attend an entire day session of
73. Id. It may be noted that historically, these are examples where the views of Management as
expressed in its response have differed from the views of the General Counsel as found in his opinion.
74. On the role of the Bank's General Counsel in general, see IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, The Role of
the World Bank's General Counsel-Roundtable of International Financial Institutions General Counsels, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 214-22
(1997). For an analysis of the role of the General Counsel in connection with the Inspection Panel, see
Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 63.
75. For a detailed description and analysis of the 1999 Conclusions, see SHIHATA, supra note 14,
at 173-203. See also Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Introductory Note, Conclusions of the Second Review of
the World Bank Inspection Panel, 39 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS (I.LM.) 243-48 (2000).
76. For a comprehensive record of the events surrounding the second review of the Inspection Panel,
see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 173-203. See also Daniel D. Bradlow, Precedent Setting NGO Campaign
Saves the World Bank Inspection Panel, 6 HuM. RTS. BRIEF OF THE WASH. L AM. U. 7 (1999).
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discussion with Board members at Bank headquarters. This consultation with
civil society had its impact on several aspects of the text of the later-on adopted
1999 Conclusions of the second review of the Inspection Panel. While not
changing the essence of the Working Group's original proposal for conclusions,
some of the nuances later adopted in the final version of the 1999 Conclusions
stem from civil society's suggestions made before Board decision on the
matter."
The solutions to the following three issues were at the heart of the 1999
Conclusions. The 1999 Conclusions ended the unbalanced focus on assessing
harm suffered or to be suffered by the requesters in the first stage of the Panel
process and made it clear that the first stage is about the formal eligibility of a
request which lies in an assertion of both (i) non-compliance by the Bank with
its policies and procedures, and (ii) resulting potential or material harmed
suffered or to be sufferedby the requesters caused by Bank's failures. The 1999
Conclusions brought an end to the wrong impressions that remedial action, as
opposed to accountability in response to harm, was at the heart of the process
which had been nurtured by the Panel's practice to focus more on assessing the
harm suffered by requesters than on ascertaining Bank failures to comply with
policies and procedures.
The 1999 Conclusions also reversed the trend of the Management
submitting borrowers' remedial action plans after the Panel issued its
recommendation on whether to investigate but before the Board met to decide
on that recommendation, a practice that frequently frustrated the Board's
authorization of investigations. Submission of borrowers' remedial action plans
by Management at this point in time, i.e., not in conjunction with either
Management's response to the request or Management's response to the Panel's
investigation report, are now explicitly prohibited. Management compliance
plans may also only be submitted together with either Management's response
to the request or its response to the Panel's findings. The Panel's role with
respect to borrowers' remedial action plans will be limited to giving a view
regarding appropriate consultations with selected people and local NGOs as
such plans do not fall under the Panel's jurisdiction.
Finally, the 1999 Conclusions require a distinction to be made in
Management's responses and Panel recommendations/reports between (i)
failures exclusively attributable to the Bank; (ii) those exclusively attributable
to the borrower (or other external factors); and (iii) those that are attributable to
both the Bank and the borrowers (or other external factors). The earlier absence
of a distinction between the different authors of failures that contributed to harm
77. For the complete text of the 1999 Conclusions, see Conclusions of the Second Review of the
World Bank Inspection Panel, 39 I.LM. 232, Sept. 15, 1999 (reprinted after introduction by Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte).
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suffered by requesters had created the impression that the Panel would, in
addition to Bank failures, be investigating borrower failures. That wrong
impression should no longer be possible with the new requirement to distinguish
between different categories of failures as well as to design action plans
including proposals for corrective measures corresponding to the different
categories of failures.
The most prominent comments by civil society included the following
arguments/requests. Instead of the Board Working Group's original suggestion
on that the Board "will authorize an investigation without making a judgment
on the merits of the claimant's request and without discussion, except with
respect to the technical eligibility criteria," civil society representatives
requested that the preliminary review process requiring Board authorization of
investigations be dropped altogether, or Board approach of investigations be
deemed to be given upon submission of the Panel's recommendation unless
otherwise decided by a two-thirds vote of the Board. While the latter
suggestions were ultimately not adopted, the technical eligibility criteria were,
however, clearly enumerated in a inserted by the Working Group in its proposal
after meeting with NGOs and accepted by the Board in the final discussion on
the set of objective factors, with the expectation that, as a result of the criteria
being spelled out, the Board would indeed trust the Panel's recommendation and
allow it to go forward with an investigation without prior discussion on the
latter's justification in the Board.
Civil Society further requested that any remedial action plans (those agreed
upon with the borrower and those concerning Bank action only) would only be
adopted after the Panel process would have been completed, i.e., the Panel
would have submitted the findings of its investigation. Neither the Working
Group after meeting with NGOs nor the Board in its final discussion did follow
this request, but it was emphasized that what seemed to have pre-empted the
Panel by previous practice from going forward with investigation had been
taken care of in the Working Group report. Management, while free to adopt
a plan including corrective measures concerning Bank failures before the Panel
would investigate, would at the first stage of the Panel process only
communicate such plans on corrective measures to the Panel, together with its
response to the request, not to the Board, so that the panel would be given an
opportunity to judge the appropriateness of the proposed Management action to
address Bank failures. (Of course, Management would be in a position to take
corrective measures after the Panel would have investigated and then the
measures would be reported to both the Panel and the Board as the Panel's
investigation would no longer be impeded by Management action.)
Management would also be free to agree on remedial action plans with the
borrower. These plans could address borrower's failures; they would fall
outside the Panel's jurisdiction (which deals with Bank, not borrower failures).
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In order, however, not to subvert the Panel process through the negotiation of
such plans either, these plans would also be communicated to the Panel which
would have the opportunity to comment on the part on consultation with
affected people and local NGOs in the plan. And would normally be considered
by the Board only after the Panel would have undertaken its investigation. The
Board's final decision on this issue achieved two purposes: (i) the Panel's
original jurisdiction was confirmed, i.e., its focus on Bank failures; and (ii) the
Panel's function was nevertheless not diminished as it would be the Panel in the
first place to be informed of any remedial plan with the Board normally
becoming involved in Management corrective plans and borrower agreed upon
plans only after the Panel had the opportunity to comment on the measures
(albeit in a limited way only for borrower agreed upon plans).
Another proposal by civil society concerned the standard to measure
material harm suffered by people as a result of the Bank's non-compliance with
its policies and procedures. Outsiders criticized the Working Group's standard
to measure such harm on the basis of the without-project situation since the
latter would only reflect a "do-no-harm" approach while not pursuing a higher
standard of importing living conditions, a standard that should be more in line
with the Bank's genuine mission of poverty reduction. This suggestion was not
accepted either by the Washington Group or by the Board in its final decision
on the Working Group report. The standard of the without-project situation was
kept because it allowed for a more objective assessment of harm and avoided
evaluations in the abstract, effectively excluding unfulfilled and difficult to
measure expectations from the assessment. It was, however, added that it was
important to gather whatever baseline information might be available.
Another suggestion by civil society related to an unimpeded Panel access
to project sites on the basis of Bank loan agreements. Again, this suggestion
was not accepted but the final Board agreed upon text of the conclusions of the
second review of the Inspection Panel equally relies on a presumption of
unimpeded Panel access to the project site. This text leaves it up to the Panel
to decide whether it would need to visit the country in order to establish the
eligibility of the request. Furthermore, the final text of the conclusion states
explicitly that the borrower's consent for field visits envisaged under the
Resolution establishing the Panel is assumed.
Upon criticism from civil society as to the recommendation that the Panel
maintain a low profile during the investigation in keeping with its role as fact-
finding body and, so as to not create the impression that it might be
investigating borrower's failures, it should decline media contacts during the
investigation, the language on the Panel's conduct was changed. The report as
newly formulated by the Working Group after the meeting with NGOs and as
ultimately adopted by the Board emphasized the need to conduct the
investigation in an independent and low-profile manner. It further called on
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both Management and the Panel to limit their comments to the media to the
process, not the substance, of the inspection. Such comments would only be
made under those circumstances in which, in the judgment of the Panel or
Management, it is necessary to respond to the media (the final Board adopted
a version which slightly deviated from the Working Group version).
As a result of the meeting with NGOs, the revised Working Group report
added a new paragraph on "outreach," calling on Management to make
significant efforts to make the Panel better known in developing countries.
Similarly, as a result of the discussion with NGOs, the revised report stressed
the importance of prompt disclosure of information to claimants and the public
and, for the first time, recommended that information provided to claimants
should be translated into their own language, to the extent possible (final Board
approved version).
B. The Bank's Anti-Corruption Strategy
The Bank's explicit concern with corruption as a general development
issue developed from both internal efforts and pushes from civil society outside.
The Banks had long been concerned with governance issues78 but corruption,
which may be identified as part and parcel of governance, in the Bank primarily
defined as a country's efficient and orderly management of its economic and
social resources, had been a taboo.
When James D. Wolfensohn assumed the Bank's Presidency in mid-1995,
he soon asked the Bank's General Counsel to review all proposals and consider
initiatives for possible actions by the Banks to address the issue of corruption.
Detailed discussion of such proposals and initiatives at the senior management
level led to specific actions that were then approved by the President, and, as
needed, by the Board of Executive Directors. In particular, a comprehensive
strategy to address corruption, both as an issue of the Bank's own effectiveness
and more generally as a development policy issue, was approved by the Bank's
Board on September 2, 1997. 79 At all stages of the various steps the Bank
undertook to address corruption more explicitly, its internal discussion was
accompanied by receipt of comments and suggestions for a Bank strategy from
many NGOs (including Transparency International) and other parts of civil
society. A dialogue with the latter took place in particular along the work of the
Corruption Action Plan Working Group (CAPWG).
Even before October 1, 1996, the Bank's President, James D. Wolfensohn,
had referred to corruption as the "cancer" of development in his speech before
the Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, in the summer of 1996, an
78. See IBRAHIM SHIMATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 53-69 (2000).
79. For a detailed chronology and on a listing of the Bank's approach to corruption, see id. at 18.
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internal Bank Group task force, the CAPWG, was set up. It was charged with
working out a systematic framework for addressing corruption as a development
issue in the assistance the Bank provides to countries and in the Bank's
operational work more generally. The report came out in June 1997 after
lengthy discussions in the Bank's Policy Committee and was discussed in a
Board seminar in July 1997, then approved (as revised) by the Board in
September 1997. It provided a framework for addressing the issue by pulling
together existing bank approaches, suggesting new ones, and outlining a plan
for action.8° The framework was meant to guide the Bank in addressing the
issue of corruption at four levels:
1) Protecting Bank-financed projects from fraud and corruption;
2) Helping borrowing countries address corruption by responding to
specific country request for assistance in areas of Bank expertise
(including policy reform and institutional strengthening);
3) Considering corruption more explicitly in the policy dialogue with
borrowing countries, country assistance strategies, the allocation of
the lending program, the design of projects, economic and sector
work, and research; and
4) Lending the Bank's voice, knowledge and full support to international
efforts against corruption.
At the first level, the Bank had revised its Procurement Guidelines in July
1996 even before the report was written. Further changes were made around the
same time at which the CAPWG report came out.
At the second and third levels, the Bank has helped and keeps helping
countries reform economic policies and strengthen public institutions. It is now
also involved in explicit anti-corruption strategies, and raising the issue of
corruption explicitly in the dialogue with its borrowing members.
Advice on economic policy reform is the main pillar of the Bank's anti-
corruption work with borrowers. Enlarging the scope and improving the
functioning of markets strengthens competitive forces in the economy and
curtails opportunities for monopoly profits, thereby eliminating the bribes
public-officials may be offered or may extort to secure them. Markets, in view
of the report of the CAPWG, discipline participants more effectively than public
sector accountability mechanisms generally can.
80. See Report of the Corruption Action Plan Working Group Helping Countries Combat
Corruption: The Role of the World Bank Group (SecM97-548), dated June 25, 1997. See also Helping
Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (R97-201), dated August 13, 1997, a paper
prepared by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) which is based on the report
of the CAPWG amending it in order to reflect the discussion on the Executive Directors' seminar on July 15,
1997.
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Further Bank advice considers institutional capacity building. Without
sufficient institutional capacity, well-intended policies can result in poor
outcomes and even more corruption. Infrastructure privatization, environmental
regulation, decentralization of government activity, tax reform, and public
expenditure reduction are examples of policy areas where institutional capacity
must be carefully factored into policy design. Building strong institutions is not
only a key to good governance and therefore to development, but also to the
control of corruption.
At the fourth level, the Bank strongly supports international efforts
including the OAS, the OECD, the European Union and the Council of Europe.
These efforts are an important complement to its country-based work, and
should become increasingly active as an observer, advisor, and/or participant.
C. The Bank's Child Labor Reduction Strategy
Until the mid-1990s, the Bank had not addressed the issue of child labor
as either a very prominent or a free-standing concern in its operations.8 With
the international community's growing awareness of the issue and recognition
of it as much pressing, the Bank's attitude changed. The latter change can be
traced back to not exclusively but especially several NGOs writing to the
Bank's President.
Before this NGO pressure, the Bank had addressed the issue of child labor
under some other titles, e.g., in the policy papers on women in development and
labor migration. The 1995 World Development Report (WDR), a major World
Bank research and vision publication, was also devoted to labor issues. One of
the WDRS findings concerned child labor and stated:
National legislation and international conventions banning child labor
have symbolic value as an expression of society's desire to eradicate
this practice. But they cannot deliver results unless accompanied by
measures to shift the balance of incentives away from child labor and
toward education. The most important ways in which governments
can shift this balance are by providing a safety net to protect the poor,
expanding opportunities for quality education, and gradually
increasing institutional capacity to enforce legislated bans.
81. For a comprehensive chronology and analysis of the Bank's approach to child labor, see Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Role in Fighting Child Labor, in UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY COURSE ON CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
327-342 (Eugen Verhellen ed., 1999).
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The Bank had further studied the question of child labor. 2 Despite of the
absence of an operational policy on child labor, the Bank contributed to child
labor reduction through its financing of projects for education, health, nutrition,
population and social safety nets. The Bank had also long recognized its
linkage to poverty and to the poor quality or availability of education.
In the mid-1990s, when child labor moved further to the center of the
international debate on the positive and negative effects of globalization and
several NGOs skillfully made the case to address child labor issues in a more
focused way in letters to the Bank's President, Bank Management, in the first
place the Bank's General Counsel, felt that the time was ripe for the Bank to
develop a more explicit position on the issue of child labor.
As a result of a growing awareness of the issue of child labor in the mid-
1990s and based on the conviction that exploitative child labor has a negative
impact on the economic and social development of countries, the Bank's
Management prepared in 1996/1997 a position paper on child labor (the World
Bank's Child Labor Paper). This paper was submitted to the Bank's Board of
Executive Directors for their consideration in May 1997. In their discussion of
this paper in July 1997, the Executive Directors agreed with the new approach
by the Bank to child labor issues, as proposed by Management. They also
agreed to the publication of the position paper with some revisions.8 3 According
to the position paper, the Bank's new approach to child labor issues includes:
(a) giving more focus to child labor issues in the policy dialogue with borrowing
countries; (b) improving partnership on these issues with other relevant
international organizations and NGOs; (c) raising the awareness and sensitivity
of Bank staff regarding the issues involved; (d) giving more emphasis to child
labor issues in existing lending activities; (e) requiring compliance with
applicable child labor laws and regulations in specific projects where
exploitative child labor is otherwise likely to occur; and (f) designing specific
projects or components of projects to target the most harmful forms of child
labor, possibly starting with pilot projects in countries where child labor is seen
as a serious problem.
Following the Board of Executive Directors' approval of the Child Labor
Paper, Bank Management immediately began to engage in the above mentioned
efforts and has, since then concentrated on mainstreaming child labor into its
work. For example, the Bank's credit agreement for the Silk Development
Project in Bangladesh, which was approved in late 1977, comprises covenants
82. Papers which were the result of such studies include F. Siddiqui & H. Patrinos, Child Labor
Issues, Causes and Interventions (World Bank Human Resources Development and Operations Policy,
Working Paper No. 56, 1995); C. Grootaert & R. Kanbur, Child Labor A Review (World Bank Research,
Working Paper No. 1454, 1995).
83. See P. FALLON & Z. TzANNATOS, CHILD LABOR ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS FORTHE WORLD BANK
(1998).
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requiring Bangladesh to make sure that contractors, hired by the Silk
Foundation (the agency responsible for the implementation of the project in
Bangladesh) undertake to abide by the applicable laws of Bangladesh, including
child labor laws, in their carrying out of the project. Similar provisions are
considered in other projects. An increasing number of further child labor
related projects are currently being undertaken by the World Bank.
Reducing child labor is a difficult task, involving a broad range of general
and more specific measures, from poverty alleviation to programs which
encourage greater school attendance. In order to incorporate the concern to
address child labor into the Bank's work, the Bank established a Child Labor
Program in May 1998. The Child Labor Program promotes a range of practical
initiatives to combat child labor and builds up knowledge on the topic. The
Program is housed in the Human Development Network and is the focal point
for Bank-wide child labor activities, projects and policy. The Program supports
various child labor and child labor related projects, including research, and
analyses, pilot studies, child labor reduction evaluations, and internal and
external dissemination through training, seminars and via the child labor
website." Policy implications derived from these projects feed into Bank
dialogue with clients and donors, Bank country assistance strategies and lending
activities.
Among major international organizations, the Bank was the first to focus
specifically on harmful or exploitative child labor when it began to discuss child
labor as a policy issue at the Senior Management level in Summer 1996, a
debate that resulted in new directions agreed upon with the Board of Executive
Directors in July 1997. With its focus on harmful child labor, the Bank
provided an impetus to further efforts by others with whom the Bank has by
now developed an extensive cooperation on the issue.
The World Bank's pragmatic focus on harmful or exploitative child labor
inspired and reinforced the debate in International Labor Organization (ILO) on
the adoption of a new convention similarly focusing on the worst forms of child
labor. Cross-fertilization between the Bank and ILO in the approach to child
labor continues beyond the adoption by ILO of the new Convention on worst
forms of child labor in June 1999. The Bank welcomes the new ILO
Convention's more substantive approach (versus its earlier, primarily formal
definitional approach to child labor based on strict age standards in the
Minimum Age Convention). The new ILO view on child labor corresponds its
own, from a general perspective, and is susceptible, in the more comprehensive
details of defining the worst forms of child labor, to even guide Bank actions to
combat child labor where the Bank's own position paper fails to give guidance.
84. Available at http://www.worldbank.orgtsp/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
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The greater parallels in ILO's and the Bank's approach from a general
policy perspective have increased the opportunities for both institutions to work
closer together as partners on the ground. As a result, ILO with its IPEC
program85 and the Bank are working together towards a gradual elimination of
child labor by strengthening the capability of countries to deal with the problem.
Further partners of the Bank include UNICEF, the International
Organization of Employers (IOE), and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The scope of impact which civil society has on the Bank in legal terms is
reflected in the concrete meaning the Bank has given to two concepts:
participation and accountability. The later translate into "meaningful
consultation" with project beneficiaries and "accountability of Bank
Management to the Board triggered by affected people's standing before the
Panel" rather than "participation in the Bank's decision-making process" and
"legal remedies against Bank financing of projects." This does not mean that
the Bank has once and for all rejected broader concepts as those brought
forward by development scholars. It means that the Bank has been the first
international finance and development institution to courageously introduce new
processes and mechanisms while ensuring a legally sound basis for them as well
as keeping an eye on the practical feasibility of dramatic changes. The bank
remains open to further develop these new processes and mechanisms and
thereby contribute to the shaping of the features of emerging concepts of
international development law.
There are a number of things that have to be kept in mind for the continued
use of already existing participation and accountability structures as well as in
the further evolution of these structures in the future.
Involvement of civil society in the Bank's activities has in terms of
participation and in accountability terms always taken place on a legally sound
basis. It developed from ad hoc incidents to more institutionalized ways (either
in the format of established and repeated practices or by incorporation in written
procedures).
From a geographical point of view, the focus by the Bank was initially on
local civil society reflecting the traditional project-lending mode of the Bank.
By now, it has broadened to international civil society, especially in adjustment
strategy, and in policy matters.
85. With its International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), ILO is assisting
countries in elaborating and implementing comprehensive policies and targeted programs and projects starting
in 1992, with financial support from several governments.
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In substance, involvement took the form of consultation or assistance in
oversight through alerting the Bank where its projects were badly managed. It
never meant attribution of powers in the decision-making, as such an attribution
would have been inconsistent with the Bank's Articles of Agreement and the
allocation of powers to Management and the Board of Executive Directors
under the Articles. Any future developments should keep this limitation in
mind.
From a practical point of view, involvement of civil society in the way it
has so far been structured has not led to disruptions in the functioning of the
Bank and in doing its business. Inappropriate manipulations only occurred
when civil society made itself heard outside the established ad hoc and/or
institutionalized frameworks, i.e., contrary to the existing established rules of
the game or ad hoc agreed-upon new practices by those vested with the powers
to set the rules of the game. For example, undue influences were exerted on the
Bank when, contrary to the Bank's rules of the game, demonstrations in front
of the Bank took place and comments originating with civil society were
published in the media at the time the Bank's Board of Executive Directors were
deliberating and discussing the investigation report of the Inspection Panel in
the Western China Poverty Reduction/Tibet case before the Board had taken a
decision because the reports by both Management and the Inspection Panel had
been leaked to the outside." In the latter incident, the Board followed the
traditional model of decision-making process in the Bank and, unlike in the case
of the second review of the Inspection Panel where it had itself organized a
meeting with NGOs before making a final decision, did not want to officially
hear outsiders' views before taking a decision. For an orderly development of
consulting with outsiders, agreed upon procedures, i.e., the "rule of law," should
be followed. Furthermore, respect must be paid to limitations that cannot be
overcome by agreed upon procedures but would require a change in the big
framework through an amendment of the Bank's Articles of Agreement.
Beyond the rules of the game under the Bank's current framework, i.e., in
terms of future developments, or from a policy perspective, two issues are most
important. First, if one would like to accord civil society a greater role in the
development activities of the Bank and other development agencies, in
particular accord to them some decision-making powers, the legitimacy of such
a move must be scrutinized. Are international NGOs, for example, really the
representative of local population in a developing country, i.e., the ultimate
beneficiaries of development assistance? Or are they not merely self-appointed
spokesmen, frequently without elaborate internal governance structures and
without their heads being internally "democratically" elected, with the
86. See also Daniel D. Bradlow, Why World BankNeeds an Ombudsman, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1993,
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exceptions of labor unions? As Paul C. Szasz, a fellow member of the ILA
Committee on Accountability of International Organizations has written, "[a]ny
discussion of the role of NGOs in relation to [international organizations] must
start from an understanding of what those organizations are " i.e., inter alia,
who their members and representatives are and who supports them, before
giving them roles in the working of international organizations. 7 The Bank has
started, in addition to involving NGOs, to analyze them but much more analysis
would be needed to be informed for further increasing NGOs' roles in Bank
activities.88 It is understandable that Executive Directors from democratic
member countries express great frustration over NGOs' participating in the
demonstration on the occasion of the joint Bank/Fund Board of Governors'
meetings as NGOs deserve less attention than Executive Directors or Governors
who, when coming from democratic countries, bring much more legitimacy
with them.
The second issue is of conceptual nature. Frequently, outsiders have called
for greater "democratization" of international organizations generally, and
international financial organizations in particular. Democratization, however,
is not only the wrong term but should never conceptually be asked for because,
unlike states, international organizations are not organisms that could within
themselves establish a self-standing democratic structure. They do neither
possess a territory nor a population to be looked after fairly, but have a much
narrower purpose to fulfill. The only exception here would potentially be the
European Union. 89 Thus, any call for direct involvement of the people in the
political decision-making process or their representation for that process as well
as separation of powers, e.g., direct participation by people in Bank decisions
or representation by them in the Board as well as establishment of an
independent court judging in cases between Bank Management and affected
people, or participation of NGOs in decision-making by the Bank's Board as
87. See Paul C. Szasz, The Role of NGOs in International Governance, WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW
RE'., Mar. 4, 1999.
88. See the work on putting together a Handbook on Good Practices for Laws relating to NGOs,
analytical work which was sponsored and begun by the World Bank in the mid- 1990s but has been abandoned
in the meantime. A definition of NGOs for bank purposes, however, has been formulated. See Good Practice
(GP) 14.70 Involving NGOs in Bank-supported Activities (1998) (noting that, in general, the interest of the
Bank is restricted to those NGOs that work in the field of economic and social development, emergency relief,
and environmental protection or that comprise or represent poor or vulnerable people). For further analytical
work and classification of NGOs as relevant for the Bank's operational work, see Carmen Malena, Working
with NGOs A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank and NGOs (World Bank
Publication, Operational Policy Department March 1995).
89. Even in the case of the European Union (EU), great care in the use of the term "democracy" and
application of that term to the EU has to be exercised. For a discussion of the issue of democracy and the EU,
see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte. The "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union Revisited, EUROPEAN
REVIEW OF PUBLIC LAW (2000) (forthcoming).
2001]
428 ILSA Journal of Intemational & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:399
part of involvement of people in the legislating process of the Bank have their
conceptual shortcomings.' These shortcomings should be kept in mind while,
of course, smaller goals for change to enhance the organizations' efficiency
such as further transparency and additional checks and balances can and should
certainly be pursued.
90. For discussion of the potential for a development of the Inspection Panel into an independent
court, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank Inspection Panel: The Building of an International
Grievance System, in LBER AMICORUM IBRAHIM F.1. SHIHATA INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
LAw (Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-Yung Tung eds., 2000).
A POPE, TWO PRESIDENTS AND A PRIME
MINISTER
Professor Ivan Shearer*
The modem history-the tragic history-of the people of East Timor can
be said to have begun in 1493. In that year the Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, was
asked to rule on a conflict of jurisdiction that had arisen between the religious
orders governed from Spain and Portugal over newly found mission territories
in South America. The Pope drew a vertical north-south line on a map: to the
east of that line the Portuguese orders would have exclusive jurisdiction; to the
west, the Spanish orders.
In the following year, Spain and Portugal revised this line, without the help
of the Pope, in the Treaty of Tordesillas, moving it further westward, to a point
where it began to approximate the present day border between Brazil and
Spanish-speaking America. It seemed to have been forgotten that the division
began as one of ecclesiastical jurisdiction only. The Portuguese interpreted the
Treaty (and the inferred Papal authority) as extending their general sovereign
rights to the whole southern hemisphere east of the line.
So it was that in their exploration of the so-called East Indies (the present
day South East Asia) the Portuguese claimed sovereignty not only over their
settlements on land, but on the sea areas surrounding those settlements and as
a consequence, the right to exclude other European nations from navigation and
trade in the area. This brought them into conflict with the Dutch, and later the
British, who were keen to participate in the lucrative trade in spices and timber.
This is not the place to recount the story-in any case well known--of how
the Netherlands East Indies Company, which confronted the Portuguese in the
so-called Spice Islands and surrounding seas, commissioned a brilliant young
Dutch lawyer, named Hugo de Groot, to write an opinion for the company
refuting the claims of the Portuguese, and supporting the legal and moral right
of the company to trade in the East. The motivation of this brief was two-fold:
to assuage the consciences of the shareholders that they did indeed have rights,
that these were being unjustly denied, and that force might be used to vindicate
them; and to engage, if possible, the interest of the Netherlands government in
protecting the company. As everyone knows, the young Grotius published to
the world what was originally a confidential opinion, to the embarrassment of
* Challis Professor of International Law, The University of Sydney; Stockton Professor of
International Law, United States Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
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the Netherlands government, which had in the meanwhile adopted different
policies, under the title De Mare Liberum: "Of the Freedom of the Seas."
No doubt the people of East Timor, in the late 16th century when the
Portuguese and the Dutch arrived, would have been bemused by these
theological and legal debates. All they knew was that these Europeans were
fighting for control of the land territory of the island of Timor, among many
other islands. Both were invaders. Both were equally unwelcome.
We travel forward now to the late 19th century. The Portuguese had been
largely repelled in Asia by the Dutch, the British, and the Spaniards, but
retained small territories as trading posts in India (Goa), China (Macau), and-
fatefully-East Timor. The Dutch occupied the western half of the island of
Timor, which, together with the remainder of the Indonesian archipelago,
constituted the Netherlands East Indies. This situation, which had existed since
the late 16th century, continued with minor adjustments or rectifications of the
border until 1949. A geographical anomaly was the Portuguese enclave of
Oecussi on the northern coast of West Timor, but administered as part of East
Timor from the capital of the colony, Dili.
In 1945, in the dying days of the Japanese occupation, an Indonesian
Republic was proclaimed by Hatta and Soekarno. The Dutch, however,
returned to their possessions and a bloody civil war ensued. This came to an
end in December 1949, with the signing of the Roundtable Agreements between
the Netherlands and Indonesia for independence. All parts of the former
Netherlands East Indies were transferred to the sovereignty of the Republic of
Indonesia, with the exception of West New Guinea. East Timor, in the
meantime, had been ravaged under a Japanese occupation that took place
notwithstanding the neutrality of Portugal during the Second World War. There
was no move in 1949 to incorporate East Timor as part of Indonesia. Indonesia
was content to leave Portugal in possession of this sleepy backwater of
European empire.
It is of more than passing interest to compare, at this point, the status of
East Timor with that of West New Guinea (now the Indonesian Province of
Irian Jaya). East Timor was never part of the Netherlands East Indies, but its
people were geographically, ethnically, and culturally (the last, at least, until the
20th century) part of the Indonesian archipelago. West New Guinea, by
contrast, was not related geographically, ethnically, or culturally with Indonesia.
Its administration as part of the Netherlands East Indies was purely a matter of
convenience to the distant sovereign power. Nevertheless, Indonesia was
determined to claim it, and a campaign against the Netherlands continued until
1962 when, after a temporary administration by the United Nations and the
holding of a consultation with representatives of the people (the validity of
which has been much debated), the territory was transferred to Indonesia.
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It can now be understood why Indonesia did not campaign after 1949 for
the incorporation of East Timor. West New Guinea was a far richer prize. The
arguments for its incorporation stood or fell by the claim to succession to the
entire territory of the Netherlands East Indies, of which East Timor had never
been part. To have claimed East Timor then on the grounds of propinquity and
ethnic affinity would have undercut the arguments for incorporation of West
New Guinea.
Nevertheless, East Timor remained a geographical and historical anomaly.
It was, moreover, ruled by a distant European power of rather feeble pretensions
in Asia; Portugal's overseas interests were focused on its rich territories in
Africa, especially Angola and Mozambique. In Indonesian eyes, this neglected
and unimportant territory could be allowed to slumber on: one day it would just
drop into Indonesia's lap when the colonial power decided to leave.
Unexpected events suddenly took place in 1974. In that year, the Salazar
dictatorship in metropolitan Portugal was overthrown in a military coup led by
an idealistic general with experience in Africa. Doors were thrown open for the
first time in more than forty years to the prospects of democracy. There was
turmoil in Portugal as different political parties, tasting freedom after so many
years of repression, vied for the realization of their vision for the future.
Portugal's African colonies were offered independence. Government authority
in Portugal itself throughout 1974 and 1975 was precariously balanced. The
reverberations were felt not only in the African colonies, where ill-prepared
leaders accepted an independence that soon turned into economic and political
disaster, but also in East Timor.
In East Timor the main political parties emerging from the heady liberation
of political thought and process of 1974 were: a) Fretilin, a Marxist-inspired
party which sought immediate independence; b) the UDT, a non-Marxist party
which also sought independence but only after a period of transition under
continuing Portuguese presence; and c) Apodeti, a party dedicated to bringing
about East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia. Portugal tried to bring these
parties together at a conference in Macau in March 1975, but without success.
In August of that year, Fretilin decided to seize the initiative and to take over the
administration. They were opposed principally by the UDT and a bloody civil
war erupted.
The Portuguese colonial administration under Governor Pires was only
lightly garrisoned, mostly with locally recruited troops whose loyalty soon
evaporated. No reinforcements came from Lisbon. Governor Pires made a
fateful decision. In September 1975, in view of the impossible security
situation, he decided to abandon the administrative capital, Dili, and other
settled towns, and to withdraw to the offshore island of Atauro. There the
Governor and his officials waited on the outcome of events, not interfering at
all. They could be seen through binoculars swimming and playing sports on the
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beaches of the island. Meanwhile, on the mainland, Fretilin gained the upper
hand over its rivals. For a time they resisted the proclamation of a new state.
They left the symbols of Portugal, including the flag, in place. They even left
Governor Pires's official Mercedes parked untouched in its garage. Finally,
however, in November, the Fretilin leaders proclaimed "The Democratic
Republic of East Timor."
Most in this room are old enough to remember that countries inserting the
word "Democratic" into their names were anything but that. They were Marxist
dictatorships. It may be true that Fretilin held to a mild version of Marxist
theory and practice. Nevertheless, (and remember, it is 1975 and Vietnam and
Cambodia have just fallen to the Communists) the name sent a distinctly
unwelcome message to the anti-Communist world outside. The alarm bells rang
in Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo. They rang loudest of all in Jakarta.
Let us pause here to consider the options, as of November 1975. Fretilin
appeared willing, until then, to allow the Portuguese back in order to perform
the last rites of colonialism, and to hand authority over to the new state.
Perhaps they knew that a disorderly Portuguese withdrawal would play into the
hands of Indonesia. Indonesia, meanwhile, was readying itself in West Timor
to intervene. But the question was, if and how it should do so. Members of the
UDT and Apodeti parties in East Timor had fled to sanctuary in Indonesian
West Timor and were urging intervention by Indonesia in order to overthrow
Fretilin. But would this be merely a law and order exercise, or the prelude to
incorporation? There is evidence of Indonesian military incursions into East
Timor as early as October. In one of these actions a group of western journalists
was murdered.
In October 1975, President Suharto paid a visit to Australia. He had a
meeting with Australian Prime Minister, Whitlam. Their discussions included
the issue of the future of East Timor. The records of this meeting have recently
been released. They show clearly that Prime Minister Whitlam, while
expressing the view that the best long-term solution for East Timor was to be
integrated with Indonesia, stated that the people of East Timor must be
consulted and agree. The procedures laid down by the Decolonization
Committee of the United Nations (the Committee of twenty-four) must be
followed, and the result of the consultation with the people must be approved
by that Committee. President Suharto agreed.
What caused President Suharto to change his mind was the declaration of
independence by Fretilin under the name "The Democratic Republic of East
Timor" on November 22, 1975. He had visions of a Marxist enclave, exporting
revolution to the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. Under those circumstances
it was highly unlikely that a popular vote would be free or would produce a
result amenable to Indonesia.
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On December 7, 1975, Indonesian paratroopers landed in Dili. The city
and the surrounding countryside were quickly overrun. Resistance was brutally
suppressed. Fretilin forces fled to the mountains, where they remained for the
next twenty-four years. On December 8, 1975, the very next day, the
Portuguese administration under Governor Pires was seen leaving Atauro by
ship for the Australian port of Darwin. No effort was made by the Portuguese
to intervene or resist the Indonesian invasion. If this were a home invasion it
would be as though the owners had left the doors of their house wide open,
camped at a nearby beach and run away at the first sight of the invaders.
The reaction of the international community to these events was not swift.
The invasion took place on December 7, 1975. The Security Council passed no
resolution on the matter until December 22, 1975. In the meantime, the General
Assembly, on December 12, 1975, passed a resolution condemning the
Indonesian action and calling upon it to withdraw by seventy-two votes to ten,
with forty-three members abstaining. The large number of abstention votes
causes us to pause again for thought: more than one third of the roll-call of the
United Nations were either actively opposed to the condemnation of Indonesia
or were undecided about it.
The Security Council met to consider East Timor on December 22, 1975.
It passed a resolution calling upon Indonesia "to withdraw without delay all its
forces from the Territory." This rather mild resolution, using the phrase "calls
upon" rather than "demands," was further weakened by the paragraph
requesting the United Nations Secretary-General to send a special representative
to East Timor for the purpose of making an on-the-spot assessment of the
situation. This implied that, at least in the minds of some members, the situation
was not entirely clear-cut. While "deploring" intervention by Indonesia, the
resolution also "regretted" the failure of Portugal to discharge its responsibilities
as administering Power of the Territory under Chapter XI of the United Nations
Charter. The resolution was adopted unanimously.
Indonesia did not withdraw. The Secretary-General's representative made
his visit and reported back to New York, in March 1976. In April, Indonesia
called together a meeting of district chiefs to consider the future of the Territory.
The meeting unanimously called for integration with Indonesia. On April 22,
1976, the Security Council passed a second resolution, repeating its call for
Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the Territory without further delay. By
reaffirming also the "inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples," the Council impliedly rejected the validity of
the "act of self-determination" carried out by Indonesia earlier that month. That
act, in which the general population did not participate, but only a small number
of selected community representatives, was similar to the one carried out in
2001]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:429
West New Guinea in 1962. An invitation to the President of the Security
Council from Indonesia to visit East Timor on June 24th to witness or validate
the act of self-determination was rejected by a letter sent by the President of the
Security Council on June 21 st. That letter reaffirmed the Council's resolutions.
It is important to note that the second resolution of the Security Council
(and the last on the question of East Timor by the Security Council) was not
passed unanimously. Twelve members voted in favor of calling upon Indonesia
to withdraw. Japan and the United States abstained. One member (Benin) did
not participate in the vote. The significance of the abstentions of Japan and the
United States can hardly be overstated. They sent a message to the rest of the
world, from the world's two largest economies, that the situation would soon be
under control and that, although the manner of Indonesian intervention was
regrettable, in the longer run East Timor would be better off as part of
Indonesia.
It is therefore not surprising that Indonesia failed to heed the Council's
resolution. In July 1976, after the visit of an Indonesian Parliamentary
delegation charged to investigate whether the people of East Timor truly wished
to become part of Indonesia, the territory of East Timor was formally
incorporated by an Act of the Indonesian Parliament as a Province of Indonesia.
In the meantime, in Portugal a new Constitution had been adopted in April
1976. The definition of the territories over which Portugal claimed sovereignty
omitted East Timor. A special article of the Constitution, however, charged the
President of the Republic with the responsibility of continuing to work for the
self-determination of the people of East Timor. Thus Portugal was no longer,
in law, the sovereign of East Timor; only the dispossessed "administering
Power" under the terms of United Nations resolutions and in the eyes of the
Decolonization Committee of the United Nations. In formal terms- Indonesia
could be argued to have temporarily occupied East Timor during the period
December 1975 to July 1976 in order to restore security in a Territory
effectively abandoned by Portugal. By July 1976, Portugal no longer claimed
sovereignty, so that the act of incorporation of East Timor in that month was not
an act of aggression by Indonesia against Portugal. The house owners had not
only left the house unguarded and run away but had now thrown away the title
deeds.
From this point onwards, the international community gradually lost
interest in the plight of the people of East Timor. The issue of East Timor
returned next to the Agenda of the United Nations in December 1976 as a
regular item from the Fourth Committee. Each December thereafter, until 1982,
the General Assembly passed a resolution reaffirming the right of the people of
East Timor to self-determination. But each year the language became less
peremptory and support for it weaker. Even in its watered-down form, the
resolution of November 23, 1982, introduced by Portugal, was passed by the
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very narrow majority of fifty in favor, forty-six against, and fifty abstentions.
Putting these figures another way, it could be said that nearly two-thirds of the
roll-call of the United Nations membership either supported Indonesia's
incorporation of East Timor or was indifferent to it. No resolution on East
Timor was introduced into the General Assembly after 1982. Portugal and the
East Timorese leaders in exile feared that, on these voting trends, the resolution
would be defeated if introduced again and that the question of East Timor would
disappear forever from the agenda of the United Nations.
Instead, the East Timor issue was kept alive through representations
directly to governments by pro-East Timor lobby groups, motions in various
forums, including the European Parliament, and by the concerns of human
rights groups. Most of all, Indonesia itself managed to keep the issue alive
through its brutal and corrupt administration of its new province. A number of
outrages occurred, most notably the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre of
November 1991. There was in consequence relentless international media
attention. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, ruefully described East
Timor as "the pebble in Indonesia's shoe."
What was the status of East Timor in international law from 1976 to 1999?
The simple answer is that it was a territory entitled to self-determination and
independence under the law of the United Nations Charter, in particular the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Res. 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, which had not yet exercised that right.
By the use of force, the territory had been occupied by Indonesia, and
subsequently annexed by it without the approval of the United Nations.
According to the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, Res. 2625 (XXV) of October 24, 1970, "the
territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State
resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting
from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal."
Neither the administering Power (Portugal) nor any other State was
willing, however, after 1982 to propose resolutions to the General Assembly
demanding the exercise by the people of East Timor of the right of self-
determination, still less to request the Security Council to take action to force
the withdrawal from the Territory of the occupier (Indonesia). What were other
States with economic and security interests in the area to protect to do?
The country most closely affected was Australia. It has already been
recounted that Australia and Indonesia had agreed in October 1975 that the
people of East Timor must be granted the right to self-determination in
accordance with United Nations resolutions and procedures. Australia voted to
condemn Indonesia's actions in the United Nations General Assembly vote in
December 1975. In December 1976, however, and again in December 1977, it
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abstained in the vote on the resolutions. (In 1977 the vote to condemn
Indonesia was passed with sixty-seven votes in favor, twenty-six against, and
forty-seven abstaining). In 1978, Australia began to vote against the resolution,
and maintained that position until the votes ceased after 1982.
Australia had to consider its position carefully. In the first place, Australia
and Indonesia are close neighbors. Australia has a population of less than
twenty million. Indonesia has a population some nine times greater. For its
own security, Australia has always tried to foster good political and economic
relations with Indonesia. It would not wish to offend it without a reason that
outweighed these considerations. In the second place, there appeared to be no
willingness in the United Nations to take any action to force Indonesia to accede
to the demand for a proper process of self-determination for East Timor under
United Nations procedures. States were largely indifferent, and significant
numbers of them appeared by their negative votes to have already acquiesced
in the annexation. Thirdly, the seabed between the island of Timor and the
northwest coast of Australia was known to contain hydrocarbon deposits and
prospects of significant sources of oil and gas. That seabed constitutes an
uninterrupted continental shelf (uninterrupted, that is, apart from the Timor
Trough--discussed later) and thus required delimitation and apportionment.
Considered as part of the exclusive economic zones of these opposite territories,
the distance between the coasts was less than four hundred nautical miles, and,
thus would equally require delimitation and apportionment.
Australia had already concluded a treaty (1971-72), with Indonesia
delimiting the seabed between Australia and West Timor and Australia and the
easternmost parts of the archipelago. This left a gap in the line adjacent to the
then Portuguese colony of East Timor (the so-called "Timor Gap"). Portugal
was invited by Australia in 1974 to negotiate a delimitation line that would have
closed the gap, but it declined. The reason appeared to be the relevance of the
Timor Trough. Not to be confused with the Gap, the Trough is a geographical
feature running along the entire length of the island of Timor, both West and
East. It is a deep depression, a trench, in the seabed, lying close to the coast of
Timor. Relying on what the International Court of Justice had declared (North
Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969), that the basis of a coastal state's right to its
continental shelf lay in the natural prolongation of its land territory beneath the
sea it was argued by Australias that the Trough marked the outer edge of the
natural prolongation of the land territory of Timor, and that this was the natural
delimitation line in the otherwise uninterrupted continental shelf between the
two countries. If accepted, this argument would have given the lion's share of
the shelf to Australia, since the distance of the Trough from the coast of Timor
is only between thirty and sixty miles. Indonesia did not accept it, but in
deference to the equities that might be said to flow from such a significant
geographical feature agreed on a compromise line roughly halfway between a
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median line and the Timor Trough. Portugal perhaps divined that UNCLOS 11I,
then in progress, or the International Court of Justice, might move away from
the natural prolongation theory, thus discounting the relevance of the Trough.
Or perhaps events in metropolitan Portugal in 1974-75 made it impossible to
give the subject the necessary attention.
After Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in 1976, there was urgency
in the need to fill the Gap. Prospectors had been active for some time, and
Portugal had already granted some licenses in the area. To whom were the
prospectors to turn for security of title? Australia, seeing that Indonesia was
firmly in possession of East Timor and that no effective action by the United
Nations was forthcoming, decided in December 1978, to propose negotiations
to Indonesia, the de facto sovereign power, for the filling of the Gap. The
opening of these negotiations in February 1979 marked the transition by
Australia from recognition de facto of Indonesia's authority in East Timor to
recognition de jure of the incorporation of East Timor. Several weeks later
Portugal sent a Note to Australia expressing "surprise" at this action. In the
language of diplomacy this must be the faintest form of protest.
Australia opened the negotiations with Indonesia with a proposal that the
Gap be closed simply by extending the existing lines of delimitation. Indonesia,
however, also had the same intuition as Portugal that international law was
moving away from the primacy of the natural prolongation theory. Moreover,
it was irritated by reports in the Australian press in 1972 that Australia's success
in negotiating a line in 1972 very much in Australia's favor, by reason of the
account taken of the Timor Trough, could be described as "taking Indonesia to
the cleaners"-an Australian expression meaning "trouncing." It therefore
sought a better deal in the area off East Timor.
The negotiations begun in 1979 continued until 1989. This period
coincided not only with the negotiation and conclusion of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, but also with the hearing of several
seabed delimitation cases before the International Court of Justice in which the
Court discounted geomorphology and prolongation in favor of broader equitable
factors. These factors favored the Indonesian position, but Australia did not
resile from its own position. The result was a compromise, not in the form of
a line, but in the form of a joint development zone, called the Zone of Co-
operation, which boxed in the entire area bounded by the extremes of the
Australian and Indonesian claims, but then divided it into three sectors which
more realistically represented, respectively, the areas more naturally
appertaining to the parties and the central area, the true area in dispute. The
treaty was signed by the Australian and Indonesian foreign ministers in an
aircraft flying over the zone.
The ratification and entry into force of the treaty in 1991 was the signal
that at last galvanized Portugal into action. In its capacity as the administering
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Power under still extant, but dormant, United Nations resolutions relating to
East Timor it commenced action in the International Court of Justice in
February 1991 against Australia for its failure to respect the rights of Portugal
as administering Power of East Timor by entering into an agreement relating to
the natural resources appurtenant to that Territory with a third party. Indonesia
was not named in the application documents. The reason was that both Portugal
and Australia had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice under the Optional Clause of the Court's Statute; Indonesia had
not. It could therefore not be made a party to the case without its consent.
Moreover, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, a dispute could not be
decided in relation to a matter in which a State not party to the case had a
substantial interest. The issue before the Court was whether Australia alone was
in breach of obligations owed towards Portugal which could be determined in
the absence of Indonesia as an affected party. The Court decided that it could
not determine the matter in the absence of Indonesia. In rejecting the
application on the grounds of its inadmissibility for this reason, the Court
nevertheless stated that the people of East Timor had a continuing right to self-
determination. By implication, this right could be achieved only through the
relevant political organs of the United Nations. Of that, there were still no
signs.
This is not the place for an analysis of the Timor Gap Zone of Co-operation
Treaty. It is fair to say, however, that it suited the interests of both Australia
and Indonesia very well. It was innovative in design and sophisticated in its
detailed provisions. As a working model of co-operation it attracted favourable
comment even from the Fretilin leaders in exile; their only objection was that
they, and not Indonesia, should have been the partner with Australia in the
arrangement.
We move forward now to the events in Indonesia of 1999. Following
student protest and other unrest, President Suharto stepped down to be replaced
by his deputy, Dr Habibie. Unrest spread also to East Timor. The Australian
Prime Minister, John Howard, using what he considered to be the influence
available to him as the Prime Minister of a country with close and friendly ties
to Indonesia, suggested in a letter to President Habibie that the people of East
Timor be prepared for a decision on their future. The pebble in the shoe should
be removed: it was doing Indonesia much harm. President Habibie's heart may
have been in the right place, but he was impetuous in nature and erratic in
action. Whereas Mr. Howard had in mind a series of cautious steps, beginning
with increased autonomy for East Timor, a lessening of the military presence
there, and an effort to improve the conditions of the people, all paving the way
for a plebiscite on independence in a few years time, President Habibie decided
to hold a plebiscite in East Timor immediately, for or against independence.
The result was, as we know, an overwhelming vote for independence followed
by mayhem and the intervention of the United Nations Force, called
INTERFET. Pro-Indonesian militias went on a rampage, destroying seventy
percent of all buildings, and driving a quarter of the population out of the
country. Many lives were lost, some of them in horrendous ways. The people
of East Timor had been made to pay dearly for their lack of gratitude toward
Indonesia, which considered that it had done so much for them. Indonesian
politicians rounded on Australia as the alleged instigator of the disaster. Unrest
has since broken out elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago, especially Aceh
and Ambon. The new President, Abdurahman Wahid, is beset from all sides
with political problems. Australian stocks in Jakarta are at their lowest level
ever.
The United Nations military operation is now over. There is a transitional
United Nations civil administration called UNTAET, which, under the terms of
Security Council Resolution 1272 of 1999, is exercising complete authority over
East Timor pending the holding of elections to form a government of the newly
independent State of East Timor. Indonesia has formally renounced sovereignty
over East Timor. The formal date of relinquishment of Indonesian authority and
its transfer to UNTAET was October 25, 1999.
What has happened to the Timor Gap Treaty? Australia proposed to
UNTAET a formal succession, but that was rejected by UNTAET on the ground
that the treaty was void ab initio by reason of the lack of capacity of Indonesia
to conclude it. By an exchange of notes between Australia and UNTAET in Dili
on February 10, 2000 it was agreed that the terms of the treaty-but not the
treaty itself-should remain binding throughout the transitional period, until the
date of independence of East Timor. This was stated to be without prejudice to
the position of the future government of an independent East Timor with regard
to the Treaty. Indonesia recognized the termination of the Timor Gap Treaty,
as from October 25, 1999, by an exchange of letters with Australia in Jakarta on
May 25, 2000.
Australia will thus have to negotiate with an independent East Timor a
replacement for the terminated Timor Gap Treaty, Indeed, negotiations have
already commenced, with UNTAET acting on behalf of East Timor, with
putative future East Timorese leaders as advisers. Chief negotiator on the East
Timor side is a former United States diplomat, Peter Galbraith, now minister for
political affairs in UNTAET. He is known to be arguing that the Timor Trough
is not in fact a fault line between tectonic plates and that no equities flow from
it. He is pressing for adoption of the median line between Australia and East
Timor, and thus, impliedly, for the dismantling of the zone of co-operation. The
median line as a permanent solution would place the presently most promising
oil field, Bayu Undan, which is expected to go into production in four years
time, exclusively inside East Timor's claim. The delimitation of the line of
fisheries and other EEZjurisdictions between Australia and East Timor will also
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need to be renegotiated. These are presently included in the Memorandum of
Understanding between Australia and Indonesia concerning the Implementation
of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement of 1981,
and the Treaty Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary of 1997.
The latter has not yet entered into force. Both instruments provide for, in effect,
a median line between Australia and East Timor. Assuming this to be
acceptable to both sides, East Timor would then need to negotiate the lines
perpendicular to its coasts to the transverse median line separately with
Indonesia.
What can be said to be the lessons learned from all this? There are at least
three lessons. First, questions of self-determination are notoriously difficult,
and most often intractable where basic facts are disputed. In the case of East
Timor, however, the case was clear: East Timor was a territory inscribed on the
list of non-self-governing territories maintained by the United Nations
Decolonisation Committee. The failure of the United Nations to deal with it
promptly and decisively, in December 1975, was disgraceful and led to much
unnecessary suffering.
Second, the role of the Security Council, in particular, calls for
examination in relation to East Timor. It did not want to act decisively because
Indonesia is a large and important country. As has been the case for some time,
it is not necessarily the casting of a veto that impedes the Council in its work,
but the express or even implied or assumed potential exercise of one that casts
a long shadow over proceedings. This has been most recently evident in
relation to Kosovo; the taking of action by NATO without Security Council
authorization may have been controversial but has occasioned little surprise.
Such situations will fuel the movement for reform of the structure of the
Security Council.
Last, where the United Nations is unable or unwilling to act, what are
particular member states to do, faced with pressing realities? This is the
situation which faced Australia after July 1976 when it appeared that Indonesia
was firmly in control of East Timor and unlikely to be dislodged. An apparently
"dead" claim to self-determination should not be allowed to hang over other
nations' heads for twenty-five years or more, only to surface in an unexpected
way and to give rise to possible claims based on the illegality of dealing with
the power actually in control (nemo dat quod non habet). Effectiveness should
be considered in this context, in the interests of stability, fairness, and good
legal order.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have an uneasy feeling about the title of this panel. If it implies that there
is widespread ignorance in the general community, and in civilian law schools
in particular, and that this ignorance ought to be redressed, then my answer is
yes. But if it implies-as I think it also does-that somehow the teaching of the
laws of war in military academies is inadequate or inappropriately biased, and
that those academies cannot be trusted to teach it properly, then my answer
would be no.
I speak with some knowledge of both. As well as being a professor of
international law, I am also a Captain in the Reserve of the Royal Australian
Navy. I teach courses in international humanitarian law (incorporating the laws
of war) in my own University in Australia to civilian law students (although
typically there are a few in the class with military experience). I also teach the
same subjects to military courses in Australia and also presently at the United
States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. I have to offer some
comparisons between military and civilian students based on my experience,
mainly in Australia.
First, let us note the actual obligations of nations in the teaching of the laws
of war, deriving from their treaty commitments. There are some 190 States
Parties to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, making them the most heavily
subscribed conventions in existence. A common article (with minor variations)
in each of the four reads:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time
of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as
possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the
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study thereof in their programmes of military, and, if possible, civil
instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the
entire population.
The Geneva Conventions relate to what is called, in its narrower sense,
international humanitarian law. Additional Protocol I of 1977, however,
brought the law of Geneva together with the law of The Hague (the laws of war,
or the law of armed conflict), so that it is now accepted that the expressions "the
laws of war" and "the law of armed conflict" are coextensive with international
humanitarian law. Article 83 of Protocol I thus marks a significant step forward
in that it imposes an obligation of dissemination in respect of the laws of
war/armed conflict as well as of international humanitarian law. That article
reads:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time
of armed conflict, to disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol
as widely as possible in their respective countries and, in particular,
to include the study thereof in their programmes of military
instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the civilian
population, so that those instruments may become known to the
armed forces and to the civilian population.
The fact that the United States is not yet a party to Additional Protocol I
is not, I think, relevant. As I understand it, the policy of the United States is to
apply the Protocol de facto wherever possible, and to accept most of its
provisions as reflective of customary international law.
It is interesting to note that prime emphasis is placed in these provisions on
dissemination through courses of military instruction, with civilian instruction
in second place. That is understandable. But I take it that at least one of the
intentions of the title of the present panel is to suggest that, if civilians are not
made aware of the content of the laws of armed conflict they will not be
knowledgeable enough to put appropriate pressure on governments to live up
to their obligations. That can certainly be accepted.
II. AUSTRALIA
A major role is played in Australia in the field of education in the laws of
armed conflict by the Red Cross movement. The work of the Regional Delegate
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), based in Sydney, is
almost entirely devoted to the promotion of the Conventions and the two
Additional Protocols. He travels extensively throughout Australia, New
Zealand, and the Pacific islands. He meets with officials of local defense
ministries and with politicians. He also visits the universities.
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The national association, the Australian Red Cross, although primarily
concerned with disaster relief and the tracing of missing relatives, is also
engaged in the work of making the Conventions and Protocols better known to
the entire population. There is a Dissemination Committee in each of the States
of Australia, where there is a representative of each of the three armed forces
-Navy, Army, and Air Force. The Australian Red Cross sponsors periodic
conferences on international humanitarian law, in which academics, journalists,
the general public, uniformed military personnel, and defense civilians take part.
A recent and most notable initiative of the Australian Red Cross is the
sponsorship of a Red Cross Chair in International Humanitarian Law at the
University of Melbourne. This is a continuing chair, not a short-term visiting
post. The inaugural holder of the chair is Professor Timothy McCormack.
There are elective courses in international humanitarian law/law of armed
conflict (IHL/LOAC) offered in at least four Australian law schools: the
University of Melbourne, the University of Sydney, the University of New
South Wales, and the Australian National University. The Red Cross sponsors
an essay competition for law students throughout Australia whether they are
enrolled in such an elective or not. There are also plans to conduct a national
student moot court competition involving questions of IHILOAC under the
auspices of the Red Cross.
So far as military instruction is concerned, there are short courses or
seminars in IH_/LOAC at each stage of the officer promotion process. Such
courses are not confined to those who especially need them for their particular
billets. The courses are conducted either by regular officers with appropriate
academic qualifications, by reserve personnel (who include a number of
university law teachers), or by civilian experts. Exercises and war games
always contain international law elements. Each of the three branches of the
Armed Services has a Manual of International Law specific to their operations.
Officers of the Australian Defence Force may be selected to attend the courses
run at San Remo, Italy, by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.
Selected senior legal officers specializing in international law may also attend
a course at Cambridge University in England. On exchange with the United
States many officers study courses, or take higher degrees, in international law
at United States military academies.
One should never be complacent. However, I do believe that IHIJLOAC
training in the Australian Defence Force is on the right track. It may be that the
isolation of Australia has the effect of making Australians more internationally
minded. Certainly the prospect of attending a course or seminar on IHIJLOAC
at an overseas location helps to make the subject popular. I personally know
four serving legal officers who have Ph.Ds in international law, and many have
master's qualifications or their equivalents. My only substantial criticism is that
officers move billets too frequently and that often their advanced expertise in
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IH/JLOAC becomes dissipated. I suppose that is inevitable in a force of such
a small size.
I have one final comment on Australia, anecdotal but I think more broadly
true. I was once the presenter of an unclassified "war game" at a Navy seminar,
in which line officers (not legal officers) were the participants. I decided to use
the same scenario in playing a war game with a group of law students in my
University humanitarian law class. The general object of war games is to decide
when deadly force will first be used. They are typically exercises using rules
of engagement (ROE) in which the stated national objective is to contain, and
if possible, de-escalate a situation of tension with another country. If armed
force is to be used, let it be the other side who uses it first. That is the approach.
But of course there are situations in which the use of force in anticipatory (or
"interceptive") self-defense must be considered. One does not have to accept
the first casualties in order to be on the "good" side. I have to report that the
law students were far more eager to open fire first than were the naval officers.
They were the Rambos, not the military people. I shall leave you to speculate
on the possible reasons for this.
III. THE UNITED STATES
I shall not speak at any length about the situation in the United States.
Although I have now been teaching at the Naval War College for three months,
I am not sufficiently aware of the scene in the United States at large. What I
have seen and heard, however, inclines me to believe that the teaching of
IHIJLOAC in military academies is generally conducted at a very high level of
both awareness and competence.
The Chair I occupy for the academic year 2000-2001-the Charles H.
Stockton Chair of International Law-stands as an example of the "infiltration"
of civilian professors of international law into the curriculum of the College.
Founded in 195 1, the Stockton Chair has been occupied by a line of holders of
recognized eminence in civilian academic life (although it is true that some have
also had military experience). The inaugural holder of the Chair was Judge
Manley 0. Hudson. He was followed by Hans Kelsen and Leo Gross. Other
notable holders include Brunson MacChesney, William T. Mallison Jr., Carl
Christol, Richard Lillich, Oliver Lissitzyn, L.F.E. Goldie, Howard Levie, Alwyn
Freeman, our current ILA American Branch President Alfred Rubin, George
Bunn, George Walker, Myron Nordquist, Leslie Green, Ruth Wedgwood, and
most recently Yoram Dinstein. Each one of these names will, I am sure, be
familiar to this audience.
The Department of Oceans Law and Policy at the College, in which the
Stockton Chair is situated, and whose mandate extends to the teaching of
IHL/LOAC, is staffed with highly qualified and experienced serving and retired
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officers. All have law degrees and have participated in advanced courses. They
include United States Coast Guard and Marine Corps officers as well as Navy.
All are able to integrate their military training with their advanced legal
knowledge and teaching skills. This is a vital point. Teaching to military
audiences lacks credibility unless scholarship and teaching are informed and
focused through operational experience. This is the "street cred" factor, if you
will; essentially it ensures the relevance of the teaching to the real world the
audience inhabits.
The Naval War College has also contributed significantly to the fund of
scholarship and dissemination of the laws of war through its well known series
of International Law Studies, begun in 1901. Known as Bluebooks, they are to
be found in all major law libraries of the world. There are now nearly eighty
volumes in the series. The most recent are Howard S. Levie on the Law of War
(Vol. 70, 1998); a collection of essays on The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the
Next Millennium (Vol. 71, 1998); The Law of Military Operations: Liber
Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt (Vol. 72, 1998); and the Annotated
Supplement to the Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
(Vol. 73, 1998). This last publication (which had been issued in a different
format previously as NWP 9) has been immensely influential in the navies of
other nations. There are four further volumes currently in press or nearing
completion: a study of the Tanker War 1980-88 by Professor George Walker,
a Festschrift for Professor Leslie Green, articles from a symposium held at the
War College on Computer Network Attack and International Law, and a study
of the Forcible Protection of Nationals and Humanitarian Intervention. This is
a quite outstanding body of work. The Government Printing office distributes
free copies to United States law schools and to various public libraries.
Others here will be able to say how widely IHL/LOAC is taught in
American law schools. Judging from the periodical literature and the number
of monographs, there is a very significant body of scholars contributing greatly
to the development of this branch of the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The present panel, captioned the "Evolving Dynamics of Intervention to
End Atrocities and Secure Accountability," analyzes developments in the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention and corresponding efforts to secure
accountability for mass atrocities in the context of recent events in Kosovo, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia.
The doctrine of "humanitarian intervention," defined for the purposes of
this discussion as the threat or use of force or other coercive measures by states
or international or regional organizations in response to gross violations of
human rights, has assumed an increasingly prominent profile in recent years,
both in international discourse and through United Nations and state practice in
such regions as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor and Sierra Leone.
The contemporary agenda of the United Nations Secretary-General has reflected
this development. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in
September 1999, for example, Secretary-General Annan proclaimed that the
core challenge to the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, in
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the next century will be to "forge unity behind the principle that massive and
systematic violations of human rights-wherever they may take place-should
not be allowed to stand." The Secretary-General repeated this challenge in his
Millennium Report, "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the
21st Century," in which he called upon United Nations member-states to unite
in the pursuit of more effective policies to stop mass murder and egregious
violations of human rights. In urging this approach, Secretary-General Annan
emphasized that while armed intervention must always remain the option of last
resort, in the face of gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend
every precept our common humanity it is an option that cannot be relinquished.
This rise in instances of humanitarian intervention in gross human rights
violations has also witnessed a recognition and practice on the part of the
international community that such intervention must be accompanied by
mechanisms to secure individual accountability for those human rights
violations. The creation through United Nations Security Council resolutions
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda in the early 1990s constituted milestones in this respect. Variations on
these initiatives have been canvassed more recently in the post-intervention
environments in Sierra Leone and East Timor, with the United Nations playing
a leading role in the development of accountability mechanisms in those
regions. My colleagues on this panel will address the particulars of each of
these instances in more detail.
My presentation considers the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the
context of current efforts to seek accountability for atrocities committed by the
Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in the 1970s. In summary, the Cambodia
experience suggests that the absence of timely intervention by the international
community to prevent or punish Khmer Rouge atrocities significantly limited
the United Nations' present-day ability to influence the creation of a Khmer
Rouge tribunal or to ensure that any such tribunal is competent, impartial, and
effective. Correspondingly, these conclusions militate in favor of humanitarian
intervention in future atrocities where, at least prior to the establishment of the
International Criminal Court, ad hoc measures by the international community
may be necessary to secure accountability for those atrocities.
f1. THE HISTORY OF KHMER ROUGE ATROCITIES AND RECENT EFFORTS TO
SECURE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KHMER ROUGE CRIMES
In April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), more
commonly known as the Khmer Rouge, seized power from Cambodia's Khmer
Republic Government and established a brutal authoritarian regime, which it
subsequently named Democratic Kampuchea (DK), under the political and
ideological leadership of Pol Pot. What followed during its nearly four years
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of rule were increasingly widespread and violent campaigns of displacement,
forced labor, arrests, torture, and executions. These atrocities were perpetrated
under the guise of CPK policies that sought to construct a socially and
ethnically homogeneous society and rid the country, and increasingly the
Communist Party itself, of perceived enemies of the Communist revolution.
Millions of Cambodians were displaced and subjected to inhumane living and
working conditions during the period of DK rule, and it is estimated that over
one million Cambodians perished as a consequence of the Khmer Rouge's
deadly policies.
The Khmer Rouge's rule ended in January 1979, when, following a
protracted and escalating border war with Vietnam, Vietnamese forces launched
a full-scale invasion of Cambodia, took Phnom Penh, and installed the
opposition group in power, which later declared itself the People's Republic of
Kampuchea. With the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea, many remaining
Khmer Rouge members fled and re-established themselves on the Cambodia-
Thai border. Over the next decade, CPK forces maintained an armed resistance
against the Vietnam-backed Cambodian government. In 1993, however, the
Khmer Rouge ceased to be an active fighting force, due principally to the
defection from the CPK of Khmer Rouge guerrillas in response to offers of
amnesty from prosecution by the Cambodian government.
Throughout this period, neither the perpetration of atrocities by the Khmer
Rouge nor the issue of accountability for those atrocities were the subject of
constructive action by the international community. It was not until 1997 that
the United Nations contemplated concrete measures to bring surviving Khmer
Rouge members to justice. In a jointly-authored letter to the United Nations
Secretary-General dated June 21, 1997, former first Prime Minister of
Cambodia Prince Norodom Ranariddh and second Prime Minister Hun Sen
requested the assistance of the United Nations and the international community
in "bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes
against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979." The
letter also indicated that Cambodia did not have the resources or expertise to
conduct this very important procedure, and specifically requested assistance
similar to that of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Following receipt of the June 1997 letter, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a resolution in December 1997 requesting that the Secretary-
General consider the possible appointment of a group of experts to respond to
Cambodia's request for assistance. In July 1998, the Secretary-General
appointed a three-member group of experts with a three-fold mandate: 1) to
evaluate existing evidence to determine the nature of the crimes Khmer Rouge
leaders committed in the years 1975 to 1979; 2) to assess the feasibility of
apprehending, detaining and extraditing, or surrendering Khmer Rouge leaders;
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and 3) exploring options for bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice before an
international or national jurisdiction.
The group of experts subsequently delivered its report to the Secretary-
General on February 22, 1999, which concluded that serious crimes under
international and Cambodian law had been committed during the period of CPK
rule. These crimes included genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
other acts incurring individual responsibility, in particular torture, forced labor,
and crimes against internationally-protected persons. The group of experts also
recommended that the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly
establish an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute those persons most
responsible for the most serious violations of human rights during the DK era.
In making this recommendation, the group specifically rejected the option of
establishing a tribunal under Cambodian law. This was based upon the group's
informed opinion that Cambodia continued to lack a culture of respect for an
impartial justice system, and the group's corresponding concern that domestic
prosecutors, investigators, and judges may be subject to political pressure and
influence.
In the interim, however, events transpired in Cambodia that further
complicated the United Nations' efforts to secure accountability for Khmer
Rouge crimes. In July 1997, Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party seized
exclusive control of the Cambodian government, and later rejected the group of
expert's call for an ad hoc international tribunal, claiming that any decision to
bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice must take into account Cambodia's need
for peace and national reconciliation and that Cambodian courts were "fully
competent" to conduct trials of former CPK officials. At the same time, Pol Pot
was captured and subjected to a show trial by his CPK compatriots in 1997.
This, followed by Pol Pot's death in April 1998, galvanized world attention on
the question of accountability of surviving Khmer Rouge members for DK-era
crimes. This was accompanied in 1998 and 1999 by the surrender or capture of
several of the most prominent surviving members of the Khmer Rouge
leadership, including former CPK Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea, former CPK
Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, former DK state president Khieu Samphan, former
head of the Southwest Region Ta Mok, and former director of the prison and
torture facility at Tuol Sleng, Kaing Khek Iev, better known as Duch.
These developments have since resulted in prolonged negotiations between
the United Nations and Hun Sen's government to find a compromise on the
convocation of Khmer Rouge trials. In the course of these negotiations, the
Cambodian Government has steadfastly rejected the creation of a fully-
independent international tribunal, but has at most expressed some support for
the establishment of a domestic tribunal with limited international participation
and a narrowly-defined personal jurisdiction. For its part, the United Nations
appears to have abandoned any call for an international tribunal, and has
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endeavored to negotiate attributes of a tribunal established under Cambodian
law that would render Khmer Rouge prosecutions fair and impartial. Such
attributes have included in particular an effective and independent role for the
international community in any domestic prosecutions. Although the latest
round of negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian
government concluded in July of 2000, the particulars of any agreement
between the parties have not been officially publicized. Currently, it appears to
have been left to the Cambodian government to take the legislative measures
necessary to establish a Khmer Rouge tribunal.
III. THE ABSENCE OF TIMELY INTERVENTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
PROSECUTING KHMER ROUGE ATROCITIES
As alluded to above, during the course of the Khmer Rouge regime and for
much of the subsequent period of civil conflict in Cambodia, the international
community did not intervene to prevent or seek accountability for the
commission of DK-era atrocities. To the contrary, an anti-Vietnam coalition of
states composed of China, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations, and the
United States ensured through United Nations General Assembly's Credentials
Committee that the Khmer Rouge retained Cambodia's seat in the United
Nations General Assembly through most of the 1980s.
While the international community took concrete measures in the late
1980s to end the conflict between the warring factions in Cambodia, this
process ultimately did not address the issue of accountability for Khmer Rouge
crimes. An internationally-sponsored peace process, the Paris Conference on
Cambodia, was convened in 1989 and ultimately led to a comprehensive peace
settlement between the principal factions in Cambodia, although the Khmer
Rouge subsequently refused to comply with most of the terms of the settlement.
The agreement provided for the establishment of the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was given the mandate
of establishing a peaceful and neutral environment in Cambodia for the conduct
of elections and responsibilities for demobilizing and disarming the rival forces
in Cambodia. However, the settlement contained no explicit provision for
Khmer Rouge trials, and such a process was not included in UNTAC's mandate.
Rather, the matter was left to the future Cambodian government.
In light of the absence of humanitarian intervention in CPK atrocities, and
without addressing the feasibility of such intervention or the morality of the
international community's conduct in this regard, the present analysis endeavors
to draw insights respecting the effect of this non-intervention upon recent efforts
by the United Nations to secure accountability for Khmer Rouge atrocities. The
Cambodia experience suggests that the absence of timely intervention by the
international community to prevent or punish Khmer Rouge atrocities
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significantly limited the United Nations' present-day ability to influence the
creation of a Khmer Rouge tribunal or to ensure that any such tribunal is
competent, impartial, and effective.
More particularly, the international community's inaction in the face of
Khmer Rouge atrocities has been depicted by some as undermining the United
Nations' political and moral authority to call for the establishment of an
international tribunal to prosecute DK-era crimes. Prime Minister Hun Sen has
exploited this apparent weakness on numerous occasions, citing in particular the
CPK's retention of Cambodia's seat in the United Nations General Assembly
in challenging the legitimacy of current United Nations efforts to create an
international Khmer Rouge tribunal. The Cambodian government has likewise
disparaged the considerable delay in international action on Khmer Rouge
crimes, arguing early on that after over twenty years, such matters may be best
left buried in the past. And unlike the recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the United Nations is not able to draw political or legal support
from Security Council resolutions adopted contemporaneously with the
perpetration of Khmer Rouge atrocities as to the international criminality of the
conduct Khmer Rouge members and their susceptibility to prosecution before
an international tribunal.
These limitations on the United Nations' negotiating authority have been
exacerbated by the fact that, in the delay following the fall of Democratic
Kampuchea, individuals who may potentially be implicated in Khmer Rouge
atrocities have assumed influential positions with the current Cambodian
government. In particular, Prime Minister Hun Sen and various other current
Cambodian officials were previously members of the CPK and, according to
some observers, may constitute potential targets in open-ended and rigorous
Khmer Rouge prosecutions. Indeed, this possibility has been cited by some
authorities as explaining in part Prime Minister Hun Sen's opposition to the
establishment of a fully independent Khmer Rouge tribunal with broad personal
jurisdiction.
In the face of these political shortcomings, the United Nations has had little
choice but to abandon its recommended approach of establishing an
international Khmer Rouge tribunal. Rather, it has been relegated to negotiating
some degree of meaningful international participation in domestically-
constituted Khmer Rouge trials, and this despite concerns expressed by its own
group of experts and civil society more generally that the Cambodian justice
system cannot support fair or impartial trials. Although this does not
necessarily foreclose the possibility that an appropriate accommodation might
be reached on Cambodian-constituted prosecutions, it has placed the United
Nations in an exceedingly problematical negotiating position and with
considerably less control over whether a Khmer Rouge tribunal will ultimately
be established.
Tittemore
The absence of timely humanitarian intervention in preventing or
punishing Khmer Rouge atrocities may also be considered to have limited the
United Nations' ability to ensure that a Khmer Rouge tribunal, if established,
is competent, impartial, and effective. It is apparent, for example, that the
effective personal jurisdiction of a Khmer Rouge tribunal has been significantly
restricted, resulting in a diminishing number of potential defendants available
for prosecution. Among the key candidates for prosecution who have died since
the period of DK rule are CPK Secretary Pol Pot and General Staff Chairman
Son Sen. Moreover, in light of the fact that most, if not all, of the remaining
potential candidates live within Cambodia's borders, the United Nations must
rely entirely upon the Cambodian government to secure the arrest of suspects
who may be indicted by a Khmer Rouge tribunal. While likely candidates for
prosecution, such as Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea, reportedly live freely in
Cambodia, the Hun Sen government's commitment in this regard is open to
serious question. The early establishment of an appropriate international
presence within a jurisdiction like Cambodia, on the other hand, arguably
provides the international community with some independent avenue through
which to secure effective jurisdiction over suspected perpetrators of atrocities.
The international community has also found itself at a considerable
disadvantage in facilitating the search for pertinent evidence for potential
Khmer Rouge prosecutions. As with potential suspects, victims and witnesses
of Khmer Rouge atrocities have died or their memories have diminished since
the 1970s. Despite the impressive efforts of institutions, such as the
Documentation Centre of Cambodia, in gathering, cataloguing, and translating
DK-era documentation, it has been recognized by the United Nations group of
experts and other authorities that many potentially incriminating documents
have been lost or destroyed since 1979. Further, the delays in investigations
have aggravated difficulties in identifying and authenticating what documentary
and other physical evidence may still be available for use in Khmer Rouge
prosecutions. Conversely, a timely international presence may facilitate the
collection and verification of potentially relevant documents and other evidence.
International inaction on Khmer Rouge atrocities has also complicated the
process of identifying the proper subject matter jurisdiction of a current CPK
tribunal. In this connection, the general legal principle nullum crimen sine lege
limits the crimes for which an individual may be prosecuted to those that were
considered criminal under domestic or international law at the time they were
committed. As a consequence, present-day efforts to establish a Khmer Rouge
tribunal must endeavor to define the substance of Cambodian and international
law as it stood over twenty years ago.
Finally and more generally, the absence of any effective international
intervention initiative in Cambodia has diminished the United Nations'
operational independence to serve as a control against unfairness and
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impropriety in any domestic Khmer Rouge prosecutions that may be convened.
This may be especially significant in respect to such matters as witness
protection and tribunal staffing, which are particularly susceptible to improper
influence and abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis should not be taken to suggest that the international
community lacks any authority to influence the creation or conduct of a Khmer
Rouge tribunal by Cambodia, or that it is not still possible to convene proper
and effective trials of surviving members of the Khmer Rouge regime through
a carefully designed tribunal under Cambodian law with appropriate and
effective international participation. The Cambodia experience should,
however, serve as a stark illustration of the risks and complications posed when
the international community fails to intervene in a timely manner in response
to gross violations of human rights. The future implications of such
intervention could mean the difference between accountability and impunity.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL
ACTORS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
KOSOVO AND EAST TIMOR
Ralph Wilde*
Current international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and
East Timor has two elements. The first is an "accountability" element,
consisting of various judicial and non-judicial processes. This element includes
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
proposed mixed international/local courts for "special crimes" in Kosovo, and
the mixed international/local process for prosecuting militia members for
serious crimes committed after the East Timorese referendum in 1999. The
second is a territorial administration element. Here, international actors assert
the right to exercise either plenary powers of administration-as with the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)-or certain governmental prerogatives
(e.g. the right to impose laws), as with the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In this paper, I suggest that the two elements of international involvement
-accountability and administration-have been conceived by international law
as mutually exclusive. That is to say, the accountability agenda has been set up
to address a particular area of activity, excluding the conduct of territorial
administration by international actors. I argue that such an exclusion has a
potentially negative impact within the territories affected. I set out the powers
asserted by and accountability regime directly applicable to international actors
in the sphere of territorial administration, and suggest the reasons for and the
effects of a lack of accountability in this sphere. In this regard, I look at
international law's regulatory structures insofar as these structures are directly
applicable tot he international actors involved. I am not concerned, therefore,
with how such structures might engage with the activity- of territorial
administration because this activity engages the legal personality of the host
territorial entity.'
* Ralph Wilde, Trinity College, Cambridge University, CB2 ITQ, UK, rgw25@cam.ac.uk.
1. 1 discuss this issue in The complex role of the legal advisor when international organizations
administer territory (forthcoming, 2001, PRoc. AM. Soc. IL). As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is
concerned, see Consitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision in Case U 9/100 (regarding the Law
on the State Border Service), Nov. 3, 2000, available at http://www.ustavnisud.ba/homelen/index.html, (last
visited May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Case U 9/100] at part 5.
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In each of the administration projects, international actors assert extensive
administrative powers. These powers are broad in terms of their subject-matter,
covering the whole spectrum of territorial administration. For example, under
Resolution 1272, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
is "endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and
... empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice."2  These powers are also wide in scope, being
explicitly conceived with minimal standards delineating how they are to be
exercised. Much of general international law-such as human rights and
environmental law-is clearly relevant to the conduct of territorial
administration. However, traditionally this law is conceived in terms of state
or (in the case of gross human rights abuses) individual responsibility.
In Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo, international actors have been
granted the usual privileges and immunities, undermining the capacity of
national law to regulate them directly for their conduct of administration.' In
East Timor, UNTAET considers itself immune from local jurisdiction, although
at the time of this writing, no legal instrument relating to such immunity has
been passed in local law. An Ombudsperson has been introduced belatedly in
Kosovo, and a similar institution is, at the time of this writing, at the proposal
stage in East Timor.4 The Kosovo Ombudsperson has the power to hear
complaints "concerning human fights violations and actions constituting an
abuse of authority" by UNMIK, but only has the power to make
recommendations as a result of these complaints.'
This attenuated local system of accountability is more than matched at the
international level, since none of the international judicial scrutiny mechanisms
can hear complaints brought against the international actors involved arising out
of their conduct of territorial administration. Looking at the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), scrutiny would only seem possible in the (somewhat unlikely)
event of the United Nations referring a case relating to its own activities for a
non-binding advisory opinion.' Beyond judicial mechanisms, there is, of
2. U.N. Scor, 4057th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
3. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Bosnia and Hercegovina Croatia Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14,
1995, 35 ILM 75, available at http://www.ohr.int/gfalgfa-home.hIm, (last visited Dec. 3, 1999) [hereinafter
Dayton Peace Agreement] done at Paris, e.g. Annex IA, article VI.9.a and Annex 10, art. M. For Kosovo,
see UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, UNMIK Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (2000).
4. For the Kosovo Ombudsperson, see UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, UNMIK Doe.
UNMLK/REG/2000/38 (2000). UNMIKIREG/2000/38, available at http://www.ohr.int/gfalgfa-home.hm,
supra note 3 [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 2000/38]. Source of information on the East Timor
Ombudsperson proposal: e-mail from a member of the UNTAET Legal Office, December 2000.
5. UNMIK, Regulation 2000/38, supra note 4, at 1-2.
6. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 34.1, Art. 65.
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course, also the United Nations Security Council. However, in addition to the
usual problems that are raised by the idea of the Security Council as an effective
regulatory mechanism (its unrepresentative nature, the veto etc.), an additional
independence question is raised by the fact that this body played a formal role
in creating each of the administration projects to begin with.
A striking example of the combined inadequacy of domestic and
international scrutiny mechanisms directly applicable to international actors
when they carry out territorial administration would be the mandates of OHR
and the military Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Dayton grants both organizations "final authority" power "in theatre" (viz.
Bosnia and Herzegovina) to interpret their respective mandates.7 Since the
mandates exist as a matter of international law, the "in theatre" caveat suggests
that the final authority power does not render all interpretations made by OHR
and SFOR automatically lawful, but rather makes the legality of such
interpretations unchallengeable in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking this
domestic exclusion alongside the lack of international jurisdiction, it would
seem that, lawful or unlawful, all interpretations of these mandates by the
relevant international actors go unchallenged as far as the institutions of national
and international judicial scrutiny are concerned.8
Considering the above factors together, international actors engage in
administrative activity that is similar to (and, indeed, necessarily based on) the
activity performed by states in their own territory, yet no comparable regulatory
regime applies directly to them when they engage in such activity. Some of the
reasons for this lie in two broad areas: first, assumptions concerning the
behavior of states and international organizations, and second, the manner in
which territorial administration by international actors has emerged.
The way international law applies to international organizations and states
assumes that these two actors perform different activities. With territorial
administration, the assumption is that states perform this activity and
international organizations do not. This assumption explains who is involved
in regulating territorial administration, and in what role. States are regulated;
international organizations are not, and, moreover, act in a regulatory role (for
example, through monitoring human rights). The international regulatory
process reflects, and thereby reinforces, these distinct roles and the assumption
that lies behind them. Moreover, the assumption that states administer territory
and international actors do not is reflected in the way international law
influences the application of national law to these two actors. Whereas the law
7. See Dayton Peace Agreement. supra note 3. Annex IA, art. XII (SFOR); Annex 10, art. V
(OHR).
8. They may however, be challengeable not as the acts of international actors, but as the acts of
the state. See supra note 1.
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is silent with respect to local governments (in their own state), as I have already
said it grants international actors immunity from national law. This immunity
reflects an idea that international organizations do not perform "local" activities
(such as administration), but rather, perform activities that are distinct and
somehow "above" the "local" (such as scrutinizing territorial administration by
states).
A further potential cause of the accountability deficit is the way the current
administration projects merged and were conceived. The projects developed in
an ad hoc manner, with different organizations involved (OHR in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the United Nations in Kosovo and East Timor). Each project is
conceived as "temporary" and "interim," with the full conduct of territorial
administration by local actors the eventual goal. These two factors can undercut
arguments calling for accountability mechanisms applicable directly to
international actors when they engage in territorial administration-there is no
need to bother too much about accountability for something that will not last
and may not recur.
What effect does this accountability problem have on the activity itself and
those affected by it? One of the objectives in the current projects is to foster
conditions for a liberal-democratic order in the territory, rooted in human rights,
a vibrant civil society, the rule of law and an elected, representative government.
Whereas territorial administration by international actors seeks to promote these
conditions, paradoxically it operates in an autocratic manner itself-"benevolent
despotism," as Sergio Vierra de Mello, the head of the United Nations
administration in East Timor, puts it.9 An aspect of this 'despotism' is, of
course, the lack of accountability. One danger is that territorial administration
by international actors may be undermining its own objectives, by establishing
a precedent for governance that is unaccountable, centralized and autocratic.
Moreover, the accountability deficit with respect to international actors
when they carry out administration creates further problems when considered
alongside other areas where accountability is promoted. This brings me back
to the accountability agenda I sketched at the start. One of the arguments made
for the International Criminal Court (ICC) was that justice is compromised
when it is selective. The presence of ad hoc tribunals with limited temporal and
territorial scope, in the absence of an ICC, effectively privileges accountability
with respect to a narrow geographical area and time period. Looking at the
issue of selectivity from a different angle, the existence of criminal tribunals
with certain subject-matter jurisdiction over individuals, in the absence of
accountability mechanisms applicable directly to international actors conducting
administration, may operate on a symbolic level to foster an idea that
9. SERGIO VIERRA DE MELLO, How NOT TO RUN A CouNTRY: LESSONS FROM KOSOVO AND EAST
TIMOR (2000).
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accountability operates exclusively on the individual level, and only in respect
of the most serious acts. I shall discuss these two symbolic elements in turn.
First, the symbolism of focusing exclusively on individual accountability.
Of course, because of the role played by group identity in the 1991-95 conflict
in the former Yugoslavia, many found the focus on individual rather than
collective local accountability appealing. However, this consideration, whatever
its merits, is on its own terms inapplicable to collective responsibility as far as
international actors are concerned. Moreover, the above objective allied to the
conduct of administration by international actors-promoting a liberal
democratic order-is necessarily rooted in the idea of a collective polis. In
administration, therefore, the nettle of collective identity has been grasped
already, albeit in a confused fashion in the case of Kosovo, given the continuing
uncertainty as to that territory's eventual status. An exclusive focus on the
individual in the accountability sphere risks undermining the project of forging
a particular kind of collective identity in the political sphere.
Turning to the symbolism of focusing exclusively on serious crimes.
Again, the commission of these crimes is considered more important than other
forms of accountability, because of their serious nature. Such a consideration,
however, concerns relative importance: it does not itself suggest why other
forms of accountability should be almost totally absent. Moreover, in the long
term, an absence of other forms of accountability may operate on a
representational level to occlude the changes that happen in the society affected.
The prosecution of serious crimes symbolizes a deeply traumatized society.
Equally, the operation of other, less important accountability structures also
symbolizes a society where accountability issues are no longer as grave. As far
as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the vast majority, if not all
prosecutions at the ICTY concern acts that took place at least five years ago.
Whereas these prosecutions continue to symbolize the trauma of the Bosnian
people, certain other accountability mechanisms symbolizing how Bosnian
society has changed since 1995-such as mechanisms directly applicable to
international actors-are absent. Yet all can agree that, regardless of whether
anything else has changed significantly since Dayton, the kinds of acts that
come under ICTY jurisdiction no longer take place to anywhere near the same
degree.
Another representational problem with the current accountability bias is
that it risks creating a perception that accountability is for "us" the local people,
not "them" the international officials. Whereas some of the reasons for
territorial administration by international actors-for example, filling the
administrative vacuum after conflict-are understood, the reasons for
unaccountability on the part of international actors are not. This apparent
inconsistency creates the impression of arbitrariness, potentially making more
persuasive the idea that territorial administration by international actors is a
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paternalistic, imperialist endeavor. In turn, this idea threatens the project of
fostering conditions where a liberal-democratic political system can flourish, by
reinforcing perceptions that the project is about imposing an alien system rather
than supporting local political initiatives.
In conclusion, the international regulatory regime directly applicable to
international actors when they carry out administration needs to be transformed.
This requires changes in the law and legal enforcement modalities. Territorial
administration by international actors is a significant institution of international
policy that profoundly affects the lives of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and East Timor, and may be utilized in other situations in the future.
The ad hoc criminal tribunals were followed by the joined-up thinking on
international criminal justice effected through the institution of the ICC. What
is also needed, in the light of the ad hoc administrative projects, is joined-up
analysis on the way international actors can be made more directly accountable
for their conduct of territorial administration.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOURTH GENEVA
CONVENTION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY, INCLUDING JERUSALEM
Hussein A. Hassouna"
This article expresses a timely and most important subject. It concerns the
implementation of international humanitarian law, that branch of law that has
recently assumed an ever-growing prominence, as an expression of our
generation's ideal of the rule of law in international relations.
This article was written in a year of historic celebrations. Let us remember
that the year 1999 marked the centenary of the first Hague Peace Conference,'
which began a long ongoing process of outlawing destructive deadly weapons
while setting up the first institution for peaceful settlement of disputes.2 It was
also the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the four Geneva Conventions,
which laid down a set of universal rules for humane conduct in armed conflict.3
And lastly, it marked the anniversary of the Convention of the Rights of the
Child that combines articles of human rights with provisions of international
humanitarian law.4
As the century drew to a close, we may also add to that series of historic
celebrations 1998's celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights.5 This universal declaration, whose principles
have been enshrined over the years in a number of international conventions,
has formed the core of a growing body of international human rights law.
* Dr. Hussein A. Hassouna, Ambassador of the League of Arab States to the United Nations and
the United States and formerly Assistant Foreign Minister of Egypt for international legal affairs and treaties;
Ph.D. in International Law from Cambridge University. This article is revised from a presentation given in
Cairo, Egypt on June 15, 1999.
1. Institute for Comparative and International Law, First International Peace Conference, held
in The Hague, 1899. Centenary of the Hague Peace Conference, available at
http://www.law.unimelbalu.edu.au/eventshaguel 1899-Hague-conference/I999-hague_.html conference
(last visited Mar 17, 2001).
2. Permanent Court of Arbitration, First International Peace Conference, The Hague 1899,
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/genifomerg.htm (last visited Mar. 17 2001).
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August
12, 1949, U.N.T.S. No. 973.
4. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), available at
http://www.webcom.com/kmcladoptionllaw/un/un-child.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
5. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217 (1948) [hereinafter Resolution
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Furthermore, the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in
Rome has since been signed by 139 states and Ratified by twenty-seven as of
December 31, 2000, thus marking an important step in institutionalizing the
enforcement of international humanitarian law in terms of individual criminal
responsibility.6
These recent developments in the field of international humanitarian law
have found their inspirational source in the Charter of the United Nations7 that
declares the solving of international problems of a humanitarian character to be
one of the main purposes of the United Nations.
These advancements should be seen as part of the United Nations and
other humanitarian organizations, notably the International Committee of the
Red Cross' long-term efforts and overall contribution to the codification and
implementation of international humanitarian law.'
But while we may rejoice at the richness of this legal creativity and the
proliferation of instruments of international humanitarian law, we cannot but
notice with concern the widening gap between the rules of international
humanitarian law and their actual application. The case of the Fourth Geneva
Convention provides a good illustration of that regrettable situation.
The issue is therefore not to elaborate new rules, since current
humanitarian law already comprises all the basic rules and principles. For
example, if we are guided by the principles and standards of international
humanitarian law, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention,9 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights"° and the International Covenants on Human
Rights" the essence for confronting such violations is already present. Rather
it is necessary to implement effective mechanism to ensure a globalized
compliance of all relevant established rules of international humanitarian law.
This is not an easy task for the United Nations, which is often confronted with
difficult challenges in its contact with humanitarian issues, such as how to
6. U.N. Charter prmbl., U.N. Doc. A/ConfJ9 (1999).
7. UN Charter of October 24, 1945.
8. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) contributes to the development of
international law by drafting documents which form the basis of the texts adopted by States while also
preparing drafts for the Diplomatic Conferences. Thus, the ICRC plays an important role in the codification
process of humanitarian law. This is how the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional
Protocols of 1977 came into being. Accordingly, the ICRC has become the guardian of international
humanitarian law, whereas it has been legitimatized by the international community to monitor its application
by the parties to conflict. Excerpt from ICRC information site, available at www.icrc.org (last visited Mar.
17, 2001).
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12,
1949, U.N.T.S., No. 970.
10. Resolution 217, supra note 5.
1I. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 15, U.N. Doc. A/ 21/2200 (1976).
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refrain from attempting to politicize humanitarian issues, how to avoid
selectivity and double standards, how to avoid using humanitarian action as a
substitute for the necessary political action, and how to reconcile preservation
of the sovereignty of states and their domestic jurisdiction with the ever
growing drive to protect human rights worldwide.
But there is perhaps no greater need in our turbulent world of today than
to raise to the challenge of confronting the growing civilian toll of armed
conflict and protecting the millions of innocent civilians that now account for
the vast majority of casualties in armed conflict. t2 Civilians have increasingly
become primary targets in many armed conflicts in which the basic rules of
humanitarian law have been deliberately violated. Such violations of
humanitarian law have been observed in the Balkans, in the Great Lakes region,
in West Africa, in the Caucasus and in the Middle East. 3
These continuous violations of international humanitarian law explain why
the International Court of Justice, in recent cases, involving Yugoslavia, 4 and
a number of NATO countries,"5 expressed its deep concern with the human
tragedy, the loss of life and the human suffering found in Kosovo, other parts
of Yugoslavia and in East Timor. 6 The International Court of Justice has since
called upon all parties to act in conformity with their obligations under the
United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, including
humanitarian law.17
Such humanitarian violations also explain why the Security Council has
recently devoted a number of official meetings in February and September of
1999 to a comprehensive discussion of the issue of "Protection of Civilians in
armed conflict."' 8 Furthermore, such acts of humanitarian apathy explain why
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 has become the essential core of
numerous Security Council and General assembly resolutions. These
resolutions call for strict observance and full respect for the rules of
12. Report of Secretary-General of April 13, 1998 on the "Causes of Conflict and the Promotion
of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa" U.N. Doc. S/1998/318 (1998), September 8, 1999
report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/957 (1998), and September 22, 1998, on the "Protection
for Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Others in Conflict Situations," U.N. Doec. S/1998/883 (1998),
in particular on their analysis related to the protection of civilians; see also, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4046th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1265 (1999).
13. Id.
14. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. BeIg.), (Yugo. v. Can.), (Yugo. v. Fr.), (Yugo. v. F.R.G.),
(Yugo. v. Italy), (Yugo. v. Neth.), (Yugo. v. Port.), (Yugo. v. Spain), (Yugo. v. U.K.), (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999
I.C.J. 114 (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of June 2, 1999).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Security Council Resolution: "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, " supra note 12.
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international humanitarian law. 9 In short, it explains the justification behind
the international community's current sustained efforts to improve the physical
and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict.
The signing of the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949 was a major
breakthrough that culminated long efforts over the years to ensure a better
protection for the civilians in times of war. And while the Convention, which
has now been ratified by 188 states, has received universal recognition, its
observance and implementation is still lacking, since serious violations of its
provisions have become common practice in many conflicts.
A major problem facing implementation stems from the frequent refusal
of the occupying power to acknowledge that definition, thereby contesting its
obligation to apply the convention. The main aim of the convention resides in
alleviating human suffering caused by conflict. According to Article Four of
the Fourth Geneva Convention "Persons protected by the Convention are those
who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals."'2 While lengthy legal debate over the
applicability of the convention is politically important, it should nevertheless
be minimized, in order to terminate the possibility of any deviation from the
basic rules of the convention and humanitarian law altogether, by the occupying
power. Instead, efforts should be centered on the practical problems arising
from occupation or the threat of occupation, in the hope of adopting practical
steps for the early resolution of the problem and this allows no change under the
convention in the legal status of the territory or the continued normal life of its
inhabitants in accordance with their laws, culture, and traditions.
However, the most effective way to bring about an end to any violations
of the applicable rules of international humanitarian law is to deal with the
underlying issues of the conflict, thus bringing about an end to that occupation.
But let us add in all candor that any success in settling such issues, such as the
applicability of the convention, practical problems of the occupation and the
underlying conflict, depend on two things. First, on the cooperation and good
will of the parties concerned, and second, on the international community's
readiness, will and ability to adopt a clear and firm position vis-i-vis the
recalcitrant party.
19. U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 4008th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1242 (1999); U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4057th mtg., U.N. Doc S/Res/1272 (1999); U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4079th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1281(1999); G.A. Res. 76, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/76 (1999); G.A. Res.
77, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A77 (1999); G.A. Res. 78, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doec. A/78/ (1999); G.A. Res. 79, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/79
(1999); G.A. Res. 80, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/80 (1999).
20. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note
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In assessing the effectiveness of the mechanism provided under the Fourth
Convention for implementation of its provisions, we cannot but express
consternation over the fact that the role contemplated for the Protecting Powers
and the International fact-finding Commission has virtually remained dead
letter. Will the newly created International Criminal Court witness a similar
fate? As a general rule, the activation of these bodies to accomplish their task
depends on the political and practical support they receive from the
international community.
The difficulty in implementing the Protecting Power mechanism owing to
the lack of consent of a party to the conflict could be overcome by granting the
ICRC,2 well known for its neutrality and impartiality, the necessary mandate
to play the role of substitute. Either formally as provided in the convention, or
informally, in that formal acceptance is difficult to achieve. Likewise, the
International fact-finding Commission's role could be revived by inducing more
states to formally recognize its competence, or alternatively to grant their
consent for its role in any given situation. And this task of fact-finding can be
supplemented by humanitarian missions undertaken by United Nations ad hoc
bodies.
A unique feature of the four Geneva Conventions and their additional
Protocols lies in the collective responsibility of the parties.22 The parties have
undertaken to implement such responsibility through a common goal in which
"to respect and to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances." 23 It
underscores the particular legal nature of the conventions, their universality and
the essential value of the body of humanitarian law they incorporate. The
carrying out of this solemn obligation entails, in our opinion, concrete action
of the parties, to ensure respect for the Convention and not merely rebuke or
condemn the violating state.
However, the permissible limits of such action should always be consistent
with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. In case of serious violations,
like those perpetrated in a systematic manner as deliberate policies of state,
such action could be taken in cooperation with the United Nations Charter in
adopting a variety of measures, coercive ones if necessary.' Furthermore, as
a true reaffirmation of their collective responsibility, the High Contracting
21. International Committee of the Red Cross.
22. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note
9, at 11; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) adopted on June 8, 1977; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) adopted on June 8, 1977.
23. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note
9, at art. i.
24. UN Charter, supra note 7, at ch. VII.
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Parties of the Conventions should seek to hold periodic meetings among
themselves, in order to create an institutionalized forum for undertaking
effective collective action.
The measures just suggested for enhancing the implementation of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, would apply to any occupied territory, including
occupied Palestinian territory of which Jerusalem is an integral part. One
crucial question raised is the issue of the applicability of the Fourth Convention
on occupied Palestinian territory in the light of Israel's refusal to accept its de
jure applicability while agreeing only to defacto application.
International legal opinion, twenty-four resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council, five resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in
ordinary and emergency special sessions, as well as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, all clearly confirm the applicability of the Fourth
Geneva Convention to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including
Jerusalem. Such provisions call upon Israel, as party to the Convention since
January 1952, to comply and accept its dejure applicability. Israel's contention
on this issue must therefore be categorically rejected on solid legal grounds,
including the inadmissibility that a duly ratified international treaty may be
suspended at the wish of one of the parties, who refuses to comply according
to its own free discretion. Furthermore, there is ample evidence produced by
several impartial bodies, governmental and non-governmental, international and
even Israeli, refusing Israel's contention that although the Convention is not
legally applicable, nonetheless it implements its provisions in practice.25 And
in the final analysis, all violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention are the
outcome of the very fact of Israel's illegal occupation of the concerned Arab
territories.
The United Nations International Meeting on the Convening of the
Conference on Measures to Enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, was held in Cairo, Egypt
on June 14, 1999 and June 15, 1999, under the auspices of the Committee on
the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The Meeting
was attended by hundred Governments, eleven United Nations bodies and
agencies, five intergovernmental organizations, forty-two non-governmental
organizations and a delegation from Palestine.' The two-day meeting was
divided by three plenary sessions and adopted a final document which declared:
25. Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,
U.N. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 35, U.N. Doc.
A/54/35 (1999).
26. United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), DPR MONTHLY
BULLETIN, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (May/June 1999).
Hassouna
The participants strongly supported the convening of the conference
on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, as recommended in General Assembly
resolutions ES-10/3, 10/4 and 10/5. They also strongly supported the
convening by the High Contracting Parties of the said conference on
15 July 1999 at the United Nations Office at Geneva in accordance
with General Assembly resolution ES- 10/6, adopted overwhelmingly
on 9 February 1999. The report of the Secretary-General of 14
October 1997 demonstrated clearly that the majority of the High
Contracting Parties were in favour of the convening of a conference
and recent consultations conducted by the depository also showed that
the broad majority supports the convening of the conference on 15
July 1999. The participants called upon all the High Contracting
Parties to participate actively in the conference.27
The convening of the Geneva Conference of the High Contracting Parties
to the Fourth Geneva Convention on Measures to Enforce the Convention in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, as recommended by the
General Assembly at its tenth emergency special session in its resolution ES-
10/6, assumed a historic importance, since it was the first of such meetings of
the Contracting Parties to the Convention at that level.2" The significance of the
Conference was that the "participating High Contracting Parties reaffirmed the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem ... [and] would convene again in the light
of consultations on the development of the humanitarian situation in the
field."29 The Conference will open the door for future similar meetings, held
on a regular basis, to monitor implementation of the Convention in Palestinian
territory or any other occupied territory where the provisions of the Convention
are not applied and fully respected.' In a more general context, the convening
27. Excerpt from the final document of the United Nations International Meeting on the Convening
of the Conference on Measures to Enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, organized in Cairo, June 14 - 15 1999, under the auspices of the Committee
on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; see also U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/34 (1999);
supra note 19, at 35 7 (final document).
28. Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,
supra note 25, at 19; see also G.A. Res. ES-l 0/6, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/ES-
10/6 (1999).
29. Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,
supra note 25, at 19.
30. On October 18, 2000, the 10th Emergency Special Session was resumed in light of the serious
deterioration of the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and
after a permanent member of the Security Council indicated publicly on October 12, 2000 that it would veto
any draft resolution presented to the Security Council. Following the Emergency Special Session, Resolution
ES- 10/7 on October 20, 2000 was adopted inviting the
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of the conference can be considered as an expression of the international
community's renewed commitment and dedication, by reinforcing the rule of
law in armed conflict.
In conclusion, it is my view that the Geneva Conference represented a
unique opportunity to increase world-wide awareness of the solemn obligation
of states to respect the norms of international humanitarian law in armed
conflict, and take collective measures to ensure their implementation by all
states without exception. The success of the Conference will contribute to
creating a better world, a world based on the rule of law and respect for the
principles of humanity and justice.
depository of the Fourth Geneva Convention to consult on the development of the
humanitarian situation in the field, in accordance with the statement adopted on 15
July 1999 by the above-mentioned Conference of High Contracting Parties to the
Convention, with the aim of ensuring respect for the Convention in all circumstances
in accordance with common article I of the four Conventions.
Accordingly, and following receipt of a letter from the Permanent Delegation of the League of Arab States
in Geneva on October 13, 2000, which invited the High Contracting Parties to convene again their meeting
in light of the situation in the field, Switzerland, in its capacity as depository of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, distributed a note to the High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions on November 17,
2000, submitting the above-mentioned proposal to reconvene the conference and requesting responses by
December 31, 2000 on the appropriateness of such a meeting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Various forms of legal recognition have been given to same-sex spousal
relations in many nations of the European Union. At present Holland,'
Denmark,2 Sweden 3 and France4 have implemented laws that Americans would
find similar to the legislation concerning civil unions which came into force in
Vermont in July of 2000.5 In the current year, following the lead of its Nordic
neighbors, Norway6 and Sweden, Finland will likely implement legislation
providing recognition in law to partnerships between two men or two women.
7
This trend towards greater integration of Gays into Western European society,
granting spousal rights, has been followed to a less dramatic extent even by
nations that might be considered less socially liberal.
Last year, the United Kingdom removed one more legal obstacle that
stigmatized Gays. Despite strong opposition from the House of Lords, the Blair
government lowered the age of consent for homosexual relations to that of
heterosexual relations.8 In October 2000, the Liberal Democratic Party adopted
civil partnerships as part of its political platform.9 In Belgium, the government
enacted a partnership registration law, though with fewer significant legal rights
flowing to the "spouses."'
I. Symposium: Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex
Partners in Europe, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L 62, 79-84 (2000) [hereinafter Civil Developments].
2. Marianne Hojgaard Pedersen, Denmark: Homosexual Marriages and New Rules Regarding
Separation and Divorce, 30 J. FAM. L 289 (1992). See also Craig A. Sloane, Note, A Rose by Any Other
Name, Marriage and the Danish Registered Partnership Act, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L 189 (1997).
3. Civil Developments, supra note 1, at 80.
4. Law No 99-944 of Nov. 15, 1999 J.O. Nov. 16 1999 at 16959, available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/dossiers/pacs/2pacs.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
5. See generally, VT. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (discussing Civil Unions).
6. Marianne Roth, The Norwegian Act on Registered Partnership for Homosexual Couples, 35 U.
OF LOuiSviLLE J. FAM. L 467 (1996-97).
7. Government proposes legalizing gay partnership but not adoption, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec.
12, 2000, at International News.
8. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2000, c. 44, §§ 1, 2 (Eng.).
9. Conference Report Bournemouth 2000, at http://www.libdems.org.uk/documents/
policies/conferencemotions/conf.doc (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). See also Andrew Woodcock, "Civil
Partnerships" win Lib Dems' Approval, BIRMINGHAM POST, Sep. 19,2000 at 7.
10. The act provides for the registration and recognition of long-term relationships between two men
or two women. However, some commentators suggest that the rights contained in this legislation are weaker
than those in French law and significantly weaker than those found in the legislation in effect in Holland,
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. See Civil Developments, supra note 1, at 80. In terms of the integration of
Gays and Lesbians into European society, one might note the recent Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union which states in Article 21: "Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race,
colour,... age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited." 2000 OJ (C364) 13. The text can also be found at
http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/ CharteEN.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
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Within this framework of a Western European movement towards fuller
emancipation of homosexuals culminating in recognized spousal rights, recent
German developments are most significant. This article will discuss the colorful
legislative history of the German same-sex partnership law. It will look at the
key features of the legislation and explain the constitutional challenges that
might prevent implementation on August 1, 2001. While it is true that the topic
of this article narrowly construed involves same-sex spousal rights, the reader
may find its scope to be broader. An examination of the legislative process
related to this strikingly progressive bill brings into sharper focus significant
aspects of the political and constitutional structuring of Germany.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The coming of same-sex partnership legislation to Germany has been long
and somewhat arduous. During the twentieth century, the German record on
Gay rights has been a mixture of both progress and persecution. At the turn of
the last century, the German Reich's capital was Berlin, a city in which Magnus
Hirschfeld lived, worked, established an institute, and developed and published
his theories about the "third sex."" The Reich capital was also the city where
government officials promulgated Paragraph 175 of the Criminal Code, which
subjected homosexuals in all German states to prosecution for sodomy. In the
time of the National Socialists, officials working for the Reich Ministry of
Justice in Berlin made Paragraph 175 more draconian; homosexual activity,
contemplated as well as consummated, became subject to prosecution."2 It is
estimated that during the period of the Nazis, more than sixty thousand German
homosexuals were prosecuted under Paragraph 175.1' Of this number, between
11. RiCHARD PLANT, TiH PINK TRIANGLE 29 (Henry Holt and Company 1988). Plant states:
Hirschfeld, a Jew, a homosexual, and a physician, was a man possessed of enormous
energy, imagination, and ambition. He became a leader of several psychological and
medical organizations, the founder of a unique institute for sexual research, and the
organizer of numerous international congresses dedicated to research on sexual matters
and to the promotion of policies that would lead to an acceptance of homosexuals by
society.
Id. Plant further states:
For a long time Hirschfeld had believed that homosexuals formed a third sex. (He
would abandon this notion in 1910) . . . He was convinced that homosexuals
constituted a biologically distinct gender -a human being between male and female.
He devoted much thought to establishing fine differentiations within this third sex.
Id. at 30.
12. Id. at 110: Plant states: "In December of 1934 the Ministry of Justice issued new guidelines
stating that homosexual offences did not have actually to be committed to be punishable; intent was what
mattered." Id. at 112. Plant further states: "Later, courts decided that a lewd glance form one man to another
was sufficient grounds for persecution." id. at 113.
13. Id. at 148.
Levitt
472 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:469
5,000 and 15,000 "perished behind barbed-wire fences."' 4 At the close of
World War II when the Allies liberated Czechs, French, Jews, Poles, Roma and
Sinti, and Russians from concentration camps, Gay inmates were freed from
their Nazi captors, sometimes only to serve out the remainder of their sentences
in "democratic" prisons." In 1957, the German Constitutional Court upheld
anti-sodomy laws and commented that "homosexual activities violate the moral
laws of society.' 6 A resolution brought by the Party of Democratic Socialism
before the German Parliament revealed that prosecutors opened over 100,000
cases and courts convicted 59,316 homosexuals under Paragraph 175 of the
Criminal Code in the period between 1950 and October 1969.'1 After 1969, the
Federal Republic of Germany decriminalized sexual relations between two
consenting adult males.
In regard to Gay rights, both Germanies rapidly moved forward since 1969.
In the twenty-year period prior to unification on October 3rd, 1990, the
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic both promulgated laws that
gradually eliminated legal burdens previously imposed upon homosexuals.
Gays became more integrated into society in both the East and the West. After
unification, it was hoped in the early 1990s that the tide of freedom sweeping
across Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany would ultimately bring with it
14. Id. at 154.
15. Elinor J. Brecher, Nearly Wiped Out Under Nazis, Gays Community Now Flourishes in Berlin,
MIAMI HERALD, May 22, 1995, at IA.
16. Homosexuelle, BverfGE 6, 389. At page 394 of the judgment, a most interesting commentary
is provided. The court explains that there was a change in the attitude of the National Socialists after the
murder of Ernst Rohn and those groups supporting him, which included a large number of homosexuals.
According to the court, this led to the law of 28 June 1935 that sharpened the provisions of para. 175 of the
Criminal Code. Plant confirms this opinion and states:
Inner-party rivalry grew more heated and bitter. Himmler, together with Heydrich and
Gbring, used every opportunity and means to drive a wedge between Hitler and
Roehm, even going so far as to accuse Roehm, as Hitler's only serious political rival,
of planning a coup against the Fohrer... Hider was forced to conclude that the SA,
unruly and undisciplined, headed by a man whose objectives threatened his own,
simply had to go.
Plant, supra note 11, at 55.
17. BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the German Parliament]
14/2620 from Jan. 27, 2000, p. 2, "Rehabilitierung und Entschadigung ftir die strafrechtliche Verfolgung
einvemehmlicher gleichgeschlechdicher sexueller Handlungen zwischen Erwachsenen in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik." (Vindication and apology for the penal
prosecution of consensual sexual relations between same-sex adults in the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic] (hereinafter BT-Drs. 14/2620. The printed matter of the Bundestag can
be found at http://dip. bundestag.de/parfors/parmain.htm.
greater emancipation for Gays, a more earnest Wiedergutmachung," as well as
complete and final rehabilitation.
I. POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAST TEN YEARS
Chancellor Kohl's government, which brought about German unity,
concentrated on the very compelling and immediate economic problems that
presented themselves in the early 1990s. The eastern part of the nation lacked
adequate housing, employment, and infrastructure. Consequently, liberal social
issues were sometimes left on the back burner. However, to characterize the last
two Kohl administrations 9 as a time of little progress on social issues would be
unfair. In 1994, legislators finally struck Paragraph 175 from the German
Criminal Code.' Nonetheless, Chancellor Kohl and his Christian Democratic
Party relied upon a base of support that included religious Catholics and
Lutherans, as well as older persons and social conservatives. Pursuant to their
more conservative Weltanschauungen,2" most Christian Democrats were
prepared to grant toleration to Gays, to give them protection against physical
assault or verbal degradation, but not to fashion a law giving legal recognition
and legitimization to a spousal relationship between two men or two women.
In the 1998 election, an entirely new political landscape emerged. For the
first time in more than sixteen years the Social Democratic Party, forming a
coalition with the Green Party,22 won control of the government. With this
completely new political constellation' in place the situation looked hopeful for
significant movement on the issue of recognizing and legalizing same-sex
partnerships.
18. "Wiedergutmachung" can mean "reparation, compensation, redress." DIcTIONARY OF LEGAL
ANDCoMMERCIALTERMS 853 (2d ed. C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich, 1985) (Part II, German-
English).
19. Kohl's coalition partners were in some respects strange bedfellows. Today, the Free Democratic
Party supports same-sex partnerships and a liberal social agenda.. The Christian Social Union (CSU) exists
in Bavaria only and is allied at the national level with the Christian Democrats (CDU). The CSU is socially
conservative and opposes legally recognizing same-sex partnerships.
20. See Tatjana Homle, Penal Law and Sexuality: Recent Reforms in German Criminal Law, 3
BuF:F. CRIM. L R. 639,642 (2000).
21. "Weltanschauung" means "philosophy of life, ideology." DICTIONARY OF LEGAL AND
COMMERCIAL TERMS, supra note 18, at 845.
22. See Charlotte Streck, Ecopolitics in Modern Germany: The Rebirth of the Green Party, 8 DICK.
J. ENV. L POL. 33 (1999) (discussing the Green Party and its political platform and history).
23. The SPD's decision to choose the Green Party as its coalition partner constituted a new twist
to German politics. Since 1969, all previous governments had chosen the Free Democratic Party (FDP) as
the coalition partner. The FDP was in a coalition government with Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats
from 1982 to 1998. The FDP was previously in a coalition government with the Social Democrats in the
Schmidt government from 1974 to 1982, and before that with the Brandt government from 1969 to 1974.
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IV. THE "HAMBURG MARRIAGE" LEGISLATION AND THE RESOLUTION FROM
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
A same-sex partnership law was ultimately brought to Germany on account
of changing political tides and a complicated "tango" involving four levels of
government: local, state, national, and European.
It has been argued that the now well-known "Hamburg Marriage"
legislation of April 1999 brought this issue to the fore. However, this view is
not historically accurate. Across northern Europe in the early 1990s, nations
liberalized their laws on Gay issues. For years, members of the Green Party,
Schroeder's24 coalition partners, had actively fought for Gay Rights on various
European political planes. In 1994, a representative of the Green Party from
Germany brought forth in Strasbourg before the European Parliament a non-
binding, but morally significant, resolution. This resolution called upon
governments in the European Union to recognize the rights of Gays and
Lesbians to dignity and equality. The majority of European Parliament
members who supported the resolution called upon nations in the Union to treat
in law the sexual conduct of homosexuals in the same manner as heterosexual
relations. They contended that just as heterosexual persons benefited from the
institution of marriage, equality under law should accord same-sex partnerships
similar advantages and protections.25
Despite an outpouring of criticism including strong words from the Pope,
the 1994 Resolution influenced liberals in Germany. Even before Schroeder
was elected, three states, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony,
brought before the Bundesrat (the upper house of the German legislature) a
resolution calling on the Kohl government to take action toward implementing
a same-sex partnership law. 26
The city-state of Hamburg27 decided not to wait until the national
government moved on the issue of legislation recognizing same-sex
partnerships. Its lower and upper houses of the legislature enacted a domestic
24. Gerhard Schroeder became Chancellor of Germany after the election of September 1998.
25. 1994 O.J. (C 61) 40 [Official Journal of the European Communities].
26. BR-Drs. (Bundesrat-Drucksache) (Printed matter of the upper house of the German Parliament]
544/98 from June 4, 1998, "EntschlieBung des Bundesrates zu einem Rechtsinstitut 'Eingetragene
Partnerschaft' fUr gleichgeschlechtliche Paare," [Resolution of the Bundesrat for a Legal Framework
"Registered Partnership" for same sex couples] [hereinafter Bundesrat Resolution on a Legal Framework].
In this document, there is reference to the Resolution of the European Parliament of Feb. 8, 1994, p. 1, 3.
27. Hamburg constitutes one of the sixteen state governments. However, the impact of Hamburg's
decision to legislate same-sex partnership registration must be less than that of Vermont in the United States
constitutional system. In Germany, the Code of Civil Law, enacted in 1900, governs family law relationships,
as well as inheritance rights, contract law, and torts. The purpose of the Civil Code of 1900 was to supplant
state laws with a unitary nation-wide statutory code. Without amendments to the Civil Code that would have
had to be enacted by the federal government, Hamburg's new partnership law had to remain, to a large extent,
symbolic.
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partnership law authorizing same-sex couples to register their relationships with
the city-state officials. 28  Despite the fact that the legislation stated that the
partners' standing in law would not change through this registration, some rights
ultimately were extended to registered partners.29 In March 2000, the legislature
extended a right to registered partners to deal with hospital officials in the city-
state of Hamburg.3° In June 2000, a major insurance company, the
Volksftirsorge, decided to grant benefits previously extended only to married
employees to same-sex employees who submitted proof to the company of the
registration of their relationship. 3' Even if the "Hamburg Marriage" was mostly
of symbolic importance, this legislation sparked national debate.
V. THE LEGISLATION PROPOSED BY THE FDP
The "Hamburg Marriage" legislation led within three months to action in
the Bundestag. For many years, the platform of the Free Democratic Party,
despite the long-standing political coalition with the Kohl government, called
for legal recognition of same-sex partnerships.32 In June 1999, members of this
party, now sitting on the opposition benches, challenged the Social Democrats
and Greens to make good on their election promises to the Gay and Lesbian
community. The Free Democratic Party tendered a draft of legislation to the
lower house of Parliament (Bundestag) establishing a regime of life partnership
between two persons of the same sex.
The draft legislation, "On the Regulation of the Legal Relations of
Registered Life Partners," contained fifteen articles, an introduction, and a
28. Hamburgisches Gesetz und Verordnungsblatt, (1999) Number 10, pp. 69-70 (GVBI. Hamburg),
"Gesetz Uber die Eintragung gleichgeschlechticher Partnerschaften" [Law Concerning the Registration of
Same-Sex Partnerships].
29. Id. at para. 1.
30. Hamburgisches Gesetz und Verordnungsblatt, (2000) Number 10, p. 67 (GVB1. Hamburg).
31. See Press Announcement on the web page of the Volksfllrsorge concerning same-sex partner
benefits, at http://www.volksfuersorge.delinternet/VFUlnternet.nsf/vwByID/
A55663767B7E4D5CI2569530045FEF4 (last visited Feb. 23, 2001). For general information about the
Volksftirsorge (insurance company), see Volksfllrsorge's homepage at http:llwww. volksfuersorge.de, or
http://www.volksfuersorge.de/intemet/VFUIntemet.nsf/frame/ wirueeruns (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). Press
Announcement on the web page for the City of Hamburg at http://www.hamburg.de/ Behoerden/SfG/
presse/Volksfuersorge.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
32. Plenarprotokoll 14/67, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 67. Sitzung, Berlin,
Freitag, den 5 Nov., 1999, [German Parliament (lower house) Stenographic Report, 67th sitting, Berlin, Friday
5, Nov., 1999] at 6027A [hereinafter Stenographic Report Nov. 5, 1999]. This is a speech by Guido
Westerwelle, member of the FDP. He states:
My party, concerning this question, has a long tradition. We are convinced on account
of our liberal convictions that minorities may not be discriminated against, that the
state should not be the censor of various forms of living arrangements, that what is
allowed, should be what makes the individual happy provided that this does not harm
others.
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commentary on the effect and purpose of the bill.33 The introduction stated that
with more than 2.5 million persons living in same-sex partnerships,. there was
a need for a new legal construct. On the one hand, this new legal construct
would be used to end discrimination and unequal treatment of same-sex couples.
On the other hand, this construct could not extend so far that it would violate
constitutional norms protecting marriage and family.'
To gain this balance, the draft legislation envisioned a series of
amendments to various federal statutes and paragraphs of the Civil Code
affecting property, inheritance, income tax, and residential tenancy laws.35 It set
out requirements for entering a registered life partnership and provided a
mechanism for dissolution.36  The bill envisioned by the FDP would have
changed a number of penal and civil procedural rules.37 One of these changes
set out that partners, like wives or husbands, would not be compelled to testify
against one another.38 Upon the death of one of the partners, the "matrimonial"
home could pass tax free to the other and a preferential share in the estate would
be guaranteed to the surviving partner.39 Also, the bill would authorize doctors
and other professionals, as well as government officials, to treat a same-sex
partner in a manner similar to family members vis-ai-vis information and
decision-making. 4
33. BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the German Parliament]
14/1259 from June 23, 1999, "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung der Rechtsverhalltnisse eingetragener
Lebenspartnerschaften (Eingetragene-Lebenspartnerschaften-Gesetz- ELPSchG)" [Draft Legislation on the
regulation of the Legal Relations of Registered Life Partners (Registered Life Partners Act)] [hereinafter FDP
Draft of the Registered Life Partners Act].
34. Id. at p. 1. See also GRUNDGESErz [Constitution] [GG] art. 6(l) [F.R.G.], which states:
"Marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state."
35. Id. at pp. 3, 4, 6.
36. Id. at pp. 3-4. According to the bill, Paragraph 1588A would have been added to the Civil Code.
This sets forth that if two persons of the same sex declare in the presence of a notary that they wish to enter
a life partnership, and if they fulfill the prerequisites set out in subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Status Registry
Office will enter the registered life partnership in the registry book concerning family matters. Dissolution
was envisioned to occur after a one-year period of separation.
37. Id. at pp. 5-6. Article 3 of the draft concerns changes to the rules of civil procedure. Article 4
concerns changes to the Criminal Code. Article 5 concerns changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
38. FDP Draft of the Registered Life Partners Act, supra note 33, at p. 6. Article 5, subparagraph
1, speaks of chatiges to Paragraph 52 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
39. Id. at pp. 3, 5, 6. Article 1, Subparagraph 8 speaks about amendments to the statute concerning
the compulsory share that must be awarded to a surviving spouse. It amends Paragraph 1931 of the Civil
Code and adds the words, "or life partner." The effect of this will be that the life partner, unless explicitly
excluded from the estate according to the terms of a "pre-nuptial" partnership contract, will have the rights
vis-,-vis the estate as if he or she were a married spouse. For a translation of Paragraph 1931 in English, as
it was written before any of these amendments were proposed, see SIMON L GOREN, THE GERMAN CIVIL
CODE 350 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1994).
40. ld. at p. 5. Article 2 of the bill concerns changes to the Law Concerning Personal Status.
According to the amendments proposed, the registered life partner would be treated as a family member in
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The debate after the introduction of this bill followed party lines. For
members of the Green Party, Social Democrats and some members of the Party
of Democratic Socialism (hereinafter "PDS"), the draft introduced by the FDP
did not go far enough. Specifically, the Social Democrats and Greens criticized
the draft legislation on account of its failure to provide sufficient support
provisions for each partner during the period of separation and subsequent
dissolution of the relationship.4 For these Bundestag representatives of the
Green Party and the SPD, the draft of the Free Democrats was too malleable.
It provided too few financial obligations between the partners, and in their view,
the proposed law permitted dissolution too easily.42 One of the members
commented that this is like trying to get washed without getting wet.43
For the Christian Democrats this draft legislation went too far. A same-sex
partnership law would undermine the special protections, which they viewed as
exclusive in nature, granted to traditional marriage and family life set out in
Article 6 of the German Constitution." At the end of the day, the draft
legislation of the FDP, put before the Bundestag in June 1999, constituted an
important step in furthering the debate on this issue and it compelled the new
government to move forward with its own draft legislation.
VI. THE DRAFT LEGISLATION FROM JULY 4TH, 2000
On July 4th, 2000, members of the Social Democratic Party and the Green
Party produced a draft of a law entitled: "The Law to End Discrimination
against Same-Sex Unions: Life Partnerships [the Life Partnership Act]. ' 5 Like
its name, this draft legislation to the American mind might appear cumbersome
and complicated. Possibly the complexity and length of this legislation reflect
characteristic elements of German law making. Alternatively, the complexity
law. The Law Concerning Personal Status (Personenstandgesetz), first enacted in 1937, established a unified
regime of registration of all births, deaths, marriages, and familial relationships. Like a marriage registration,
which will subsequently note the death of one of the parties, dissolution through divorce, or a decree of nullity,
registered life partnerships will also be entered and various notations made as legal changes in the status of
the relationship occur.
41. Stenographic Report Nov. 5, 1999, supra note 32, at 6028 A, B, speech made by Margot von
Renesse (SPD); see also statements made by Volker Beck (Green Party) at 6035 D and 6036 A, B, C, D.
42. id. at 6028 C, D, 6029 B.
43. Id. at 6028 D. Margot von Renesse says in German, "Wasch mir den Pelz, aber mach mich nicht
naB." Id.
44. Id. at 6032 D (Norbert Geis of the Christian Democratic Party speaking before the Bundestag).
45. BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the German Parliament]
14/3751 from July 4, 2000, "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung
gleichgeschlechtlicherGemeinschaften: Lebenspartnerschaften (Lebenspartner-schaftsgesetz-LpartG)," [Draft
of a Law to End Discrimination against Same-Sex Unions: Life Partnerships (The Life Partnership Law.
"LpartG" is simply an abbreviation in German for Life Partnership Law)] [hereinafter Government's First
Draft of the Life Partnership Law].
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revolves around the political and constitutional hurdles that needed to be
cleared.4
European governments took different approaches to implementing same-
sex partnerships. Nordic legislation extended spousal rights to two men or two
women. However, from the bundle of rights and responsibilities that flowed to
married couples, adoption rights were removed for same-sex partners.47 In
France, due to political considerations, the government had to create a new legal
institution. The Pacte Civile de Solidarit, had its own set of rules and duties.
This law was not limited to same-sex partners; it also provided a new legal
construct for partners of the opposite sex who did not wish to exercise the
option of marriage.
48
Article 6 of the Constitution made it impossible for German drafters to
follow the established path of either the French or Nordic legislation. These
civil servants had to illustrate a sure-footedness similar to that of mountain goats
negotiating a precarious pass. The writers of this bill wanted to provide as
many rights of marriage to same-sex partners as was possible; however, they
46. Compared with Nordic Legislation, which runs three or four pages, this draft law seems
mammoth, with more than thirty-two pages and five major articles. Article 3 is the longest, containing 112
subparagraphs amending various federal laws. The justification for the law and other explanations are
attached; these are thirty-nine pages in length.
47. Pedersen, supra note 2, at 290. Another limitation affects foreigners. "However, while two
foreigners who are in the country for only a short period of time can enter into a marriage, at least one of the
parties must be a Danish citizen to obtain a partnership registration." Id. "In contrast to marriage, partnership
registration requires that a least one of the partners be a citizen of Norway, domiciled there." Roth, supra note
6, at 468. "According to Section 3 of the Partnership Act, registration of homosexual partnership had the same
legal consequences as entering into marriage, with the exception of the right to adopt children as a couple."
Id. at 469. See also Government's First Draft of the life Partnership Law, supra note 45, at p. 33. The
discussion attached to the Law to End Discrimination against Same-Sex Unions deals explicitly with this
issue. It mentions that in many nations of Europe, there is already legislation in place concerning couples.
In some European nations (namely Belgium, France, Holland, and some regions of Spain), it is explained there
are three possibilities for heterosexual couples: they can marry, enter into a life partnership, which is
registered and has legal consequences, or they can avoid entirely any formalization of the relationship. Gays
and Lesbians can enter into a life partnership or avoid legal formalization. It is stated further that in other
nations of Europe (namely Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), partnership laws are open only to same-sex
couples, and similar legal consequences flow to same-sex couples as married, couples with the exception of
adoption. Also, in these Nordic nations, there are limitations imposed upon foreigners who come into the
jurisdiction solely to conclude a same-sex marriage which might not be recognized where the couple is
domiciled. Further, the Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz states that because of the constitution in Germany, which
provides marriage special protection, a new legal institute had to be constructed. This new construct could
not make marriage and partnership rights identical. However, it could be designed to combat discrimination
against same-sex couples and it could provide for rights and duties between the partners. What is the
significance of the name given to the legislation? The legislation in Germany was framed not only as a
partnership act, but a law to combat discrimination against same-sex partners.
48. Law No. 99-944 of Nov. 15, 1999, J.O., at p. 16959. Article 515-1 of this French legislation
states (author's translation): "A pacte civil de solidarit is a contract concluded between two persons who
are of the age of majority, of different sexes, or the same sex, to arrange their life together."
could not use the word "marriage." They could not design a French-styled
compromise for both same-sex and opposite-sex unions, as legislation
fashioning a quasi-marriage or "marriage light" would likely violate Article 6.
Last but not least, if all the indicia of marriage were found to be present in
same-sex partnerships, the constitutional norm protecting marriage and family
life might be violated; hence, the Federal Constitutional Court might strike
down the legislation.49 A final hurdle involved the sixteen German states and
how they would react to this draft.
VII. THE BUNDESRAT AND THE SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIP LEGISLATION
Germany, like the United States, is a federal state. There is a bicameral
federal legislature in Berlin and state legislatures in each of the sixteen states.
However, there are some significant differences concerning the passage of
federal legislation, particularly in regard to the role of the upper house. This
constitutional framework would come into play in the passage of same-sex
partnership legislation.
In Germany today, similar to the situation in the United States prior to the
passage of the XVII amendment, representatives of the upper house of the
German federal legislature (Bundesrat) are chosen by the state governments. At
present there are sixty-nine votes in the Bundesrat; each of the sixteen states has
three, four, five, or six votes depending on its population. Unlike the rules that
govern the U.S. Senate, each German state must cast all its votes in one block.50
In the United States, there is a standard path for the passage of legislation. A
bill must pass both the House and the Senate and the President must sign it into
law. In the case of a presidential veto, legislation supported by a two-third's
majority in both houses becomes law. In Germany, the President also must sign
a bill into law, and under many situations a bill becomes law after a majority
vote in both the lower and upper houses, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.
However, there are variations on this theme involving the role of the upper
house in enacting legislation.
If a bill affects the rights or interests of states, it needs to win the consent
of a simple majority of votes in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.i
However, if legislation is considered within the competency of the federal
government, a lack of consent by the upper chamber does not automatically
defeat the bill. The Bundesrat has to make a decision whether it wishes to lodge
49. Government's First Draft of the life Partnership Law, supra note 45, at p. 33.
50. See GG art. 51 (3), which states, "Each Land [state] may delegate as many members as it has
votes. The votes of each Land may be cast only as a block vote and only by Members present or their
alternatives." See also KURT SONTHEIMER, GRUNDZOGE DES POLLITISCHEN SYSTEMS DER NEUEN
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 290 (Piper 16th ed. 1995). See also ALFRED KATZ, STAATSRECHT:
GRUNDKURS IM OFFENTLICHEN RECHT 181-2 (Luchterhand 12th ed. 1994).
51. A constitutional amendment needs the consent of two-thirds of the members of the Bundesrat.
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an objection. If the Bundesrat lodges an objection to a bill within the
competency of the federal government by a margin of two-thirds, this will
require a new vote in the Bundestag with a two-third's majority in order to
override the "veto." If the Bundesrat lodges an objection to a bill by a simple
majority, this will require a simple majority in the Bundestag in a new vote to
override the "veto" and place this legislation before the President for signature
into law.52 A final option open to members of the Bundesrat is to vote for a
committee to be constituted with members of both the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat to negotiate compromise legislation.
When the question of same-sex partnership arose, it was estimated that
there were twenty-six votes in the Bundesrat that were favorable to this
legislation, and twenty-eight votes which would be cast against it. The question
of passage came to concern the three coalition CSU/SPD states and the
Rhineland that together possessed a total of fifteen "swing" votes.53
For the Schroeder government, it became evident that there would not be
a majority in favor of the partnership legislation in the Bundesrat. In late fall
of 2000, the government decided to take the following measure. It split the
legislation into two: the first impacted upon state governments and required a
majority vote in favor in the Bundesrat, while the second bill was within the
competency of the federal government as defined by the Constitution. The part
that was within federal competency was named the "Law to End Discrimination
against Same-Sex Unions: Life Partnerships," while the second bill was
named the "Law to Supplement the Life Partnership Act and other Laws [The
Life Partnership Supplementary Law]. 55
52. Article 77 (4) of the German Constitution states:
If the objection was adopted with a majority of the votes of the Bundesrat it may be
rejected by a decision of the majority of the Members of the Bundestag. If the
Bundesrat adopted the objection with a majority of at least two thirds of its votes its
rejection by the Bundestag shall require a majority of two thirds of the votes ....
53. When this legislation was considered, the SPD controlled two state governments, was in alliance
with the Green Party in three states, and was in alliance with the Party of Democratic Socialism in the State
of Mecklenburg-Pomerania. The conservatives (CDU or CSU) controlled four state governments and were
in coalition governments with the Free Democrats in two. The CDU was also in coalition governments with
Social Democrats in three states, and there was an alliance between the SPD and the FDP in the Rhineland.
54. BR-Drs. (Bundesrat-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the upper house of the German Parliament]
738/00 from Nov. 10, 2000 "Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher
Gemeinschaften: Lebenspartnerschaften" [An Act to End the Discrimination against Same-Sex Unions: Life
Partnerships] [hereinafter Law to End Discrimination].
55. BR-Drs. (Bundesrat-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the upper house of the German Parliament]
739/00 from Nov. 10, 2000 "Gesetz zur Erganzung des Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetzes und anderer Gesetze
(Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetzerganzungsgesetz LPartGErgG)" [An Act to Supplement the Life Partnership Law
and other Laws, the Life Partnership Supplementary Law] [hereinafter Law to Supplement the Life Partnership
Law]. See also Katz, supra note 50, at 209. Katz states that in the 1950's, around ten percent of the
legislation was considered to affect states' rights. Today, about sixty percent of the legislation requires a
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This division of the July 4, 2000 draft legislation into two separate bills led
to the following results on December 1, 2000 when the members of the
Bundesrat met and voted. They discussed the first bill, the Law to End
Discrimination against Same-Sex Unions, and took two separate votes. The first
count of hands sought to determine whether a majority of the Bundesrat thought
that there needed to be a joint committee established between members of the
Bundestag and Bundesrat to negotiate a compromise concerning the legislation.
Only a minority voted in favor of this. A second vote was taken to determine
whether a majority believed that the Law to End Discrimination affected state
interests such that this legislation was not in the competency of the federal
government. Again, only a minority voted in favor of this. 6 These two votes,
framed in negative questions, meant that the upper house would not lodge an
objection to the first bill, and it could go to the president for signature.
Concerning the second bill, there was nO desire by a majority of the Bundesrat
to form a committee to negotiate an acceptable version that later might be
passed in the upper house. This second bill, because it affected states' rights,
needed to win a majority of votes in the upper house, and there was no majority
in favor of it. The Law to Supplement the Life Partnership Act was defeated.57
VIII. THE LEGISLATION GOVERNING SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS
The Law to End Discrimination against Same-Sex Unions: Life
Partnerships, which was signed into law on February 16, 2001 by the President
of the Federal Republic of Germany,"8 is divided into five main articles. Each
article is divided into paragraphs and subparagraphs. Article 1 is the most
significant as it sets out the main features of a life partnership. 9 Article 2 lists
majority vote in the Bundesrat because it affects the interests of the states. This still means that forty percent
of legislation is viewed as within the competence of the federal government.
56. Plenarprotokoll 757, Deutscher Bundesrat, Stenographischer Bericht, 757. Sitzung, Berlin,
Freitag, den 1 Dezember, 2000, [German Parliament (upper house) Stenographic Report, 757th sitting, Berlin,
Dec. 1, 2000] at p. 551C [hereinafter Stenographic Report, Bundesrat, Dec. 1, 2000].
57. Id. at p. 551 D. Rau unterzeichnet Partnerschaftsgesetz, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,
Feb. 17, 2001, at 7. The Bundestag asked for a committee to be formed comprised of Bundestag and
Bundesrat members in order to consider whether the Life Partnership Supplementary Law, that was defeated
in December, 2000, might be amended so that it would become acceptable to a majority in the Bundesrat. As
of February 20, 2001 ,.there has been no compromise reached.
58. Rau unterzeichnet Partnerschaftrgesetz, supra note 57, at 7. It is stated that President Rau has
signed the Life Partnership bill into law on February 16, 2001. Its provisions will come into force on August
1,2001. The law has been published, on February 22, 2001, in the Bundesgesetzblatt. (2001 BGBI. I s. 266).
59. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54. Ulrich Thoelke of Viadrina University explains that
when German legislation regulates a new subject matter, the most important substantive and/or procedural
provisions are found in the first article. The name of the new legislation is also found in the first article. In
the present case, although all five articles together are called "he Law to End Discrimination against Same-
Sex Couples, the life Partnership Act," this legislation will ultimately come to be known by its shorter title
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a series of amendments to the Code of Civil Law which give force and effect to
the partnership arrangements set out in Article 1, primarily, but not exclusively,
in respect to residential tenancy and inheritance laws.' Article 3, in a similar
vein, sets out other amendments to various federal statutes, relating both to
procedural and substantive rules, impacted by the creation of a life partnership. 6'
Article 4 sets out that those regulations amended by this legislation continue in
force as regulations and do not take on the characteristics of statutory law.62
Article 5 establishes a mechanism for determining the date when the partnership
legislation will come into force.63
A partnership between two men or two women comes into being when
"they both declare at the same time that they wish to establish a partnership with
each other for the course of their lives."' ' At the time they make their
declaration, each party must accept certain rights and responsibilities. Prior to
the establishment of the domestic partnership, a decision must be made
concerning the regime of "spousal" finances.6' Either the partners have already
negotiated a contract setting out a division of assets upon dissolution, or they
must accept the statutory regime set out in Paragraphs 1371 to 1390 of the Civil
Code."
mentioned in Article 1: the fe Partnership Law (Das Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz). Telephone Interview
with Ulrich Thoelke, Lecturer in the Department of Law, Viadrina University, Frankfurt-Oder, Germany (Feb.
19, 2001).
60. Id. at art. 2.
61. Id. at art. 3.
62. Id. at art. 4.
63. Id. at art. 5.
64. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54, at art. 1, pan. 1.
65. Id. at art. 1, para 1, Subparagraph 1.
66. Id. at art. 1, para. 6 (2). Paragraphs 1371 to 1390 provide a mechanism for the division of assets
between spouses upon dissolution of the marriage or death. For the purposes of this discussion reference
should be made to two paragraphs. Paragraph 1372 of the Civil Code states: "If the matrimonial regime is
terminated otherwise than by the death of a spouse, the accrued gains shall be equalized according to the
provisions of §§ 1373 to 1390." Goren, supra note 39, at 240. Paragraph 1378 (1) states: "If the accrued
gains of one spouse exceed the accrued gains of the other, the other is entitled to half of the surplus as an
equalization claim." Goren, supra note 39, at 241. Claudia Wendrich describes this regime in her article. She
states:
In both jurisdictions [Manitoba and Germany) there is a so-called deferred community
property regime. Its main feature is that there is no property which belongs to the
community. The spouses remain owners of their separate properties, which each of
them can freely dispose of and control, with few exceptions. At the end of the
marriage there is only a monetary compensation. The amount of money that must be
paid will depend both on the assets included in the calculation and on their fate during
the marriage. The purpose of an equalization payment upon marriage breakdown is to
share the economic achievements of the marriage and, by doing so, to implement the
idea of marriage as an economic partnership. The individual contributions of each
spouse are not decisive.
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The freedom to contract a regime of "spousal" property and financial
relations, similar to a pre-nuptial agreement in American law, is not unlimited.
According to Paragraph 1, subparagraph 4, clause 4, "a partnership cannot be
concluded if the life partners are not prepared to assume any of the obligations
[of maintenance and support] set out in paragraph 2 of this act. 6 7 At the time
that the parties enter a life partnership, like persons entering a marriage in
Germany, they have to consider the issue of a surname. A party can keep his
or her own surname or take on the surname of his or her partner.68
Paragraph 5 stipulates that the parties have duties to each other. This
paragraph speaks about a duty of care and makes reference to the Code of Civil
Law. It mandates that a partner must support the other during the course of the
relationship in a manner similar to the obligations between a husband and a
wife. This right of support, according to the new legislation, is not extinguished
in its entirety by either separation or the dissolution of the partnership.
69
Pursuant to Paragraph 12, during a period of separation, one partner can
claim support from the other.7" According to Paragraph 16, there may exist a
duty of support between partners even after the relationship is dissolved.
Subparagraph 1, for instance, states that "after the dissolution of the partnership
if one of the parties cannot support himself, the other may be obliged to do
sO. ' '71 Paragraph 16 is also noteworthy because one sees in it a hierarchy of
relationships established, at least in terms of maintenance subsequent to the
dissolution of the same-sex relationship. In the event of dissolution, a court is
advised first to look to blood relatives to support the former partner, and then
if this group of persons cannot support the relative or does not exist, the former
partner's ability to support will be considered.72
Claudia Wendrich, Who Should Profit from an Academic Degree Upon Marital Breakdown? Comparing
Manitoba Common Law and the German Civil Code, 25 MAN L J. 267, 268 (1998).
67. Id. at art. 1, para. 1, subparagraph 4, cl. 4.
68. id. at art. 1, para. 3 (1). If one party takes on the surname of his or her partner, s/he can fashion
a hyphenated surname which contains the "maiden" name along with the partner's name. For example, if
Smith enters into a life partnership with Jones, and s/he wishes to take on the surname Jones, this partner can
legally be known as Jones, Jones-Smith, or Smith-Jones.
69. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54, at art. 1, para. 5. There is a reference to Paragraphs
1360a and 1360b of the Civil Code. 1360a has four subparagraphs. 1360a(I) states: "The adequate financial
support of the family includes all that is required, according to the circumstances of the spouses, to meet the
household expenses and to provide for the personal needs of the spouses and the necessities of life for those
of their children who are entitled to support." Goren, supra note 39, at 236. 1360b states: "If a spouse
contributes more to the support of the family than he is obliged to give, the presumption is, in case of doubt,
that he does not intend to demand restitution from the other spouse." Id.
70. Id. at art. 1, para. 12.
71. Id. at art. 1, para. 16 (1).
72. Id. at art. I para. 16 (3). This approach is interesting because the rule is different from the
provisions governing support after the dissolution of marriages. In the case of husband and wife after divorce,
the court will consider first the husband's or wife's ability to pay support before burdening relatives.
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Prior to the passage of the Law to End Discrimination against Same-Sex
Unions, the law as it stood generated certain results, which some members of
both houses of the German legislature came to view as unconscionable. The
AIDS pandemic exacerbated these problems. If a same-sex relationship ended
through illness leading to death, the healthy partner during the illness, and after
the death, was left in a very precarious position. There was a question
concerning how hospitals were to handle relations between the same-sex partner
and the parents of the patient. Who was to be informed of the medical condition
of the patient and which party had the legal authority to authorize treatment?
As well, complications arose concerning whether the same-sex partner was
entitled to receive leave from work to assist the ailing partner and bereavement
time in the event of death.73 Upon the death of the partner some very unusual
results occurred. If a same-sex partner died intestate, pursuant to statutory
provisions courts divided up his or her property between parents, and if they did
not survive, among grandparents or siblings. Upon death, a residential tenancy
in the name of the deceased would terminate. Hence, after caring for a sick
partner, the same-sex partner might find himself or herself facing eviction from
the apartment, fighting with the blood relatives over furniture, pots and pans,
and excluded from receiving any money from the estate. He or she might even
be excluded from participating during the funeral service or carrying out the
partner's last wishes.74
The Law to End Discrimination against Same-Sex Unions attempts to
remedy the above-described situations through a number of key provisions.
Paragraph 10 sets out a right of inheritance for the partner. In the event that the
parents or children of a deceased partner survive, and there is no will, the life
partner is entitled to a quarter of the estate. A surviving life partner is entitled
also to the household effects and gifts, which he or she received in anticipation
of the establishment of the relationship. If a partner dies intestate, and there are
no relatives of the first degree alive, nor grandparents, the surviving life partner
will receive the entire estate.75
In Germany, total freedom of testation does not exist. According to law,
child/parent and husband/wife relations, in terms of support and inheritance, are
never fully extinguished. A parent must provide for his or her child during that
child's minority, and even after the child becomes an adult, the parent must give
that child a share of the estate unless a compelling reason exists for
disinheritance. A husband cannot exclude his wife from inheritance unless there
73. Bundesrat Resolution on a Legal Framework, supra note 26. See also Stenographic Report Nov.
5, 1999, supra note 32, at 6034 A/B, Statement by Volker Beck. He asks: "I would like to know whether
there is one known case of a hospital ordinance which would prevent a husband or wife from going to the
hospital room of his or her spouse. I know of many cases in which same-sex couples had this problem."
74. Bundesrat Resolution on a Legal Framework, supra note 26, at Anlage I [attachment #1].
75. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54, at art. I paras. 10 (1), 10 (2).
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is a compelling reason. 6 Paragraph 6 of the Life Partnership Law establishes
a regime of support, inheritance, and obligation between the partners. A partner
is prima facie entitled to a share of the inheritance that can never be entirely
extinguished. Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 10 states:
If the deceased through his testamentary disposition of assets has
excluded the life partner from the estate, the partner is entitled to
bring a suit for his compulsory portion, which can constitute up to
half the value of the estate. The provisions of the Civil Code setting
out the compulsory portion of an estate are to be applied in such a
manner that the life partner is treated [in law for the purposes of this
section] as if he were a [married] spouse."
The issue concerning unexpected termination of a residential tenancy is dealt
with by the first paragraph of Article 2, which sets out amendments to
Paragraph 569 of the Code of Civil Law. Paragraph 569 of the Code of Civil
Law will now state: "upon the death of the lessee, the spouse, who had a
common household with the deceased can assume the tenancy. The same will
apply for life partners. "78
If the partnership does not end by death, the provisions of Paragraph 15 set
out three paths leading to dissolution. If both the partners agree that the
relationship has come to an end, and they separate for one year, a court may
grant dissolution. If only one of the partners wishes to leave the relationship,
he or she will have to wait three years from the time that he or she separates and
serves written notice upon the other party. If an unacceptable hardship would
result from not granting dissolution more quickly, and this relates entirely to the
conduct of the non-petitioning partner, the court, in its discretion, may grant
dissolution prior to the expiration of three years' time.79
During the period of separation envisioned by Paragraph 15, issues of
support, division of property and living arrangements will arise. Upon the
separation of the parties, Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the legislation authorize the
court, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, to decide upon a
regime for the division of household goods and put into place rules concerning
living arrangements." Upon final dissolution, Paragraphs 18 and 19 come into
76. Goren, supra note 39, at 286, translating § 2 para. 1601 BGB (BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil
Code)): "Relatives in direct line are obliged to furnish maintenance to each other." See also Paragraph 2333
at p. 417 that sets out conditions when a testator may deprive a descendant of his compulsory portion. See
also Paragraph 2335 at p. 418 that sets out conditions when a testator may deprive a spouse of the compulsory
portion.
77. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54, at art. 1, par. 10(6).
78. Id. at art. 2, subparagraph 2.
79. Id. at art. 1, para. 15, subparagraph 2, cls. 1, 2, 3.
80. Id. at art. 1, paras. 12, 13.
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play and the court is authorized to make a final decision regarding living
arrangements and the assignment of household effects. It is interesting to note
that Paragraph 19, involving division of household effects between same-sex
partners, refers the court to the laws dealing with the division of effects between
married couples. 8'
The question arose concerning what would occur if a formerly married
person with children entered a same-sex partnership or a child were born to a
same-sex partner. Despite liberal laws across Europe on the issue of the
establishment of same-sex partnerships, adoption and raising children seems to
be the point where the boundary of permissiveness is reached. The German law
does not envision same-sex couples adopting children. It does, however,
provide for the situation when a partner has custody over a child. Although
there are no provisions for adoption, Paragraph 9 sets out that "with the consent
of the custodial parent ... a partner will . . . have the right to help make
decisions regarding the day-to-day life of the child. 8 2 Interestingly enough,
subparagraph 3 spells out clearly that "if this is in the best interests of the child,"
the family court can limit or exclude the participation, enumerated in
subparagraph 1.83 Also, it is interesting to note that upon dissolution a partner
is deemed to keep the partnership name and relations with the relatives of his
or her former spouse. However, "the right to participate in raising a child...
will not survive the separation of the partners.""
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss each of the more than sixty
amendments to federal legislation envisioned in Article 3. However, three
paragraphs or subparagraphs illustrate both the attention to detail and extensive
scope that characterize this new same-sex partnership law. Changes to the Code
of Criminal Procedure will be examined. The new rules enunciated in regard
to foreign residents who wish to bring a same-sex partner to sojourn in Germany
are also worthy of discussion. Finally, to illustrate how the new law impacts
upon a very wide range of federal laws, the provisions concerning security
clearances will be examined.
Paragraph 56 of Article 3 sets out a series of amendments to the Code of
Criminal Procedure. According to subparagraph 1, a judge will be required to
recuse himself or herself from a case if his or her life partner is a defendant or
a victim of the crime. Pursuant to subparagraph 2, the German Code of
Criminal Procedure will be amended so that a witness in a criminal trial can no
81. Id. at art. 1, paras. 18, 19.
82. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54, at art. 1, para. 9 (1).
83. Id. at art. 1, para. 9 (3).
84. Id. at art. 1, para. 9(4). See also art. 1, para. 3(3) in relation names, and art. 1, para. Il(I) and
(2) (concerning family ties).
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longer be compelled to testify against his or her life partner or former life
partner.8 5
The life partner of a defendant will gain the right to attend the trial. The
legislation permits the life partner of a victim of a crime to be present at the trial
and to make representations to the court. In the event that a victim dies, his or
her life partner, like a husband or wife, under Paragraph 361 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, can petition the court to reopen the case. If the victim of
the crime dies, his or her life partner can become a Nebenklager.
8 6
Paragraph 47 of Article 3 makes four main amendments to the Law
Concerning the Entry and Sojourn of Foreigners in the Federal Republic.
Paragraphs 17, 18, and 31 of this statute currently create a right for minor
children and a married spouse to apply for an entry and residence permit for the
duration of the period while the foreign husband or wife legally resides in
Germany.8 7 When the Life Partnership Act comes into force, a same-sex partner
will be able to apply also for an entry permit to be reunited with his or her
partner and establish a common residence on German soil. 8
Paragraph 4a of Article 3 provides for a series of amendments to the Law
Concerning Security Clearances. When a security clearance is authorized, the
life partner of the applicant will be included in any background check. The Law
Concerning Security Clearances provides that if a man or woman enters into a
marriage during the period while clearance is still being investigated, the new
spouse will be included in the background check. When the Life Partnership
Law comes into force, if a life partnership is concluded before the clearance is
finished, the new partner will, like a new spouse, be included in the background
check. 9
Section VII of this essay explained that because of opposition in the upper
house, the original draft of this legislation was split into two parts. One part
needed the consent of the Bundesrat, and the other did not because it was within
the competence of the federal government. The Law to Supplement the Life
Partnership Act was defeated on December 1, 2000 in a vote of the Bundesrat.9
85. Id. at art. 3, para. 56. This paragraph makes amendments to paragraphs 22, 52, 149, 361, 395,
and 404 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
86. JOHN LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE GERMANY 154 (West Publishing 1977),
"Nebenklager, literally one who complains alongside, in the sense of alongside the public prosecutor; the
victim or near kin of a victim of a crime who is allowed to intervene and to have right of audience in criminal
trials under certain circumstances."
87. Gesetz Uber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von Auslander im Bundesgebiet, v. 9.7.1990
(BGBI. I S.1354), [The Law concerning the Entry and Sojourn of Foreigners in Lands (belonging to the]
Federation], paras. 17, 18, 31.
88. Law to End Discrimination, supra note 54, at art. 3, para. 47.
89. Id. at art. 3, para. 4a.
90. Stenographic Report, Bundesrat, Dec. 1, 2000, supra note 56, at p. 55 1D.
Levitt
488 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:469
Put in a nutshell, there are at least four main features of the original draft from
July 4, 2000, which will not come into force in August of 2001.
The first feature concerns the solemnization and registration of the
partnership. In Germany today, there is a registry office in each town and city
that records in separate registry books births, deaths, marriages, and family
relationships. The first draft of the legislation envisioned the participation of
these offices in each state in the registration and solemnization of same-sex
partnerships. As well, the Supplementary Law that the Bundesrat defeated had
envisioned the addition of a fifth book to the list, a same-sex partnership
registry. When it became clear that the states would not consent, the
government changed the legislation to remove references to these state offices.
At present a question remains concerning exactly where the registration will
take place and which government agency will be responsible for record
keeping.9
1
Second, the government had hoped to award to same-sex couples a number
of tax benefits that accrue to married couples.9 This has been defeated through
the refusal of the Bundesrat to pass the supplementary legislation. Third, the
government had hoped to amend inheritance and tax laws to permit assets to
transfer between the partners at death without tax liability accruing, and this will
not be possible at present.93 Fourth, the government had hoped to change
embassy and consular law such that partnerships could be registered abroad and
German consular officials would be better instructed how to assist German
same-sex partners."
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Even before the first partnership is established, there is a strong possibility
that this legislation will face a challenge before the Federal Constitutional
Court. Unlike the United States, where judicial review will occur only if a case
and controversy exists, Germany provides for abstract review of the
constitutionality of legislation. The provisions of Article 93(1)(2) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany provide two avenues whereby
the Federal Constitutional Court will be required to review legislation after it is
enacted, and sometimes before it comes into force.95
A review before the Federal Constitutional Court can be triggered by the
lodging of a formal complaint by any one of the sixteen state governments
91. Law to Supplement the Life Partnership Law, supra note 55, at art. 1 subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4.
92. Id. at art. 2, para. 55.
93. Id. at art. 2, para. 56.
94. Id. at art. 2, para. 48.
95. See Rosemarie Will, German Unification and the Reform of Abortion Law, 3 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L. 399, 401 n. 10 (1996).
alleging that a federal law violates any fundamental principle set out in the
constitution. Abstract judicial review by the Federal Constitutional Court can
also be compelled if one-third of the members of the Bundestag sign a petition
challenging the constitutionality of a recently enacted federal law in part or in
its entirety."
The provisions of Article 93 permit results which would be unexpected by
American jurists. An American jurist might say that constitutional review, as
permitted in Germany, may actually limit or circumscribe rights that have been
granted or extended by the federal legislature. Unlike the Bill of Rights, which
establishes limits upon the power of the federal government, the Constitution
of Germany extends governmental duties further. It is incumbent upon the
German government not only to refrain from implementing policies that limit
or infringe rights, but also actively to protect and ensure rights.97
A constitutional challenge to the Life Partnership Act might well adopt the
following argument. Article 6 of the German Constitution clearly states that
marriage and family are subject to special protection by the state. The new
same-sex partnership legislation creates a paradigm which undermines the
legitimacy and sanctity of marriage between a man and a woman and traditional
family life.9
To understand a constitutional challenge along these lines one might
consider the German Abortion Case of 1975. The Abortion Case concerned
legislation of the Bundestag that liberalized abortion rules in Germany. For all
intents and purposes, abortion was permitted in the first twelve weeks with
relatively few limitations. In 1974, the Christian Democrats objected to liberal
legislation brought forward by Social Democrats and argued that the law
96. GG art. 93 (1) (2) states that the Federal Constitutional Court shall rule "in case of a
disagreement or doubt as to the formal and material compatibility of federal or land legislation with this Basic
Law or as to the compatibility of land legislation with other federal legislation at the request of one third of
the Members of the Bundestag." "Land" in Article 93 means a state of Germany.
97. See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L J. 837
at 861 (1991), which states:
German constitutional theory posits the dual character of basic rights. These rights are
both negative and positive. A negative right is a subjective right to liberty. It protects
the individual against the state, vindicating his right to freedom and personal
autonomy. A positive right, on the other hand, represents a claim that the individual
has on the state.
See also Martin Rhonheimer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in a
Constitutional Democracy, 43 AM. J. JuRis 135, 150, which states: "Fundamental rights not only represent
the freedoms of the individual in relation to the state but also express an order of values to be realized by the
political community; they constitute the aims that define state functions and tasks."
98. PlenarprotokoU 14/131, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 131. Sitzung, Berlin,
Freitag, den 10 November, 2000 [German Parliament (lower house) Stenographic Report. 131 st sitting, Berlin,
Nov. 10, 2000] at p. 12614D [hereinafter Stenographic Report, Bundestag, Nov. 10, 2000].
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violated constitutional norms, the right to life under Article 2 (2) and the right
to dignity under Article 1.99
Despite arguments concerning a woman's right to the free development of
her personality, guaranteed by Article 2 (1), the Federal Constitutional Court
struck down the legislation and required the federal government of Germany to
re-institute criminal sanctions for abortions. The Court determined that the right
to life under Article 2 of the Constitution extended to fetuses fourteen days after
conception. Any interference with pregnancy, after the fourteen days had
passed, would be a primafacie deprivation of a constitutionally protected right
to life. The Court carved out from the general prohibition against abortion four
specific exceptions. These included pregnancies that threaten the life of the
mother, cases of rape or incest, gross deformation of the fetus, and social
hardship.' °°
The approach of the Court in the Abortion Case is significant. In that case,
legislation, which liberalized law and extended rights to women, was held to be
unconstitutional. The Court found that the government could not extend these
rights to women without violating the constitutional protection of life.
Analogously, German conservatives have already made the argument that the
state has a positive obligation to protect and promote the institution of marriage,
and that this protection must be exclusive.' 0 They further argue that any
legislation that legitimizes or recognizes any other form of union between two
persons undermines that exclusivity.
For several reasons it is not certain that the Life Partnership Act will be
struck down. German, like American, constitutional law is often animated by
the past. When a court makes a decision in an American constitutional case
concerning equal protection or due process, the legacy of slavery and
segregation seldom remains far from the judge's thoughts. °2 Similarly,
99. The Abortion Case, BverfGE 39, 1 (1975), translated in West German Abortion Decision: A
Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 605, 621.
100. Id. at 642. The Court says: "The obligation of the state to take the life developing itself under
protection exists, as a matter of principle, even against the mother." See also id. at 648.
101. Stenographic Report, Bundestag, Nov. 10, 2000, supra note 98, at p. 12614D, (speech by
Norbert Geis of the Christian Democratic Party). He states marriage and family enjoy a constitutional
protection that is exclusive. Although the opinion of Bundestag Representative Geis is not decisive on this
matter, it is important to note that the Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted marriage under Article 6
to mean a union between a man and a woman. See Stenographic Report, Nov. 5, 1999, supra note 32, at p.
6035C, statement by Volker Beck of the Green Party.
102. See Runyon Et Ux., DBA Bobbe's School v. McCrary et. al., 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See also
Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In
Bakke, Justice Marshall said, "Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this country in
chains to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage for forced labor, the slave
was deprived of all legal rights." Id. at 387. Further, Justice Marshall stated:
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of
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constitutional judges in Germany are concerned with the past, including the
Third Reich, and its negative legacies which must be overcome.
The majority of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1975 in the Abortion
Case wrote in relation to negative legacies that: "Underlying the Basic Law are
principles for the structuring of the state that may be understood only in light of
the historical experience and the spiritual-moral confrontation with the previous
system of National Socialism."' 3
Recently, there has been a spiritual-moral confrontation with the past in
regard to National Socialist treatment of homosexuals. On January 27, 2000,
on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz concentration camp,
the members of the Party of Democratic Socialism brought a motion before the
Bundestag that called upon the government to declare that all prosecutions by
the Nazis under Paragraph 175 and 175a were illegal.' Secondly, it called
upon the government to offer compensation to the victims and to establish a Dr.
Magnus Hirschfeld institute, which would be supported by both state and
federal money, to document the persecution of Gays in Germany during the
Third Reich. A second motion brought forth on the same day noted that in both
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
consensual sexual relations between same-sex adults were punishable with
prison sentences. It called for the vindication of Gays and an official apology
by the German government for these prosecutions, and striking from the federal
registry of criminals the names of all persons convicted under Paragraph 175.'0'
Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state
interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever
remain a divided society.
Id. at 396.
103. The Abortion Case, supra note 99, at 662.
104. BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the German Parliament]
14/2619 from Jan. 27, 2000, "Unrechtserklfrung der nationalsozialistischen §§ 175 und 175a Nr. 4
Reichstrafgesetzbuch sowie Rehabilitierung und Entschadigung fuir die schwulen und lesbischen Opfer des
NS-Regimes," [Declaration that Paragraphs 175 and 175a No. 4 of the Criminal Code during the Nazi period
were unjust and a call for the vindication of, and apology to, Gay and Lesbian victims of the Nazi Regime].
See also a motion brought by the Social Democrats and the Green Party: BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache)
[Printed matter of the lower house of the German Parliament] 14/2984 from Mar. 21, 2000, "Rehabilitierung
der im Nationalsozialismus verfolgten Homosexuellen," [Vindication of Homosexuals persecuted during the
National Socialist regime]. These two motions have been given consideration by the legal committee of the
Bundestag and the report and recommendations can be found in the following document: BT-Drs.
(Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the German Parliament] 14/4894 from Nov.
29, 2000. A resolution apologizing to Gays for persecution during the Third Reich was passed unanimously
by the Bundestag on December 7, 2000. See Plenarprotokoll 14/140, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer
Bericht, 140. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 7. Dezember, 2000 [German Parliament (lower house)
Stenographic Report, 140th sitting, Berlin, Thursday 7 Dec.. 2000] at 13745 A, B (hereinafter Stenographic
Report Dec. 7, 2000].
105. BT-Drs. 14/2620, supra note 17.
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The recent domestic partnership legislation can be viewed as the
culmination of the integration of homosexuals into German society and a
somewhat late Wiedergutmachung (reparation) for past wrongs committed by
previous regimes, including, but not exclusively, the Nazis."°3 Today, human
dignity is the highest value of the German constitutional order. As well, under
Article 2, each citizen has the right to the "free development of his
personality."' 7
Article 3 states that "all people are equal before the law." Politicians have
argued that a same-sex partnership law helps make Gays and Lesbians equal
before the law because it eliminates to a large extent the intended and
unintended discrimination against same-sex relationships that arises from a
system of laws made by the majority for the majority.' A law which makes
living as man and man or woman and woman less socially awkward could be
viewed as providing two and one-half million persons with the freedom to
develop their personalities and a right of dignified living.
The Federal Constitutional Court also might hold that marriage rights
under Article 6 are not injured to any extent by giving homosexuals the right to
legitimize their relationships. This group of persons, by definition, is excluded
from taking advantage of marriage rights, which are extended only to
heterosexuals. The Court could find that despite the introduction of a same-sex
partnership law, marriage rights can be upheld fully as they always have been.
The chance to right past wrongs, to protect groups victimized by the Nazis, to
defend dignity, to protect the right of the free development of personality, and
to ensure that "all people are equal before the law" are compelling motives for
the Federal Constitutional Court to view the legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships as neither detrimental to nor competitive with the institution of
marriage.' °9
106. Bandestag Representative Hanna Wolf (Munich) of the Social Democratic Party states that what
the legislation concerns may be found in its title: The Law to End Discrimination against Same-Sex Couples.
She further states that "after one century of discrimination, this is a long overdue reparation
['Wiedergutmachung"] to Lesbians and Gays." See Stenographic Report. Bundestag, Nov. 10, 2000, supra
note 98, at 12620 D.
107. Id. at 12624 A, (speech by Volker Beck, Green Party). He makes reference to Article 2 (1) in
his discussion concerning the reasons why the same-sex partnership legislation is constitutional.
108. Id. at 12628 B, C, speech by Alfred Hartenbach, Social Democratic Party. He says that rather
than violating constitutional norms, the Partnership Law fulfills the requirements of Article 3 of the
Constitution.
109. Of course, there remains a possibility that the Federal Constitutional Court will interpret Article
6 to be exclusive in nature thus making competitive forms of "spousal" arrangements unconstitutional. There
also might arise questions concerning the government's division of the original legislation into two bills in
order to circumvent opposition in the Bundesrat.
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X. CONCLUSION
Granting legitimization to same-sex spousal relations started in Denmark
and spread to other Nordic nations. This trend toward liberalization ultimately
influenced the European Union, with its focus on human rights. From the
European Parliament came a resolution that spurred on discussion about the
legal treatment of Gays and Lesbians. In the 1990s, even socially conservative
nations began to reevaluate their positions on these issues, and at the very least,
they took action to end those practices that were most discriminatory.
Located at the heart of Europe, Germany watched as its neighbors, France,
Belgium, and Holland experimented with laws making spousal rights more
flexible, either by the institution of "quasi-marriage" or extending to
homosexuals the possibility of a recognized legal framework for their
relationships. Pressure mounted upon the Kohl government to move forward
on the issue of same-sex partnerships. Ultimately with a new political
constellation in place in September 1998, it became possible for legislation to
be drafted that would change German society fundamentally.
Since 1945, Germans have struggled to bring democracy and human rights
to Central Europe. Against an historical backdrop of totalitarianism, the
German Constitution of 1949 defends democracy and places the protection of
the dignity and worth of the individual as the highest societal good. In 2001, on
account of this parthership legislation, the German government will grant
dignity and vindication to a group in society that had been victimized by the
Nazis. This legislation will overcome many defects of past legal structures, and
Gays and Lesbians will become more fully integrated into German society.
On account of the fact that Germany is the most wealthy and populous
nation in the European Union, its example will be significant. The German
legislation, combined with initiatives in Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland,
Sweden, and regions of Spain, has turned the tide in terms of favoring
legitimization of same-sex relationships in the European Union. One can
anticipate that because of this recent initiative taken in Berlin, same-sex
partnership laws will become in the next decade an entrenched norm of the
European Union and an established practice all across the European continent.*"
*** This article was completed in May of 2001, and it represents the legal situation as of that date.
On August 1, 2001, the partnership legislation went into effect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whoever, being a citizen or resident of the United States and a
member of the crew or ship's company of any foreign vessel engaged
in the slave trade, or whoever, being of the crew or ship's company
of any vessel owned in whole or in part, or navigated for, or in behalf
of, any citizen of the United States, lands from such vessel, and on
any foreign shore seizes any person with intent to make that person
a slave, or decoys or forcibly brings, carries, receives, confines,
detains or transports any person as a slave on board such vessel, or,
on board such vessel, offers or attempts to sell any such person as a
slave, or on the high seas or anywhere on tide water, transfers or
delivers to any other vessel any such person with intent to make such
person a slave, or lands or delivers on shore from such vessel any
person with intent to sell, or having previously sold, such person as
a slave, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
seven years, or both.'
At first glance, 18 U.S.C. § 1585 appears to be a curious artifact embedded
in the United States Code. It is part of a chapter on peonage and slavery, whose
other seven sections deal with peonage,2 involvement with vessels for the slave
trade,3 enticement into slavery, sale into involuntary servitude,5 service on
slavers,' possession of slaves,7 and the transportation of slaves from the United
States.8 At first glance, these laws would appear to be more appropriate for a
nineteenth century historical treatise or a romantic novel rather than a code
constituting the law of the land. This paper will examine the existence of the
maritime slave trade and analogous problems in the twentieth century and
consider supporting arguments and evidence for the retention and elaboration
of 18 USC § 77 as we move into a new millennium.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1585 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1585 (1999) (seizure, detention, transportation or sale
of slaves).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1995, 1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1581 (1984, 1999) (peonage: obstructing
enforcement).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1582 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1582 (1999) (vessels for slave trade).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (1995, 1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1583 (1999) (enticement into slavery).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1584 (1999) (sale into involuntary servitude).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1586 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1586 (1999) (service on vessels in slave trade).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1587 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1587 (1999) (possession of slaves aboard vessel).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1588 (1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1588 (1999) (transportation of slaves from United
States).
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A. "Beyond the Horizon": The 20th Century "Classic" Slave Trade
Overseas
While the Atlantic9 and East African 0 slave trade had largely ceased by the
beginning of the twentieth century, classic maritime slaving was still practiced
in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf area. It seems likely, for example, that the
kidnaping of Eritrian women by pirates (which led to calls for more stringent
policing by the Italian government) was for slaving purposes." The second half
of the twentieth century has shown persistence in this trade. Gerald de Gaury,
writing about his Arabian experiences in 1950, noted that "[iun 1941 the price
of a small boy was about £20, for a strong young male £50 (for a Somali rather
more), [and] for a small girl £12, which is considerably less than the price of a
good horse.., and a little less.than that of a camel."' 2 According to de Gaury,
"the main route for them is to Mecca from the Yemen, where they are brought
by sailing-boats from the opposite African coast."' 3 A November 7, 1953,
report from France's ambassador to the Saudis claims that naturalized Saudis
of Senegalese origin posed as Muslim missionaries in Sudan, Upper Volta and
Niger and inveigled the faithful to make the haj (pilgrimage). This apparently
occurred despite the 1936 decree of King Saud prohibiting the importation of
slaves by sea. They were then transported by truck to Port Sudan or Suakin on
the Red Sea and took specially constructed dhows across to Rith, only to be
declared illegal pilgrims, thrown into prison and have their services sold. Sean
O'Callaghan reports a generally similar scam, with the exception of the initial
temptation and with land transportation being by camel on an individual basis. 4
O'Callaghan also found evidence of the funneling of slaves through Suakin
from as far away as Zaire "and was given specific information from one slaver
about a shipment of 10 juveniles, mainly Gallas, whom he had sent from Suakin
9. This does not necessarily mean that West African slavery had been extinguished, "in 1960 Lord
Faringdon noted the continuing traffic in slaves on the coast river in eastern Nigeria, with boys taken upstream
and sold to farmers in French-controlled territory and girls shipped downstream to Fernando Po." Dr. Samuel
Pyeatt Menefee, TRENDS IN MARnTME VIOLENCE: A SPECIAL REPORT FROM JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
AND JANE'S SENTINEL 44 (n.d.). See also Sean O'Callaghan, THE SLAVE TRADE TODAY 185 (1961) (quoting
from 225 HANSARD, 104, Thursday, July 14, 1960).
10. Sean O'Callaghan reports rumors of white slavers operating as far south as Zanzibar. See Sean
O'Callaghan, supra note 9, at 125-29; Dr. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, supra note 9, at 44.
11. See PRO C 10903/10903/22; Samuel Pyeatt Menefee "Piracy and Maritime Crimes of
Violence," at 42 (ms.; n.d.).
12. GERALD DE GAURY, ARABIAN JOURNEY AND OTHER DESERT TRAVELS 89 (1950).
13. Id.
14. Dr. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, supra note 9, at 43. See also C.W.W. G[reenridge], "Slavery:
Slavery After World War I," in 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 786 (1964); SEAN O'CALLAGHAN, supra note
9, at 108-11 (quoting dispatch from ambassador).
2001]
498 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:495
to Lith."' "Djibouti has been another transhipment port for slaves from
southern Ethiopian who have been sent across the Red Sea to Yemen,"' 6 a city
also "identified as a clearing house for slaves landed by dhow from Sudan [and]
Ethiopia. .. ",
Africa has not been the only source of slaves for the Arabian peninsula
during the twentieth century. De Gaury notes that:
Among the white-skinned slaves from Persia or Indian Mekran, who
fetch a higher price, are some who remember whence and how they
came. It was usually to the Oman coast, but there are other clearing-
houses on the mainland, much farther north, where cargoes of boys
according to a good authority, were still arriving in 1947. The trade
is if anything increasing, probably because of the cheapness of money
consequent upon the War, the high cost of labourers, wives, and
servants.1
Noting the difficulty in stanching this flow, de Gaury states that "it would,
to be effective, entail the use of a number of fast vessels especially built to the
quest."' 9
According to Viscount Maugham in a House of Lords debate on July 14,
1960, a slave route extended from Iran and Iraq across the Persian Gulf to the
Arabian peninsula. O'Callaghan states that he was told that as late as this date,
men were shipped from Abadan to Kuwait by dhow, smuggled to Bahrain and
sold into slavery. A story said to have appeared in a November 1958 Iranian
newspaper reported the discovery of two starving men on a Persian Gulf island-
all that remained of a group of 40 transportees who had been marooned there by
a dhow captain seeking to avoid the Iranian Navy. Many such individuals were
allegedly employed in pearl fishing and kept in a perpetual state of indentured
servitude through loans for food."
While not prolific, this evidence suggests a continuing trickle of slaves
shipped by sea, which argues that 18 U.S.C. § 77 can be viewed as more than
an historical artifact. The development of international law on the subject
during the century bolsters this conclusion.
15. Dr. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, supra note 9, at 43.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Gerald de Gauzy, supra note 12, at 90.
19. Id.
20. Dr. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, supra note 9. at 43. See also Sean O'Callaghan, supra note 9, at
122-23, 174.
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B. The Slave Trade and Twentieth Century International Law: A Brief
Overview
Initially, twentieth century developments in the law on slavery related to
earlier agreements dealing with the African Slave Trade such as the General Act
for the Repression of the African Slave Trade.2" The 1919 Convention of St.
German-en-Laye declared that its contracting parties would "endeavour to
secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the slave-trade
by land and sea."22 Greenridge notes that the Brussels act of 1890 "is still in
force as between parties to it which did not adhere to the Convention of St.
Germain-en-Laye ... and doubts are entertained by international lawyers of
authority as to whether it was in fact abrogated even between parties to the
convention." 3 A League of Nations investigation of slavery by the Slavery
Commission of 1924 included not only the Red Sea trade, but forms of servitude
in Liberia and Ethiopia resulting in the 1926 Convention to Suppression the
Slave Trade and Slavery. This recognized the metamorphosis in the trade, as
parties were not only to "prevent and suppress" the practice, but "to bring about,
progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all
its forms," including certain forms of forced labor.' Due to the continuation of
slavery problems, a second League of Nations Standing Committee was
established in 1932, which called for a Permanent Advisory Committee of
Seven Experts on the subject. 25 After World War II, the new United Nations
appointed an ad hoc committee of four to consider the problem of slavery.
The committee recommended that the definition of slavery in the 1926
Slavery Convention was accurate and adequate and that the United Nations
should assume the powers and functions of the League of Nations under the
Slavery convention. It further recommended that a Supplementary Convention
on Slavery should be prepared to remedy deficiencies found by experience to
exist in the 1926 Slavery Convention.26
This resulted in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery in
1956, stating that "[t]he act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from
21. General Act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade, Brussels, July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886,
T.S. No. 383, 1 Bevans 134.
22. C.W.W. G[reenridge], supra note 14, at 786.
23. id.
24. See Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Geneva, September 25, 1926, 60
LN.T.S. 253, 46 Stat. 2183 at 2191, T.S. No. 778, 2 Bevans, 607, arts. 1, 2, 5. A separate Forced Labor
Convention was drafted in 1930, dealing with "'work or service (other than penal labor), exacted under means
of a penalty."' C.W.W. G[reenxidge], supra note 14, at 786).
25. This met from 1935-38. See C.W.W. G[reenridge] supra note 14, at 786. This Committee
issued annual reports, the second part of each dealing with slave raiding and the slave trade. See id.
26. Id.
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one country to another by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory
thereto, shall be a criminal offense under the laws of States Parties ... ,"27 The
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea considered the subject
and embedded an anti-slavery article in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas:
"Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the transport
of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of
its flag for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever
its flag, shall, ipso facto, be free."' This wording was adapted as article 99 of
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.29 Thus, it can be seen that at the
close of the twentieth century, a strong continuing basis exists in international
law for criminalization of the slave trade.
C. "The New American 'Slavers"': A Slave Trade Analogue in Western
Waters
It is comforting to assume that problems like those of the slave trade only
exist in some "diminished capacity" over the horizon. The truth, unfortunately,
is otherwise, as slave-trade analogues have been occurring in American waters
with increased frequency. The problem of illegal Chinese immigration provides
one obvious case study.
In September 1991, American authorities first intercepted a vessel carrying
illegal Chinese immigrants.30 It has been estimated that in the years following:
[Slome 50 Chinese crime groups have smuggled tens of thousands of
Chinese into the U.S. The routes vary, some plying the seas, others
the air or the overland paths through Mexico. But the sticker price of
$20,000 to $35,000 per head holds steady. In the southern coastal
province of Fujain, home to some 80% of these immigrants, families
band together to raise the funds, thinking they are making a down
payment not only on a loved one's future but on their own as well.
For their effort, they often bankrupt their savings--only to sell the
loved one into slavery.3'
27. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Geneva, September 7, 1956,266 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418,
art. 3(1). See also J.A.C. Gutteridge, Supplementary Slavery Convention, 1956,6 INT'L & CoMP. L Q. 449
(1957).
28. Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.LA.S. No. 5200, art 13.
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 99.
30. Marlowe Hood, Why Clinton cannot stem the flood of illegal immigrants, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, July 18, 1993, at 5, available at lexis.com.
31. Jill Smolowe, Where's the Promised Land? 141 TIME, no. 25, June 21, 1993, at 29. Paul
George notes that the United States Coast Guard intercepted 3000 illegal Chinese boat immigrants between
September 1991 and April 1994. See Paul George, Immigration By Sea to North America: More Golden
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On June 6, 1993, the Golden Venture grounded off Rockaway peninsula
in Queens. Some two hundred and eighty five illegal Chinese immigrants were
aboard, and six to eight of them perished in the surf.32 The conditions aboard
the rusty freighter came as a shock. Flies swarmed among the clothing,
blankets, and personal possessions that were strewn everywhere, and the smell
of urine and fecal matter filled the air. Says Petty Officer Chris O'Neil of the
Coast Guard:
You don't like to say something smelled like death, but... [n]o food
was in evidence, save some rice. An assortment of bags illustrated
the efforts of the ship's 285 immigrants to collect rainwater for
drinking. Despite the damp conditions in the cargo hold, exposed
wires jutted every which way."
Asian analyst Paul George notes that:
Typically, a down-payment is made in China with the balance being
paid off over many years of virtual slave labor in the garment and
restaurant industries .... Retribution for failing to make repayment
is believed to be harsh. For the individual, the voyage usually
involves many months crowded into the hold of an unseaworthy
vessel with inadequate toilet and bathing facilities. Paid enforcers
maintain brutal control over the passengers and distribute the food,
which consists only of rice.'
Ventures?, Commentary, no. 43, April, 1994, available at http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.cc/eng/comment/com43e.html (on file with author).
32. See PAUL GEORGE, supra note 31; JILL SMOLOWE, supra note 31, at 29; Bertil Lintner,
Organized Crime: World Wide Web: The tangled trail of illicit Chinese migrants, in FAR EASTERN EcONOMIC
REVIEW 34, available atWestlaw: 1998 WL.-FEER 652f798; Michael Grey, USpledges action on smuggled
immigrants, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, June 9, 1993, at 3, available at Westlaw: 1993 WL 10624069 (stating that
the Golden Venture was the 24th ship apprehended smuggling illegal immigrants into the US). See also
Jennifer Mattos, Tarnished Venture, A. MAGAZINE, July 30, 1996, available at Westlaw: 1996 WL 15520458
(noting an increase in illegal smuggling vessels from China... from just a few in 1989 to 17 ships in 1992.");
Gordon Witkin et al., One way, $28,000 Why smuggling aliens into American is a boom business, U.S. NEWS
&WORLD REPORT, April 14, 1997, available at Westlaw: 1997 WL 8331882 ("at least 43 smuggling ships
... have brought Chinese aliens to the Western Hemisphere since 1991. A 1996 Coast Guard report pegs the
number of Chinese immigrants crossing the Pacific by boat at 400 to 600 people a month.").
33. Jill Smolowe, supra note 31, at 29. Such appalling conditions were not unusual; the Chens, a
Fujian couple who arrived illegally in 1992, subsisted for two months "on a single bottle of water weekly and
a single meal daily." Id. See also Jennifer Mattos, supra note 32.
34. Paul George, supra note 31.
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While several vessels directly targeted the western and eastern coasts of the
United States, other sea smugglers have used a more oblique approach:
Mexico.35
Upon arrival, assuming they are not intercepted, the immigrants have to
fade into American life, but in fact enter a strange half world run by the Chinese
tongs and "snakeheads" who have sponsored their immigration. "We live like
pigs and eat like dogs." Working for minimal wages with no legal safeguards,
many of the immigrants live in gang-run safe houses.3" Tales of forced behavior
abound. Twice during 1998 "gang members surrounded the Bowry quarters,
blocked the fire escapes, then calmly robbed the residents of their savings. The
victims didn't complain, they said, because they feared retaliation against their
families in China if they caused trouble for the gangs."37 On other occasions,
when workers cannot pay off their immigration debt, the gangsters offer them
a deal. The illegals describe their ex-employer's operation and return with
shotguns and masks to rob the place with members of the gang. The debt is
then canceled. "Local police are usually stumped, but we know exactly what
35. See Id.; THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 1993, available at Westlaw: 1993 WL 12190650 (noting a
single maritime seizure which netted 661 illegal Chinese immigrants); Yogana Sharma, China: International
Action Needed to Stop Human Smuggling, Inter Press Service Global Information Network, available at
Westlaw: 1993 WL 2538372 (noting the repatriation of three boatloads of illegal immigrants from Mexico).
See also Bert Wilkinson, Authorities Investigating Major Alien Smuggling Ring, Inter Press Service Global
Information Network, available at Westlaw: 1994 WL 2588935 (smuggling of immigrants by boat from
Guyana). Peter Kwong notes that Chinese human smuggling entails an elaborate and sophisticated
international network, which is said to be financed and masterminded in Taiwan. The whole operation is like
a global baseball game. Most often, the sprint to first base involves the transfer of would-be immigrants from
Fuzhou or Wenzhou to international waters, where they are picked up by Taiwanese cargo ships or fishing
boats. After each vessel is fully loaded (the shipping companies are paid by the head), it sails south to
Thailand for refueling before making the dash to second base, across the Pacific to the coast of Central
America or Mexico. The southern sea route is specifically chosen to avoid detection by U.S. reconnaissance
satellites monitoring American coastal waters. (The path selected by the Golden Venture-making a landing
off the American shoreline-is the most risky and least popular route.) Having landed, the smuggling crew
escorts its charges to third base, crossing the U.S. border by land. If the ship comes ashore in Central
America, the immigrants travel through Mexico City, cross the border clandestinely and arrive in Houston.
If they land in the Baja peninsula of Mexico, they cross into San Diego and rest in safe houses in Monterey
Park before making their way to New York. Kwong, China's Human Traffickers: Wake of the Golden
Venture, 259 THE NATION no. 12, October 17, 1994, available at Westlaw: 1994 Wl. 1344869. See also
CLIVE CUSSLER, FLOOD TIDE: A NOVEL (1997); small watercraft plying between islands in the St. Lawrence
river, CP, Human Smuggling Ring Busted, in LONDON FREE PREsS (1998), available at Westlaw: 1998 WL
27450952 (noting that "(t]he ring is believed to have made 33 smuggling runs in 60 days, moving from eight
to 24 persons per run and adding that the illegals "paid "$40,000 US or more and some worked as indentured
servants for years to pay their fee!").
36. Slaves of New York, 72 TIME, November 2, 1998 (noting the presence of 300 such safe houses
in New York city).
37. Id.
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happens," says [New York city police intelligence officer Tony] Ong. "It has
been a nationwide problem."38
Such illegal workers "are slaves, pure and simple," says a United States
immigration official. "Many end up in bondage, forced to become gang
enforcers or drug carriers."39 The coercive nature of the smuggling has been
confirmed by at least one of the bosses involved in the racket,' of his $20,000
prepaid package trips, which he claims have a success rate of 80% to 90%.
"What if the Chinese illegal is detained?" a writer asks.
"We will get him out," Big Boss says cockily.
"What if the full fee cannot be paid?"
"That," Big Boss says calmly, "is very dangerous business."'4
While American sources testify as to the force used against illegal
immigrants, Chin Ko-Lin of Rutgers University reports that:
[Miany illegal immigrants are locked up in "safe houses" until their
final installment is paid. Sometimes triad goons are hired to do the
collection, and the "safe houses" turn into "hell houses," says Chin.
Methods of persuasion to pay up include sexual assault, starvation,
and the chopping-off of fingers.' 2
Similar brutality infects European safe houses. "When these people arrive,
those who do not pay up are treated as slaves, sometimes they even have an ear
chopped off," Winrich Granityka, police chief in Cologne, said in a recent
interview. "To pay their debts, women are often forced to prostitution .... ,,4'
When relatives cannot pay a fare, immigrants are often forced to borrow
money from the "snakeheads" at rates of thirty percent. "The snakeheads hire
enforcers to beat up debtors who evade their obligations. A favorite tactic is to
threaten the victim's relatives with his imminent execution so they will come
up with some quick cash." Asiaweek has described New York's Chinatown
as a "grim place where powerful businessmen and crime syndicates keep...
[undocumented workers] in line with threats of kidnaping, torture and rape. ' 45
Despite such hardships, the wave of illegal immigration continues. In July
1995, the Jung Sheng 8 with 147 Chinese illegals was nabbed by the Coast
38. Id.
39. Jill Smolowe, supra note 31, at 29.
40. A Thai of Chinese extraction, who spoke on the record.
41. Id.
42. Bertil Lintner, supra note 32.
43. Id.
44. Peter Kwong, supra note 35.
45. Books: Fear and Bondage in America: How dreams turn into nightmares for Chinese illegals,
ASIAWEEK, June 16, 1998, available at Westlaw: 1998 WL 13699293. See also PETER KWONG,
FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LABOR (1998).
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Guard 800 miles south of Hawaii. Some of the migrants were beaten and
sexually abused by enforcers on board, and many suffered from skin and urinary
tract infections due to dehydration and unsanitary conditions. "When we pulled
the hatch on the hold, we were overwhelmed with a rush of hot steamy air that
smelled of urine and fecal matter," says Lt. Shannon Crothers, a Coast Guard
boarding officer. "The smell just never went away.'"
Early in 1999 "a surge of illegal smuggling vessels began targeting the
island of Guam,"' 7 while in September of that year, suspected Chinese illegals
were removed from a ship off Vancouver by Canadian authorities; the vessel
was one of three ships with no names or flags recently spotted in the area."'48 It
seems clear that this represents an ongoing problem, which will remain with us
into the new millennium. How then may American law on the subject best be
revised to cover the modem maritime slave trade?
III. "FURTHER REVISION... SHOULD BE CONSIDERED": UPDATING UNITED
STATES LAW ON THE SLAVE TRADE
It was felt that further revision of this chapter should be considered at an
opportune time for the same reasons stated with respect to Chapter 81, "Piracy
and Privateering."49
In recasting American law on the slave trade to take account of
contemporary conditions, a process similar to that used for piracy and
privateering would appear to be in order.50 The following discussion will focus
on major suggestions and corrections which might be considered.
46. GORDON WITLAIN, DANA HAWKINS, and BRIAN PALMER, supra note 32.
47. INS Repatriates Second Group of Chinese Nationalsfrom Tinian, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE NEWS RELEASE, June 22, 1999, available at
http'//www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/pubicaffairs/newsrelstinian.htm (noting eighteen boats which have landed
or been intercepted at this location since May, 1998).
48. David Osler, Chinese taken off "rustbucket": Canada, LLOYD'S LIST, September 2, 1999,
available on Westlaw (1999 WL 21568339).
49. 18 U.S.C. §. 77 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 77 (1984) (historical and revision notes). The note to
Chapter 81 states:
In the light of far-reaching developments in the field of international law and foreign
relations, the law of piracy is deemed to require a fundamental reconsideration and
complete restatement, perhaps resulting in drastic changes by way of modification and
expansion .... It is recommended.. that at some opportune time in the near future,
the subject of piracy be entirely reconsidered and the law bearing on it modified and
restated in accordance with the needs of the times.
50. See "Yo Heave Ho!": Updating America's Piracy Laws, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L J. 151-79 (1990-
A. § 1581. Peonage; Obstructing Enforcement"
(a) Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage,
or arrests any person with the intent of placing him in or returning
him to a condition of peonage, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) Whoever obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in any way interfere
with or prevent the enforcement of this section, shall be liable to the
penalties prescribed in subsection (a). 2
In addition to problems of coverage, this section suffers from poor drafting
and verbosity. As currently drafted, those who return an individual to peonage,
however inadvertent or innocent, their action may be, are liable to fine or
imprisonment. It would serve further to require a mens rea. Similarly,
expansion to include slavery and indentured servitude would provide more
comprehensive coverage of the problem. A more succinct reading of § 1581(a),
might be: Whoever entices, persuades or induces, kidnaps or carries away,
sells, receives, holds or detains, arrests, transfers, delivers, or transports any
person with the intent of placing him in, keeping, or returning him to a
condition of slavery, peonage, or indentured servitude shall be fined.
B. § 1582. Vessels for Slave Trade3
As drafted, the section suffers from three major flaws-the individuals
covered, the required geographical nexus for their crimes, and the limitation to
maritime situations. It would appear a better strategy to concentrate on the mens
rea of the persons involved rather than their particular title or designation, and
to expand geographical coverage to allow for a more universal jurisdiction. As
has been argued in the case of piracy, establishment of an expansive jurisdiction
does not require the prosecution of the crime in all cases; it is better that
jurisdictional overlapping occur, rather than that some criminal conduct be
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1995) (peonage; obstructing enforcement).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1581(a) (1999); 18 U.S.C. § 1581(b) (1995); 18
U.S.C.A. § 1581 (b) (1984).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1582 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1582 (1999) (Vessels for slave trade).
Whoever, whether as master, factor, or owner, builds, fits out, equips, loads, or
otherwise prepares or sends away any vessel, in any port or place within the United
States, or causes such vessel to sail from any such port or place, for the purpose of
procuring any person from any foreign kingdom or country to be transported and held,
sold, or otherwise disposed of as a slave, or held to service or labor, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.
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allowed to "fall between the cracks., 54 Similarly, an expansion to include
potential aerial transport would appear to be in order. A redraft of this section
could read:
Whoever builds, fits out, equips, loads or otherwise prepares, sends
away, or insures a vessel, vehicle or aircraft with knowledge that it is
to be used for the transportation, sale, or disposal of slaves, peons, or
indentured servants, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than seven years, or both.
C. § 1583. Enticement into Slavery5
Whoever kidnaps or carries away any other person, with the intent
that such other person be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as
a slave; or whoever entices, persuades, or induces any other person
to go on board any vessel or to any other place with the intent that he
may be made or held as a slave, or sent out of the country to be so
made or held, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.56
Section 1583 has certain problems of coverage. While its first paragraph
speaks of slavery or indentured servitude, only the former is referred to in the
subsequent "subsection." Enticement into involuntary servitude is thus not a
punishable crime! Neither paragraph covers the subject of peonage. A more
expansive statement might read: (a) Whoever kidnaps or carries a person away
with the intent that he be made a slave, peon, or involuntary servant; or (b)
Whoever entices, persuades, or induces a person to board a vehicle, vessel or
aircraft or to travel to any location with the intent that the person be made a
slave, peon, or involuntary servant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both.
D. § 1584. Sale into Involuntary Servitude 7
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells
into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or
54. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 'Boxing the Compass': A Review of Contemporary Laws of Piracy
and Their Legal Framework (December 5, 1996) (speech at semi-annual MARLO [Maritime Liaison Office]
Shipping Conference, Dubai, U.A.E.).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (1999) (enticement into slavery).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (1995, 1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1583 (1999).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1999) (sale into involuntary servitude).
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brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.58
As currently drafted, this only covers the condition of involuntary
servitude. A redraft of the section could combine it with § 158 L"
E. § 1585. Seizure, Detention, Transportation or Sale of Slaves,
This section only applies to citizens or residents of the United States,
leaving other foreigners free to engage in slavery activities. Expansion to
include forms of land and air transportation would appear to be in order. Again,
an amended § 1581 could include the major points made under this section."'
F. § 1586. Service on Vessels in Slave Trade62
Whoever, being a citizen or resident of the United States, voluntarily
serves on board of any vessel employed or made use of in the
transportation of slaves from any foreign country or place to another,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years
or both.'
Two problems similar to those found with previous situations appear in this
section, the class of those subject to the law, and the absence of any requirement
for intent. There seems to be no good reason to confine the statute's ambit to
United States citizens or residents, and equally, no need to make criminal the
activity of voluntarily serving on board a slaver if the crewman lacks the
necessary mens rea. Particularly with the advent of hidden compartments, it is
not inconceivable that some members of the crew might not be in on a
smuggling racket, and it thus seems unfair to make their mere present on board
criminal. Again, the current statute seems to be adequately covered by a revised
version of § 1581.
G. § 1587. Possession of Slaves Aboard Vessel
Whoever, being the captain, master, or commander of any vessel
found in any river, port, bay, harbor, or on the high seas within the
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1584 (1999).
59. Supra note 51; see also supra text accompanying note 51.
60. Supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
61. Supra note 51; see also supra text accompanying note 5 !.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1586 (1995) (service on vessels in slave trade).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1586 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1586 (1999).
64. Supra note 51; see also supra text accompanying note 51.
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jurisdiction of the United States, or hovering off the coast thereof, and
having on board any person for the purpose of selling such person as
a slave, or with intent to land such person for such purpose, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than four years, or
both.
As it now exists, this statute exclusively relates to the individual in charge
of a vessel. Additionally, it is not clear whether any place outside American
jurisdiction is included in the statute's ambit, nor are peonage or involuntary
servitude considered within the context of the law. A revised § 1581 would
appear to cover these matters adequately.
H. § 1588. Transportation of Slaves from United StatesO
Whoever, being the master or owner or person having charge of any
vessel, receives on board any other person with the knowledge or
intent that such person is to be carried from any place within the
United States to any other place to be held or sold as a slave, or
carries away from any place within the United States any such person
with the intent that he may be so held or sold as a slave, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 7
While this might initially seem to represent the flip side of § 1585, dealing
with the seizure, detention, transport, or sale of slaves from foreign shores, it
arguably does not cover the transport of slaves between points in the United
States. The key question here is whether "any such place" means any place
besides the point of transhipment, or whether it refers to a place other than "any
place within the United States." Additionally, unlike § 1585, § 1588 makes
owners liable for punishment.68 This section would again be subsumed under
a revised § 1581.
IV. "BROKEN FETTERS": FIGHTING THE 21ST CENTURY SLAVE TRADE
This study has traced the slave trade through some of its 20th century
permutations. It has been shown that vestiges of the "classic" slave trade
remain in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf area, but that the situation has changed
with the introduction of slave trade analogues to American waters, such as the
illegal importation of Chinese immigrants. The greatest threat we face in the
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1587 (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1587 (1999).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1588 (1999) (transportation of slaves from United States).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1588 (1999); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1588 (1999).
68. Although, arguably, § 1585 owners are covered under § 1582.
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21 st century, lies in the landward extension of the slave-like relations between
immigrants and "snakeheads." Much as is the case with marine piracy, changed
conditions call for changed laws. A revised chapter 77 would consist of four
articles, a revised and much expanded § 1581, subsuming many of the previous
articles, revised versions of §§ 1582 and 1583, and a new article making
attempts to engage in the forbidden activities and accessories before and after
the fact, liable to some punishment. Expansion to include peonage and
involuntary servitude would obviate many of the definitional problems found
in the current statutes and would more closely track the targeted behavior as it
is now practiced. Such a revision of 18 U.S.C. § 77 would not only clarify the
meaning of the statutes, but would make law dealing with the maritime slave
trade more directly responsive to the events occurring on today's oceans.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Air rage is a fairly recent phenomenon gaining domestic and international
scrutiny in an area of increasing importance and interest to the traveling public.'
In order to provide reasonable solutions to eliminate or decrease this trend, it is
necessary to analyze recent occurrences, as well as the motives for air rage. It
is also essential to examine government and airline union roles and responses
to the phenomenon. With an understanding of the motives for air rage, along
with a solid background of the current status of the laws around the globe,
proactive measures can then be taken to ensure full and complete prosecution
by governments of disruptive passengers. Part I of this article introduces several
outrageous examples of air rage. Part II examines the important role of airline
unions and governments. Part I presents various domestic and international
air rage statistics and the need for further studies and analysis. Part IV
addresses the role that different cultures may play with air rage. Part V
discusses the potential dangers associated with air rage, from both pilot and
passenger perspectives. Part VI reveals the various measures that airlines are
using to combat air rage. Lastly, Part VII provides the current status of
domestic and international air rage laws, including a discussion of the Tokyo
convention.
II. EXAMPLES OF Am RAGE
With visions of rum punch, sandy beaches, and a week of relaxation ahead,
your mind and body are beginning to transform into vacation mode. Imagine
embarking on an airplane looking forward to a well-earned holiday at a warm
Caribbean resort destination. As the aircraft flies along at 36,000 feet, your
daydream begins. All of a sudden, your daydream is immediately interrupted
by a group of rowdy, drunk passengers singing noisy songs, screaming
obscenities, and throwing objects at the flight crew. This exact scenario
occurred on board an Airtours flight from London, England to Montego Bay,
Jamaica.2 Apparently, the group of twelve passengers started demanding
alcohol shortly after takeoff. A fight ensued when a Jamaican passenger
complained about the other passenger's outlandish behavior and threw beer on
1. Stephen Luckey, Passenger Interference with Flight Crews and the Carry-On Baggage
Reduction Act of 1997, at http://www.safety.alpa.org/testimony/tmO6l198.htm (last visited March 24, 2001)
(hereinafter Hearings] (statement before the Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure U.S. House of Representatives). Mr. Luckey testified in front of the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Aviation under the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. He spoke on
behalf of 49,000 pilots working for 48 airlines in the United States and Canada regarding passenger
interference with flight crews and carry-on bags limits.
2. Elliott Neal Hester, Straightjacket for the Skies, at http://www.salon.comlbusiness/
col/hest/2000/08/1 l/restraintlindex.html (Aug. 11, 2000).
a member of the group, Patrick Connors? Connors, restrained by three flight
attendants, lunged at the Jamaican man. As a result, the captain of the plane
diverted to Norfolk, Virginia, and ten FBI agents boarded the plane and
removed the twelve unruly British passengers.' The disruptive passengers were
returned to England, and Connors was convicted of endangering an aircraft.5
Connors was jailed for twelve months and another member of the group was
jailed for three months.6 The judge presiding at the three-week trial told the
men, "[ffor those passengers around you who were unused to public displays of
violence it must have been a very terrifying incident."7
A more recent international air rage incident receiving media attention
occurred this past holiday season on a British Airways flight from London to
Nairobi A man entered the cockpit and temporarily took over the aircraft
controls causing the plane to nosedive. After a struggle, the pilots managed to
regain control of the plane. It was within only four seconds of crashing to the
ground.9
Another outrageous incident aboard an airplane occurred when a thirty-
nine year old man from Missouri was on the final leg of an Alaskan Airline
flight enroute from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. He became restless and started
acting irrational."0 He took off his shirt, threatened to kill everyone on board,
and even tried to open an exterior plane door." After walking through the
cabin, the man broke into the cockpit and attacked the plane's co-pilot, who
defended himself with a small ax.'2 Six passengers answered the captain's call
for assistance and restrained the man using plastic restraints.' 3 The man was
taken into custody, appeared in federal court, and was charged with interference
with the flight crew.'4
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. AirRage: TheMile-HighMenace, athttp'//www.itn.co.uklWlP/20000820/airrage.shnll (Aug.
20,2000).
7. See id.
8. Jimmy Burns, Passenger Drama Puts BA Jet in Jeopardy: Aircraft Man Tries to Seize Controls,
MN TIMEs (London), Dec. 30, 2000, at National News 3. The plane's automatic pilot was disengaged and the
plane spiraled downward. The man who broke into the cockpit was apparently a deranged mental patient.
9. See id.
10. Ryan Kim, Menace of Air Rage Appears to be Growing, Thursday's Airliner Drama is Part of
a Disturbing Pattern, S. F. EXAMINER, Mar. 18, 2000, at A 1.
i. See id.
12. Hester, supra note 2.
13. See id.
14. Kim, supra note 10.
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There are different categories of passenger misconduct." Some events do
not interfere with flight safety (e.g. minor verbal abuse).16 However, some
actions do interfere with flight safety and cause a crew member's duties to be
disrupted, or may even cause a crew member to become injured. 7 Passengers
have been jailed for one year from everything from a simple refusal to turn off
a cellular phone during a flight, to a passenger with a broken bottle attacking a
flight attendant causing an injury requiring eighteen stitches.' 8
On a flight to Florida from England, a British woman head-butted a flight
attendant after she was asked to stop smoking in the bathroom. 9 The woman
was then detained in a cubicle but she broke loose and had to be controlled by
passengers and the flight crew.2 The pilot had to abort landing the airplane and
went into a holding pattern until the woman calmed down.2' The flight
attendant was treated later for a suspected broken nose.' On a United Airlines
flight from Buenos Aires, Argentina to New York City, a passenger was fined
$50,000 (clean-up fees) by the airline after he assaulted a flight attendant, and
defecated on a first-class food cart.' On a different flight, a passenger placed
his hands around a flight attendant's throat and threatened her because she
accidentally spilled a drink.24 A female passenger grabbed a flight attendant's
finger and bent it backward, saying that she did not like the way the attendant
asked her to put her tray and seat upright before the aircraft landed.2
Shortly after an All Nippon Airways jet left Tokyo, a twenty-eight year old
Tokyo man forced his way into the cockpit by attacking a flight attendant with
an eight-inch knife.26 He told the co-pilot to exit, stabbed the pilot, and then
took control of the airplane. The plane came as close as 1,000 feet to the
ground.27 The co-pilot and two employees entered the cockpit and overpowered
15. Interference With Crewmembers in the Performance of Their Duties - FAA Advisory Circular,
at httpJlwww.faa.govlawafslinterfer.doc (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). See App. B. infra.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Air Rage: The Mile-High Menace, supra note 6.
19. Hester, supra note 2.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Diana Fairechild, Air Rage Caused by Intentional Oxygen Deprivation: Airlines Reduce Oxygen
Levels to Increase Revenue, at http//flyana.com/rage.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
24. See id.
25. See id
26. Elliott Neal Hester, Flying in the Age of Air Rage, at http://www.salon.coml/
travel/diary/hest/1999/09/07/rage/index2.html (Sept. 7, 1999).
27. See id.
2001]
the man. A non-duty pilot managed to land the plane safely, but tragically, the
pilot bled to death. 28
All of the above incidents are examples of recent occurren*ces known as air
rage. Air rage has been defined as "extreme misbehavior by unruly passengers
that can lead to tense moments in the air, putting crew members and passengers
at risk."29 Another definition for air rage is "airline-passenger disruption or
violence in flight."3 One article mentioned that "a disruptive passenger is
characterized as one who interferes with aircrew duties, the quiet enjoyment of
fellow passengers, or creates an unsafe environment."'" It has also been
described as "intentional acts that are highly disproportionate to motivating
factors, which endanger the flight crew and/or other passengers and potentially
jeopardize the safety of the aircraft itself." 2
Ill. ROLE OF AIRLINE UNIONS AND GOVERNMENTS
A. Role of Airline Unions
Airline unions play a strong role in the campaign against air rage. The
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), which represents thousands
of aviation workers around the globe, began a worldwide movement. 33 They
want to decrease the episodes of aggression on aircraft and hope to compel
governments into signing an international convention that would end current
loopholes allowing air rage offenders to avoid criminal charges.34 The
convention calls on all countries to enact laws that prosecute all offenders on all
flights that land in their country.35 Airline employees demonstrated and passed
out literature on July 6, 2000, in many cities around the globe.36 The cities
included Chicago, Montreal, Paris, London, Mexico City, Taipei, Oslo,
Stockholm, Zurich, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Buenos Aires, and Lagos, Nigeria.37
28. See id
29. Air Rage Information Resources, at http://www.airsafe.comlissues/rage.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2001).
30. Ruth Walker, Protecting Travelers from Acts of Air Rage, CHRISTIAN So. MONIToR, June 16,
1999, at World Global Report 1.
31. Donato 1. Borrio, Air Rage: Modem Day Dog-Fight, Increasing Incidents of Disruptive
Passenger Syndrome Seen By Airlines as Alarming Trend, The Fed. Air Surgeon's Medical Bull. (Summer
1999).
32. Nancy Lee Firak & Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Air Rage: Choice of Law for Intentional Torts
Occurring in Flight Over International Waters, 63 ALB. L REv. 1, 7 (1999).
33. Air Rage: The Mile-High Menace, supra note 6.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Lisa Falkenburg, Flight Attendants Seek Stiff Air-Rage Penalties; Leaflet Campaign Tries to
Alert Public; Rise in Violence Cited as Growing Menace, SUN SENTINEL, July 7, 2000, at DI.
37. See id.
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Cabin Crew '89, an industry organization working on the British government's
air rage study group, wants to see air rage legislation passed by the British
parliament.
38
According to the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), an American
union, neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) nor the airlines are
notifying travelers of a recently passed increase in civil fines.39 "Passengers
don't know the fine is there, so what would deter them from going and acting
up?" said Jeff Zack, a spokesman for the Washington, D.C.-based flight
attendants' group.' The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) is a trade
organization that assists members in promoting safety, cost efficiency, and
technology, and provides representation before governments and informational
assistance to passengers." Unions are playing a key role in targeting air rage
offenders, hoping to keep the skies safe for crew and passengers.
B. Role of Government
A key government official on the international front, Deputy Prime
Minister John Prescott of Great Britain, a former transport worker, has
supported the interest in an international treaty against air rage offenders. 42 "I
take the issue of air rage extremely seriously," he said. "Not only are these
incidents an affront to airline workers and passengers, but, at worst, they
threaten aircraft safety.' 3 Britain's Civil Aviation Authority requires British
airlines to report every occurrence concerning disorderly or dangerous
passengers." They must also report if alcohol is a factor in these occurrences.4 5
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) handles and
develops international rules concerning civil aviation matters.46 Internationally,
there are many different legal philosophies and judicial systems, and the ICAO
38. Mark Benham, Huge Surge in Arrests of Violent Plane Passengers, EvENING STANDARD
(London), Jan. 20, 2000, at 5.
39. Richard Poweison, Chill, Air-Ragers: The Worse You Are, the More You'll Pay, SCRIPPS How.
NEWS SERvICE, Aug. 2, 2000, at Domestic News.
40. See id.
41. What is ATA, at http:Hwww.air-transport.org/public/about/16.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
42. Air Rage: The Mile-High Menace, supra note 6.
43. See id.
44. Hester, supra, note 26.
45. See id.
46. Foundation of the International Civil Aviation Organization, at http://www.icao.int/
cgi/goto.pl?icaon/history.htn. (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). In 1944, fifty-two countries signed the
Convention of International Civil Aviation (ICAO), known as the Chicago Convention. After the final 26th
ratification was received, the ICAO was formed in April, 1947. In October 1947, the ICAO became a
specialized agency of the United Nations linked to the Economic and Social Council. As of 1998, there were
185 member countries. Contracting states can be found at
http:/Iwww.icao.intcgi/goto.pl?icao/en/members.htm.
serves to unify countries in certain areas of international aviation law. 7 The
ICAO was created as a way to enlist international cooperation and the highest
degree of uniformity regarding regulations, standards, procedures, and
organization within the airline industry. One of its many functions is to
facilitate the adoption of agreements/treaties and to promote their acceptance. 48
Multiple federal agencies, as well as private organizations, are involved in
the effort to keep passengers safe in the skies. The -Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the American counterpart to Britain's Civil Aviation
Authority, is the agency that regulates the aviation industry and ensures
compliance with safety standards.49 It may require civil penalties for violations
of its laws.50 "From what I've read, air rage is up. Interference with flight crew
members is on the upswing," said FAA spokesman Mitch Barker.5
The United States Department of Justice is aggressively involved in
enforcing federal statutes. 52 The United States Attorneys' Offices prosecute
these cases with their help.53 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has
investigative power over air rage statutory offenses." The Office of
International Affairs and the Office of Terrorism and Violent Crime Section of
Main Justice have knowledge in international affairs.5 They assist in cases
involving violence or terrorism on international flights or on flights that have
an international element. 5'6
United States Senator Harry Reid of Nevada introduced legislation known
as the "Air Rage" bill, which was enacted into law. 7 The United States House
of Representatives also heard testimony regarding the issue.'8 The FAA, in
concert with airline operators and airline unions, has formed Partners in Cabin
Safety (PICS) as part of a government/airline industry initiative.' 9 It will assist
law enforcement officials to respond more reliably to reports of unruly actions.'
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Robert P. Warren, Outline to Prosecuting Federal Crimes CommittedAgainst Airline Personnel
And Passengers, athttp://www.air-transport.org/publicipublications/10l .asp. (last visited Mar. 17,2001) (Air
Transport Association of America).
50. See id.
51. Kim, supra note 10.
52. Warren, supra note 49.
53. See id,
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id
57. Donrey Washington Bureau, Reid Seeks $25,000 Fine For Air Rage, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Oct.
7, 1999, at B7.
58. Hearings, supra note I (statement of Stephen Luckey).
59. Warren, supra note 49.
60. See id.
2001] Fogg
518 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:511
PICS works with law enforcement to address civil enforcement options from the
FAA, as well as criminal enforcement to help with the problem.6' It is also
looking to create a better database to track air violations.62
IV. STATISTICS
Airline travel is at an all time high. The FAA reports general travel
statistics that show air travel passenger volume increasing at a moderate rate
domestically (3%-4% per year through 2010), as well as internationally (5% per
year through 2010).63 In 1999, approximately 499 million people boarded one
of the ten major American carriers to fly within the United States.' In addition,
approximately 55 million people that boarded a flight in the United States flew
to an international destination.65 Regional and commuter carriers accounted for
another 57 million passengers flying domestically." It is anticipated that airport
congestion will get worse before it improves. Because of these growing
statistics, it is important to get a handle on the air rage situation now, versus
later.
Air rage appears to be a global problem.67 However, this is pure
speculation because there are no firm statistics on the problem. "There is no
unified system in the industry for collecting information on these incidents. In
fact, we do not know unequivocally that the number of passenger interference
events is rising, but anecdotal evidence and statistics kept by some air carriers
gives strong credence to that belief.6 8 Based on an analysis of reporting
airlines, as well as a look at the number of recent occurrences reported, it is
clear that air rage is occurring around the world, not just within the United
States. The stories about air rage are never ending. The media gives it much
attention. However, it is difficult to reveal how extensive air rage is because of
conflicting reports from the airlines and from flight crew who actually deal with
the disruptive passengers.69
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Brent D. Bowen & Dean E. Headley, The Airline Quality Rating 2000, Apr. 2000, at
http://www.unomaha.edu-unoai/research/aqrO0 (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Firak, supra note 32.
68. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Stephen Lackey).
69. Inform Passengers of Penalties for Violence, SEATrLE POST-IWTELLIGENCER, Aug. 16, 2000,
at B6.
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A. Domestic Air Rage Statistics
The airlines' reports to the FAA purport that disruptive passenger episodes
decreased between 1997 and 1999, from 320 to 310.70 But according to a
confidential reporting system used by flight crews, incidents aboard American
carriers increased from 66 to 534 during the same years.7 Oftentimes, airline
statistics do not include passenger threats to flight crew that do not involve
violent behavior.72 "A recent study by the FAA indicated that some airlines
have experienced a 400 percent increase in air rage since 1996."' San
Francisco International Airport spokesman Ron Wilson said that in recent years,
the number of confrontational passengers has risen. The airport has reported
121 cases in which passengers were arrested for interfering with flight crew
since 1996.74
The FAA reported that as of the end of the fourth quarter of 2000, there
were 266 violations of federal law for unruly passengers.75 Enforcement actions
for unruly passengers varied greatly between the years 1995-2000.76 In 1999,
the total enforcement actions of unruly passengers were 310, an increase from
the prior year, 1998, when there were 282 violations." Officials are hoping the
decrease in 2000 is related to consumers becoming more educated about the
dangers and penalties associated with air rage. 78 Even though the domestic
statistics purport to show positive signs, it is a little premature to be celebrating.
It is more likely that a standardized national database should be created to gather
uniform air rage statistics from all airlines and aircrew, and an efficient analysis
should then be conducted to study the results.
B. International Air Rage Statistics
British Airways' official statistics show 122 occurrences of air rage
through March 1999. 79  However, an in-house British Airways document
revealed that cabin crew are dealing with more than 644 incidents of physical
70. See id.
71. Herald Traveler, B. HERALD, Aug. 13, 2000, at Travel 66.
72. Powelson, supra note 39.
73. Glenn Puit, Teen Dies After Flight Rampage, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Aug. 13, 2000, at Al.
74. Kim, supra note 10.
75. FAA Enforcement Actions Violations of.14 CFR 91.11,121.580 & 135.120 Unruly Passengers,
at http://www.faa.gov/apa/stats/unruly.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). The FAA's database contains only
those incidents reported to the FAA, and reporting is at the discretion of the crewmember. Year 2000 numbers
may change due to ongoing reporting of December incidents.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Chris Woodyard, Fewer Fliers are Losing Their Cool, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2000, at BI.
7.9. Tom Robbins & David Leppard, Airlines Conceal Attacks on Crew, SUN. TIMES (London), Apr.
2, 2000, at Home News.
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and verbal abuse each year.' During the first half of 1999, thirteen passengers
were restrained by handcuffs on British Airways flights and four flights were
diverted because of disorderly travelers."'
The first survey of air rage cases was announced by the British Civil
Aviation Authority. There were 800 incidents during one seven month period
on all British aircraft, or one incident per 870 flights.82 The British Airways
figures reveal a larger frequency of air rage, with flight crew dealing with
disruptive passengers on one in 440 flights.83 Almost 200 airline passengers
flying into London airports were arrested for disruptive behavior last year
according to statistics." The number of arrests reveals the shocking rise in
aggressive and drunken behavior on airplanes.S Based on the few international
statistics released, along with the continued interest from the media, air rage
seems to be a growing global problem.
Since airplane travel is at an all time high, and statistics have only recently
been gathered, it is difficult to say whether air rage is just a function of more
media attention, or whether it is really an international epidemic. There is a
problem with leaving the situation status quo: continued media attention but no
uniformity among airlines or other country's laws. As an example, one can only
imagine the scrutiny that would result should a major airliner crash as a result
of an incident of air rage. It would be tragic to put if mildly. More proactive
measures, including training, education, and international cooperation are
essential to finding a solution to the problem.
V. How Do CULTURE AND SOCIETY PLAY A ROLE IN Am RAGE?
A. Reasons Associated with the Increase in Air Rage
There are many theories attributed to the increase in air rage and unruly
passenger behavior over the past five years. Experts in various fields have
given their opinion on the subject. One of the bigger questions is why is it so
prevalent now? The United States' aviation industry has led the world for the
past ninety years, helping make air travel safer and more available to hundreds
of millions of travelers." However, air rage is a recent phenomenon, with
statistics just now starting to be gathered and analyzed. Unruly behavior is
displayed by all sectors of the population: male, female, young, old, first class,
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Benham, supra note 38.
85. See id.
86. International and Domestic Aviation, at http:lwww.ostpxweb.dot.govlaviationl xaviat.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001).
business and economy.87 "Statistics compiled by government agencies indicate
that twenty-five percent of air rage incidents involve alcohol; sixteen percent,
disputes over seating assignments; ten percent, smokers who can't light up; nine
percent, carry-on luggage; eight percent, problems with flight attendants; and
five percent, food." 88
There are many reasons that air travel has become frustrating for fliers.
They include more frequent delays, crowded airplanes, busier airports, long
lines, stuffy cabin air, and smaller seating arrangements with less legroom.89
"The planes are crowded. There are delays. I think people in general are just
less tolerant of any infringement on their space or their time," said Northwest
Airlines spokeswoman Kathy Peach.' Experts also theorize that there is a
growing feeling of superiority amongst travelers. They also point to factors
such as less time, overcrowding, advancing technology, and other demands on
the public in the future.9 Other reasons include fear of flying which may create
a sense of powerlessness, or the discrepancy between flier's expectations as
shown in advertisements and the reality of flying.' Social anthropologists have
indicated that crowding generates expanding violence. 93 A recent poll found
that seventy-eight percent of Americans think rude and selfish behavior has
increased at highways and airports. It also showed that seventy-nine percent
said the number of people who get angry at the bad behavior of others has
grown.
94
Another expert commented on blood sugar rates and how they have been
demonstrated to cause stress.9" He also noted that smoking and nicotine
withdrawal has been compared, in scope, to opiate addiction, and that it is a
factor on a closed airplane.9s Additionally, the effects of alcohol are magnified
with altitude. 97 The inside of the airplane cabin is pressurized to 8,000 feet.
Passengers are affected by alcohol more quickly than they realize at high
altitudes. Drinking dehydrates people and this can lead to irritability, fatigue,
and tunnel vision. Alcohol is known to lower a person's inhibitions, but it also
87. Unruly and Disruptive Passengers, at http://www.afanetorg/unruly.htm (last visited Mar. 17,
2001).
88. Marianne Costantinou, Unruly Airline Travelers Will Pay; SFO's Welcoming Committee For
Them Will Include FBI, S. F. ExAMINER, Nov. 18, 1997, at AI.
89. Powelson, supra note 39.
90. See id.
91. Karen S. Peterson, Why is Everyone So Short-Tempered?, USA TODAY, July 18, 2000, at Al.
92. Unruly and Disruptive Passengers, supra note 87.
93. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Stephen Luckey).
94. 'Peterson, supra note 91.
95. Unruly and Disruptive Passengers, supra note 87.
96. See id.
97. See id.
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magnifies the emotional reaction to the difficult flying environment.
Consequently, many air rage incidents have been alcohol related.9"
Yet another expert said air rage could be anything from increased
impatience over waiting in airport lines to more selfishness in society."
"Certain successful individuals have what is called 'significant narcissistic
features' which can be categorized as merely extreme self-confidence. These
individuals resent being told what to do but also have expectations of being
catered to like royalty."'" As noted, the outrageous behavior exhibited by
airline passengers have many explanations including excessive alcohol
consumption, smoking bans, more crowding, longer flights, lack of respect for
authority, and powerlessness associated with flying.'"
Passengers are not the only cause of air rage. Airlines must also accept a
portion of the blame for the problem. "Curtailment of fresh air in airplanes can
be causing deficient oxygen in the brain of passengers, and this often makes
people act belligerent, even crazy," said Dr. Vincent Mark in a telephone
interview, adding "I'm positive about this, and it can be proven with a simple
blood test."'0 2 One passenger stated:
I would suggest that the enraged passenger develops his/her rage at
the plane or in the terminal in specific, direct, and immediate
response to airline employee arrogance, incompetence,
superciliousness, discourtesy, rudeness, ignorance, and disregard for
normal courtesy, much less some things called professional standards
and professional conduct and professional performance.'03
Another culprit is cramped seating. "Airline seats are now as small as seats
on subway trains, and with many flights lasting longer, passengers feel they are
packed like sardines in a can, or chickens in crowded cages."1°4 Also, airlines
have contributed to the lack of storage room by removing closets, leaving little
room for garment bags or heavier outerwear. With eight percent of airline
luggage lost or stolen, passengers are more unwilling to check their luggage.
Another problem is the difference between coach class passenger expectations
for comfort and service, and the actuality of the situation.' °5
98. Fairechild, supra note 23.
99. Kim, supra note 10.
100. Hearings, supra note I (statement of Stephen LUckey).
101. Air Rage Information Resources, supra note 29.
102. Fairechild, supra note 23.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
B. Global Cultural Differences
Subtle cultural differences could have an impact in the way that air crew
and passengers are treated around the globe. Air crew should be able to
understand these differences, which can play a major part in the international
business scene.'0 For example, there are differences in priorities, protocol,
value systems, and methods of reasoning throughout the world. As a case in
point, British tend to be pragmatic, French work conceptually, and Germans
tend to have a legalistic frame of mind.117 Attitudes about time are also
different. Americans generally think that "time is money."' 8 In contrast, Latins
and Mediterraneans are more flexible in their organization of time and time
pressures. Northern Europeans, by comparison, tend to tackle agendas in an
organized, predetermined sequence."°
When an individual negotiates with another from a different country or
culture, it makes sense that ideas are usually evaluated, perceived, and
understood differently. Even if it is only a small change, a person's beliefs and
ideas are affected by their culture, values, and ways of thinking."0 Cultural
differences can play a large role in today's global society. Because of this, it is
important for airlines, travelers, and governments to be sensitive and aware of
these differences, and respond accordingly to the situation.
VI. DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH AIR RAGE
There are many dangerous situations that can occur in an incident of air
rage. Among the more obvious would be a lack of control by the pilot should
a passenger enter the cockpit. For example, during a recent confrontation
between a pilot and passenger in the cockpit of a flight, a plane took a dramatic
dip before the captain regained control. This happened during the scenario
described above when the pilot tried to defend himself with an ax."' Obviously,
rage is especially dangerous in an airplane, versus other locations where assault
and battery take place. The airplane is a closed environment with no place to
escape. Therefore, everyone on the plane is placed in danger, along with other
planes nearby, or any potential people on the ground.
Pilots can become disrupted and make serious flying errors if interrupted
by unruly passengers. These errors can threaten safety, as reported by National
106. Richard Hill, How Europeans Do Business, EUR. CULTURAL DIG., May 1999, available at
http://www.european-digest.com/ecdl l/docs/digest08.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)." 2 In forty percent of 152
studied cases, pilots left the cockpit to allay a commotion, or were interrupted
from their flight duties by other crew who needed assistance. In one-fourth of
the cases, the pilots made errors such as going too fast, flying at the wrong
altitude or taxiing across runways set aside for other airplanes." 3 The report
found fifteen pilot errors out of 152 air rage cases over ten years." 4
A. Pilots' Concerns
Pilots are the ones with the ultimate control and destiny over an airplane
while it is flying. Thus, it is important to listen to their concerns regaiding the
topic of air rage. According to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),
passenger interference is the most persistent safety problem facing the airline
industry. It is a global problem that creates dangerous risks to passengers and
flight crew." 5 ALPA is most concerned about the extreme forms of violence on
board airliners, those that have caused injuries to crew members." 6
B. Passenger Concerns
During the London to Montego Bay flight scenario described above, one
female passenger said the scene was like a "bar room brawl," and said she was
petrified. 7 Other passengers were screaming and crying during the altercation.
The foreman of the jury called for better warnings of the legal dangers of
drinking on airplanes. He said, "[w]e feel there should be a spoken warning
about it being an offense to be drunk on an aircraft during the safety
announcement."" 8
Mr. Thomas J. Payne, Jr., a frequent business traveler and corporate
executive who travels both domestically and internationally approximately ten
months each year, recently shared his personal experiences and viewpoints
regarding the topic of air rage." 9 He has experienced air rage first hand, both
in a plane, on the ground, and in the air. In one incident, he described two
passengers who fought on a flight triggered when one passenger merely pressed
the recline button on his chair. The person sitting behind him slapped the
112. Alan Levin, Air Rage a Threat on Flights; Disruptive Passengers Linked to Pilot Errors, USA
TODAY, Jun. 12, 2000, at Al.
113. Seeid.
114. See id.
115. Hearings, supra note I (statement of Stephen Luckey).
116. See id.
117. Air Rage: The Mile-High Menace, supra note 6.
118. See id.
119. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Payne Jr., Senior Vice President of Students In Free
Enterprise (Sept. 4, 2000). Mr. Payne also serves as a USA Today Road Warrior travel consultant.
individual who had reclined the chair. 20 Mr. Payne commended the
professional crew who responded immediately and prevented the situation from
becoming out of control. The crew simply asked one of the parties to exchange
seats with another passenger.'2' The other event he described occurred on the
ground shortly before takeoff. A couple became incensed with crew members
after the male was accused of smoking in the plane lavatory. The crew called
security and the couple was physically restrained and removed from the plane
before takeoff.'
Despite these and other incidents he has witnessed, Mr. Payne is not
terribly concerned about air rage. He believes the events were isolated. 23
Additionally, Mr. Payne believes that air rage is actually a combination of a
number of factors, including societal changes, job stresses, and candor of airline
employees. 24 "Business travelers have low tolerance for human error. If a
flight is late or canceled due to circumstances within the airline's control, people
get very irritated and angry, and it is a natural reaction. However, airlines
exacerbate the problem when they do not communicate candidly with their
customers."'2  His suggestion was simple but valuable. "Ticket and gate
agents, flight attendants, and pilots could deal effectively with the situation if
they just use common sense and exercise patience when dealing with frustrated
passengers."'' Sometimes, the situation is simply beyond the airline's control,
such as weather delays or strikes by unions; these are known as force majeure
events. 27 During these times, it seems that positive communication in a timely
manner would certainly help to alleviate customer's concerns. Simple gestures
such as the airline offering assistance to a delayed passenger or explaining
traveler's rights during delays (Rule 240) can go a long way with the traveling
public. 28
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Payne, Jr., supra note 119.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Al Anolik, Rule 240: Don't Leave Home Without It, at http://www.mytravelrights.com (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001).
128. See id. Rule 240 is a term used to describe individual airline's policies for late or stranded
passengers. If a flight is delayed or cancelled, the policies state what amenities the airline may provide,
including free meal vouchers, hotel accommodations, telephone calls, etc. An airline may even book a
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VII. WHAT MEASURES ARE AIRLINES TAKING TO COMBAT AR RAGE?
In response to the growing numbers of air rage incidents, airlines are taking
necessary steps to prevent injury. These include additional training and more
proactive measures in dealing with offenders. "We're taking a more aggressive
approach," said Ron Wilson of the San Francisco Airport. "Airports, police and
airlines are not putting up with it any more."1 29 Northwest Airlines and U.S.
Airways mentioned they give a passenger written notice of federal fines only
when the passenger is nearing a violation. 30 American Airlines also issues
written warning notices to disruptive passengers ordering them to stop their
disorderly behavior. 31  Five airlines are contemplating fortifying airplane
cockpit doors on MD-80s and DC-9s after recent air rage occurrences.'32
Swissair is one of the latest airlines to install plastic restraints on its airplanes
in an effort to control unruly passengers. The handcuffs are rapidly becoming
standard equipment on most major airlines because of the increase in air rage
incidents. 33
Another airline, Airtours is vocal about their policy. Spokesman Debra
Saddler said, "Airtours will not accept behavior that puts either the passengers
or the crew at risk."'' 34 A British detective, Constable Rod Bird, said, "[w]e treat
each case very seriously. It's a message to everyone who may even consider
becoming aggressive on an aircraft.' ' 31 Some domestic and international
airlines are even attempting to ban air rage offenders from future flights for
specific time frames. 36 Currently, there is a great deal of discussion and debate
in the airline industry and with various governments around the globe, regarding
the banning of unruly passengers.
Since deregulation in 1978, the number of competing American airlines
decreased, but airlines have more independence. 37 In return for this freedom,
airlines should improve performance and provide a level of customer service
that is acceptable to the flying public. Most American carriers voluntarily
enacted passenger-rights plans, avoiding government regulation. In an effort to
improve customer service, these airlines promised to respond to complaints
faster, provide on-time baggage delivery, offer the lowest fares available, and
129. Kim, supra note 10.
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131. William Mann, All the (Air) Rage: Legal Implications Surrounding Airline and Government
Bans on Unruly Passengers in the Sky, 65 J. AIR L & COM. 857, 863 (2000).
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133. Budget Cruiser Goes Belly Up, THE OTTAWA SUN, Jan. 6, 2001, at Travel 22.
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136. For an interesting discussion of the United States constitutional right to travel and the attempt
by various airlines and governments to ban unruly passengers, see Mann, supra note 131, at 865.
137. Glen Johnson, Are Skys Not So Friendly Anymore, THE DEsERET NEws, Feb. 8, 1999, at D7.
give more information on delays and cancellations. 3 ' The airlines hope these
efforts improve their bottom line, as well as decrease the incidents of air rage.
Educating employees is another method airlines are using to address air rage
problems. "Rageproofing" is a course taught by professional flight instructors,
and includes real world, common sense methods for reducing the risk of
becoming involved in an incident. 39 It also provides broad education on federal
regulations, as well as conflict management techniques.' 4 Training includes
teaching crew members to predict and manage potentially dangerous
passengers. '4
When an incident does occur, airlines often divert the flight and make an
unscheduled stop to drop off the offending passenger. A United Airlines flight
from San Francisco to Newark made an unscheduled stop when they had a
person on board who assaulted two flight attendants. 42 On a flight out of
Madrid, the captain, fearing a situation was escalating, decided to return to
Madrid to the delight of passengers on board. 43 On a Belgian Sabena Airlines
flight, the pilot called the control tower and landed the aircraft, with the state
police waiting for the passenger who was verbally abusive to crew members.'"
A British Airways spokesman said that a pilot decided to divert a plane due to
concern for the safety of the aircraft, and commented that the airline would not
tolerate violent behavior on any airplane.'
British Airways has had in place since 1998 a "yellow card" system that
warns offending passengers they could face charges unless they change their
behavior." Some airlines are also experimenting with restraint devices. British
Airways is experimenting with a device known as the body restraint package
which is designed for the worst offenders of air rage. 14 The device was created
by a former police sergeant to help air crew restrain violent passengers. It is
supposed to lock down assailants by securing them to their seat."4
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144. Emannuelle Praet, Passager Obise et Violent, LA DERNIERE HEURE, available at
http://www.dhnet.bet (Aug. 22, 2000).
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2000).
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The device is made up of five components - an upper-body restraint,
waist-restraint belt, handcuffs, lower-arm restraint and leg restraints.
When a passenger becomes unruly, crew members would approach
the offender from behind and lasso him like a rodeo steer, using the
strap attached at the end of the upper-body restraint. When the
restraint is pulled tight, the offender is effectively immobilized. For
total lock-down, handcuffs and additional devices can be engaged." 9
One of the more fascinating aspects regarding British Airways is the fact
that they do not lock their cockpit doors during flight. 5 ' On the recent holiday
flight from London to Nairobi described earlier, the deranged passenger entered
through an unlocked cockpit door. Top British Airways officials have
concluded that locking the door would cause more problems than not. They
stated that flight attendants and pilots need constant communication and a
passenger could just kick in the cockpit door even if it was locked.''
Interestingly, most Americans would be shocked to learn about. this fact, as
American carriers lock their cockpits during takeoff, landing, and in flight.
Sometimes, airline crews have taken too drastic measures, which have
caused disastrous consequences. In December of 1998, an unruly passenger
onboard a Malov flight between Bangkok and Budapest was tied to his seat with
airline headset cords.'52 A doctor on the flight injected him with a tranquilizer
and the passenger died. 53 When the crew noticed the passenger had died, the
plane made an unscheduled stop in Istanbul. Five witness passengers were
detained by the Turkish police along with the doctor.54 An autopsy showed that
the passenger died due to a mixture in his blood of the tranquilizer and some
other drug or alcohol.15
There can also be tragic endings when fellow passengers assist in
restraining out of control passengers. One episode occurred on board a
Southwest Airlines plane to Salt Lake City. 56 A nineteen year old man tried to
break into the cockpit and began hitting fellow passengers. 57 He was restrained
by eight of the passengers on board. It was initially reported that the man died
149. See id.
150. Alfred Lee, British Airways Will Keep Cockpits Unlocked, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 8.,
2001, at World 9. British Airways consulted with senior pilots before making their final decision. British
Airways still locks the cockpit door during takeoff and landing, but not during flight.
151. See id.
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153. See id.
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155. See id.
156. Travelers Killed Teen Aboard Jet, Prosecutor Says, SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 17, 2000, at A6.
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of a heart attack. However, an autopsy classified his death as a homicide
confirming that the man died as a result of intentional actions by another
person.15' The man died after he was removed from the plane, and the report
noted that he had bruises, scratches, and experienced blunt force injuries. 59
More recently, a pig that was allowed to ride in first class on board a flight
from Philadelphia to Seattle went wild upon landing."W As the aircraft taxied
to the gate, the pig squealed and ran down the aisle, even trying to enter the
cockpit. Apparently, it was untrained and along the jetway, dropped feces.' 6'
The FAA investigated the incident to see if the airline violated any federal
safety or sanitation regulations. Jim Peters, a FAA spokesman, announced that
the airline and its employees "acted in a reasonable and thoughtful manner,
based on a legitimate request to transport a qualified individual with a disability
and her service animal."' 62 , One could only speculate as to what may have
happened had this incident occurred in air, and if the pig had been successful in
getting into the cockpit; would this have been considered air rage?
VIn. CURRENT STATUS OF AIR RAGE LAWS
A. United States Laws
Legislation addressing complex issues arising in criminal airline cases has
already been enacted. 63 There are a few federal laws and regulations which
prohibit passenger interference aboard an aircraft. For example, federal statutes
protect persons from crimes on an aircraft in flight.16 Another statute provides
protection against assaults directed towards flight crew "that interfere with
performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessen the ability of the
member or attendant to perform those duties.""6 Prosecutions under this statute
and the previous statute are regular, and include prosecutions for assaults,'6
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pig was allowed on board the USAirways flight because the two passengers accompanying the pig provided
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threats,'67 and dangerous disorderliness.'68 Penalties for violations of this statute
are serious. Violators may be imprisoned for up to twenty years for a single
offense, and up to life for an offense involving a dangerous weapon.' 69
Administrative penalties are also included for those who get in the way of flight
crew.'° One federal aviation regulation states "No person may assault, threaten,
intimidate, or interfere with a crewmember in the performance of the
crewmember's duties aboard an aircraft being operated."'' This statute
provides protection within the United States and its territories.
The United States Senate passed a bill that granted even broader authority
to the FAA to impose fines for unruly conduct. The FAA's Reauthorization Bill
states:
An individual who interferes with the duties or responsibilities of the
flight crew or cabin crew of a civil aircraft, or who poses an imminent
threat to the safety of the aircraft or other individuals on the aircraft,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
more than $25 ,000 .l
"Federal law does not require airlines to give travelers notice of the new
fine before a flight, but the FAA would not object if airlines voluntarily did so,"
agency spokesman Paul Takemoto said. 73 Now, convicted assailants of air rage
face up to a $10,000 criminal fine and punishment of up to twenty years in
prison.""4 In addition, the maximum civil fine used to be $1,100, but as
previously mentioned was increased by Congress to $25,000.'
B. International Laws
The British government responded to the disturbing air rage trend by
creating a new offense of "acting in a disruptive manner" and for using
threatening and abusive language or behavior to crew." 6 It is designed to
F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Warren, supra note 49.
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protect the interests of the flight crew. All air rage offenders on incoming
flights can be prosecuted.177 Since the new law was introduced, offenders face
a two-year jail sentence or £2,000 fine. 7 In Canada, the Air Transport
Association of Canada, an organization made up of ten airlines, recently met to
establish some guidelines and consistency regarding the topic of unruly
passengers.77 The group convened to define air rage and determine sanctions
against disruptive passengers. They asked the Canadian government to change
their criminal code to make it a specific crime to interfere with the work of
flight crews, similar to laws in the United States and other European
countries.'"
Cathay Pacific Airlines has called for tough air rage laws to be enacted in
Hong Kong to mirror those of Great Britain. "We would welcome any
strengthening of the current law in order to improve safety for our crew and
passengers," said an airline spokesman.'18 Cathay would not give statistics on
air rage incidents." 2 However, the spokesman for the airline believed that the
recently enacted British laws, banning airborne acts of violence or insulting or
abusive language may be the solution to the problem.1 3 However, as of late
1999, Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department, was satisfied with the existing
air navigation orders there, currently outlawing "reckless or negligent behavior
likely to endanger a plane, its crew or passengers."'" In recent years, six people
have been prosecuted for air rage in Hong Kong. Interestingly, they were fined
under their common law, not the navigation order.8 5 Current air rage laws now
only subject passengers if the act takes place within SAR airspace or on planes
registered there."8 6 In mid 2000, the Hong Kong Secretary for Security, Regina
Lau Suk-yee mentioned that the right to prosecute passengers engaged in air
rage could be extended to all Hong-Kong bound planes pending a study by
international aviation groups. 18 7
C. Tokyo Convention
As a common carrier, an international airline must abide not only to federal
regulations, but also international regulations if it operates in more than one
177. See id.
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country. 88 Some regulations can lead to jurisdiction and choice of law
questions. 89 Local police are not always able to arrest a troublemaker who has
just landed in a foreign-flag aircraft. Canada, the United States, Australia, and
Great Britain are countries that have rectified this problem with legislation. tg
Internationally, the Tokyo Convention was the first large effort regarding air
terrorism. Following it was the Hague and the Montreal Conventions.' 91 The
Tokyo Convention, which was signed in 1963 and now has 170 member
countries worldwide, sets up some legal remedies for passenger disruption.' 92
It authorized each contracting country to establish jurisdiction over offenses
committed in their territory, over offenses committed on board an airplane
registered in the contracting state, and whenever an airplane landed in the
country with an offender on board the aircraft.' 9
The Tokyo Convention clearly asserts that the state of registration of the
aircraft has the authority to apply its own laws, thus it provides for international
recognition to extraterritorial jurisdiction.'94 It also provides the airplane
commander authority to deal with those who have or will commit a crime or an
act jeopardizing safety on board the aircraft. The commander may use
reasonable force without fear of suit. 9 However, when an international act
occurs, oftentimes more than one state has jurisdiction to prosecute the offender
and jurisdictional conflicts can occur since both states can claim the right to
prosecute. The jurisdictional rules in the Tokyo Convention tried to solve this
conflict.'
However, the Tokyo convention has various flaws. First, it does not define
the meaning of an international criminal offense, which leaves it open to
different interpretations and inconsistencies among the contracting states. For
the definition of criminal acts, the Convention depends on domestic law
definitions. 97 A second problem is that it does not require the contracting state
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189. See id.
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to punish an offender upon disembarkation. If the landing state chooses not to
extradite or prosecute the offender, the state must set him free and let him
continue to the destination of his choice as soon as possible.'98 In addition,
many "jeopardizing" acts are not likely to be accepted as a reason for
extradition. The Convention created and defined "jeopardizing" acts, however
it did not require states to treat them as "serious crimes." The Convention's
procedures for delivery and extradition are applicable only to serious crimes.'"
Therefore:
Since aircraft in flight are legally regarded as part of the territory of
the state of registration of the aircraft, the state where the aircraft
lands will treat offenses committed on board during the flight as
committed on foreign territory (unless it is the state of registration of
the aircraft). In most cases of minor offenses and "less serious"
crimes, it will, therefore, not have the jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute. The Tokyo Convention of 1963 obliges contracting states
to establish their jurisdiction over offenses and crimes only when
committed on board aircraft of their own nationality. There is no
obligation in the Convention to establish jurisdiction with respect to
offenses and crimes committed on board foreign aircraft.
Furthermore, the Tokyo Convention does not establish such
jurisdiction itself. It therefore leaves a jurisdictional gap in this
respect.2°
°
The jurisdictional gap is not a problem in the United States because the
Justice Department prosecutes inbound offenders regardless of the airplane's
nationality.2°' The United States and Great Britain need to encourage efforts to
guarantee that the Tokyo Convention' s jurisdictional weakness is tackled so that
other countries can and will prosecute incoming air rage offenders zm "The
authority to prosecute does not equal the obligation to prosecute, and minor
offenses committed on an airplane landing in other countries may not be
prosecuted."'2 3 The final problem with the Tokyo Convention is that just half
of the world subscribes to it, and its impact could be much greater if there were
more participants.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Air rage is a global problem. As noted above, there are a number of
reasons attributed to its increase. In order to provide a solution to the
phenomenon, there are steps that can be taken to ensure its decline.
Governments and airline unions must become involved and work together to
ensure the safety of the flying public. A thorough study and efficient statistical
data must be compiled. Without this important data, effective solutions to the
problem will not work because it will only be based on a collective hunch. 2D'
Member countries must gather to talk about ways to amend current loopholes
in the Tokyo Convention. Until the members meet, the jurisdictional gap
problem will continue.2 5 "The United States should encourage other countries
to adopt into their national laws - provisions for the prosecution of inbound
disruptive passengers, regardless of the nationality of the air carrier involved."'
There are more people flying than ever before. The traveling public must
be made aware of the penalty'associated with air rage." 7 If they are not aware
of the penalties, it will not be a deterrent. Airlines must train air crew in a more
effective manner. They need to educate their aircraft commanders about the
provisions in the Tokyo Convention, so that there is no confusion and offenders
will be prosecuted. Law enforcement in other countries also need to be
educated about the Convention. Other training suggestions for aircrew include
better instruction to deal with unruly passengers, including education in calming
measures and training in the use of handcuffs, should it become necessary.2 8
Airlines should also provide restraint equipment and better security procedures
during the necessary times.' Additionally, airlines need to establish zero
tolerance policies.20 The flying public needs to be aware of current regulations.
Advertising and distribution of FAA guidelines and circulars would help
educate travelers.2" The public also needs to be educated to treat the crew as
"safety officers, not waiters and waitresses. '21 2 Likewise, air crew should have
respect for passenger's needs, and respond in a professional manner. Airlines
and governments must work together and become more proactive to ensure
prosecution of disruptive passengers, to assist in the decrease of air rage.
204. Hearings, supra note I (statement of Stephen Luckey).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Inform Passengers Of Penalties for Violence, supra note 69.
208. Powelson, supra note 39.
209. Air Rage: The Mile-High Menace, supra note 6.
210. Hearings, supra note I (statement of Stephen Luckey).
211. Airlines Conceal Air Rage Attacks, supra note 79.
212. Benham, supra note 38.
2001]
APPENDIX A
FAA Enforcement Actions
Violations of 14 C.F.R. 91.11
"Unruly Passengers"
Calendar Years 1995-2000
Status 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Grand Total
Grand 146 185 320 282 310 266 1509
Total
Federal Aviation Regulation 91.11,121.580 and 135.120 state that "no person
may assault, threaten, intimidate, or interfere with a crewmember in the
performance of the crewmember's duties aboard an aircraft being operated."
General notes:
Interfering with the duties of a crewmember violates federal law.
The FAA's database contains only those incidents reported to the FAA.
Reporting is at the discretion of the crewmember.
Year 2000 numbers may change due to ongoing reporting of December
incidents.
The repercussions for passengers who engage in unruly behavior can be
substantial. They can be fined by the FAA or prosecuted on criminal
charges.
As part of the FAA's Reauthorization Bill (April 16, 2000) the FAA can
now propose up to $25,000 per violation for unruly passenger cases.
Previously, the maximum civil penalty per violation was $1,100. One
incident can result in multiple violations.
Updated January 10, 2001
http://www.faa.gov/apa/stats/unruly.htm
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APPENDIX B
FAA Advisory Circular http://www.faa.gov
This sample airline information should be reviewed by each airline's legal
department to assure that it accurately states the airline's policies and the legal
duties, responsibilities, and rights of the airline and airline personnel. The FAA
does not provide legal advice about the specifics of tort and criminal law.
CATEGORY ONE: Passenger complies with There is no further action
Attendant requests request. required by the flight
passenger to comply. attendant. (Such an
(Actions which do incident need not be
not interfere with reported to the cockpit,
cabin or flight safety the carrier, or the FAA.)
such as minor verbal
abuse.)
CATEGORY TWO: Passenger continues After attempting to defuse
Flight attendant Disturbance which the situation, the captain
requests passenger to interferes with cabin and the flight attendant
comply. safety such as will coordinate on the
continuation of verbal issuance of the Airline
abuse or continuing Passenger In-flight
refusal to comply with Disturbance Report or
federal regulations (such other appropriate actions.
as failure to fasten The flight attendant
seatbelt when sign is completes the report.
illuminated, operation of Completed report is given
unauthorized electronic to appropriate company
equipment). In addition, personnel upon arrival. In
the crewmember should turn, company personnel
follow company may file the incident
procedures regarding report with the FAA.
cockpit notification. I _I
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CATEGORY
THREE:
Advise cockpit, identify
passenger, then cockpit
requests the appropriate
law enforcement office to
meet the flight upon its
arrival.
Examples: 1) when
crew's duties are
disrupted due to
continuing interference,
2) when a passenger or
crewmember is injured or
subjected to a credible
threat of injury, 3) when
an unscheduled landing.
is made and/or restraints
are used, & 4) operator
has program for written
notification and
passenger continues
disturbance after
notification.
I
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I. INTRODUCTION
The General Security Service of Israel, also known as the Shin Bet,
investigates individuals suspected of being involved with crimes against Israel's
security.' Some people view the various interrogation methods employed by the
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2002, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
I. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et a.; H.C. 4054/95,
The Ass'n for Civil Rights in Israel v. Prime Minister et al; H.C. 5188/96, Wa'al AJ-Kaaqua and Ibrahim
Abd'allah Ganimat: Ctr. For Defense of the Individual v. Gen. Security Service et al; HCJ 6536/96, Hat'm
Abu Zayda v. Gen. Security Service; H.C. 7563/97, Abd Al Rahman Ismail Ganimat and the Pub. Comm.
Against Torture in Israel v. Minister of Defense etal; H.C. 7628/97, Fouad Awad Quran and the Pub. Comm.
Against Torture in Israel v. Minister of Defense et al.; President Barak gives the opinion, at http://www.
court.gov.il/mishpat/ html/en/verdict/judgment.rtf (last visited Jan 17, 2001) [hereinafter Torture Case].
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General Security Service as a violation of human rights, while others see them
as necessary to uphold Israel's "communitarianism" ideology. Israel has
historically prioritized the community's interests over individual human rights
because the State of Israel has had reason to be concerned with the safety of its
community due to ever-present problems with peace. The State of Israel has
been engaged in an immutable struggle for both its security and existence from
the day it was founded due to terrorist organizations.2 These terrorists have
attacked major cities in Israel, such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, often killing and
injuring innocent people. One hundred and twenty-one people were murdered
by terrorist attacks between January 1, 1996 and May 14, 1998.' In addition to
the 121 deaths from terrorism, 707 people were injured.4 This has concerned
Israeli legislators and citizens.
The General Security Service uses specific interrogation methods to quash
future terrorist attacks in the hope of saving lives. The question pondered by
judges, politicians, and the entire Israeli nation is, "how does Israel maintain a
high level of security in the Israeli community by eradicating heinous acts of
terrorism and simultaneously protect the human rights of terrorists?" This Note
will look at Israel's current "constitution" and analyze some of the implicit laws
used to govern Israel's stance on human rights. In addition, this Note analyzes
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and explores the reaction of prominent
Israeli leaders after the United Nations asked Israel to become a member of the
Convention. Finally, this Note dissects the recent Supreme Court of Israel's
decision condemning the interrogation methods used on terrorists by the
General Security Service of Israel.
II. ISRAEL'S JUDICIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Constitution
Israel does not have a written constitution.5 Upon the founding of the State
of Israel in May 14, 1948, Israel's Declaration of Independence contained an
explicit promise to prepare a written constitution by October 1, 1948.6
Unfortunately, due to religious parties objecting to the drafting of a written
constitution, and the secular parties objecting to a reference of divine authority,
a political consensus could not be arrived at concerning the formalities and
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Knesset as Constituent Assembly, The Constitution (1998), at http://www.knesset.
gov.iliknesset/kneseng mimshalhoka.htm.
6. Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform:
Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. CoMP. L. 585, 588 (1996).
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language of the constitution.7 Fortunately, the United States has a written
Constitution, so that when constitutional issues arise in day to day life,
governmental and judicial entities have a formal guideline setting out what is
considered constitutional. Since Israel lacks a written constitution, the Supreme
Court uses other means to determine the constitutionality of issues in Israel.
Over the years, the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, via
judicial interpretation and judicial activism, was able to establish several
universal human rights that are ingrained in national constitutions elsewhere. 8
Through its jurisdiction as a High Court of Justice, the Supreme Court maintains
and strengthens human rights.9
B. The Basic Laws
The Proclamation of Independence in Israel states that human rights in
Israel are premised upon the appreciation for the value of man, the sanctity of
his life and on his being free.'0 Although Israel has no written constitution to
regulate and guide constitutional issues, Israel has found an adequate substitute
in the Basic Laws. Ten years after the founding of the State of Israel on May
14, 1948, the Knesset invented what eventually became the first of eleven Basic
Laws." The following Basic Laws have been adopted: Basic Law: the
Knesset, (1958); Basic Law: Israel Lands, (1960); Basic Law: the President of
the State (1964); Basic Law: the State Economy (1975); Basic Law: the Army
(1976); Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel (1980); Basic Law: the
Judiciary (1984); Basic Law: the State Comptroller (1988); Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty (1992); Basic Law: the Government (1992); and Basic
Law: the Freedom of Occupation (1994). 2
The Basic Law utilized when Israel sets out to protect human rights is
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). 13 This Basic Law states that
7. Id. at 588.
8. Id at 592.
9. The Courts' Directorate, The Judiciary: The Court System, Functions and Structure (1999), at
http://www.israel-mfa.gov.ilmfa/go.asp?MFAHOOgz (last visited Jan. 17, 2001).
10. The Knesset as Constituent Assembly, supra note 5, at 2.
11. Basic Laws-Introduction (1999), at http://www.knesset.gov.iknessetmknes/eng.
mimshal-yesodl.htn. The Knesset acts as the House of Representatives of Israel, which sits in Jerusalem and
functions as the Israeli Parliament. See id. The Knesset holds the powers of the legislative branch similar to
those held in the legislative branch of the United States. See Hofung, supra note 6, at 594.
12. Basic Laws-Introduction (1999), at http://www.knesset.gov.il/imesset/knes/eng-
mimshal-yesodl .htm.
13. Yitzhak Shamir et al., Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1994), at http:lwww.israel-
mfa.gov.ilmfa/go.asp?MFAHOOhiO. Sections 1-11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty expressly
provide:
1. The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to
establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic
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the fundamental human rights in Israel are based on appreciation of the value
of a man's life and his freedom to live.'4 The primary focus of the law is "to
defend Human Dignity and Liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the
values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state."'' The Basic Law
determines that human liberty in Israel consists of the right to leave and enter
the country, the right to privacy and intimacy, the right to immunity from
searches involving one's property, body and possessions, and the right to avoid
breaches of the privacy of one's speech and writings.'6 Violations of the dignity
or freedom of man is not permitted unless it is done in accordance with the
law.' 7 It is here where the Basic Law starts to resemble fundamental rights that
are present in national constitutions elsewhere. The ultimate question for the
state.
2. There shall be no violation of the life, body, or dignity of any person as such.
3. There shall be no violation of the property of a person.
4. All persons are entitled to protection of their life, body, and dignity.
5. There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by
imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.
6. (a) All persons are free to leave Israel. (b) Every Israel national has the right of
entry into Israel abroad.
7. (a) All persons have the right to privacy and intimacy. (b) There shall be no entry
into the private premises of a person who has not consented thereto. (c) No search
shall be conducted on the private premises of a person, nor in the body or personal
effects. (d) There shall be no violation of the confidentiality of conversation, or of the
writings or records of a person.
8. There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic law except by a law befitting
the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no
greater than is required.
9. There shall be no restriction of rights under this Basic Law held by persons serving
in the Israel Defense Forces, the Israel Police, the Prisons Service and other security
organizations of the State, nor shall such rights be subject to conditions, except by
virtue of a law, or by regulation enacted by virtue of a law, and to an extent no greater
than is required by the nature and character of the service.
10. This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the
commencement of the Basic Law.
1I. All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law.
12. This Basic Law cannot be varied, suspended, or made subject to conditions by
emergency regulations; notwithstanding, when a state of emergency exists, by virtue
of a declaration under section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948,
emergency regulations may be enacted by virtue of said section to deny or restrict
rights under this Basic Law, provided the denial or restriction shall be for a proper
purpose and for a period and extent no greater than is required.
14. The Existing Basic Laws: Summary (1998), at http://www.knesset.gov.iylknesset
knex/eng-mimshalyesod2.htm.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice is whether the interrogations
at issue in the Torture Case violate the dignity and/or freedom of man, and if so,
whether this should be permitted in accordance with the law.
III. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
On November 2, 1991, Israel consented to becoming a member of the
"United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment," which was implemented by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1984.18 Section 2 of Basic Law: Human Liberty
and Dignity which prohibits the "violation of the life, body, or dignity of any
person as such", and Section 4 of the aforementioned Basic Law, which grants
all persons the right to protection against such violations, have constitutional
status in Israel's legislative framework.' 9 Section 2 of the Basic Law gives the
Supreme Court of Israel power to scrutinize legislation that could violate an
individual's liberty and/or dignity:
The Supreme Court arguably has the power to void any legislation
enacted after the entry into force of the Basic Law which violates the
above provision. The Court for this reason may not deem previously
enacted laws void, but they will be interpreted in accordance with the
fundamental principles of sanctity of life, integrity of the body and
primacy of human dignity, broadly construed. These provisions in
the Basic Law, then, may be deemed to constitute a general
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
including torture, and are binding vis-a-vis both public and private
entities."0
Some of the issues raised with the ambit of Israel's presentation before The
Human Rights Committee Against Torture were themes regarding the state of
emergency in Israel, the right to life, and the techniques used by the General
Security Service when interrogating terrorist suspects21 The Human Rights
18. Matthew 0. St. Amand, Note, Public Committee Against Torture In Israel v. The State of Israel
Et Al: Landmark Human Rights Decision By the Israeli High Court of Justice Or Status Quo Maintained?,
25 N.C. J. INT'L L &CoM. Rra. 655, 671 (2000).
19. Second Periodic Report of Israel Concerning the Implementation of The Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1998), at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfago.asp?MFAH024kO [hereinafter SecondPeriodic Report] (quoting Human Rights
Committee Against Torture).
20. Id. §5.
21. Alan Baker & Ady Schonmann, Presenting Israel's Case Before International Human Rights
Bodies, in JUSTICE -THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JEWISH LAWYERS AND JURISTS 23 (1998), available
at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.ii/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOddrO (last visited Jan. 17, 2001).
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Committee Against Torture stated that the Committee will have many functions,
and, in particular to Israel, will endeavor to scrutinize and watch over the
General Security Service's activities, specifically their interrogation methods
that may amount to torture." The question then asked is "what is torture?"
Torture is defined as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted upon an individual for purposes such
as retrieving vital information and/or a confession... when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by the instigation of or with the acquiescence
of a public officer or anyone else acting in an official representative
capacity.... "
The founding parties of the Convention were unable to agree on whether
or not to completely prohibit both components of the title of the Convention.'
Although this decision was never officially agreed upon, and Article 1 of the
Convention only prohibits "torture," clear guidelines and detailed instructions
have been created for the purpose of guiding the General Security Service in all
aspects of the interrogation procedures.'
On October 24, 1995, Former Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin gave
a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on the 50th Anniversary of
the United Nations. The speech included a plea to the United Nations to help
strengthen and support the war on terrorism:
The United Nations must continue giving expression to the new
reality in the Middle East. We must all be at the forefront of the fight
against the forces which threaten peace and security in the region, to
all countries, to all the peoples of the region and in the entire
world.. .the UN must intensify the international struggle against
terrorism and its supporters. Terrorism is the world's cancer today.
Don't fool yourselves, even if you ignore terror it can enter any of
your homes. Terror must be defeated. Peace must win. This is a
fight that we cannot afford to lose. 26
22. See Second Periodic Report, supra note 19 § 13.
23. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984 (entry into force June 26, 1987), available at
bttp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/h_cat39.htm [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. See St. Amand,
supra note 18, at 671.
24. St. Amand, supra note 18, at 671. The parties were in disagreement on whether to "prohibit both
torture and "other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
25. Alan Baker & Ady Schonmann, supra note 21, at 9.
26. Yitzhak Rabin, Address to the UN General Assembly, on the 50th anniversary of the United
Nations (1995), available at http://www.israel-un.org/archive/rabinun5.htm.
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Yitzhak Rabin, if still alive, would probably be somewhat disheartened
after the results of the United Nations General Assembly's decision on the
interrogations in Israel. In fact, many of the political leaders in Israel were
dissatisfied with the result of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This discontent stems from
an already historically unstable relationship between Israel and the United
Nations.27 In the United Nations General Assembly there exists a long-standing
history of scrutinizing Israel more than other countries.' The General
Assembly devotes seven out of 140 items of its agenda to Israeli-generated
issues.29 Within the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights often
implements completely lopsided resolutions against Israel.3" "Israel is the object
of more investigative committees and special representatives than any other
state in the entire UN system."'" The United Nations has continually held
Emergency Special Sessions of the General Assembly in Jerusalem.32 During
the 48th Special Session of the General Assembly, two resolutions on terrorism
were talked about, one in the Third Committee and one in the Sixth
Committee.3"
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment caused anxiety within the Israeli delegation, headed
by the Israeli Foreign Ministry Legal Advisor, Alan Baker and Deputy State
27. Gad Yaacobi, Israel and the United Nations: A New Perspective (1994), at http.//www.israel-
mfa.gov.ilmfa/go.asp?MFAH0cfh0. Gad Yaacobi is the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations.
28. Israel and the UN- An Uneasy Relationship (1999), at http://www.israel-
un.org/Israelun/isrun/isrnl.htm. The General Assembly is the voice of the United Nations on International
issues.
29. Id.
30. Id. §4.
31. Id. §5.
32. Id. § 8. These Emergency Special Sessions were originally adopted in 1950 for serious
emergencies, such as the Korean War. In the last fifteen years, these Emergency Special Sessions have only
been regarding Israel. To make it even clearer as to the meaning behind this past behavior of the General
Assembly, the Emergency Special Sessions were not held when the mass-genocide took place in Rwanda, nor
were the Sessions held during the "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia.
33. Yaacobi, supra note 27, § 9 (Resolutions on Terrorism). The Third Committee is in charge of
social, humanitarian and cultural Issues, and the Sixth Committee is in charge of legal issues. Turkey
introduced the resolution in the Third Committee, and effectively condemned terrorism as a violation of
human rights. Syria and Pakistan tried to qualify the censure and formed amendments that would exempt
terrorism that was performed in resistance to "alien domination." These amendments never went through and
the majority adopted the resolution. In the Sixth Committee, nothing was decided on the topic of international
terrorism and the Committee made the decision to postpone the international terrorism issue until the
following year. Id.
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Attorney, Yehuda Shaffer.' The Israeli delegation alleged that the use of
"moderate physical pressure" on detainees in extraordinary circumstances, in
order to retrieve vital information concerning present terrorist attacks, cannot
be considered torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.35 In its
statement to the Committee, Israel explained in great detail its dilemma.36 This
dilemma is the need to procure vital information from suspected terrorists about
forthcoming acts of terrorism in order to thwart such events from happening and
thereby saving human lives; and at the same time, fully practice human rights
norms, specifically those emphasized in the Convention Against Torture. 7
The work of the General Security Service has proven to avoid many
disasters.3" The GSS investigators have foiled some 90 plans for large-scale
terrorist activities when time was running out.39 Unfortunately, some extremist
groups, in opposition to talks of peace, are able to slip past the Israeli security;
and in doing so, cause many individuals to die or be severely injured.
Explosions in Haifa and Tiberias occurred almost simultaneously, and not
surprisingly the explosions took place the day following the signing of the
34. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, United Nations Committee Against Torture- Summary of the Israeli
Opening Statement (1998), at http//www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfalgo.asp?MFAHOIniO.
35. Id.
36. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, Israel Reaction to the Conclusions of the Committee Against
Torture (1998), at http://www.-mfa.gov.i/mfalgo.asp?MFAH1nIO [hereinafter Israel Reaction]. The Justice
Ministry Spokeswoman stated that:
The signing of the Declaration of Principles (start of the peace process between Israel
and the PLO) between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization has given rise
to a great deal of opposition amongst the extremist groups on both sides. In fact, the
process prompted an unprecedented outburst of atrocities on the part of Palestinian
terrorist organizations, which began to carry out acts of terrorism within the State of
Israel, in order to shatter the peace process. Terrorists were dispatched to carry out
suicide bombings, in which many people were killed and injured. Since September 12,
1993, when the Declaration of Principles was signed, until today, two hundred and
fourteen Israelis have been killed in terrorist attacks in Israel; of these, one hundred and
forty-three were civilians, and seventy one were members of the security forces. Also,
one hundred and fifty one Palestinians were killed in these attacks.
Justice Ministry Spokeswoman, Statement By Israeli Representative At 18th Session of United Nations
Committee Against Torture (1997), at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/ go.asp?MFAHOcif0.
37. Israel Reaction, supra note 36.
38. Justice Ministry Spokeswoman, Statement by Israeli Representative at 18th Session of United
Nations Committee Against Torture (1997), at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/ mfa/go.asp?MFAH0cif0.
39. Id As noted in paragraph twenty four of the special report: "Among these planned attacks are
some 10 suicide bombings, seven car bombings, 15 kidnappings of soldiers and civilians, and some 60 attacks
of different types including shootings of soldiers and civilians, hijacking of buses, stabbing and murder of
Israelis, placing of explosives, etc." Israel has a top priority for thwarting terrorism and a tremendous
importance is given to the importance of saving human lives; this comes as a result of the interrogators' work.
See id.
Greenberg
Sharm agreement.40 The extremist Islamic groups, such as the "Hamas" and the
Islamic "Jihad," have decided to choose a murderous path of destruction to
express their dismay with the peace process.4'
The General Security Service's counter-operations and interrogations slow
the Hamas' and Islamic Jihads' ability to recruit would-be terrorists.42 This
causes terrorist groups to use alternative methods to recruit, and in desperate
circumstances, try to recruit Israeli Arabs. Faced with the uphill battle of trying
to protect the land and citizens of the State from terrorism, Israel and the
General Security Service must also try to find a way to safeguard the human
rights of the suspected terrorists.
IV. INTERROGATION METHODS USED ON TERRORISTS RULED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The issue in the Torture Case was a complicated one. The Supreme Court
of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, was forced to make a decision that
would ultimately affect the entire society of Israel. On September 6, 1999, in
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, the Supreme
Court of Israel ruled that several of the predominantly used interrogation
methods applied by the General Security Service in seeking confessions of
suspected terrorists, were unconstitutional per se.43
The purpose of using physical means on terrorists is so that the terrorists
confess that they have first-hand knowledge of danger in the public sphere and
to extrapolate and use that information for the sake of the general welfare of
Israel. While General Security Service interrogators in Israel have used
physical means to secure incriminating evidence against suspected terrorists, the
United States forbids police interrogators from forcing individuals to be a
witness against himself or herself," because the United States Constitution has
the Bill of Rights containing the Fifth Amendment, which, among other things,
safeguards individuals from self-incrimination. In addition, the United States
extends "Miranda Rights" to United States citizens, stemming from the
40. Ronni Shaked, Yediot Ahronot [Unskilled Terrorists] (1999), at http://www.israel-
mfa.gov.i/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOfohO. The Sharm agreement is a peace agreement between the Islamic and
Israeli nations, which was rejuvenated at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.
41. Id. The Hamas and Islamic Jihad are two prominent Islamic organizations that are in opposition
to the peace process, and therefore are involved in acts of terrorism. However, it has not been proven that the
Harnas and/or the Islamic Jihad were behind the attacks in Haifa and Tiberias.
42. Id.
43. St. Amand, supra note 18, at 656. The General Security Service is the main body responsible
for trying to fight terrorism in Israel. Id.
44. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V. In applicable part, the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights states, "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " Id.
20011
548 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:539
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, which gives the suspects of crimes "the
right to remain silent. '45 The Israeli Knesset has attempted to ratify a Bill of
Rights similar to that of the United States for many years, however opposition
from special interest groups has impeded the task.46 While no "Bill of Rights"
exists in Israel, the privilege against self-incrimination is generally upheld.
Haim Cohn, a retired justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Israel, said,
"[a]lthough it isn't stated verbatim, the reason for the exclusion of all self-
incriminatory evidence is the desire to prevent confessions being elicited by
torture or other violent means.' 7  Contemporary Israeli law permits a
confession to be used, but only if procured without violent means; the
confession must be free and voluntary.48 Still, many times the General Security
Service has been forced to use physical means to gain confessions out of
terrorists in the hope of saving lives. The decision to utilize physical means in
a specific instance is premised on internal regulations, requiring permission
from the various ranks of the General Security Service chain of command.49
Different interrogation methods are used depending on the suspect, both in
relation to what is required in the particular circumstance and to the probability
of procuring authorization from within the ranks of the General Security Service
hierarchy'5 The physical means used by the General Security Service were
presented to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice in Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel by the General
Security Service investigators.5 These are the physical means that will now be
discussed.
A. The Physical Means
1. Shaking
Among the interrogation tactics cited in the General Security Service's
regulations, shaking is considered the most brutal.52 Shaking constitutes "the
forceful shaking of the suspect's upper torso, back and forth, repeatedly in a
manner which causes the neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly."53 The
shaking is capable of causing severe trauma to the brain, injure the spinal
45. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. St. Antand, supra note 18, at 663.
47. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L Rosenberg, In The Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against
Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L REv. 955, 1049 (1988).
48. Id.
49. Torture Case, supra note 1, § 8.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. §9.
53. St. Arnand, supra note 18, at 658-59.
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column, causing the suspect to faint, vomit and urinate without control and
suffer intense head pain.54 The State of Israel entered into evidence several
contradicting expert opinions as to the effects of shaking. 55 In The Association
of Civil Rights in Israel v. The Prime Minister of Israel and The Minister of
Justice, the suspect involved in question died after being shaken.56 The victim's
death was caused by an uncommon complication resulting in the atrophy of the
lung." Although this may have been an extremely rare case, it shows that
shaking has the potential to cause serious injury and, in rare instances, death.
2. The Shabach Position
When the General Security Service puts a suspect in the "Shabach"
position, that individual is made to sit in a low chair, with the seat tilted forward
towards the ground. 8 The suspect then has his hands tied together behind the
chair, and the suspect's head is covered by a hood while powerfully deafening
music is emitted within inches of the suspect's head.59 Affidavits indicate that
suspects were exposed to the Shabach position for extended periods of time, and
this prolonged exposure may cause severe muscle pains to the upper torso and
head.' The State contends that the suspect's hands were tied to ensure the
safety of the Shin Bet interrogators, and that the playing of noisy music and
head covering was done for the purpose of preventing contact among the
terrorists in the room.6'
3. The Frog Crouch
This method appeared in Wa 'al Al Kaaqua, Ibrahim Abd'allah Ganimat,
and Center for the Defense of the Individual v. The General Security Service
and the Prison Commander-Jerusalem.62 The Frog Crouch required that the
suspects "crouch on the tips of their toes" for five-minute intervals.63
54. Torture Case, supra note 1, § 9. This is taken from an expert opinion in a prior application in
1995.
55. Id. The State claimed that: i. Shaking posed no fatal danger to the suspect; 2. The risk to fife
from shaking is atypical; 3. That no evidence exists that shaking results in any fatal damage to the body; 4.
That there was no medical literature on point that could show that shaking alone proximately caused a person
to die; and 5. That physicians are present at all interrogations to protect the individual when there is possible
danger of medical damage. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 9.
58. St. Amand, supra note 18, at 659.
59. Id.
60. Torture Case, supra note 1, § 10.
61. Id.
62. ld. § 11.
63. St. Amand, supra note 18, at 658.
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4. Excessive Tightening of Handcuffs
Many applicants in the recent past have complained of unnecessary
tightening of the hand or leg cuffs and the fact that the handcuffs were
particularly small, and often disproportionate to the victim's arm and leg size.4
Due to this excessiveness and the long duration of the interrogations, the victim
may suffer severe harm to the arms, hands, and feet.65 The State admits to using
hand and leg cuffs in their interrogations, but denies using abnormally small
cuffs, stating that the cuffs used are of standard size and are applied with normal
tightness.66
5. Sleep Deprivation
Since the Shabach position and loud music can last for long periods of
time, some interrogated suspects have complained that they have been deprived
of sleep, although the State claims that loss of sleep is incidental to the process
of the interrogation and not done with an intention to exhaust the suspect.67
B. Petitioner's Argument
The petitioners argued that the Shin Bet did not have the authority to
conduct interrogations, since no statute existed that would grant the authority
necessary to do so.68 The petitioners also argued that the General Security
Service's physical interrogation tactics constituted an infringement on the
suspects' human dignity, and even more so, constituted a criminal offense on
the part of the interrogators.69 They continued to explain to the court that the
General Security Service is not authorized to conduct any physically intrusive
interrogations without complete authority from the legislator pertaining to the
implementation of such physical interrogations and in compliance with Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.70 These arguments were countered by a few
defenses asserted by the State of Israel, both in defense of the interrogation
procedures employed by the Shin Bet and of the possible criminal liability of
each individual interrogator.
64. Torture Case, supra note 1, § 12.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 13.
68. St. Amand, supra note 18, at 657-58.
69. Torture Case, supra note 1, § 14.
70. Id. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 13, and accompanying text.
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C. Respondent's Argument
Although torture is prohibited under Israeli Law, the 1987 Landau
Guidelines allow the use of "moderate physical pressure" of suspected terrorists
in limited cases where the information sought is vital to prevent death via
terrorist bombings." The State feels the interrogation practices fall within these
Landau guidelines and hence do not constitute torture. The General Security
Service investigators claim they are in fact authorized to investigate and
interrogate those who are suspected of endangering Israel's security.72 The
State also argues that the physical means implemented are legal under the
"necessity defense."' The necessity defense is a matter open for debate for
some time.74 The General Security Service mentions to the Supreme Court of
Israel that the necessity defense should apply because of the "ticking time
bomb" argument.75 This argument is premised on the fact that there is an
imminent danger that exists and therefore a corresponding immediate need to
preserve human life.76 Finally, the General Security Service asserted that the
necessity defense is available to each individual interrogator if faced with
criminal liability for improper interrogation.77
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ruled
against the State of Israel, finding that the General Security Service did not have
the authority to implement the various physical methods of interrogation on the
terrorist suspects.78 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Israel emphasized that
Israeli law forbids the challenged physical interrogation practices, because "I)
they offend the general notions of interrogation law, 2) the practices could not
be justified by the necessity defense, and 3) no legislation authorized the use of
such practices." 79 The Court concluded that any justification for allowing
physical means of interrogation should be decided by the legislature, that the
71. Baker and Schonmann, supra note 21, § 4. See also St. Amand, supra note 18,655n. 91 (2000).
72. Torture Case, supra note 1, at 15.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 34. See also Alan Dershowitz, Is it Necessary to Apply 'Physical Pressure' to Terrorists-
And to Lie About it?, 23 ISR. L REv. 193 (1989).
75. Id. § 34. See also Mordecai Kremnitzer, The Landau Report - Was the Security Service
Subordinated to the Law or the Law to the Needs of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L REv. 216, 244-247
(1989).
76. Id. at § 34.
77. St. Amand, supra note 19, 659-60.
78. Torture Case, supra note 1, at § 40. Recall that the physical methods of interrogation used by
the Shin Bet included shaking, the "Shabach position," the "Frog crouch," excessive tightening of cuffs, and
sleep deprivation.
79. St. Amand, supra note 19, at 660.
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legislature represents the people, and therefore, any discussion about this issue
should be presented in front of the legislature.80 The effect of the Supreme
Court's decision has been to eliminate the uses of the interrogation methods by
the General Security Service, producing a wide range of controversy as to
whether or not the General Security Service should be allowed to conduct these
kinds of interrogations on suspected terrorists. 8'
This decision by the Supreme Court of Israel to ban the interrogation
methods used by the General Security Service has raised many questions. To
put it clichd, the State of Israel was caught between a rock and a hard place.
What price, if any, should be paid in order to eradicate terrorism in Israel?
Should the fundamental human rights of terrorists be compromised for the sake
of the Israeli community? The Supreme Court of Israel, along with the United
Nations' Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, have paved the way for human rights to trump
communitarianism. In keeping with their position that individual rights should
be the highest priority, human rights activists vehemently support the recent
decision, and feel that Israel has taken a step in the right direction. Conversely,
members of Israeli security maintain that this decision will lead to enormous
problems for the general welfare and citizenry of Israel. Which side is correct
remains to be seen.
80. Id. at 661.
81. id. at 675.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, we live in a world where the women's movement has given most
women the opportunity to excel in professional careers, hold political offices,
own their own companies, and hold many other positions of power. Yet, in this
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2002, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. I am dedicating this paper to the women of Afghanistan who remain silenced by the
Taliban. You have not been forgotten.
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same world, women in Afghanistan have become powerless. Afghan women
have become prisoners in a world that is ruled by the Taliban' regime.
Afghanistan is a small country that shares its borders with Pakistan, Iran,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China.2 In 1996, after over seventy-
five years of government instability in the country, the Taliban, a fundamentalist
Islamic group, extended its control over approximately eighty-five percent of
Afghanistan.3
Under Taliban rule, women have become virtually invisible. The Taliban' s
harsh rules prohibit Afghan women from obtaining life's most basic necessities.
For example, women are prohibited from obtaining employment outside the
home, obtaining a formal education, leaving their homes without a male family
member to chaperone them, obtaining medical treatment, and appearing in
public without being completely covered by a burqa.4
Before the Taliban regime took control of Afghanistan, many women in
Afghanistan's urban and metropolitan areas worked outside the home, had
access to formal educational facilities, and enjoyed a more liberal lifestyle.'
Statistics by the Feminist Majority Foundation show that women and girls in
Afghanistan's capital city of Kabul, as well as many other parts of the country,
have attended co-educational schools since the 1950s. 6 These same statistics
also show the following: before the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan,
seventy percent of teachers were women; forty percent of doctors were women;
women comprised over one-half of the student body of Afghanistan's
universities; schools were co-educational at all levels; women were employed
as judges, engineers, nurses, and lawyers; and women were not required to
cover themselves with a burqa.7
1. Taliban means "religious student." Emily MacFarquhar, The Rise of the Taliban a New Force
of Muslim Fighters Determined to Rule Afghanistan; Pakistan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 1995, at
64.
2. U.S.-Afghanistan Policy: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the Senate
Comm'n, 106th Cong. (1999), available at http://www.state.govwwwpolicy-remarksl
1999/990309_inderfurth.afgh.html (statement of Karl F. lnderfurth, Assistant Sec'y of State for S. Asian
Affairs).
3. There are conflicting accounts of how much of Afghanistan is under Taliban control. Most
sources state that the Taliban control between 85% to 95% of the area. Afghanistan and The Taliban:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Near E. and S. Asian Affairs of the Senate Comm'n. on Foreign Relations,
106th Cong. (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Statement of Karl F. Inderfurth].
4. A burqa is comparable to wearing a bed sheet. It is a floor-length covering that only contains
an opening across the eyes which is made of a wire-like mesh.
5. Katha Pollitt, Underground Against the Taliban, THE NATION, May 29, 2000, at 10 (Afghan
Women's Rights Group Opposes Treatment of Women).
6. Afghanistan and The Taliban: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Near E. and S. Asian Affairs
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (2000) (on file with author) (testimony of Mavis
Leno, Nat'l. Bd. Member, Feminist Majority Found) [hereinafter Testimony of Mavis Leno].
7. Id.
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The oppression of women in Afghanistan is one of the most deplorable
human rights violations, and it is capturing the attention of leaders and activists
worldwide. The goal of this paper is to inform others about the mistreatment of
women by the Taliban regime. Section II will discuss the history of political
instability in Afghanistan, and how the Taliban rose to power. Section mII will
discuss some of the laws that have been laid down by the Taliban, and the
punishment for breaking these laws. Section IV will discuss the religion of
Islam's views on the rights of women, the proper treatment of women, and the
Taliban's treatment of women. Section V will give a brief account of the United
States' response to the Taliban's treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan.
Lastly, Section VI will discuss the future of women and girls in Afghanistan.
11. THE TALIBAN: WHO THEY ARE AND How THEY CAME TO POWER
After more than seventy-five years of government instability in
Afghanistan, the fundamentalist-Islamic group, known as the Taliban emerged
sometime in the Fall of 1994. The Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar,
started a reform movement that eventually grew into what is now known as the
Taliban. 9 The Taliban claims that it was originally formed in response to the
widespread civil unrest and crime in Afghanistan."0 The stated goal of the
Taliban is "to bring Afghanistan [back] under Islamic rule.""
Throughout its history, Afghanistan has consistently been plagued with
political instability. 2 Afghanistan has been referred to as the "crossroads to
Central Asia."'3 Because of its coveted location as a trade route, there have
been constant struggles for power and control of Afghanistan. 4 Alexander the
Great, the Turkish Empire, and the Mongol Dynasty of India are a few of the
noteworthy historical figures who have struggled to control Afghanistan. 5
During the Nineteenth Century, a struggle for the control of Afghanistan erupted
between Britain and Russia. 6 The most recent power struggle in Afghanistan
8. The Taliban Story: God's Holy Warriors Or The Devil's Militia available at
http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/story.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001) [hereinafter The Taliban Story];
Pam O'Toole, Who Are The Taliban, available at http://news2.thls.bbc.co.ukhil english/world/south-asia/
newsid_144000/144382.stm (last modified Aug.3,1998) [hereinafter O'Toole].
9. The Taliban Story, supra note 8.
10. Id.
11. Background Notes Archive - Near E. and N. Afr., at http://dosfan'bb.uic.edu/ERCtbgnotes/sa
afghanistan9407.htnl (last visited Mar. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Background Notes Archive].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
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resulted in the ten-year occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union from
1979 to 1989."7
A. Afghanistan's History of Political Instability
From 1919 to 1929, Afghanistan was ruled by King Amanullah.8 King
Amanullah attempted to end Afghanistan's isolation as a country by establishing
diplomatic relations with most major countries and by attempting to modernize
the country. 9 For example, the traditional Muslim veil required as part of the
dress code of women was abolished and co-educational schools were opened.2"
Because these changes conflicted with their conservative beliefs, many
traditional religious and tribal leaders were alienated. 21 Eventually King
Amanullah lost control of Afghanistan to rebel forces in 1929.22
In 1929, King Amanullah's cousin, Prince Nadir Khan, took control of
Afghanistan from the rebel forces and became King Nadir Shah.' King Nadir
Shah's rule was short; in 1933, he was assassinated by a Kabul student.24
In 1933, Afghanistan's last king, King Nadir Shah's son, Mohammad Zahir
Shah, took the throne and ruled Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973.2 King Zahir
Shah's cousin, Sardar Mohammed Daoud, served as the Prime Minister of
Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963. 26 Under the rule of King Zahir Shah and Prime
Minister Daoud, the country appeared to be leaning toward a more liberal
government structure. Prime Minister Daoud sought military and economic
assistance for Afghanistan from the United States and the Soviet Union.27 Prime
Minister Daoud also introduced new social policies that instantly became a
source of controversy. 2 For example, Prime Minister Daoud appeared at the
country's 1959 independence celebrations with his wife and other female
members of the royal family not covered by thetraditional Muslim veil worn by
women. 
29
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-South Asia - Afghanistan, Jane's Information Group
Umited, Aug. 3, 1999, available at LEXIS, Nexis Ubrary, MILTRY/JANSEN File [hereinafter Jane's
Sentinel Security Assessment].
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In 1963, Prime Minister Daoud was dismissed after being accused of
giving support for the creation of a Pashtun state at the border of Pakistan and
Afghanistan. 30 Because of these allegations, the tensions in an already strained
relationship became greater between Afghanistan and Pakistan.3' Upon the
dismissal of Prime Minister Daoud, King Zahir Shah was left to rule
Afghanistan directly.32
In 1964, King Zahir Shah's introduced a new constitution.33 In 1964 and
1969, elections were held by King Zahir Shah as part of an "experiment with
democracy," but the ultimate power was still held by King Zahir Shah.34
Despite the King's "experiment with democracy," political parties were illegal
in Afghanistan until 1965. 35
In 1965, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a communist-
supported party, was founded.36 The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
"had close ideological ties to the Soviet Union."37 The 1965 elections were
successful for the communist party, after two communist deputies were elected
to the Afghanistan Parliament.3  In 1967, the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan split into two branches, and other political parties were formed that
gained overwhelming support from the "students and young intellectuals" of the
country.39
In the early 1970s, there was an overwhelming number of educated young
people whom outnumbered the employment opportunities in Afghanistan. 4°
Also during this time, certain regions of Afghanistan were experiencing a
30. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan representing approximately thirty-eight
percent of the population. Other ethnic groups present in the country include: Tajik, accounting for
approximately twenty-five percent of the population; Hazara, accounting for approximately nineteen percent
of the population; Aimaq, accounting for approximately six percent of the population; Uzbek, accounting for
approximately six percent of the population; and Turkmen, accounting for approximately two percent of the
population. There are other small ethnic groups in the country that represent small percentages of the
population. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
31. Id.
32. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29; Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
38. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
39. One branch of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was the Khalq branch, which
means the "Masses." Nur Muhammad Taraki was the leader of the Khalq branch. The Khalq branch had the
support of the Afghan military. The following of the Khalq branch consisted mostly of the Pashtun-speaking
youth. The Parcham, which means "the Banner", was the second branch of the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan The Parcham branch was headed by Babrak Kanmal. The following of the Parcham branch
consisted mostly of the urban, Farsi-speaking population. See id.; Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
40. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
2001]
558 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:553
devastating famine.4' In response to the economic crisis student activism began
to grow and develop.42 A Marxist influence was becoming more prevalent
among, and developed by, many student activists. 43 In response to the growing
"Marxist influence" among student activists, Ghulam Mohammad Niazi and
Burhanuddin Rabbani, two Muslim professors at Kabul University, began an
Islamic-oriented political discussion group for students." From this political
discussion group, the Jawanan-i-Muslimeen, which means "Muslim Youth" was
formed.45 The Jawanan-i-Muslimeen was a student organization that was
headed by Habiburrahman and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.46
In 1973, former Prime Minister and cousin to King Zahir Shah, Sardar
Daoud, returned to power in Afghanistan after seizing power from King Zahir
Shah in a coup.47 Charges of corruption against the royal family and the
unfavorable economic conditions that the country was experiencing after the
severe drought and famine of 1971 and 1972 were contributing factors to the
success of this coup.
48
Sardar Daoud's new government was supported by the Parcham wing of
the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan." In turn, the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan was receiving support from the Soviet
Union." After abolishing the monarchy and revoking the 1964 constitution,
Sardar Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic and named himself as the first
President and Prime Minister of the newly declared republic.5'
Shortly after Sardar Daoud seized power of Afghanistan, an Islamic-
supported counter-coup was unsuccessful.52 In response, Sardar Daoud began
ordering the arrests of large numbers of Islamic supporters and political
groups.53 This forced both Burhanuddin Rabanni, the Muslim professor that
founded the Islamic oriented student political discussion groups, and
Habiburrahman and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the founders of Jawanan-i-
Muslimeen, the student organization formed around Rabanni's discussion
groups, to flee from Afghanistan to Pakistan along with their followers.' In
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
46. Id.
47. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
48. Id.
49. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
50. Id
51. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
52. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Pakistan, Rabanni and the Hekmatyars' followers received training from the
Pakistani military and began making guerrilla attacks on Sardar Daoud's newly
established government." Meanwhile, Sardar Daoud's loyalties to the
communist-supported People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan were short-
lived. 56 Shortly after he rose to power in Afghanistan, Sardar Daoud formed his
own political party, the Revolutionary Party.57
During the mid-i 970s, the original political parties of Afghanistan began
to reorganize, reunite, and reemerge. In 1976, Burhanuddin Rabanni and the
Hekmatyars began to disagree politically, and the Hekmatyars established their
own political following, the Hizb-i-Islami.58 In 1977, the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan re-united and re-organized after its division ten years
earlier in 1967.59
In April, 1978, there was another coup, that ended with the death of Sardar
Doaud.60 After the coup, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took
control of the country and named Nur Mohammad Taraki, the Secretary General
of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as President.6, The Soviet
Union acted promptly to take advantage of the political situation in
Afghanistan.62 In December 1978, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a
"bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation." 3 Shortly after the execution of
the treaty, the Soviet Union began to increase its military assistance to
Afghanistan." Ultimately, the survival and existence of the new Afghan
government became increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union's military
65assistance.
During the first eighteen months Nur Mohammad Taraki was in power, the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan began to aggressively impose a
"Marxist-style reform program" on the country." The reform program
conflicted with many of Afghanistan's deeply-rooted and traditional Islamic
roots, beliefs, and customs. 67 For example, there were many changes in the law,
55. Id
56. Id
57. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
58. Hizi-l-lslami means "Islamic Party." Id.
59. As previously discussed, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan split into two rival wings
in 1967. See supra note 39.
60. Background Notes Archive, supra note I1.
61. id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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including changes in marriage customs and land reform." These changes were
highly controversial in many of Afghanistan's extremely conservative villages,69
and resulted in thousands of conservative Muslims being imprisoned, tortured,
or killed, including members and leaders of the religious establishments,
government officials, and affluent members of society.70 Because of these
reform efforts and the uprising that they caused among Afghanistan's
conservative Islamic population, Islamic exiles were encouraged to return to
Afghanistan from Pakistan.71 These returning exiles encouraged the resistance
against the Afghan government's reforms, and this eventually resulted in control
of Afghanistan changing hands again.7
In the Fall of 1979, Hafizullah Amin had Nur Mohammad Taraki killed,
and seized control of Afghanistan." When Amin took control of Afghanistan,
the majority of the Afghan countryside was under rebel control, and the support
of the Afghan people for the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan began
to diminish.74 In October 1979, the relationship between Hafizullah Amin and
the Soviet Union became very tense after Hafzullah Amin refused to accept
guidance from the Soviet Union on how to gain stability in Afghanistan's
government." Fearing a collapse of Hafzullah Amin's entire government
structure, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and killed Hafzullah Amin in
December 1979.7' After the invasion, the government of Afghanistan changed
hands again. The Soviet Union named the Parcham leader, Barbrak Karmal, as
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
71. Many Islamic supporters fled to Pakistan after the 1973 coup of Sardar Daoud, including
members of the Islamic student organization Jawanan-i-Muslimeen ("Muslim Youth"), founded by
Habiburrahman and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Hizb-i-Islami ("Islamic Party"), the organization later formed
by the Hekmatyars after splitting from the Jawanan-i-Muslimeen. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra
note 29.
72. Id
73. Haifzullah Amin was the former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Afghanistan.
Together Haifzullah Amin and Nut Mohammad Taraki headed the Khalq, one of the two branches of the
divided People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. As previously discussed, in 1967 the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan split into two rival wings and reunited in 1977. The newly reunited People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan launched the coup in 1978, which resulted in the Afghan leader Sardar Daoud's death.
Id.
74. The rebels opposed the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan due to its reform in the
country, which conflicted with traditional Islamic traditions and beliefs. For example, there were changes
made to the marriage laws and highly controversial land reform policies. Background Notes Archive, supra
note 11.
75. Id.
76. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, supra note 29.
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Prime Minister of Afghanistan." This marked the beginning of a ten-year
occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.
Like his predecessor, Hafzullah Amin, Prime Minister Karmal was also
unsuccessful in establishing a stable and centralized government outside of
Afghanistan's capital, Kabul. 8 During Prime Minister Karmal's rule, the
majority of Afghanistan's countryside still remained in rebel hands." The
biggest factor in the inability to achieve stability in Afghanistan's government
was the Mujahidin, the "Afghan freedom fighters."' Initially, the Mujahidin
organization was poorly organized and lacked power; however, the Mujahidin' s
power strengthened with time because they were receiving weapons and training
from outside sources, including the United States.8 The Mujahidin vigorously
opposed the Soviet Union's control of Afghanistan, and made it virtually
impossible for the Afghan government to establish any stable system of
government outside of Afghanistan's major urban cities.82 The Mujahidin
actively and frequently launched attacks on Kabul and assassinated high Afghan
government officials.8 3 Despite the fact that the Mujahidin was almost entirely
responsible for the majority of the civil unrest in Afghanistan, the burden of the
blame landed squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.8 This was one of
the biggest factors contributing to the Soviet Union's failure to win the support
of the Afghan people. 5
In 1986, Prime Minister Karmal was replaced by Muhammad Najibullah,
the former chief of the Afghan secret police." Again, like his predecessors,
Najibullah was unsuccessful in bringing stability to the Afghan government, and
the country continued to remain highly dependent on support from the Soviet
Union. 7 During this same time period, the rebel resistance against the Soviet
Union's control was aided by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.8
In May 1988, the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Union of Soviet Social Republics-
United States Accords on the Peaceful Resolution of the Situation in
Afghanistan (the "Peaceful Accords") resolved certain disputes between
77. The Parcham was one of the two rival wings of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
during its split in 1967. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. ld
82. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
88. Id.
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Afghanistan and Pakistan.89 In Geneva, certain agreements were executed at the
Peaceful Accords between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to resolve the
conflicts in Afghanistan.' The Soviet Union and the United States also signed
the agreements at the Peaceful Accords as guarantors.9 One of the crucial
issues addressed and resolved at the Peaceful Accords provided that there would
be no further interference by the United States or the Soviet Union in Afghan
or Pakistani affairs.92 To assure that this provision would be followed, the
agreements reached at the Peaceful Accords provided for the Soviet Union's full
withdrawal from Afghanistan by 1989. 93 Interestingly, the Mujahidin neither
participated in the negotiations, nor signed the agreements reached at the
Peaceful Accords. 94
In accordance with the agreements reached at the Peaceful Accords, the
Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.9' After the Soviet Union's
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country still continued to be plagued by civil
war." Ironically, Muhammad Najibullah continued to remain in power until
1992 despite his lack of support from the Afghan people, and his lack of
recognition by the international community.9
In 1992, the Mujahidin were successful in taking control of Kabul." The
Mujahidin immediately established a fifty-one member leadership council to
assume temporary power and leadership in Kabul, and made provisions for the
establishment of a new government." According to the Mujahidin's plan, the
fifty-one member leadership council would turn over leadership to a ten-
member leadership council after three months. The ten-member leadership
council was to be headed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. ° Burhanuddin
Rabbani made a radical departure from the Mujahidin's plan and formed the
ten-member leadership council prematurely in May, 1992.201 Burhanuddin
Rabanni was then elected President by the leadership council."°
89. Afghanistan-Pakistan-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Accords on Peaceful
Resolution of the Situation in Afghanistan, Apr. 14, 1988, Afg.-Pak.-U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 LLM. 587.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
95. Id
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
100. As previously discussed, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was one of the professors at Kabul
University in the late 1960s and early 1970s who began the Islamic student discussion groups. Jane's Sentinel
Security Assessment, supra note 29.
101. Background Notes Archive, supra note 11.
102. Id.
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The fighting in Afghanistan continued because of the ethnic and religious
differences among the Afghan people."°3 There was also fighting between
Burhanuddin Rabanni's supporters and his rivals." The country remained in
a state of civil war and divided into various war zones, with each war zone
being governed by a different "warlord."' 05 The warlords expanded the already
flourishing criminal trades of smuggling and narcotics, and strengthened their
ties with the international criminal community.'t ° As a result, Afghanistan's
economy became supported primarily by criminal activity. 0 7
In the Summer of 1994, the Taliban, a fundamentalist and radical religious
student militia, emerged in South Afghanistan in reaction to the widespread civil
unrest and lawlessness in Afghanistan.'
B. The Origins of the Taliban: Claims by Outside Sources
Little is known about the group of religious students that make up the
Taliban. The only information that seems not to be contradicted, wholly or
partly, is that the Taliban is lead by Mullah Mohammed Omar. Likewise, little
is known about Mullah Mohammed Omar. The Taliban are reported to be a
group of "militant Sunni Muslim Afghan tribesman" from South Afghanistan. "
The sources are not clear, and there are often conflicting accounts as to the
exact origins of the Taliban, and their role in Afghanistan's turbulent past. One
account is that the members of the Taliban are from the rural villages of
Afghanistan, where they lived radically conservative lives in conformity with
a strict interpretation of Islamic law." 0 The customs, traditions, and beliefs of
these rural villages are said to give women no rights. It is reported that the
women residing in these rural villages are required to be completely covered by
a burqa, and are often sold off to the highest bidder as child-brides, and then
resold when their husbands grow bored with them."'
There are some reports claiming that the members of the Taliban fought as
a Mujahidin during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan.' Other
sources claim that the Taliban were appointed by Pakistani officials to protect
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and escort trade convoys on a developing trade route from Pakistan to Central
Asia."' These sources claim that after the Taliban provided service to the
Pakistani government, they became more developed and organized, and moved
on to take control of the city of Kandahar in South Afghanistan, which would
be the group's first step toward taking control of the majority of the country." 4
However, other sources speculate that there is more behind the Taliban
than just a group of religious students passionate about bringing Afghanistan
under pure Islamic rule. There are theories by some, that the Taliban is a
military and political operation created solely to give Pakistan "indirect control
over the policies made in Afghanistan.""' 5 Propositions asserted under this
theory are: that the high-ranking Taliban officials are former officials of the
communist government, and that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are using these
high-ranking Taliban officials as "puppets" to control the internal affairs of
Afghanistan." 6 The supporters of this theory claim that it provides justification
for the Taliban's questionable swift ascension to power in Afghanistan. While
there are many conflicting accounts as to the exact evolution of the Taliban and
the role that they played in Afghanistan's history, most sources agree that
members of the Taliban did flee to Pakistan during Soviet occupation in
Afghanistan, and it was there that they received training in religious schools."7
C. The Origins of the Taliban: Claims by the Taliban
The only claim that has been consistently made by the Taliban is that they
are a group of students of pure Islam, Islam jurisprudence and the laws of the
Sharia, and that their ultimate goal is to bring Afghanistan under Islamic rule,
thereby creating a pure Islamic-Afghan government."5 The Taliban's claims
about their origins, backgrounds, and goals are also conflicting. Because media
coverage is rarely allowed by the Taliban, most of the conclusions about the
Taliban must be drawn from a combination of information from a variety of
sources and speculation about the facts missing from that information.
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The Taliban claims that they have been in existence since the Soviet
occupation" 9 of Afghanistan in 1979." They also claim that, during the
occupation, they were affiliated with Harakat-e Inqelab-e Afghanistan
(Afghanistan's Movement of Islamic Revolution) and Hizb-e Islami (The
Islamic Party), two political parties which opposed Soviet occupation.' This
claim is consistent with some reports given by other outside sources.
The Taliban claim their movement began in 1994, in the city of Kandahar,
in Southern Afghanistan." They claim that its calling was to "rescue" the
Afghan people who have suffered through years of chaos and devastation under
the rule of the warlords, who were in control of the countryside."2 The Taliban
also claim that their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, formed the movement
in order to restore law and order to the area of Kandahar, which was plagued by
crime and civil unrest.'2'
While there are numerous conflicting accounts as to the exact origins of the
Taliban and their role in the history of Afghanistan, most sources seem to agree
that the Taliban are religious students that were trained in Pakistan during the
Soviet Union's occupation in Afghanistan. Their goal is to establish a pure
Islamic government in Afghanistan. Their ascension to power began in the city
of Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan and eventually led to the capture of
Afghanistan's capital of Kabul in 1996.
D. The Taliban's Ascension To Power
The Taliban ascended to power in Afghanistan's capital city of Kabul, in
1996. 12 Strategically, Kabul is considered to be an important city for the
Taliban because it is considered "the gateway to the Indian subcontinent in the
south and to the central Asia republics to the north."'" Immediately after taking
control of Kabul, the Taliban captured and killed Afghanistan's former
President, Muhammad Najibullah, and his brother, Shahpur Ahmedzi. 27 The
119. As previously discussed, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. In 1989,
the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan pursuant to the Geneva Accords Agreement signed by
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Taliban then made a gruesome statement of their arrival and presence in Kabul
by displaying the corpses of Muhammad Najibullah and Shahpur Ahmedzi
hanging in the center of the city."
When the Taliban first ascended to power in Kabul, they were welcomed
by the majority of the population of Afghanistan.' 29 After years of war,
instability, civil unrest, and living under the rule of the various warlords who
ruled the countryside of Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan viewed the
Taliban as an organization that would provide them with the stability and
security that they craved. 3' However, almost immediately after the Taliban's
occupation of Kabul, they suspended the constitution and changed the name of
Afghanistan to the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," with their leader, Mullah
Mohammad Omar, carrying the title of "Commander of the Faithful."''
Currently, there are no constitutional protections or any other basic law in place
in Afghanistan.' 32 The only law is the law of the Taliban, which is erratic,
illogical, and inconsistent. The Taliban's law is based upon their own strict
interpretations of Islamic law.
33
I. THE LAW OF THE TALIBAN
The Taliban subscribe to a radical interpretation of Islam that mandates
extreme conservatism. The Taliban belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. '3 While
Taliban stormed the compound and killed Najibullah. Many Afghans celebrated Najibullah's death. The
Soviet-supported leader was nicknamed the "Butcher of Kabul" because of his brutal rule of Afghanistan.
His brother acted as his security chief. Anthony Spaeth, Kabul's New Islamic Rule Young and
Fundamentalist, The Taliban Capture the Afghan Capital and Quickly Make a Gory Point, IlME MAGAZINE,
Oct. 7, 1996, at 48.
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other Muslim countries that belong to both the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam
have imposed rules on women that would be termed "strict" by western
standards, it has been said that no other Muslim country in the world shares the
Taliban's extreme and harsh interpretation of the principles of Islam.'35
Some of the first official acts of the Taliban after taking control of Kabul
were: to make it mandatory for women to wear a burqa; to prohibit women
from working outside their homes; to prohibit girls from attending school; and
to prohibit women from going outside their homes without a male family
member serving as a chaperone. 36 Under the rules of the Taliban, women are
not allowed to wear white burqas, white socks, or white shoes, and are subject
to being beaten if their shoe heels click when they walk. 37
The laws of the Taliban have had the greatest effect on the women in the
metropolitan and urban areas of Afghanistan and have virtually made them
prisoners in their own homes.13  For example, as part of the implementation of
their plan to create their "pure Islamic state," the Taliban immediately placed
a ban on televisions, movies, music, and photographs. 39 The Taliban have also
prohibited activities such as kite flying and chess, along with dolls and stuffed
animals."4 Under its religious interpretations, the Taliban have declared that
dolls, stuffed animals, televisions, and photographs represent graven images,
which are prohibited in the religion of Islam.' 4 ' The Taliban require that a
man's beard must hang from his chin at a length that is longer than a fist
clamped underneath his chin, that men wear head coverings, and may not have
long hair. 42 A man can be imprisoned for ten days for shaving his beard, or
alternatively, required to attend instructions in the Islamic faith. 43 The Taliban
have also established mandatory prayer schedules. 44 Anyone who does not
observe the mandatory prayer schedules, or who is late to the mandatory prayer
session, runs the risk of being punished, which could include a severe beating. 145
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The Taliban has also made it mandatory that all children be given Muslim
names by their parents."
Because there is no law or constitutional provision in place, other than the
law of the Taliban, the Taliban freely enter homes, without permission,
notification, or consent, to search for violations of the Taliban law.14 The
Taliban rely on the Ministry for Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of
Vice to enforce its rules, and the Ministry is notorious for regularly checking for
compliance with the Taliban's edicts on the streets of Afghanistan's cities.'"
A. Life for Women Before the Taliban Regime
The Taliban's harsh rules have had the greatest impact on Afghan women
who reside in the urban areas, and less of an impact on women in rural areas.
This is because enforcement of the Taliban's law is not as consistent in
Afghanistan's rural areas because the Taliban' s presence is not as substantial. 49
Additionally, because most women in Afghanistan's rural villages have always
lived a conservative lifestyle, the Taliban has brought some security and
stability to their lives."5 During the years when the country was ruled by
warlords and plagued by crime, these women lived with the constant threat of
becoming the victims of rape and other criminal acts." Some reports indicate
that the Taliban have stopped, or at least significantly reduced, the rapes and
other crimes that were common during the rule of the former President,
Muhammad Najibullah.' While the Afghan women in rural areas may breathe
a sigh of relief because some order has been restored to their world, the women
in Afghanistan's urban cities are feeling the greatest impact of the Taliban rule.
The country began its attempt to modernize its treatment of women in 1919
under the rule of King Amanullah and Queen Soraya."5 During the 1920s, there
were other laws enacted that were favorable to women pertaining to marriage,
dowry, and circumcision." During this time period, the first women's
organizations were established and education for women was encouraged.'"
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These reforms were opposed by many conservative Afghans, and it resulted in
many girl's schools being closed shortly thereafter.15 6
From 1929 to 1963, women were again forced into a period of extreme
conservatism, which included the return to the customs of veiling and
seclusion.'57 There was segregation of the sexes in all sectors of Afghan society,
including movie theaters, schools, and universities.'
In 1959, women were again encouraged to remove their veils and many
women began appearing unveiled in public.'59 In 1964, the Afghanistan
Constitution was enacted.'" During the same year, the government of
Afghanistan got its first female cabinet member as Minister of Health.' 6' During
the 1970s, many women were dressing in clothing that was very similar in style
to that of some Western countries. 162 Again, many conservative Afghans
opposed these changes in custom and there was bloodshed as a result. 63
In 1978, the communist party took power of Afghanistan.' 4 Under
communist rule, there were substantial changes to the woman's role in
society. 165 For example, there were laws enacted forbidding forced marriages
and establishing a minimum age requirement for marriage.'" Under communist
rule women were also given the right to work. 67
Statistics show that in 1992, women made up approximately fifty percent
of the Afghan workforce. 68 Before the Taliban came into power in 1996,
women worked outside the home, were not required to cover themselves with
a burqa, and were not subjected to the harsh rules imposed upon them by the
Taliban.
B. Life for Women Under the Taliban Regime
Under Taliban rule, women have no rights. They are unable to obtain
access to things that most consider to be a right, not a privilege. For example,
they do not have access to sufficient medical care, or in most cases any medical
care, education, employment, or their mosques. 69 The Taliban claim that their
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goal is "preserving women's honor' 170 and further claim that "the restrictions
on women are for their own protection.'' In response to the negative media
coverage on the Taliban's treatment of Afghan women, the Taliban leader
Mullah Mohammad Omar expressed the following opinion about the Western
world's treatment of women: "their interpretation of women's rights is only
those ugly and filthy western cultures and customs in which women are insulted
and dishonoured [sic] as a toy.' 72
Justifications give by the Taliban and their supporters for the strict
restrictions on women have ranged from the need to restore civil unrest in the
country, to the theory that Western women are not truly respected in their
culture. The Taliban and their supporters assert that Muslim women are the
queens of their homes and it is their husband's duty to care for them; therefore,
they do not need the same rights as Western women.
C. The Taliban's Prohibition of Working Women
When the Taliban took control of Kabul, women were immediately banned
from all employment outside the home, apart from the traditional agricultural
work performed by women in the rural areas of the country.' 7 The ban on
working outside the home has, perhaps, been one of the Taliban' s harshest rules.
The Taliban claim that they are gradually making exceptions by allowing some
women to return to work as doctors and nurses, but under very restricted
conditions. 7 For the most part, the ban on working outside the home still
continues in full force for the majority of Afghan women."
The ban on employment outside the home has been devastating to the
thousands of widows residing in Afghanistan.176 Because of Afghanistan's long
history of civil war and political instability, reports estimate that there are
approximately 30,000 widows in Kabul alone. 77 Because of the loss of their
husbands and other male family members, these widowed-women are the sole
source of support and income for their families. 78 Because the Taliban has
forbidden these women from working, many are forced to beg in the streets and
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sell their personal belongings in order to provide food for themselves and their
children.'79
D. The Taliban 's Mandated Dress Code for Women
While the Islamic faith encourages women to cover their bodies, it does not
prescribe the covering of their faces, and it also requires that men properly cover
their bodies from their chest to their knees. 80 Many women comply with the
obligations of their faith by covering their bodies with common clothing that
sufficiently covers their limbs, and scarves that cover their heads. While the
requirement that women should be covered may seem oppressive to Western
women, for Muslim women it is simply an observance of their traditional
religious beliefs and is done out of respect for the teachings of their religion and
the Qur'an.
As it has with many of its laws, the Taliban has taken a principle of the
Islam religion and distorted it into an extreme and harsh rule. The Taliban has
prohibited women from appearing in public without wearing the traditional
burqa.' 81 The burqa can best be described as resembling a long bed sheet. It
covers the woman from head to toe, with a small opening over the eyes that is
covered by mesh.8 2
Prior to the Taliban's control of the country, many women in the rural
areas of Afghanistan wore the burqa when appearing in public, but it was not a
required dress code for women. ' In contrast, prior to the Taliban's control of
the country, many Afghan women in the cities only covered their heads with
scarves.' Now, the Taliban requires that a burqa be worn by all women.
Women caught without a burqa, or who have failed to completely cover
themselves with a burqa, are subject to a beating on the street from the Taliban' s
Ministry for Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice."8 5
Another problem created by the requirement that all women wear a burqa
is that not all women can afford to purchase a burqa.' 6 As previously
discussed, because the Taliban have banned women from working outside the
home, most women have no income because their husbands, brothers, fathers,
and sons have been killed fighting in Afghanistan's many civil conflicts.
Because they have no income, these women cannot afford to purchase the
burqa. Without a burqa, these women are forced to remain in their homes, or
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risk receiving a severe beating from the Taliban, along with the possibility of
the punishment of the elders of their family. 
87
Similarly, women who are disabled and require a prosthesis or walking aid
are forced to remain inside their homes because the burqa will not properly fit
over these devices so as to completely cover the woman.' These women are
forced into imprisonment within the confines of their homes or run the risk of
being subjected to the Taliban's harsh and barbaric forms of punishment for
disobedience of its law.
Sources have reported that women who cannot afford a burqa, or who
cannot properly wear a burqa because of a disability, have been unable to obtain
access to the limited medical care available.8 9 It has been reported that at least
one woman died because she could not access medical care because she either
did not own a burqa or could not properly wear one and, thus, could not leave
her home."9
E. The Taliban 's Ban on Educational Facilities for Women and Girls
Statistics by the Feminist Majority Foundation show that women and girls
in Afghanistan's capital city of Kabul and many other parts of the country have
attended co-educational schools since the 1950s.191 These same statistics also
show that prior to the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan, over half of the
student body of Afghanistan's universities were women." Prior to the Taliban
regime, women were educated as nurses, engineers, doctors, lawyers, and
teachers. '"
Most educational opportunities offered to women and girls abruptly ended
when the Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996. The Taliban has prohibited
most girls from attending school and closed the majority of girls schools almost
immediately upon taking control of Kabul."9 While the Taliban have prohibited
females from attending school, most males still have the opportunity to continue
to their education.' 95 There are a few home based schools and schools in the
rural areas of the country that operate secretly, offering limited educational
opportunities to girls; however, they live under constant fear of severe
punishment for disobedience of the Taliban's law prohibiting educational
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facilities for females.' It is reported that one teacher, who denounced the laws
of the Taliban and insisted that she would continue to teach, was struck with a
rifle butt, and then killed after being shot in the head and stomach. 97 Her death
was witnessed by her students, her husband, and her daughter. 98
The Taliban claim that they do not oppose educational opportunities for
females and that some of the schools for girls have been reopened.'" However,
despite their claims, it appears that the Taliban have made no real effort to
provide females with educational opportunities.' ° The lack of educational
opportunities is a substantial factor that contributes to the despair that the
Afghan women are experiencing.
F. The Taliban Requirement that Women have Male Chaperones
In addition to requiring that women be covered by a burqa, the Taliban also
require women to be escorted outside their homes by a male relative."0 This
rule also presents another obstacle for women because, as previously discussed,
a substantial number of Afghan families are headed by widows, because the
male members of the family have been killed fighting in Afghanistan's many
civil conflicts."' Enforcement of this harsh and irrational rule results in women
being forced to become even more isolated.
G. The Taliban Refusal to Provide Women with Access to Adequate Medical
Care
The Taliban have prohibited and/or severely limited the availability of
medical care for women and girls. The Taliban have severely restricted the
male doctors' ability to treat female patients, and have prohibited females from
being employed as doctors and nurses.2 3 Reports from the Physicians for
Human Rights indicate that the Taliban segregated hospitals by gender in
January 1997.2" In September 1997, the Physicians for Human Rights claim
that the Taliban suspended all medical care for women." 5 The result was that
the only medical facility available to women was a temporary structure that
contained thirty-five beds with no clean water, electricity, surgical equipment,
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or other medical supplies.' Women were forced to deliver their children in a
filthy, unsanitary maternity wards, which were poorly equipped and contained
insufficient medical equipment. 20 7 After the Taliban received international
condemnation for these practices, they opened a few beds for women in several
of the men's facilities. However, the medical care currently available to women
is severely limited and inadequate at best.'
Because of the Taliban's restrictions, many women are unable to gain
access to any medical care. 2°9 For example, if a woman is fortunate enough to
convince a male physician to treat her, he is not allowed to examine the woman
or speak to her directly.210 All communication is done by and through her male
chaperone.2 ' Many times, the male chaperone demonstrates on his own body
the area of the body that is the source of the woman's discomfort or illness.2 2
Because of no access, or poor access, to medical care, most Afghan women
have experienced an alarming decline in their health and well-being since the
Taliban took control of the country.23 There have been reports of women and
girls who have died after being turned away from male-only facilities, or
because they were unable to seek medical care because they did not own a burqa
or have a male relative that can escort them on the city's streets.2" 4
H. Miscellaneous Rules of the Taliban that are Directed Towards Women
The rules of the Taliban outlined above are some of the harshest of the
Taliban's edicts. However, there are many other rules that are directly aimed
at women, and further contribute to their feelings of despair, oppression, and
isolation. For example, women are not allowed to be seen in their homes from
the street.2" 5 In order to implement this rule, the Taliban requires that every
window of all houses with female occupants be painted over.216 The Taliban
have prohibited women from driving.217 The only form of transportation for
women are the buses that the Taliban have designated as "women's buses. 218
Because there are only a few of these buses, the wait for transportation can be
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long.21 9 The Taliban requires that the windows of the women's buses be
covered by curtains and that the driver's area also be separated by a curtain.22°
The Taliban requires bus drivers to employ boys under the age of fifteen to
collect the bus fares on women's buses.22' As mentioned above, women are not
allowed to wear white burqas, white socks, or white shoes, and are subject to a
beating if the heels of their shoes make any noise while they walk or if they are
found to be in violation of any of the Taliban's laws.'
. Punishment for Breaking the Law of the Taliban
The Taliban maintains order in the areas that it controls by issuing extreme,
and sometimes barbaric, penalties for violations of its self-declared law. The
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice and Islamic
courts, both established by the Taliban, enforce the harsh rules of the Taliban.2"
In the Taliban's courts, judges render swift decisions in summary criminal trials,
according to the Taliban's extreme interpretation of Islamic law, and
punishment quickly follows these decisions.'
For example, Taliban justice prescribes that the punishment for murder is
public execution in front of a stadium audience of thousands, and punishment
for thieves is the amputation of one or both hands and feet. 2' It is reported that
some executions have taken place before crowds of up to 30,000 people.2
Executions are sometimes carried out in such barbaric methods as throat slitting,
stoning, beheadings, collapsing walls, and hangings.22 While rape and murder
are serious crimes and certainly worthy of some form of serious punishment,
Afghan citizens are called to the country's stadiums to witness executions for
alleged crimes that would not even merit a citation in most other countries in the
world. For example, adulterers are stoned to death or publicly whipped, and
homosexuals are crushed to death by having walls toppled on them. 2s
In addition to the severe punishment that is rendered after a decision is
handed down by the Taliban's courts, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue
and the Suppression of Vice patrols the streets of Afghanistan, and will often
issue beatings on the spot if they deem one's behavior not to be in compliance
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220. Afghanistan Statistics on Religion, supra note 131.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Afghanistan Statistics on Religion, supra note 131.
226. Id.
227. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter, supra note 136.
228. Afghanistan Statistics on Religion, supra note 131.
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with their strict interpretations of Islamic law.229 For example, a woman
reportedly received a severe beating because she purchased ice cream from a
street vendor and was eating it in public.' The ice cream vendor was also
beaten and jailed for selling the ice cream to an unchaperoned woman 231 A
woman will also run the risk of receiving a beating if any part of her limbs is
exposed underneath her burqa,232 for making noise, for being found on the
streets without a male family member escorting her, or for simply being found
on the street with an excuse that is unacceptable to the Taliban.233 The elders
of the women who allegedly break the rules are also subject to punishment by
the Taliban.234
A 1998 survey conducted by the Physicians for Human Rights indicates
that sixty-eight percent of women that took the survey reported that they or a
family member had been stopped or detained by the Taliban in Kabul. 235 Fifty-
four percent of the women detained by the Taliban were beaten and twenty-one
percent of the women detained were tortured. The international community
recently got a first-hand look at the Taliban's harsh theories of punishment
when the Taliban shaved the heads of the visiting Pakistani soccer team for
wearing shorts while playing a soccer match.237
Because of the Taliban's irrational rules there are extraordinary high levels
of mental stress and depression among women. 8 Most women feel there is no
hope, no future, and experience constant anxiety that they or a family member
will receive harsh punishments if the Taliban thinks that they are not complying
with the their interpretation of Islamic law.239
IV. THE RELIGION OF ISLAM'S VIEW OF WOMEN
The Taliban's treatment of women has been condemned by some members
of the international community and the Muslim faith. For example, the Muslim
Women's League has said that the Taliban's seclusion of women is not derived
from Islam, but is a "political maneuver disguised as Islamic law."2' The
229. Id.
230. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter, supra note 136.
231. Id.
232. One report claims that the Taliban instructs young boys to lie on the ground and report whether
or not the woman's limbs are visible under the garment. Id.
233. Women and Girls in Afghanistan, supra note 138.
234. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter. supra note 136.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Statement of Karl F. Inderfurth, supra note 3.
238. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter, supra note 136.
239. Id.
240. Muslim Women's League, available at http://www.mwlusa.org/news-afghan.shtml (last visited
Mar. 17, 2001).
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Muslim Women's League points out that the Qur'an gave women rights almost
1400 years ago, such as the right to sell property.24' The Muslim Women's
League claims that the religion of Islam promotes equality among men and
women to facilitate the economic growth of society, and that it mandates
education for all Muslims, including women. 2 The Muslim Women's League
has publicly denounced the Taliban's treatment of women, and emphatically
stated that the Taliban' s treatment of women is not derived from the religion of
Islam.243
Women played a vital role in early Muslim society and were among some
of the strongest and earliest supporters of Islam.2 4 The religion of Islam teaches
that the Prophet Muhammad, who is the cornerstone of the religion of Islam,
indicated through his actions that he respected and honored women. u5 For
example, he was a dedicated and devoted husband to his first wife, Khadijah,
for twenty-six years until her death, despite the traditional practice of
polygamy. 6 After his first wife died, another wife of the Prophet Muhammad,
Aishah bint abu Bakr, was notorious for her education, specifically her ability
to read and write, and was often consulted by the early Muslim community
about the teachings of Muhammad after his death.247
The Islamic religion claims to recognize the woman' s right to own property
as being identical to that of a man's, and provides that male family members
cannot handle a woman's finances without her permission. 8 Islam also claims
to provide that a woman must consent to marriage, and that it grants women
exclusive custody of the children up to the child's early adolescent years in the
event of a divorce.249 Islam claims that men and women share the same rights
to obtain an education, and that the teachings of the Qur'an lend support for, and
encourage, women to obtain their life goals.250 While there are some cases in
which women and men are treated differently, Islam claims to provide a logical
explanation for the differential treatment. For example, a man will inherit twice
as much as a woman because he is responsible for providing for his wife,
children, and his own family.2'
Other teachings in Islam support the claim that the Taliban's harsh
treatment of women is in no way supported by the true religion of Islam. For
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. id.
244. Bassiouni, supra note 118.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Bassiouni, supra note 118.
250. id.
251. Id.
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example, a quote from the Prophet's Hadith states: "The most perfect of the
believers in faith is the best of them in moral excellence, and the best of you are
the kindest of you to their wives. '252 All accounts indicate that the Taliban have
taken an otherwise beautiful and dedicated religion and distorted it to further
their goals of oppression and power.
V.THE UNITED STATES' REACTION TO THE TALIBAN
'It appeared that the United States initially welcomed the Taliban's control
of Afghanistan because it hoped that the Taliban would restore order to a
country that was, by all standards, out of control. 1 3 However, both former First
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and President Clinton have acknowledged that
they are aware of the crisis of Afghan women, and the issue is also frequently
addressed by the State Department. 4 On a recent visit to the refugee camps in
Pakistan, former Secretary of State Albright is quoted as saying that the
Taliban's treatment of women and girls is "despicable.' 5 Former Secretary of
State Albright is also quoted as saying that the United States is "opposed to [the
Taliban's] approach to human rights, to their despicable treatment of women
and children and their lack of respect for human dignity ....,2
The United States alleges that the Taliban is harboring the terrorist
organization of Osama bin Laden in 6xchange for warriors willing to join the
Taliban's cause.25 7 The United States has labeled Osama bin Laden as a "threat
to the national security interests of the United States."'" On July 4, 1999,
former President Clinton signed an Executive Order 259 that imposed financial
and commercial sanctions against the Taliban for its alleged support of Osama
bin Laden.2W On July 5, 2000, former President Clinton extended the financial
and commercial sanctions on the Taliban, originally imposed on them pursuant
252. Id.
253. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter, supra note 136.
254. Id.
255. Women and Girls in Afghanistan, supra note 138.
256. Id.
257. The United States claims that Osama bin Laden and his organization (the "a] Qaeda") were
responsible for the bombings of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
in 1998. These bombings killed twelve Americans, nearly three hundred Kenyans and Tanzanians, and
wounded almost five thousand others. The United States claims that Osama bin Laden "continue[s] to plan
new attacks against Americans without regard to [the] innocence of [his] intended victims or for those non-
Americans who might get in the way of [the] attack." James Foley, State Dep't Spokesman, State Department
Briefing on Presidential Executive Order Imposing Sanctions on Assets of the Taliban (July 6. 1999) (on file
with author).
258. Id.
259. Exec. Order No. 13129, 28 C.F.R. 25.701 (2000), available at 1999 WL 460790.
260. State Department Briefing on Presidential Executive Order Imposing Sanctions on Assets of the
Taliban, supra note 257.
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to his 1999 Executive Order.261 The United States has made it clear that there
is no possibility of United States trade or investment in Afghanistan unless
Osama bin Laden is turned over to the proper authorities.
262
While the United States has denounced the Taliban's treatment of women
and its alleged support of Osama bin Laden, allegations have been made by
some that suggest the United States is partially responsible for the conditions in
Afghanistan. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are international allies of the United
States, and among a few that recognize the Taliban as the official government
of Afghanistan.263 Saudi Arabia continues to receive military equipment and
assistance from the United States, as it has for many years. Pakistan also
receives assistance from the United States.2' Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have
been among the major sources of financial support and arms for the Taliban. 65
However, Saudi Arabia has recently reduced its support of the Taliban after
encouragement from the United States." Unfortunately, the Taliban continues
to receive recognition as the official government structure of Afghanistan from
Pakistan and Oman.267
The Taliban craves and seeks international recognition. However, the
United Nations seat for Afghanistan continues to be occupied by the Rabanni
faction," and the United States has refused to grant official recognition to the
Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, and has vowed to only recognize a
"broad based government.. . which restores the human rights of women and
girls. '
269
VI. THE FUTURE OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN
The Taliban has exhibited hostility toward many humanitarian aid
agencies. For example, in July 1998, the Taliban issued an order requiring all
foreign aid workers to be housed at a college campus outside Kabul, which had
been partially destroyed by bombs and had no electricity or running water.27
The Taliban have made it clear that if the aid workers do not follow their
261. Continuation of Emergency With Respect to the Taliban, 65 Fed. Reg. 129 (2000), 50 U.S.C.
§ 1622(d) (1994).
262. State Department Briefing on Presidential Executive Order Imposing Sanctions on Assets of the
Taliban, supra note 257.
263. Testimony of Mavis Leno, supra note 6.
264. id.
265. Id.
266. State Department Briefing on Presidential Executive Order Imposing Sanctions on Assets of the
Taliban, supra note 257.
267. Id.
268. As discussed earlier, Burhanuddin Rabanni became President after the Mujahidin took control
of the country in 1992. The Taliban later ousted Rabanni in 1994. See infra Part II.A.
269. Testimony of Mavis Leno, supra note 6.
270. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter, supra note 136.
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instructions, they will be expelled from the country. 27' Consequently, the
United Nations and most foreign aid workers evacuated the country after the
bombing of Osama bin Laden's terrorist camps by the United States in August,
1998.272 As a result, the maternal and child healthcare clinics that were run by
these workers have now been closed.273 These were some of the only facilities
available to some Afghan women.274
Humanitarian assistance for these women has been provided by a number
of foreign aid agencies. However, a 1998 survey done by the Physicians for
Human Rights indicates that only six percent of the women participating in the
survey have received some type of foreign aid. 27 '5 The failure of Afghan women
to receive any aid can be partially attributed to the Taliban preventing women
from entering the humanitarian aid group's offices and other distribution
centers.
2 76
Pakistan is home to the largest Afghanistan refugee population.2" Some
of the newly arrived refugees are provided with basic necessities, such as health
care, education, and water. However, the aid is limited and many of the
newly-arrived Afghan refugees report that they are not receiving foreign aid or
services.79 There are reports that the Pakistani police are requiring bribes from
the refugees in order to gain access to the aid.280 It has also been reported that
the refugees in the camps are subject to abusive conduct by the Pakistani police,
which can range from rapes, thefts, assaults, to mere threats.21 The Physicians
for Human Rights has also received reports that the Taliban move freely back
and forth between the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and they also
threaten the refugees with abuse.28 2
The United States has categorized the future of the Taliban as "bleak" as
it faces "increasing international isolation. ' '283 The Taliban's primary enemy is
the Northern Alliance in Northern Afghanistan, which is under the leadership
of Burhannudin Rabanni and his Defense Minister, Ahmad Shah Masood. 28
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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275. Statement of Zohra Rasekh and Holly Burkhalter, supra note 136.
276. Id.
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278. Id.
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The Feminist Majority Foundation reports that the quotas for refugees
accepted by the United States is only 4,000 for the entire region of the Near East
and South Asia, which includes Afghanistan. 285  The Feminist Majority
Foundation also reports that the refugees accepted from Afghanistan into the
United States since the Taliban took control of the country have been very
low. 6 The Feminist Majority Foundation's findings indicate that no Afghan
refugees were accepted in 1996 or 1997 and only eight-eight refugees were
accepted in 1998." 7 However, the United States claims it has now launched a
resettlement program for Afghan women and their families." s The United
States claims it expects to admit about 1,500 individuals in the year 2000
alone.289 This will be a substantial increase from the admissions in past years.290
In March 2000, there were reports that the Taliban brought 700 women to
health care facilities in Kabul for treatment. 291 It has also been reported that the
Taliban claim that it is reopening some of the educational facilities for girls that
have been closed. The Taliban have also claimed that they are allowing women
teachers to educate girls at home and allowing women to work in limited sectors
of the workforce, such as the health care field. There is widespread speculation
that the Taliban are taking these steps because of their desire to end the
international isolation of Afghanistan. 92 However, any changes in the Taliban's
treatment of women seem to be a slow process, and these alleged changes
cannot be accurately verified.
VII. CONCLUSION
While there is continuous speculation about the Taliban's less than
promising future, it is a fact that the future of Afghan women is uncertain at
best. Even if there is a complete collapse of the Taliban regime, it will take
years for Afghan women to recover, psychologically, physically, and
emotionally, from the deplorable treatment and abuse they have endured. Using
the exact words of the Taliban, one should note that "the [Taliban' s] restrictions
on women are for their own protection. 293 It seems that the proper question to
be addressed is, "what do Afghan women need protection from?" The totality
of the facts and circumstances can lead a reasonable person to only one answer.
These women need protection from the Taliban.
285. Testimony of Mavis Leno, supra note 6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom has come into the new millennium with an
unprecedented written set of human rights for its citizens. In 1998, the British
government passed the Human Rights Act of 1998 (Human Rights Act) to
incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) into
domestic law.' It finally became effective on October 2, 2000. The Human
Rights Act enables British citizens to bring claims for human rights violations
in domestic courts. Traditionally, the lack of human rights forced citizens to
bring their human rights complaints to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg, France.
Although the Human Rights Act seems to be a step forward for the British
government, there is an important link missing. When Parliament incorporated
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the Human Rights Act into domestic law, it failed to retain Article 13 of the
Convention, which gives national courts the power to provide the injured party
with an effective remedy. Therefore, Parliament still forces its citizens to take
their human rights complaints to Strasbourg for an effective remedy.
II. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE CREATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE
In 1946, Winston Churchill declared that the European countries needed
"a remedy which, as if by miracle, would transform the whole scene and in a
few years make all Europe as free and happy as Switzerland is today. We must
build a kind of United States of Europe.' '2 The European countries were
devastated by five years of World War HI and needed to pull together a common
agreement to promote human rights throughout the countries. On May 5, 1949,
ten countries came together and signed a treaty that established the Council of
Europe (the Council). The Council opened itself up to any European state,
provided the state agreed to accept the same principles of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law.4 Since its inception, the Council has thrived. It now
includes forty-one member states stretching from the Atlantic to east of Russia.5
Throughout the decades, the Council has strived to promote human rights
through supervision and protection of fundamental freedoms and rights.' It has
also identified new threats to human rights, developed public awareness of its
importance, and trained officials through human rights education.7 The
Council's most significant step toward human rights was the introduction of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in 1950. This unprecedented international treaty gave individuals
inalienable rights and freedoms. It also obligated states to guarantee these rights
2. A Short History of the Council of Europe, at http:/www.coe.intportal.Asp?L= E&M=$tII-1-1-
lf/portal.asp?L=E&M=$t/l-0-12-2/02/EMB, l,0,12,2,Histl.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2000).
3. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S PUBLISHING AND DOCUMENTATION SERvICE, THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE (1999). The original signatories to the treaty included Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
4. Id.
5. Id. The Council is currently made up of Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
6. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S MANAGEMENT OF DOCUMENTATION INFORMATION DIRECTORATE,
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ACTIvrriEs & ACHIEVEMENTS (2000) [hereinafter EUROPE ACTIVrrIES &
ACHIEVEMENTS].
7. Id.
8. JOHN WADHAM & HELEN MOUNTFIELD, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN RIGiTS ACT
1998, 10(1999).
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to everyone within their jurisdictions.9 In 1953, the European Convention on
Human Rights came into force.'o
A. Scope of the European Convention on Human Rights
The Convention provides citizens with a constantly evolving list of
fundamental rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights created by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 inspired the creation of the
Convention." The first article introduced required all states to secure
fundamental human rights for citizens.' 2 Section one of the Convention lists the
fundamental rights and freedoms given to European member states.1 3  The
Council consistently updates the Convention with Protocols, which have added
more rights to the original Convention, inter alia. Protocol I gave the right to
education and Protocol 6 provided the abolition of the death penalty. 4
B. Enforcement of the European Convention on Human Rights
The unique aspect of the Convention was the opportunity for individuals
to bring claims against states for human rights violations, as well as allowing
state actions against other states. 5 Violations of human right laws were
originally reported to the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg
(Commission). The Commission determined the admissibility of the claim and
attempted to make a peaceful settlement before referring the case to the
European Court of Human Rights. 6 However, in 1998, the Council created a
9. EUROPE ACTIVITIES & ACHIEVEMENTS, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
1, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter The Convention].
12. Id.
13. Id. Section one provides for the right to life (Article 2); prohibition of torture (Article 3);
prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4); right to liberty and security (Article 5); right to a fair trial
(Article 6); no punishment without law (Article 7); right to respect for private life and family (Article 8);
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9); freedom of expression (Article 10); freedom of
assembly and association (Article I1); right to marry (Article 12); right to an effective remedy (Article 13);
prohibition of discrimination (Article 14); derogation in time of emergency (Article 15); restrictions on
political activities of aliens (Article 16); prohibition on abuse of rights (Article 17); and limitation on use of
restrictions on rights (Article 18).
14. The 50-year European Convention on Human Rights, at http://www.coe.int/portal.asp?
strScreenType=l00&L=E&M=$t/-I-I-l//portal.asp?L=E&M=$t/l-0- I 1-2/01/CEDH/EMB,
1,0,11 ,2,ECHR.stin (last visited Sept. 27, 2000).
15. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 2.
16. The Council of Europe: An Overview, at http://www.coe.int/portal.asp?L= E&M=$t/l-l-1-
l//portal.asp?L=E&M=$t1-0-2-2/02/EMB,1,0,2,2.Overview.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2000).
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new European Court of Human Rights that individuals could access directly
with complaints of human rights violations.17
All decisions, whether by the Commission or the European Court of
Human Rights, are binding on the respondent states concerned. 8 The
Committee of Ministers is responsible for supervising the execution of final
judgments in the states. 9 The Committee of Ministers is obligated to verify
whether states have taken adequate remedial measures to comply with the
specific or general obligations arising out of the European Court of Human
Rights' judgments and report back to such Court."°
The Convention has, therefore, provided all of its European citizens a sense
of comfort that their lives, beliefs and freedoms will be protected by a larger,
more powerful union than their own state. Additionally, almost every member
state of the Council has incorporated some variation of the Convention into
domestic law. In 1998, the United Kingdom finally committed to its own
citizens a set of domestic human right laws.
I. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The United Kingdom has no written constitution or comprehensive bill of
rights." British rights are scattered throughout conventions, customs, and
22statutes. The only Act titled the Bill of Rights 1689 set forth the exercise of
the royal prerogative and succession to the Crown to those permitted by
Parliament.'
Traditionally, the British legal system provided some remedies to deal with
human right violations. For example, the legal system has been able to provide
"habeas corpus," which secures an individual's right to freedom from unlawful
detention.24 However, British courts did not always have jurisdiction to hear
human rights cases because there were no laws guaranteeing protection against
human right infringements. Parliament has the ultimate power to enact any law
and change any previous law.2 Courts only have the power to review the law
17. Id.
18. The European Court of Human Rights: Historical Background Organization and Procedure,
at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/INFORMATION%20NOTES/infodoc%20revised %202.htm#, The European
Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. United Kingdom's "Constitution," at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.delawk uk000(_.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2001).
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 4.
24. The United Kingdom's "Constitution," supra note 21.
25. Id.
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and make rulings consistent with such laws.2 6 Previously under British law,
citizens could bring proceedings against the government or a local government
authority to protect their legal rights and to obtain a remedy for any injury
suffered.27 Generally, Britain has not codified its law, but the courts have
adopted a relatively strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes."
On an international level, the United Kingdom's ratification of a treaty or
international convention does not automatically make the agreement part of its
domestic law.29 However, when it is necessary, the government amends
domestic law to bring it in line with the Convention.3" When there is a conflict
between British law and the Convention, the Convention overrides national
law. 31 The European Court of Human Rights hears an abundant amount of cases
of Convention violations arising in the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the
Court frequently finds the United Kingdom has violated its citizens' Convention
rights. The major issue for British courts is the requirement that they apply
British law as if it were created with the Convention in mind.
While interpreting any provision in domestic legislation which was
ambiguous, the British courts would presume that Parliament intended to
legislate in conformity with the Convention and not in conflict with it.32 The
court can only review administrative discretion in accordance with conventional
principles of judicial review, which did not include a test of proportionality."
The test of proportionality is a principle of review that the European Court
of Human Rights has used to determine whether the interference is "necessary
in a democratic society."' The essence of this principle is to decide whether a
particular limitation on a right is proportionate to the aim being pursued.35 "If
the minister has used a sledgehammer to crack a nut, when a set of nutcrackers
... were [sic] available, without any pressing social need, he cannot satisfy the
test of proportionality."36 With the introduction of the Human Rights Act in
October, British courts are now required to apply the proportionality test to
Parliament's acts and British public officials to determine whether they are
within the scope of their powers. "The more substantial the interference with
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The United Kingdom's "Constitution," supra note 21.
30. id
31. Id.
32. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex pate Brind and Others, [1990] 2
W.L.R. 787, (1991] 1 C.A. 696.
33. Id.
34. WADHAM & MOUNFTELD, supra note 8, at 13.
35. Handyside v. United Kingdom, I Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976).
36. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind and Others, 2 W.L.R.
at 797.
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human rights, the more the court would require by way of jurisdiction before it
was satisfied that the decision was reasonable. 37
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ENACTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The United Kingdom was among one of the first signatories on the
Convention in 1951.38 In 1966, the United Kingdom granted the right of
petition for its citizens to seek redress for human right violations in the
European Court of Human Rights provided there were no effective remedies in
domestic courts.39 However, the British government did not, until recently, feel
it was necessary to make the Convention part of its domestic law. The
government felt that there was no need to incorporate human rights into
domestic law because its citizens already enjoyed those rights that flowed from
British Common Law.' "The rights and the freedoms of the Convention have
not been expressly incorporated by statute into domestic law, because it has
been considered unnecessary to do so, successive governments correctly
assuming that the existing arrangements within the domestic legal system
comply with its [sic] obligations pursuant to the Convention. 4t
The British political and constitutional tradition of freedom was a large
reason for the delay in enacting the Convention into law.42 The government
customarily operated on its Common Law idea of "negative" freedom, which
was the freedom from government interference. It created negative rights by
giving its citizens absolute freedom unless otherwise taken away by statute. 3
According to the Nineteenth-century Diceyan theory, "[w]e are free to do
everything except that which we are forbidden to do by law.
'
""
It is important to note that the legislature has used the Act as an aid in
deciding ambiguous cases. 45 However, public authorities have no duty to
exercise administrative discretion in a manner that compiles with the
Convention," unless the administrative body has expressly stated it would act
in conformance with the Convention.47
37. R. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, [1996] Q.B. 517.
38. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 4.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 10.
41. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex pane Brind and Others, 2 W.LR.
at 795.
42. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind and Others, 2 W.L.R.
at 798.
46. id
47. WADHAM & MOUNTRIELD, supra note 8, at 2; see, e.g., Britton v. Secretary of State for the
Environment, [1997] JPL 617.
The British government has also used the Convention to provide the
judiciary with the amount of discretion to use in determining cases for human
right violations. Prior to the Convention, the test for challenging actions of
public authorities by way of judicial review was that they must be unlawful or
else irrational.4' Lord Diplock explained that this irrational test is judged by "a
decision, which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to
be decided could have arrived at it."49 Finally, the British government used the
Convention to establish the scope of common law.50
In 1997, the Labour Government, in its election manifesto, pledged to
increase individual rights by incorporating the Convention into domestic law.5
The success of the party brought the Human Rights Act Royal Assent on
November 9, 1998.52 The Labour Government's White Paper "Rights Brought
Home" set forth important principles that are reiterated consistently in British
publications.53 The government wants to make it easier for individuals to
enforce their rights under the Convention without the cost and delay of going
to the European Court at Strausbourg. 4  In addition, it wants to increase
awareness of human rights in society, particularly among young people, to form
part of the government's commitment to constitutional reforms, and to provide
British based remedies for human rights breaches.55
An advertisement that the United Kingdom Government created to inform
people of the introduction of the Human Rights Act stated, "You'll probably
never need it, but it's nice to know it's there."56 The advertisement also listed
some of the new fundamental rights.57
48. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 12.
49. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 1; see, e.g., Council of Civil Service Unions and
others v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 1174, [1985] 1 C.A. 374, 410.
50. WADHAM & Mouw1tu, supra note 8, at 1; see, e.g., Derbyshire County Council v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., [1992] Q.B. 770, 812.
51. Sarah McMurchie, The European Convention on Human Rights: The Incorporation of the ECHR
into UK Law, at http:/www.britcoun.orglgovernance/jusrigthumanechr/index.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See McMurchie, supra note 51; see also THE GOVERNMENT'S WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
56. Id.
57. The Home Office News Releases, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hract/hradl.pdf (last visited
Jan. 19, 200).
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V. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 1998
The United Kingdom, through the incorporation of the Convention into
domestic law, has selected certain articles from the Convention. In addition to
Articles 2-12 and 14 from the Convention, the United Kingdom is ratifying
Article 1, peaceful enjoyment of possessions; Article 2, right to education; and
Article 3, the right to take part in elections by secret ballot from the first
Protocol. 58 The Act also adopted Article 1, prohibition of imprisonment for
debt; Article 2, freedom of movement within the territory of a state; and Article
3, prohibition of expulsion of nationals from the Fourth Protocol. 9 Pinally, in
Article 1, the government endorses the abolition of the death penalty and Article
2, the exception in times of war from the Sixth Protocol.W
The Human Rights Act incorporates these articles into domestic law and
determines how the new rights will be enforceable in British law. The most
significant aspect of the Human Rights Act is the development of holding a
public official accountable for his or her acts that are not compatible with the
Convention.
A. Public Authority
The Human Rights Act gives a very broad definition of people acting with
public authority. A person acting in public authority includes any "court or
tribunal, and any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public
nature, but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising
functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament. '' 6' However, the House
of Lords is not considered a public official when working in its judicial
capacity. 62 Parliament kept its name out of the definition of public authority to
keep its sovereignty. 63
The Human Rights Act also provides that when a public authority acts in
compliance with primary or subordinate legislation which prevents it from
acting in conformity with the Convention, the rule creating him or her a public
authority will be set aside.' In such circumstances, the higher court may give
a declaration of incompatibility. 65 The courts are, nonetheless, to presume that
58. THE GovERNmENT'S WHiTE PAPER, supra note 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6(3) (Eng.).
62. Id. at § 6(4).
63. WADRAM & MOuNrFIELD, supra note 8, at 34.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the act of the public authority, intended by legislation, is compatible with the
Convention.'
When a public authority has acted inconsistently with the Convention, the
injured party may use the Human Rights Act as a ground for judicial review
based on illegality.67 Also, the injured party may bring a private lawsuit against
the public authority for breach of statutory duty, or use the public authority's
illegal action as a defense.68
In general, it is not possible to make a claim for damages against a court
or tribunal that has breached the Convention rights, although it is a public
authority. 69 The courts are not accountable for damages because an injured
party can always take the bad decision in his or her case up on appeal.
However, there is a provision that allows damages against the Crown where any
judicial body has been guilty of a breach of the Convention rights.7"
There is no violation when an act or failure to act by the Parliament causes
the breach of the Convention. Parliament is free to establish, change and
abolish laws as it sees fit. Parliament is not accountable for acting
inconsistently with the Convention.
B. Courts' Role Under the Human Rights Act
The essential mechanism of the Human Rights Act is that it reserves
Parliament's sovereignty.7 Although it alters the way that the judiciary can
scrutinize legislation and the ways in which judges can interpret common law,
courts still cannot overturn any legislation created by the Parliament.
The Human Rights Act, like the Convention, is a "living instrument which
must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions."72  Previous
interpretations are not binding on court decisions. They are able to build a new
body of case law, taking into account Convention rights and case law.73 The
House of Lords has accepted that in order to interpret legislation, the courts
need to consider authorities from other jurisdictions to build its case law. 4
However, decisions from the European Court of Human Rights are only
persuasive and not binding.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Human Rights Act, supra note 61, § 7.
68. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 34.
69. Id. at 46.
70. Human Rights Act, supra note 61, § 9.
71. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 10.
72. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1978).
73. THE GovERNMENT's WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
74. WADHAM & MOUNrtFIELD, supra note 8, at 27.
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Courts are required to read primary and subordinate legislation as
compatible with Convention rights.75 The courts can not strike down any
primary legislation; they can only make a "Declaration of Incompatibility.
'76
This ensures Parliament's sovereignty.
7
1. Declarations of Incompatibility
When the courts are not convinced that the legislation is compatible with
Convention rights, they can make a declaration of incompatibility. The power
to make declarations of incompatibility is only available in the high British
courts.78 If a lower court cannot make a decision compatible with the
Convention, then it is required to follow the statute and not the Convention.79
Courts and tribunals of limited jurisdiction are not able to award such a remedy
if it is outside their statutory power to do so.0 If the court finds the legislation
incompatible with the Convention, it makes a declaration of incompatibility and
reports it to the Parliament.8'
The purpose of a declaration of incompatibility is to create public interest
and put pressure on the government to change such law.82 However, the courts
are unlikely to want to make a declaration of incompatibility. Instead, courts
strive to find meanings for statutory provisions to conform to the Convention."
A declaration of incompatibility does not, however, "affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is
given, and it is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is
made." 4 Although a higher court can make a declaration of incompatibility, it
will not be able to set aside a statute. 5 Consequently, when a statute is
incompatible with the Convention, the Parliament must attempt to amend the
legislation. Even following a declaration of incompatibility, the government is
not bound to act either by way of primary or subordinate legislation.86 In order
to introduce the incompatibility before the Parliament, the Minister of the
75. Human Rights Act, supra note 61, § 3(1).
76. Id.
77. THE GovERNMENT's WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1.
78. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 48.
79. Id
80. Id. at 46.
81. Human Rights Act, supra note 61, § 4(2).
82. WADHAM & MOUNTFELD, supra note 8, at 47.
83. Id.
84. Human Rights Act, supra note 61, § 4(a), (b).
85. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 48.
86. Id. at 51.
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Crown may make amendments to the legislation, as he considers necessary, to
remove the incompatibility.87
The declaration of incompatibility goes before Parliament as a document
that contains a draft of the proposed change in legislation and the "required
information.""8  The required information includes an explanation of the
incompatibility that the proposed order seeks to remove, including particulars
of the court decision that prompted the Minister to propose a remedial order."9
In addition, the Minister must provide Parliament with a statement of the
reasons for the order according to the Act.'
2. Scope of Judicial Remedies
The main Article missing from the Human Rights Act is Article 13 which
states: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."'" However, the British government thought the inclusion of
this article would be redundant to the remedy section of the Human Rights
Act.92 The Parliament only wants the court to apply remedies which they think
are "sufficient and clear" and does not permit courts to fashion their own
remedies.93
Without the power for courts to award an effective remedy, citizens may
be forced to take their complaints to the European Court of Human Rights who
can in turn apply an effective remedy. Parliament wanted to keep the decision-
making power out of the hands of the judiciary. It wanted to keep the power to
make laws away from the unelected and the unaccountable judiciary.94
Therefore, courts and tribunals of limited jurisdiction will not be able to award
a remedy if it is not in their statutory power to do so."
Scholastic and informed commentators pressed for the inclusion of Article
13 in order to insure effective protection of Convention rights.9 However, the
government felt that inclusion of such an act would put a "wild card" in the
87. Human Rights Act, supra note 61, § 10(2).
88. WADHAm & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 50.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
92. E.g., 475 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 475; section 8 of the Parliamentary debate, which
provides remedies the courts can utilize for violations of human rights. Id.
93. Id.
94. WADHAM & MOUNTFID, supra note 8, at 11.
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. at 52.
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hands of the judiciary.97 The Parliament also felt that the judiciary, through
precedent of the European Court of Human Rights, could somewhat apply
Article 13."
Given Parliament's failure to incorporate Article 13, it is not clear how the
Human Rights Act intends "just satisfaction" to be afforded in cases where the
breach of the Convention is a consequence of a statutory provision." The only
hope is for the government to take steps to act in compliance with the
Convention to avoid a declaration of incompatibility. Otherwise, the applicant
must to go to the European Court of Human Rights to obtain an effective
remedy. "
C. The Executive Branch and its Control
Originally, the Human Rights Act provided that the executive branch could
make corrections to Parliament's breaches of human rights.' ' However,
Parliament amended this section in order to keep absolute sovereignty. It
wanted to avoid the excessive use of provisions King Henry VIII created, which
empowered the executive branch to legislate without reference to the
Parliament.0 2 Under such acts, the executive branch has the power to repeal
acts of Parliament.10 3
The consequence of this amendment is that a declaration of incompatibility
may go by unnoticed and unchanged for a long period of time in the
Parliament.'04 The questionable statute might also go untouched if it relates to
an unpopular group or a controversial cause. 0 5 Therefore, the amendment has
the hidden effect of weakening the structure of the Human Rights Act by
making it less likely that people will bring actions for violations of human rights
seeking a declaration of incompatibility. It is precisely this domination of
majority over minority's interests that the Human Rights Act is designed to
prevent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Human Rights Act has been a long-awaited and cautiously anticipated
action from the Parliament. There are many pros and cons to the enactment of
97. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 52.
98. Id.
99. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 47.
100. Id.
101. WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 8, at 48.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
Kitterman
a written human rights act. Some citizens have been eagerly awaiting the arrival
of their new guaranteed rights. 06 However, some citizens criticize that a written
form of fundamental rights is not necessary because the written document will
not change and evolve like unwritten laws. 0 7
The overall concern, however, is that although Parliament has taken this
unprecedented step in incorporating human rights into domestic law, it has kept
its sovereignty. It will not give the British courts the power to use its judicial
discretion, and it therefore denies citizens an effective remedy when the courts
consider a statue is simply "incompatible with the Convention." The end result
is that if a citizen is looking to have a declaration of incompatibility, then there
is no need to waste time in the domestic courts. Taking the case to Strasbourg
would better serve the injured party.
Since October, the Human Rights Act only effected 45 of the 87 cases tried
in the British courts." 8 Additionally, 67 of the 87 cases received no remedy
from the British court. 10 9
The European Court of Human Rights offers more beneficial remedies than
the remedies offered by the Human Rights Act. In particular, it offers claims for
damages if the government has failed to properly give effect to European law.
In contrast, the Human Rights Act expressly excludes the possibility of damages
for failure to legislate.
The solution to providing an effective Human Rights Act in the United
Kingdom is twofold. First, Parliament must relinquish some control over
statues that the British courts find incompatible with the Convention. Second,
the Parliament and citizens must have some faith in the judiciary and allow it
to provide the effective remedies as set forth by the Convention in domestic
courts. When there is a compromise, there will truly be human rights in the
United Kingdom.
106. STOTT AND FELIX, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (photo. reprint 2000).
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108. King's College London: The Human Rights Act Research Unit Monitoring the Human Rights
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